TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF POWERS U-2 INCIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002200030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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AF IN 49515 - Dept. of Air Force
Outline of Board Inquiry
Picture of U-2 Wreckage
Picture of Khrushchev and Aides
Picture of Wreckage
Picture of Khrushchev and Wreck.
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Board of Inquiry Attachment A
Exhibit # 1
Exhibit # 11
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SET OF QUESTIONS
Index for Tapes
Index for Trial of The U-2
Index for Board of Inquiry
1 box of Index Cards
USAF review(s) completed.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
27 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Technical Analysis of Powers U-2 Incident
1. Pursuant to the request contained in the memorandum of
your General Counsel, subject as above, dated 23 February 1962,
and the verbal instructions of the Secretary of the Air Force, the
1 May 1960 Powers U-2 flight was analyzed using the information
available within the Central Intelligence Agency and the United
States Air Force.
2. Qualified Air Force specialists in aircraft structures,
intelligence, and operations were assembled in Washington on
23 February 1962. They were organized into three groups and as-
signed tasks in their areas of competence. These were (1) Opera-
tional Procedures Group, (2) the Aircraft Structures Group, and
(3) the Intelligence Group. Selection of these specialists was
made to take advantage of a combination of their knowledge of U-2
operations in general, the U-2 incident specifically, both specific
and general Air Force intelligence, and aircraft structural engineer-
ing analysis. There is attached a short statement by each member
which sets forth the basis for his particular qualification for
participating in this technical analysis.
3. Each group was instructed to make technical findings and
submit separate reports based on ascertainable facts from the
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 testimony, engineering data, interrogations, photographs, reports,
and collateral intelligence furnished to us by your Agency or from
Air Force files. The Air Force officer commanding the detachment
to which Powers was attached, the briefing officer for the mission,
and the backup pilot for the flight in question were available for
technical advice.
4. The findings of each group were carefully examined by the
senior military member of the other two groups; there are no in-
consistencies and the reviewing officers agree with all the findings.
5. The attached reports and findings of each group are self-
explanatory. Except for the question raised by the NSA evaluation
of recovered Soviet tracking, the technical analyses support the
plausibility of Mr. Powers' description of his flight and subsequent
descent.
United States Air Force
d IgI;,,A?NGHARD
Lieutenant General
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INDEX OF ATTACHMENTS
Tab A - Memorandum, subject - Technical Analysis of Powers U-2
Incident, dated 23 February 1962.
Tab B - Report of Aircraft Structures Group.
Tab C - Report of Operational Procedures Group.
Tab D - Report of Intelligence Group.
Tab E - Biographical Statement of Team Members:
Operational Procedures Group
1. Lieutenant Colonel Sidney W. Brewer
2. Major James R. Bedford, Jr.
3. Captain Charles B. Stratton
Aircraft Structures Group
4. Mr. Sydney Berman
5. Mr. William B. Miller
6. Major Hunter W. Anderson
7. Captain Don Seehafer
Intelligence Group
8. Major Harry N. Cordes
9. Major Joseph R. Peartree
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
23 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General W. H. Blanchard
The Inspector General
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.
SUBJECT: Technical Analysis of Powers - U-2
Incident
In accordance with our understanding with Secretary of
the Air Force Zuckert, the Director of Central Intelligence
desires a technical analysis by appropriate Air Force personnel
to determine insofar as is possible what happened to the U-2
Powers was flying on May 1, 1960, which caused its descent
and what the circumstances of the plane' a descent were.
Specifically, the Director desires an opinion of the Air Force
personnel involved as to whether, based on all the information
available, statements made by Mr. Powers appear to be
consistent with the facts and if not what alternate theories
or conclusions appear to be best supported by the evidence.
I understand you will be responsible for coordinating this
analysis and furnishing a report thereon to the Director of
Central Intelligence.
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
STAT
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REPORT OF THE STRUCTURES GROUP
1. Scope of Group Examination
Examined photographs, drawings, handbooks, stress reports,
U-2 accident reports, and statements by Mr. Powers.
Specifically, we examined this evidence to determine,
a. Why the aircraft came down,
b. How it came down,
c. At what altitude mission aborted,
d. Is evidence compatible with statements of Powers.
2. Findings
a. It appears that the aircraft broke up in the air.
(1) Failure of horizontal stabilizer resulting in nose
down pitching.
(2) Wing failure and subsequent breakup of the aircraft.
b. The evidence is compatible with Mr. Powers' statements
regarding the failure of the aircraft.
3. Areas included in the scope of this group for which a technically
substantiated finding has not been made:
a. The altitude at which initial failure of the aircraft occurred
could not be determined by the Aircraft Structures Group.
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4. Discussion, supporting facts, and references for findings:
a. The photographs show that the horizontal stabilizers failed
in an upward direction. Although the low design load factors
associated with the U-2 aircraft make it susceptible to a
number of factors which could induce structural failure, this
failure probably resulted from an applied load external to
the aircraft or its systems. Damage to the skin and structure
on the lower aft section of the fuselage is indicative of a load
applied from the right rear and below. This could have
resulted from ground impact, but more extensive frame
damage would have been expected if ground impact was the
cause of skin and frame separation. This is not inconsistent
with Mr. Powers' reconstruction of the incident. Loss of the
horizontal stabilizer undoubtedly caused the aircraft to pitch
down as stated by Mr. Powers. Photography shows that the
left wing failed in an upward direction. The direction of
failure of the right wing cannot be determined; however, we
are not so concerned with the direction of failure as we are
concerned with the fact that the wings did fail in the air.
From the photography, it appears that the aircraft broke
up even further, and this is consistent with Mr. Powers'
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statement concerning his report of seeing a tumbling object
while he was descending in his parachute.
b. References:
Photographs of the U-2 wreckage in Gorki Park, Moscow.
Basic Structural Loads Analysis Lockheed Report 11055.
Mr. Powersf statements.
5. Discussion regarding areas for which no findings are submitted.
a. Breakup altitude of the aircraft cannot be determined from
photography.
b. There is evidence that some damage was inflicted to parts of
the aircraft after ground impact. No conclusion is drawn as
to the source of this damage.
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Supplement to the Report of the Structures Group
A cursory analysis of the requirements to create the
overpressure required to fail the horizontal stabilizer suggests
that at 70,000 feet accuracies in the order of 100 - 150 feet
would be required with a. High Explosive warhead of the size attri-
buted to the SA-2 missile. The fragmentation at this close range
could be expected to show shrapnel damage at the rear end of the
fuselage. It is noted that there was no shrapnel damage at this
part of the wreckage. Intelligence analysis has indicated that
a very narrow dispersion pattern of fragmentation is probably
associated with the SA-2 which could perhaps be consistent with
the shrapnel holes noted in the right wing and not in the tail.
At very high altitudes the components of the fuel and High Ex-
plosive composition could be expected to create an orange glow.
The proximity required to create the overpressures nevertheless
does suggest a greater awareness of explosion by the pilot than
was reported.
A nuclear equipped warhead could more readily have created
the overpressures. It is noted that there is no collateral in-
telligence to support the possibility of a nuclear warhead;
however, this possibility does exist.
Both of these matters require more detailed analysis and
all of the above must be considered as provisional.
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REPORT OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES GROUP
1. Scope of Group Examination:
This group reviewed the debriefing tapes of Francis Gary Powers,
the available Board of Inquiry reports, maps, photographs, and
other collateral data relating to the operational aspects of
this particular mission.
2. Findings:
a. Major structural failure was induced by an unknown causes
b. It appears that the aircraft failed to the extent that
elevator control was lost, causing an uncontrollable
descent that exceeded aircraft structural design limits
and resulted in subsequent disintegration of the airframe
c. It is the opinion of the operations group that the aircraft
descended in a near vertical path from the position at which
the break-up occurred,
d. Powers' description of his flight and subsequent descent
was consistant with accepted techniques and procedures
and the experiences of other U-2 pilots.
3. Discussion and Supporting Facts for Findings:
a. Major structural failure was induced by an unknown cause. Five
possible reasons for this structural failure were considered.
These are: Soviet defensive action, pilot technique, auto
pilot malfunction, clear air turbulence, and physiological
factors, each of which is discussed separately below.
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(1)
(2) The probability of the aircraft being allowed to nose
down and pass through the limiting mach number because
of improper pilot technique is negated by the reasoning
of Major Bedford and Captain Stratton. These currently
qualified U-2 pilots have experienced many instances
of the aircraft entering the high speed buffet which
occurs prior to reaching the limiting mach. There is
little or no difficulty in recovering from this condition
even for inexperienced pilots. It is reasonable to
assume that a U-2 pilot with Mr. Powers' experience would
have encountered this condition many times previously
and would have readily recognized the onset of buffet.
(3) An auto pilot malfunction was considered to be the probable
cause of a U-2 accident on 2 January 1962. The malfunction
occurred at 68,000 feet and resulted in the aircraft
becoming uncontrollable and breaking up in flight. The
Ural
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description of events by the pilot of this aircraft
is -very similar to that of Mr. Powers from the point
where pitch control was found to be ineffective
through subsequent bail out. While it is considered
that an auto pilot malfunction Could have caused the
loss of the U -2p it is to be noted that Mr. Powers
stated throughout interrogation and in his testimony
that he was flying the aircraft manually at the time
of the incident.
(4) Clear air turbulence has been encountered from time
to time by U-2 aircraft at 65,000 to 70,000 feet of
such severity to cause concern for the safety of the
aircraft. No U-2 accidents have been attributed to
clear air turbulence; however, this could not be
positively ruled out as the cause of structural
failure. During the interrogation Mr. Powers reported
that the air was smooth, and his description of the
incident is not characteristic of an aircraft entering
turbulence.
(5) Physiological factors such as lypoxia, sudden illness,
or other physical disability could have caused loss of
control of the aircraft. Mr. Powers stated that he was
fully conscious throughout the entire incident to the
best of his knowledge. There is no evidence related
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to these factors other than Mr. Powers' statement and
the fact that he was under observation of a flight
surgeon prior to take off.
The operational Procedures Group was unable to identify
which, if any, of the above factors was the specific cause
of the major structural failure in the U-2,
b. Loss of elevator control would be an immediate result of
structural failure of any substantialpart of the horizontal
tail group. Such failure would result in loss of control
yoke back pressures similar in feel to that described by
Powers. The aircraft would nose over and rapidly gain
speed sufficient to fail the wing structure. Mr. Powers'
statements concerning this portion of the events are almost
identical to those made by Colonel Jack Nole, 4080th SRW,
describing events occurring to him such as the rapid
acceleration, the inverted aircraft attitude, and the sequence
of egress.
c. Knowledge of four accidents involving break-up of the air-
craft at high altitude is the basis $or concluding that
the various parts descended to the ground in a near vertical
path. In each of these four accidents, the wreckage was
found below the point of occurrence and along a straight
line 8 to 10 miles long. (One collateral report stated
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that the wreckage of Powers' U-2 was scattered along a 15 KM
L8 miles7 line.) Photographs of the wreckage of Powers'
plane revealed that the wings of the aircraft failed at
approximately the some structural locations as in the other
four accidents. The wings and some other lightweight parts
were in relatively good condition, suffering an almost
identical degree of damage as the other four aircraft; the
major difference noticed was the presence of multiple skin
punctures in the wings. No definite theories as to what
caused the punctures are advanced by this group.
d. The members of this group found from reading the debriefing
of Mr. Powers that his statements relative to operational
procedure, technique and sequence of events were consistent.
Following is some of the reasoning for arriving at this con-
clusion:
(1) Mr. Powers' detailed description of the sequence of
events during the break up of the aircraft and subsequent
bail out are consistent with those related by other pilots
who survived high altitude U-2 aircraft break up. A U-2
break up accident occurred from about 68,000 feet on
2 January 1962. The pilot, Captain Charles B. Stratton
related the sequence and sensations of the events almost
identical to Powers' description.
(2) The variation from the intended flight path while flying
over weather and the correction made when breaking into
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the clear is entirely reasonable. With the existing check
points in the area, visual pilotage navigation would have
been easily accomplished. It is, therefore, concluded
that Mr. Powers was capable of being in the geographical
position that he reports. (A position error of one to
two miles is considered a normal limit of error.)
(3) Procedures described by Mr. Powers in aircraft operation
and mission accomplishment are entirely consistent with
recommended techniques, for example
(a) His statement concerning being 20 to 30 miles off
course after having flown over weather for a long
period of time is a normal occurrence and considered
within the normal limitations of dead reckoning
navigation.
(b) The reported problems he experienced with the Mach
sensor and autopilot are not too infrequent in the
U-2. His stated decision to continue his mission
by manual flying is reasonable since return to
departure base would have required approximately
the same flight time as to complete the mission.
(c) His description of events during the mission was
stated using different words atmany different periods
during the debriefing interrogation, but no incon-
sistencies in his reported experiences and actions
were noted.
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Discussion regarding areas for which no finding is submitted:
A factual determination of the altitude of Mr. Powers' aircraft
at the time of the event causing descent could not be made
by this group. However, the events described by Mr. Powers
relative to aircraft gyrations, "G" forces, difficulty in
escape, and pressure suit inflation are consistent with facts
obtained from other cases of U-2 aircraft break up which resulted
from loss of control at. altitudes in the area of 65,000 to 70,000
feet.
enrT
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REPORT OF THE INTELLIGENCE GROUP
1. SCOPE OF GROUP EXAMINATION
The Intelligence Group was responsible for examining all available
intelligence pertaining to the incident, providing findings, and recommend-
ing areas requiring further long-term analysis.
2. FIN DINGS
a. The Intelligence Group was unable to establish what factor pre-
cipitated the events leading to the destruction of the U-2.
3. DISCUSSION, SUPPORTING FACTS, AND REFERENCES FOR FINDINGS
a. There is no factual information that the Soviets had prior knowledge
of the 1 May 1960 mission;
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In addition, May Day is a major Soviet
holiday involving the virtual stand down of all Soviet military
flight activity. This does not imply any state of unreadiness
on the part of Soviet air defenses; however, this reduction in
air traffic would tend to make an unidentified aircraft more
conspicuous. All preparations for this mission were apparently
normal with the exception that the mission was launched 29 minutes
late. This had no significant effect on the mission.
Fnroute to the Sverdlovsk area several factors occurred. First,
Eli
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(1) Mr. Powers stated that he had just completed a turn to
the right and back to the left so as to properly align
the U-2 with the briefed track.
(2) Shortly after rolling out and establishing the aircraft on
track, Mr. Powers stated that he "sensed" an explosion
and noted what he described as a "forward boost".
(3) At approximately the same time, Mr. Powers reported
glancing upward and seeing an orange glow.
(4) At this time, Mr. Powers described a series of events
including loss of elevator control and subsequent bailing
out of the U
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Evaluation of Mr. Powers' description of the incident and all
other available information does not permit a positive determi-
nation of what caused the events described by Mr. Powers im-
mediately above.
c. Mr. Powers stated that the incident occurred after he had rolled
out on his planned track. He estimated his position to be 20-25
miles southeast of Sverdlovsk.
Top
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIDNEY W. BREWER, 49274A
Plans and Programs, Directorate of Systems Management
Aeronautical Systems Division
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
From 1955 to the present date I have been assigned to Wright-
terson Air Force Base as Chief of the Air Force U-2 Procurement
Pat
Program. In this assignment I became most knowledgeable of the
U-2 aircraft design, construction, and operational environment. I
have personally inspected and participated in the investigation of
more than twelve U-2 major accidents. Many of these accidents
involved break-up of the aircraft at very high altitudes for unknown
reasons (similar to the incident in question).
I am forty-two year s old and have approximately twenty year s
service in the Air Force. I was a fighter pilot in World War II and
have served as an operations staff officer. I am a command pilot
and have approximately 3300 hours military flying time and am
current in jet aircraft.
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MAJOR JAMES R. BEDFORD, 24549A
4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas
I have 910 hours flying time in the U=2, approximately 50% of this
time was accumulated in the performance of photographic reconnaissance
runs similar to the ones of the mission in question. I have flown four
missions along the Soviet Siberian periphery; two of these were in 1959
and two were in 1960.
I have had considerable experience flying the aircraft without the
use of the automatic pilot. I flew one mission of about eight hours
duration without the automatic pilot and this mission consisted of
photographic reconnaissance runs and a celestial navigation leg. I have
experienced engine flame outs at feet and lower, and on numervu.o
occasions I have exceeded the limiting mach number.
I served as a U-2 standardization pilot for seventeen months and
have extensive experience in the evaluation of crew performance and
reliability.
I am thirty-eight years old and have been in the Air Force continu-
ousl since 24 October 1941. My total military flying time is approximately
y
4, 500 hours which has been predominately in fighter type aircraft.
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CAPTAIN CHARLES B. STRATTON, 24284A
4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas
I bailed out of a U-2 on the night of 2 January 1962. Portions of my
experience were very similar to Mr. Powers' experience. The bailout
was manual (no ejection).
I am thirty-two years old, have been in the Air Force eleven years
and have approximately 500 hours flying time in the U-2. My total
flying time is about 3000 hours, mostly in single-engined fighters with
some time in the RB-57D.
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SYDNEY D. BERMAN
Technical Director
Directorate of Flight Safety
Norton Air Force Base, California
I am presently Technical Director of the Directorate of Flight
Safety, Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force.
During the last seventeen years while employed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board and USAF, I have investigated approximately 200
aircraft accidents.
I graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
in 1927 with a Bachelor of Science degree. Since, then, I have been
actively engaged in all phases of aeronautical engineering and allied
sciences. Some of my positions have been: Project Engineer of the
Sikorsky S-41; Assistant Chief of Aerodynamics and Structures,
Fairchild Aviation Corporation; Structural Engineer, Civil Aeronautics
Administration; Chief of Structures, Preliminary Aircraft Design,
Bureau of Aeronautics; Chief of Technical Section, Bureau of
Safety Investigation, Civil Aeronautics Board.
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WILLIAM B. MILLER
Chief, Structures and Air Environment Division
Aeronautical Systems Division
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Since 1940 I have been employed with the Air Force at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, in various capacities as a structural
test engineer. During my career with the Air Force I have taken part in
innumerable aircraft accident investigations and given opinions to investi-
gative boards concerning my analysis and opinion on structural failures.
I am a GS-15 Supervisory Aerospace Engineer, assigned to the
Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio. My specific assignment is that as Chief, Structures and Air
Environment Division. I was graduated from Purdue University in 1939
with a degree of Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering, majoring
in aeronautics. I have done graduate studies at Ohio State University.
Since 1952 I have been a member of the National Aeronautical and
Space Administration Structures Research Advisory Committee. Since
1955 I have been a member of the Structures and Materials Panel,
Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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MAJOR HUNTER W. ANDERSON, 17737A
AFCIN-2B5 Washington 25, D. C.
I was a member of the special Air Force Intelligence Board
convened in June 1960 to investigate the 1 May 1960 U-2 incident.
For approximately three years (1958-1960) at the Air Technical
Intelligence Center, I was charged with the responsibility and spent a
considerable portion of my time making studies on the survivability of
the U-2 in the Soviet Air Defense environment.
I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering
and approximately 6, 000 hours flying time. I have used this background
as an intelligence analyst for the past five years specializing in fighter
aircraft.
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CAPTAIN DON SEEHAFER, 27727A
Advanced Plans and Programs Group
Directorate of Systems Management
Aeronautical Systems Division
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
For over three years I have been exclusively assigned to the U-2
System Project Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
My duties have been in the engineering and maintenance responsibilities
for the U-2.
I am thirty-eight years old and have about fourteen years service
in the Air Force. I was graduated from the University of Washington in
December 1950 with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical
Engineering and received a Masterst Degree from Ohio State University
in 1961. I became an aircraft maintenance officer in 1951 and since
that time I have worked almost exclusively with fighter type aircraft.
I completed the aircraft structural design course at the Air Force
Institute of Technology in 1954. I was assigned as an aircraft
structural engineer, specializing in the design of aircraft, modifications
and structural repairs for about three years at depot level.
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Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200030001-6
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Approved For ReleT 0 @IET
I am thirty-nine years old and have twenty years service in the
Air Force. I am a senior pilot and a senior navigator with over 6000
hours flying time.
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Approved For Releas 103c TIA- DP80B01676 002200030001-6
U
 Approved For Rise SE11
MAJOR JOSEPH R. PEARTREE, 24582A
AFCIN-2
Washington 25, D.C.
For the past three years I have been intimately associated with
all USAF and special reconnaissance activities, particularly with respect
to Soviet Air Defense reaction and capabilities. I was a member of the
1960 special AFCIN board established to analyze the 1 May 1960 U-2
incident and I prepared the AFCIN study which reflected the opinions
of this board. I have been AFCIN project officer on the 1 May 1960
U-2 incident and the July 1960 RB-47 incident since they occurred.
I am thirty-nine years old, possess a Bachelor of Arts college
degree, have twenty years service in the Air Force and have approxi-
mately 2900 hours flying time as a pilot.
Approved For Release 2003/07/31
TOP SECRET
I
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25X1
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Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200030001-6