MEMO TO THE RECORD FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120005-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 13, 2007
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 25, 1962
Content Type: 
MFR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120005-6.pdf57.36 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120005-6 ? ? 4-- 25 June 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - Special Group (5412) Col. Steakley, speaking for the Secretary of Defense, presented a very extensive plan for aerial reconnaissance of Communist China using RF 101s for coastal and short penetration missions and U-Zs for longer missions which would extend throughout China. There were no flight patterns for the U-2 flight; however, Col. Steakley did have a map of targets which conformed to the COMOR target program which was subsequently presented to USIB at the Special Meeting on Friday; and was approved and taken to higher authority and it was reported that he, too, approved the program. NOTE: In reflecting on these decisions over the week end, I feel that the COMOR Committee should make an intense study of the actual need of U-2 flights recognizing that each flight of a U-2 over China presents a very definite action and the possibility of an international incident. Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120005-6 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120005-6 0 40 This question was not considered by the Special Group in discussing Secretary McNamara's proposals; nor dealt with by USIB. However, we do have recent U-2 photography on a great many of the areas concerned with the Secretary of Defense. We should not fly deep penetration missions if they are duplicative of recent missions. At the earliest opportunity when weather permits, we should, in my opinion, run one or several missions along the coast line to observe possible concentrations of landing craft and other marine equipment; and also we should run shallow penetration missions over rail lines, marshalling yards, and other areas Point 6 might give us more specific information than we now have on the movement of troops and equipment into the Foochow military zone. JOHN A. McCONE Director JAM/ji Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120005-6