MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC. 10:00 A.M., OCTOBER 23, 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 23, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC.
10:00 a. m. , October 23, 1962
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these were approved.
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
should be contacted privately.
Action: DCI was requested to contact Fulbright, Russell,
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PRESENT: The President, Vice President, Secty. McNamara,
Secty. Gilpatric, Gen. Taylor, Mr. Bundy, 5ecty. Ball,
Secty. Johnson, Amb. Thompson, Attorney General, DCI
1. McCone gave a brief intelligence report as covered by the
attached documents. (De'scriptive note attached). Lundahl displayed
the most recent photographs and a map showing 97 per cent coverage
of the island.
2. Robert Kennedy stated that the question had been raised as to
why the situation was not reported earlier, what was wrong with our
intelligence. It was agreed that the rapidity with which the MRBM site
construction took place, and other events took place, accounted for
the suddenness of the findings and that the leadership and selected
Vinson, Halleck, Dirksen, and Hickenlooper, and
3. McNamara raised questions of when blockade proclamation
will be issued, become effective, and discussed plans for the intercept
of the first ship which would be the Kimovsk. It was decided that if
OAS acted on Tuesday, the proclamation would be issued, effective
Wednesday morning, October 24. Probably the first intercept would
be made on that day.
4. The President discussed the program, defending the steps
taken, stated earlier action would. not have been supported and would
not have shut off the possibility of missiles, emphasized that mobile
missiles cai~ come in at any time and be set up rapidly.
5. McNamara discussed several military actions, including
extension of tours of duty of Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and
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6. McNamara then raised question of reaction to firing on
a U-2, indicated pilots instructed to take evasive action. It was
decided that we would be immediately informed through JCS to the
Secretary of Defense and a prompt decision for retaliation would
then be made by the President. Taylor reported eight attack
aircraft are maintained in hot alert and can destroy SAM sites within
two hours or approximately the time that the U-2 would get back if
the attack on it failed. McNamara confirmed that air-sea rescue
was continuing. It was decided that if the President was not
available, McNamara would have authority to act.
Action: General Taylor agreed that he would take up and
confirm today CIA request that our representatives be stationed with
JCS planning staff and in the Flag Plot and in the JCS War Room.
If there is any delay on this please inform me so that I can again
communicate with Taylor.
?. McNamara noted that they had no air intercept capability
and would not attempt at this time to develop their plan of air intercept.
Action: It was requested that CIA and Defense carefully
analyze air traffic and report currently so that if there is a marked
build-up, the Committee will be advised and appropriate action can
be taken.
8. McNamara then presented the need for shipping, indicating
between 125 and 130 Merchant ships were needed to support an invasion
and that a few had been chartered as of yesterday. He felt perhaps
20 more could be secured promptly, but this would leave about I00
short, and this would involve extensive requisitioning. McCone
pointed out the serious consequences to American business, inter-
coastal and coast-wise shipping, the Northwest lumber industry,
et cetera, et cetera. McCone suggested consideration be given to
taking foreign flag ships on a bare boat basis. Defense was asked
to explore the possibility of temporary waiver of laws regulating
operation of foreign flag ships, et cetera, et cetera.
9. McCone and McNamara raised the question of low level
flights .
Action: Six flights were approved and General Taylor
ordered them off immediately. It was presumed that they will return
not later than 1:00 o'clock today.
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Action: It is very important that NPIC and DCI's office
receive prints at earliest moment. DDCI to follow. Also important
that if the photography is productive of new and more convincing
information, prints should be sent to Governor Stevenson at once.
10. The President raised question of security of our own
air fields in Florida during surprise strafing, etc. McNamara and
Gilpatric assumed responsibility.
11. After a brief discussion of communications Bundy stated
that subject under study by Dr. Wiesner, and urged State, Defense
and CIA communications specialists to contact Wiesner.
Action: Following meeting McCone, Wiesner,
met and reviewed the
system. Subject left for further discussion today.
Action: This whole problem is to be
followed up energetically by CIA with Wiesner and all appropriate
actions taken.
12. Secretary Ball reported Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy
felt they did not have enough information to make a convincing case
before the UN Security Council. They requested (1) a large map marked
in color, showing the actual locations of a few of the sites, possibly
one MRBM site, one IRBM site and one or two air fields; (2) pictures
of the sites showing progressive construction with dates indicated;
(3) indication, but not necessarily the numbers, of all of the sites;
(4) a pre-May 1, 1960 U-2 picture of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM site to
show similarity.
Action: The Committee left matter of disclosure to
McCone, despatch of Lundahl and Cline to New York for discussions,
and assistance in developing Stevenson's scenario. McCone
authorized items one, two and three above but refused item 4. Also
agreed transmit low-level product to Stevenson if same useful.
13. Bundy explained idea of creating a staff to support the
Committee indicating each member should have a working staff member,
details to be worked out later.
Action: DDCI should consider appropriate assignment after
conferring with State and Defense and determining their nominees.
This will be more or less full time and this staff man can handle Agency
representation and also support me.
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