MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1962. ALL
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100001-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 20, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 13, 1962
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100001-2.pdf | 73.34 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2003/d
C OB01676R001900100001-2
November 13, 1962
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NSC ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1962. ALL PRESENT
EXCEPT THE PRESIDENT.
Purpose of the meeting was to crystalize policy concerning
procedures to be followed in view of information received on
November 12th concerning the disposition of IL 28s and other matters.
Kuznetsov requested meeting with McCloy at 3:00 o'clock;
it was expected that this meeting might reveal Soviet position. In view
of this, no firm policy position was developed, although there was an
extended discussion of our position with regard to the IL 28s and also
the question of inspection.
It was agreed that the IL 28s must be removed, and if they
were removed, we could remove the quarantine. If the IL 28s are
not removed, then it was felt we could take several steps to exert
more pressure on Castro and the Soviets, and these would involve
a meeting of the OAS to restate their policy, a statement by the
President indicating non-compliance on the part of the Soviets,
economic measures by the OAS, and a tightening of the quarantine.
It was felt that one or several of these steps could be taken to extract
a commitment to remove the bombers. However, we should not make
a "no invasion" commitment unless appropriate measures for inspection
were agreed upon by the Soviets and Castro.
McCone took a strong position covering the points outlined
in attached memorandum of November 13th, warning against the
serious long term outlook for Cuba and indicating that he felt the
Soviets were trading on Castro's position and they/fn effect, could
dictate Castro's terms if they so desired. Meeting did not seem
disposed to go as far as McCone recommended, although the Vice
P
resident strongly supported this position.
The attached notes are pertinent. ^'z, . ... ..
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Also at a meeting on Monday, November the 12th at 5:30
in the White House with all present, Mr. Bundy outlined the substance
of a communication which had been received, expressing Khrushchev's
views in response to the exchange of letters of November 5th and 6th.
It was decided that the communication needed study and hence its
receipt was noted and a meeting arranged for the following day.
The attached notes are pertinent.
John A. McCone
Director
Approved For Release 2I F DP80BO1676R001900100001-2
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