INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP (REVISED), DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 26, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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26 November 1962
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MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
Inspector General's Report on Handling of
Intelligence Information During the Cuban
Arms Build-Up (Revised), dated 20 November
1962
REFERENCES : A. Subject report
B. Memo for the Special Group from Thomas
A. Parrott, dated 11 September 1962;
Subject: "Reconnaissance of Cuba"
I I
C. Memo for A/DCI from James Q. Reber
dated 9 September 1962, Subj ect: "Next
U-2 Mission Over Cuba"
1. On 21 November you asked me to consider two additional
conclusions for my report.
a. That the U-2 incidents in Sakhalin and China had
caused a timidity in CIA and the intelligence community
which affected the planning of Cuban overflight reconnaissance.
b. That CIA analysts failed to give sufficient weight to
ground observer reports indicating offensive weapons in Cuba
and that this lack of credence dulled CIA alertness to the
threat.
2. As a result of the U-2 incidents in Sakhalin and China,
extreme caution did exist in the community, which affected the
planning of Cuban overflights. This caution was expressed by the
Secretary of State at the 10 September 1962 meeting in Mr. Bundv's
office (Reference B).
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3. We have been told by several Agency officers that there
was a widespread understanding in CIA that overflights of known SAM
sites were forbidden by the Special Group. I believe this understarFelirtig
stemmed from the desires which Secretary Rusk expressed at the
10 September 1962 meeting in Mr. Bundy's office which was not. in fact
a duly constituted meeting of the Special Group. However, the records
do not reveal that CIA pressed for additional missions or changes in
coverage of overflights approved for September 1962.
4. The result of the Secretary's concern was the decision to
give CIA approximately what it asked for in the way of overflight
coverage but to require four flights instead of one in order to keep
overflights separate from peripheral flights.
5. The aim of the mission for which CIA sought approval was
a search for more SAM sites
(Ref. C., paragraph 1.)
Targeting for the requested mission was based on evidence available
on 10 September. The approvals granted were responsive to this
aim. CIA had authority for four missions, and they were flown as
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rapidly as weather permitted. I reports suggesting 25X1
offensive missile preparations began to come in on 20 September,
but there were not enough of them to permit sound analysis on which
to base new targeting until after 1 October.
6. Because of bad weather, the first mission after 10 Seoteniber
to bring back readable photography was flown By 25X1
this time you had returned to Washington, and it was due to your reuse it
to the State Department that the] mission was allowed to 25X1
7. If the single mission proposed by CIA on 10 September had
been approved it could not have been successful) flown until at leas.
because of weather. (Al mission was flown-
but the photography was useless because of cloud cover). Even if a
mission had been flown on
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that date was probably too early for the detection of MRBM pre, arat o
as was also possibly
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reports accumulate which showed need for re-coverage of 25X1
Cuba, which had not been photographed sincel This need 25X1
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was recognized in the COMOR recommendations of 5 October which
flight. (Ref. A, Annex D)
9. As noted in Paragraph 2, above, and as documented in
Reference B, caution on the part of the Secretary of State did affect
planning of overflight reconnaissance of Cuba from
The effect was this: splitting the proposed
mission into four separate segments lengthened the period of time
necessary to accomplish the approved program. Weather further
contributed to this delay. The period of time during which the
western part of Cuba was not covered by aerial photography was
greatly lengthened.
10. Therefore I am adding the following conclusion as
Paragraph 121, d., of my report:
d. That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights.
following the incidents in Sakhalin and China, affected tI e
planning of Cuban reconnaissance overflights during
D
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11. In paragraphs 74 et seq. of the 20 November Inspec-.or
General report (Ref. A), we said that some CIA officers found :he
reports of offensive build-up hard to believe. In
paragraphs 85 et seq. we cited one example in which editorial
interpretation intruded at the reporting level. In one of our corgi -
clusions (para. 121. b. ), we stated that analysts were skeptical of
CIA reporting. I believe the evidence justifies our strengtheni -tg
this conclusion.
12. Paragraph 121. b., of the 20 November report stated
(we conclude):
b. That limited use was made of the information availah';e
because of publication restrictions, aggravated by coordination
problems, and because analysts were skeptical of CIA repor -_r ;.
We are replacing this sub-paragraph with the following:
b. That limited use was made of the information available
because of publication restrictions, which were aggravated by
coordination problems, and, because officers, in CIA as well
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that this skepticism may have delayed the community's
realization of the true significance of the Cuban arms
build-up.
13. A page incorporating the new sub-paragraphs has been
placed in your copy of the report.
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Insp for General
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C-O-P-Y
11 September 196
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba
At a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office yesterday, attended by the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director :)f
Central Intelligence and others, the Secretary expressed concern a:
the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive .periphera3
coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in
one flight. He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts
and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to
fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the
necessit of obtaining vertical coverage
unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters.., wit'i
actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight
would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the
aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred? thi;H
would put the U. S. in a very poor position for standing on its rights
to overfly international waters.
He felt, however, that i is
Taking these views into account, the Agency plans to break this
proposed coverage into four part
Within this framework, higher authority gave approval th?s mcrnrng
for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority
is currently outstanding. (Priority will be given to the two overflig t ~ . )
/Signed/
Thomas A. Parrott
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Qilpatric
General Carter
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9 September 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Next U-2 Mission Over Cuba
1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has now
reviewed the information obtained from the last U-2 reconnaissance
I Unfortunately weather precluded photography
Z. The Committee recommends that another U-2 mission be
flown as soon as weather permits to cover
targets mentioned above and identified on the attached map.
/signed/
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissan :e
l-A/DCI
2-A/DCI
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