ADDITIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 28, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676RO01800060003-6
TOP SECRET
28 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Additional Inspector General Conclusions
on Cuban Arms Build-up
1. You have asked what additional conclusions we have reached
since starting on the report to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
2. The conclusions stated on Page 41 of our report to yca
are as follows:
a. That, with a few minor exceptions, intelligence
information on the Cuban arms build-up moved rapidly to
those officers who needed it;
b. That limited use was made of the information
available because of publication restrictions, which were
aggravated by coordination problems, and, because officers,
in CIA as well as other agencies, were skeptical of refugee
and agent reporting, that this skepticism may have delayed
the community's realization of the true significance of tie
Cuban arms build-up;
c. That the estimative process failed because the
estimators were unprepared to believe that the Soviets might
install offensive weapons in Cuba or that they would grossly
underestimate United States ability to detect an offensive
build-up and to react to it with forthright resolution; an=--l
d. That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights.
following the incidents in Sakhalin and China, affected the
planning of Cuban reconnaissance flights during September 1962.
3. During our work on the report to the President's Board, wt
have formed some supplementary and additional tentative conclusio is.
TOP SECRET
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They follow:
a. Prior to early October, concern over the possibility
of an offensive threat in Cuba came to a focus only in the
person of the DCI acting as an individual intelligence officer.
Publication of intelligence on offensive possibilities might
have spread a more timely alarm.
b. The full force of the DCI's concern was never com-
municated to intelligence analysts.
c. The ban on publishing intelligence about offensive
weapons in Cuba had several bad effects. Among them were:
(1) It inhibited analysis because, though the
analysts were not denied access to raw information on
offensive capabilities, they were not obliged, were in
fact forbidden, to turn it into published intelligence.
Because there were no publishing deadlines to face in
dealing with this information, analysis may have been
delayed. Analysis was fragmented by compartmentation
due to the publishing ban; analysts in the various offices
and agencies had the same raw information to work on,
but they were deprived of a common forum for discussion
of it.
(2) The Unified and Specified Commands did not
receive intelligence (as distinguished from raw informationi)
on the offensive build-up because of the publishing ban and
because of the which was imposed on
13 October. These commands were responsible fo:u con-
tingency planning and were charged with operational
responsibilities with respect to Cuba. These comrmanders
were called to Washington and briefed on 16 October.
d. There had been many reports of offensive missile activity
in Cuba, none of which had been substantiated and many of vtwhh.irh
had been disproved. Intelligence officers had therefore become
skeptical of such reporting.
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676RO01800060003-6
e. What the Soviets were doing in Cuba was unprecedent
They had never done it before. Many intelligence officers,
accustomed to predicting the future on the basis of the pr3st,
simply believed it couldn't happen. This view was not lirnited
to the estimators.
f. The community had come to place over-reliance on its
technical tools. The result was a reluctance to believe the
reports of ground observers without hard photographic evidence-
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InspWctor General
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B0l676R001800060003-6
28 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Additional Inspector General Conclusions
on Cuban Arms Build-up
1. You have asked what additional conclusions we have :reached
since starting on the report to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
2. The conclusions stated on Page 41 of our report to you
are as follows:
a. That, with a few minor exceptions, intelligence
information on the Cuban arms build-up moved rapidly to
those officers who needed it;
b. That limited use was made of the informatics
available because of publication restrictions, which were
aggravated by coordination problems, and, because officers,
in CIA as well as other agencies, were skeptical of refugee
and agent reporting, that this skepticism may have delayed
the community's realization of the true significance of the
Cuban arms build-up;
c. That the estimative process failed because the
estimators were unprepared to believe that the Soviets might
install offensive weapons in Cuba or that they would grossly
underestimate United States ability to detect an offensive
build-up and to react to it with forthright resolution; and
d. That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights.
following the incidents in Sakhalin and China, affected the
planning of Cuban reconnaissance flights during September 1962.
3. During our work on the report to the President's Board, we
have formed some supplementary and additional tentative conclusion.;.
Copy
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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B0l676R00180006P003-6
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B0l676R001800060003-6
They follow:
a. Prior to early October, concern over the possibility
of an offensive threat in Cuba came to a focus only in the
person of the DCI acting as an individual intelligence officer.
Publication of intelligence on offensive possibilities might
have spread a more timely alarm.
b. The full force of the DCI's concern was never com-
municated to intelligence analysts.
c. The ban on publishing intelligence about offensive
weapons in Cuba had several bad effects. Among them were:
(1) It inhibited analysis because, though the
analysts were not denied access to raw information on
offensive capabilities, they were not obliged, were in
fact forbidden, to turn it into published intelligence.
Because there were no publishing deadlines to face in
dealing with this information, analysis may have been
delayed. Analysis was fragmented by compartmentation
due to the publishing ban; analysts in the various offices
and agencies had the same raw information to work on,
but they were deprived of a common forum for discussion
of it.
(2) The Unified and Specified Commands did not
receive intelligence (as distinguished from raw information
on the offensive build-up because of the publishing bat and.
25X1 because of the which was imposed on
13 October. These commands were responsible for con-
tingency planning and were charged with operational
responsibilities with respect to Cuba. These commanders;
were called to Washington and briefed on 16 October.
d, There had been many reports of offensive missile activity,-
in Cuba, none of which had been substantiated and many of which
had been disproved. Intelligence officers had therefore become
skeptical of such reporting.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B0l676R001800060003-6
 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B0l676R001800060003-6
e. What the Soviets were doing in Cuba was unprecedented.
They had never done it before. Many intelligence officers,
accustomed to predicting the future on the basis of the past,
simply believed it couldn't happen. This view was not limited
to the estimators.
f. The community had come to place over-reliance on its
technical tools. The result was a reluctance to believe the
reports of ground observers without hard photographic evidence.
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arma
Ins ctor General
TOP SECRET
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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676RO01800060003-6