REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCEADVISORY BOARD ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 97
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 14, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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EEPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
(14 April through 14 October 1962)
sa? "1116, IMMO
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REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES RELATING TO
THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-TJP (14 April through 14 October 1962)
BY THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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I. PREFACE
II. INTRODUCTION
III, COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS 4
IV. SOURCES AND COLLECTION FACILITIES 10
V. REPORTING ON THE BUILD-UP 18
VI. DISSEMINATION OF THE REPORTS 29
VII. PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 32
VIII. THE INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS 44
IX. THE ESTIMATES ON CUBA 54
X. CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN U-2 OVERFLIGHTS 60
XI. COMMUNITY ACTIONS, 14-22 October 1962 79
XII. CONCLUSIONS 88
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I. PREFACE
1. The Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board requested the Director of Central Intelligence to
prepare this report on 14 November 1962. To assist him in
preparing his report, the DCI appointed a committee with himself
as chairman consisting of the State Department's Director of
Intelligence and Research, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
2. The DCI appointed the Inspector General of CIA as
chairman of an interagency working group to conduct the review
and draft the report. Members of the working group were: the
Director of the Coordination Staff of the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research; a representative of the Office of
Estimates, DIA; the Chief of the DIA's Current Intelligence
Indications Center; the Deputy Chief of the Policy Division, NSA;
CIA's Deputy Assistant Director for Central Reference; and the
Executive Officer of Task Force W, CIA.
3. The working group drafted the report on the basis of
contributions provided by member agencies of the United States
Intelligence Board in response to a questionnaire circulated by
the working group.
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4. The report depicts the activities of the intelligence com-
munity with respect to the Cuban developments from 14 April 1962
through 14 October 1962, the day that offensive missiles were first
photographed in Cuba. It also summarizes the community's actions
from the latter date through 22 October 1962, the day of the President's
address to the nation on Cuba.
5. It discusses the collection requirements on Cuba which
were in existence before the period began and the ways in which
they were subsequently expanded and augmented.
6. It describes the sources of information available to the
community and the means used to exploit them.
7. It chronicles the receipt of information on the arming of
Cuba, its distribution, and the ways in which that information was
used.
8. Finally, it presents conclusions concerning the mariner
in which the intelligence community detected, watched, and reported
the first Soviet attempt to place offensive weapons in the Western
Hemisphere.
9. Unless otherwise noted, all dates in the report refer to
1962.
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II. INTRODUCTION
1. Information available today permits a tentative and
retrospective reconstruction of the principal steps in the arms
build-up. Between midsummer and fall of 1962 the Soviets
attempted, within a very short period of time, to convert Cuba
into a powerful strategic base.
2. These events were occurring in the environment of
Castro's police-state controls, reinforced by the Soviets own
security precautions, making their detection and reporting
difficult.
3. The attached table (Tab A) shows the phasing and
probable time sequence of the arms build-up. The map (Tab B)
shows the probable location of offensive and defensive missile
sites and armored units as of mid-October 1962. The chart
(Tab C) portrays the sequence of events, both as noted at the
time and as learned in retrospect, of the receipt of significant
information by the community, and of actions taken to get more
information.
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III. COLLECTION RE Q UIREME N T S
1. In late 1961 the U.S. Government made a decision to try
to find means to create in Cuba a new situation more beneficial to
the Cuban people and to U.S. interests. To provide the basis for
future policy, the intelligence community was instructed to
increase its intelligence and action capabilities. Between January
and March 1962 various actions were taken along these lines.
Among them were the following:
a. The CIA forecast for monthly overflights of Cuba
was raised from one to two overflights per month.
b. A plan was developed to systematize and regularize
the intelligence exploitation of refugee sources by the creation
of a debriefing center in the Miami area.
c. In an effort to capitalize on community assets work--
wide, plans were developed and action undertaken
(1) to increase the number of agents inside Cuba.
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Z. These actions, which had been given impetus by the late
19 61 decision to concentrate additional effort on the Cuban problem.
were begun prior to any indication of a massive Soviet arms build-up
in Cuba and were not related to it.
3. The period from the end of January to the middle of March,
when the above actions were getting under way, was too short a time
for any significant increase to be noted in the collection and processing
of more meaningful intelligence on Cuba. This fact was noted in the
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National Intelligence Estimate 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects
in Cuba, " of 21 March 1962, which clearly pointed out serious
intelligence deficiencies with regard to Castro's relations with the
Communists, popular attitudes toward the Castro regime, and
capabilities of the internal resistance movement.
4. Reviewing the estimators' preliminary findings on 14 Ma-ch,
a special group appointed by the President directed a continued
intensification of intelligence collection activities against Cuba in
My-- --ey
order to fill these gaps so that consideration of possible U.S. action
could be more appropriately made at the policy level. It was
anticipated at that time that by the end of July there would be a marked
increase in intelligence collection based upon the actions which had
been started in January and which now were being intensified in March.
5. While these actions had been started prior to the start of
the Soviet build-up, it was this series of actions which placed the
community in a position of readiness when the Soviet build-up began
in late July and early August.
6. To assist the Caribbean Admissions Center (CAC), (see
Section IV, para. 9), which the community had established in mid-
March at Opa-Locka Naval Air Station, near Miami, to screen and
interview the refugees coming to Florida from Cuba, CIA prepared
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the first edition of the "Interrogation Guide: Cuba". It was also
sent to intelligence officers throughout the world to assist them in
exploiting the knowledge of persons coming from Cuba or to brief
those going to Cuba from other countries. In May the community
produced a third and expanded edition of this guide for the use of
CAC and the community in general, including a section on guided
missiles. It is appended as ANNEX A.
7. By 14 April there were a number of lists of priority
requirements on Cuba, which had been coordinated by appropriate
USIB committees such as the Interagency Priority Clandestine
Collection Committee and the COMINT Committee. Each agency
had prepared requirements for its own collectors. Included among
the listed information needs were:
a. Bloc economic and military support.
b. Bloc arms and equipment deliveries (particularly
guided missiles, aircraft, and heavy armament).
c. Presence of Bloc personnel.
d. Training of Cubans in the Bloc.
e. Internal developments.
f. Economic programs.
g. Dissidence.
h. Cuban international activities and subversion
in Latin America.
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8. Member agencies expanded and refined these general
requirements to conform to their collection capabilities, as then
existing or as later improved to respond to developments. They
also levied requirements on each other in support of their own
departmental tasks. Requirements were generated by production
analysts who noted gaps in information holdings on Cuba or who
noted leads toward acquiring further information. Or they
resulted from requests for intelligence from higher staff echelons
and the combat forces.
9. The COMINT Requirements List had been issued in
November 1960. It was elaborated throughout the period under
review by specific requests to the National Security Agency by
other member agencies. The ELINT Requirements List was
updated and reissued in June 1962.
10. Community requirements generation and coordination
with respect to overhead reconnaissance came into focus in the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) which used
individual requirements from the community to prepare a Master
Target List.
11. The broad framework of requirements on Cuba which
was in the community's possession before the build-up was
comprehensive enough to include guidance for the gathering of
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information on missiles, though this was only one of a long catalog
of subjects on which information was desired. This framework was
sufficient to provide guidance for the collection of information on
the scope and pace of the Soviet arms build-up.
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IV. SOURCES AND COLLECTION FACILITIES
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16. Photographic coverage of Soviet ships going to Cuba,
from shore, from the water, or from the air, was greatly
expanded after the arms influx was detected,
coverage took place in the
The photographic
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\ A special community
requirement was fulfilled to ensure a steady and timely supply of
Cuban newspapers and periodicals for the use of analysts.
22. The community's overhead reconnaissance and photographic
interpretation facilities made a unique and indispensable contribution.
23. The greatest gap in coverage concerned information on
Soviet intentions and on Cuban compliance therewith.
24. However, the community's extensive knowledge of
Soviet order of battle and of the nature and appearance of Soviet
weaponry was of great value in interpreting the raw information
reports on the arms build-up.
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V. REPORTING ON THE BUILD-UP
1. During 1961 and early 1962 there were numerous reports
from ground observers about missile activity in 22 areas of Cuba.
The intelligence community, through its Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance (COMOR), requested the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC) to confirm or disprove these reports.
In publications issued in December 1961 and in February and March
1962, NPIC stated that there was no photographic evidence of
missile activity in any of the suspect areas.
2. Until August 1962 NPIC disproved almost all ground
observer reports that Soviet missiles or excessive numbers of
Soviet aircraft or submarines had been deployed to Cuba. The
few others could be neither disproved nor confirmed by photography.
Also during this period the findings of NPIC concerning the existence
in Cuba of conventional Soviet weaponry--such as tanks, artillery
and aircraft--were entirely consistent with other information
available on arms shipments through the first half of 1962.
3. The reporting of all types of information on Cuba from
the sources that have been described was massive, and it grew as
collection facilities were increasingly focussed on the arms build-up.
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5. Beginning in August an increasingly large fraction of
this total reported the secret arms influx and attendant activities.
Of this fraction, a smaller, but an even more rapidly increasing
portion referred to the introduction of defensive missiles. It was
not until shortly after mid-September that a few ground observer
reports began coming in, which were specifically descriptive or
suggestive of the introduction into Cuba of Soviet offensive weapons
(see para. 15 below).
6. Reports received and analyzed through the third week of
August described the arrival, during a brief time span, of several
thousand Bloc personnel and of an unusually large number of Bloc
ships carrying military cargoes. The reports further described
the security precautions observed in the unloading of these cargoes
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and in their transportation to construction sites, from which Cuban
residents had been evacuated. They indicated to the community
that the speed and magnitude of this influx of Bloc personnel and
equipment into a non-Bloc country was unprecedented in Soviet
military aid activities.
7. Furthermore, there was an increasing volume of
reports from all sources relating to other phases of the Soviet
military program in Cuba: deliveries of conventional aircraft
and other military gear, electronic devices, vehicles, and
construction materials; Soviet transport convoys; Soviet
encampments and personnel, including an imported labor force;
and military airfields and operations. The collection facilities
of all USIB agencies were producing such reports at a high
rate, placing an extreme burden on the analysts. In the four
months ending in mid-October the over-all community report-
ing on Cuba increased between three and four times.
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8. One factor that undoubtedly had an effect on both
the intelligence effort and the policy-makers was the lobbying
activities of the Cuban refugees, who were using every
approach they could grab to influence the United States
government to do something about liberating Cuba from
Castro. Their reports ranged from eye-witness accounts
to rumors and were so obviously biased that all exile refugee
reporting seemed to be regarded with strong reservations.
9 Between 31 May and 5 October, NPIC published
seven issues of Photographic Evaluation of Information on
ve
Cuba in which agent and refugee reportsAwere evatuated in
the light of available photographic evidence. Of the 138 raw
reports referred to NPIC in that period, only three cited
missile activity which could not be directly linked to SAM
or cruise missile deployments, and NPIC's evidence dis-
proved those three.
10. Ground observer reporting continued at an
increasing rate through September and into October.
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In the 30 days ending 22 August there had been only seven
agent or refugee reports about rockets or missiles, usually
colneA-e
referred to by the Spanish term Go-j-et-e-, which has a wide
range of meanings. In the next 30 days there were more
than 40. There were as many more received between
20 September and 14 October, a few of which referred to
large missiles (see para. 13 below). During this latter
period there were also six reports relating to IL-28's and
four relating to MIG-21's.
11. The reports of the Soviet build-up came from
every province of Cuba. They varied in content appraisal
and source evaluation. Many of them came from untested
original sources and unskilled observers. But, allowing
for inconsistencies or distortions in individual reports,
the mosaic picture that emerged was remarkably consistent:
(a) wide-spread and large-scale construction activity; (b)
convoys of Soviet trucks, frequently moving by night and
some with trailers carrying tubular objects;
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(c) new restricted military areas, from which Cuban residents had
been evacuated; (d) Soviet personnel supervising the unloading of
ships and the land transport of their cargoes; (e) frequent references
to missiles of various types and to the construction of missile sites,
and (f) evidence of almost exclusive Soviet or Bloc occupancy and
control of new military sites.
la. The photography from the 29 August U-2 mission showing
eight SA-2 sites (see Section X, para. 10) was the first firm evidence
of what the Soviets had begun in Cuba and of how far they had then
progressed.
13. From 14 April to 14 October there were
human-source reports on the arms build-up. Screening of these,
even in retrospect, reveals only a handful that can be related to
offensive missile activity, avkcl-e-F4-3,1---saa-s-1?nate4-in--pa-r-a-r49--b-elow-, -
In mid-September
there was no evidence of the Soviets intentions and no evidence
of the fact that strategic missiles had already arrived in Cuba.
Despite the known presence of a massive Soviet-manned SAM
defense, for the intelligence analysts, conditioned to the value
and importance of hard photographic evidence, strategic missiles
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were still in the realm of speculation. However, several reports
which began to reach the community after mid-September were
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In the case of
the refugee sources reporting this information, the delays in
receiving the information resulted from the refugee not becoming
available until he had left Cuba and had been processed by CAC
at Opa-Locka. Some of these key reports are summarized in
the following paragraphs.
as of 7 September
"a large zone in Pinar del Rio within a perimeter bounded by the
cities of San Cristobal, San Diego de los Banos, Consolacion del
Norte, and Las Pozas is heavily guarded by Soviets with the
assistance of Peruvian and Colombian nationals. Security is
enforced to prevent access to the finca (plantation) of Dr. Cortina,
at La Guira, where very secret and important work is in progress.
believed to be concerned with missiles." The Headquarters
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recipients added map coordinates and an explanatory note on the
Cortina plantation, derived from other available information, and
disseminated the report on 18 September. (This was the area
where U-2 photography first found MRBM's. See the fourth map
in Tab D.)
15.
having said on 9 September:
"We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface
and air-to-air. . . . There are also many mobile ramps for
intermediate range rockets."
16.
"We
will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have
everything including atomic weapons."
He reported observing in Havana, on the night of(1)September, a
convoy of Soviet trucks pulling long trailers carrying canvas-
covered objects which looked like missiles. He drew rough
sketches of the missile and tail fin silhouette. Shown a series of
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photographs by the interrogator, he identified the SHYSTER MRBM.
The report was disseminated on September.
18.
reported having observed there, on 2 September, 20 metal
cylinders, 45 to 50 feet long and about five f et in diameter, and
having later seen five of them being carrieditoward Santa Clara on
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trailers. The report was disseminated on 23 September.
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was driving
home from Havana on the night of 17 September when he encountered
a convoy of Soviet trucks traveling in the same direction and towing
32-foot trailers carrying huge tubes covered with canvas. Within
the next few days he left Cuba and was interrogated
The report was disseminated on 1 October.
20. On 1 October the
had observed "large intercontinental rockets", more
than 20 meters long, being unloaded on trailers from a ship at=
Mariel on 19 September. The report was disseminated on
2 October with a CIA Headquarters reports officer's comment
that "it is more likely that source observed SA-2 missiles being
unloaded."
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21.
in a report disseminated on
2 October, added more detail about activity at the port of Mariel.
In the following days reports of this type became more frequent,
both from refugees and agents, but some of those cited above,
together with supporting information available to the analysts,
were sufficient to develop the strong suspicion that offensive
missiles had been unloaded from Soviet ships and transported
to a fairly definite area near San Cristobal.
22.
However, once the weapons were
on their way, the intelligence community succeeded, in a very
short period of time, in discovering and reporting the facts.
Intelligence on shipping,
brought the first
indication of the arms influx and reported on its progress through-
out.
provided
significant information on the Soviet presence. Low-flying aircraft
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photographed ships carrying jet bombers to Cuba. Agents and
refugees provided the first indications of SAM's and later of
MRBM's. U-2 photography confirmed gound observer reporting
and supplied the ultimate hard evidence.
23. Throughout the period the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC) produced a steady flow of photo
interpretation reports in response to requests from community
members. Samples are appended as ANNEX K.
24. ANNEX B contains a selection of summaries of
raw information reports culled from the files of all USIB agencies
on the Soviet arming of Cuba. They were chosen for their
significance as it appears today, and therefore the selection is
obviously based on a perspective which was not available to
analysts at the times when the reports were received.
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VI. DISSEMINATION OF THE REPORTS
1. Raw information reports on the Cuban arms build-up,
like all such reports, were widely disseminated throughout the
intelligence community. The dissemination patterns, which have
been developed over a period of years, are based on a compilation
of the information needs of the various components of the intelligence
community.
2. Each collecting agency distributes its reports to certain
"standard" addresses. In some cases, this standard distribution
is a minimal one; however, in each case the basic distribution is
broadly supplemented on the basis of specific requirements for
particular types of information levied on each collecting agency
by every customer agency.
3. Although dissemination is made according to established
patterns, these patterns are highly flexible. Specific distribution
requirements can be (and were) added without disrupting the
disseminating mechanisms.
4. Reports that were handled through electrical channels
from the point of acquisition until they reached Washington moved
rapidly. Those that moved wholly or partially through non-electrLcal
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channels were necessarily slower. Much of the delay resulted from
factors over which the intelligence community had no control.
Refugee reports could not
be acquired until the refugees had managed to get out of Cuba.
5. From early September there was a restriction on publishing
intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba. This restriction did not
affect the flow of raw information to analysts nor to officials who
were included on the dissemination of raw reports. However, those
officials who did not see raw reports and who had to rely on published
intelligence could only receive this information through oral briefings
or other channels. The restrictions on publication are discussed in
Section VIII of this report.
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6. ANNEX C describes the dissemination practices of each
USIB agency engaged in foreign intelligence collection and traces
the progress of sample reports from the time the information
was acquired by the original source until it was received by the
intelligence analyst.
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VII. PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS
1. The composite of information reaching the analysts on
the Cuban arms build-up was unique in peacetime intelligence
operations. By the end of August the total volume of reporting
reaching the analysts had become a virtual deluge. Each of the
components of the intelligence community redirected its process-
ing and analyzing mechanisms to accommodate the increased
flow of reporting on Cuba.
2. The intelligence community was understandably cautious
in raising any alarm over the possibility of MRBM's in Cuba. The
time span was very short and the evidence was inconclusive. The
MRBM's probably did not arrive in Cuba before 8 September.
Because of the difficulty in getting communications out of Cuba,
the first reports suggesting the presence of MRBM's in Cuba did
not reach Washington until after mid-September. By 3 October,
the analytical process had funneled these reports into the targeting
mechanism, resulting in the 14 October 1.3-2 flight, originally
approved to activate a SAM site, being flown over an area where
MRBM's might be found. (See Section X, para. 34.)
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The SIGINT Effort
3. By the last quarter of 1961, increased requirements on
Cuba had already caused diversion of existing NSA resources to
the Cuban problem. By 14 April 1962, additional personnel had
been transferred from other tasks or hired from the outside.
This augmentation continued throughout the period under review.
NSA analytic and reporting personnel directly assigned to the
personnel were supported by personnel and facilities of the
collection management, machine processing, central reference,
and research and development areas of NSA, as well as by
processing and analytic personnel of intercept stations.
Additionally, processing and analysis in the Soviet production
areas at NSA
produced SIGINT relating to Cuba.
In effecting the build-up in Cuban processing and analysis within
NSA, the Director, NSA, was discharging his normal management
control responsibilities as a concurrent action to the SIGINT
collection build-up described in Section IV of this report. The
processing and analysis build-up required not only inputs of
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qualified SIGINT technicians, but also inputs of development
techniques, equipment, and management know how. As a
parallel action, the SIGINT effort on those target areas which
surrendered resources to the Cuba problem had to be managed
so that an acceptable level of SIGINT output continued. This
was accomplished to the satisfaction of the intelligence community.
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5. In addition to publishing intelligence information NSA
developed, well in advance of 14 October, numerous technical aids.
files and IBM listings which have been used extensively by SIGINT
production analysts as well as intelligence analysts of other depart-
ments and agencies. Typical was the large file on
State Department Analysis
6. Within the Department of State, the responsibility for
analysis on intelligence community matters rested with the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR), specifically the Office of
Research and Analysis for Soviet Bloc (RSB), the Office of
Research and Analysis for American Republics (RAR), and the
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Office of Current Intelligence Indications (RCI). Within RSB the
work was divided largely between two divisions:. Bloc International
Economic Activities Division and Bloc International Political
Activities Division. The work on Cuba in these divisions was
assigned to the most experienced intelligence research officers
available, one of whom had served for a considerable period as
principal analyst on Soviet-Cuban relations. INR officers drew
upon their own extensive files of previously accumulated intelli-
gence information from State and other agency sources; from
Soviet, Cuban and other publications; and from reports from
friendly embassies in Havana.
DIA' s Role
7. Within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), all reports
received from the various collection facilities were processed from
three particular but closely related points of view; namely, warn-
ing and indications of hostilities, significance of current trends
or new developments, and impact on estimates. The primary
responsibility for the processing of information to meet each of
these objectives was assigned to separate organization entities.
Clear lines of administrative and operational coordination were
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established to insure that each function was not performed in
isolation and did not retard processing to accomplish other
objectives.
8. From 14 April through early August the DIA analytical
mechanism operated using normal command lines. Thereafter,
the Latin American Section of the Current Intelligence Division
and the Latin American Division of the Estimates Office increased
the analytical coverage of the Cuban situation. During September
\ A e Lfzegl._
a Cuban Situation Room
with responsibility for the analytical processes on Cuba and the-
..c.r_ea.444941.--ai an associated Task Group to study the sophisticated
equipment introduced into Cuba. As a result of this realignment,
DIA was able to provide coordinated intelligence on the Svie.t )ctivi
Ca, 0? C---191.,421. LS? S?s
-13-lee-e-eruiprize-nt-a-nd-troop-s-at- any-heur of the day.
CIA Production
9. Analysis was performed in CIA by the Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI), the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and
the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) These offices were
organized to focus appropriate human skills on various specific
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scientific, economic, and geographic fields, with particular
emphasis on the Soviet Bloc and a high priority on Soviet weapons
systems.
10. Planning for an increased coverage of non-Soviet
offensive weapons systems was begun in early August; on
4 September a Non-Soviet Weapons Branch
was established in OSI. Although the branch
had responsibility for other areas, the primary effort was devoted
to the Cuban missile situation.
11. The Economic Research Area of ORR was engaged in
research on the production and deployment of Soviet missiles, on
the maritime transport of Soviet cargo, on analysis of internal
Cuban economic problems, and on Soviet assistance to non-Bloc
states--with Cuba being a major concern. By mid-August this
organization was fully involved with the Cuban build-up. The
maritime portion of ORR had been continuously involved with
deliveries to Cuba since the USSR first shipped quantities of
arms in the fall of 1960.
12. In the case of reports concerning missiles in Cuba,
both ORR and OSI were involved since it was necessary to determine
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the characteristics of the missiles being deployed as well as the
deployment pattern being followed.
13. OCI was engaged throughout the period in producing
summaries of current evidence on Cuban developments, making
evaluations of new developments in briefing memoranda in support
of the Board of National Estimates and the DCI, and maintaining
coverage of the Cuban situation in formal current intelligence
publications. The Cuban Daily and Weekly Summaries furnished
selected information to support clandestine collection in Cuba.
14. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)
played a most important role in the processing of intelligence
information and in the support of other intelligence processing
components. When new photography was collected over Cuba,
the initial photographic interpretation report was concerned
primarily with the photographic COMOR-established targets,
but also covered unforeseen items of interest discovered in
the photography. This initial report was prepared in the course
of one or two days. Subsequently, if working time permitted,
a Mission Coverage Index was prepared giving a detailed, frame-
by-frame description of what was shown in the photography.
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Summary
15. The volume of information from
was so great
and the detailed evaluation and analyses of this material required
such an outlay of man power that the intelligence community would
have been hard pressed to devote a similar effort to a similar
problem occurring in some other part of the world at the same
time.
Low-
altitude Navy photography provided a means of examination of deck
cargo only.
17. The earliest physical indication of a SAM system was
the identification on the decks of some early August arrivals of
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the types of construction and transport equipment called for in
the Soviet-Indonesian 1961 contract as part of a SAM system.
18.
Agent and refugee reporting, correlated with other
information, initially revealed ten locations of unidentified
Soviet activity. Photography of 29 August confirmed Soviet
activity at most of these points and showed over half to be
SAM installations.
19. Refugee and agent reports were especially useful
in establishing a chronology of events dealing with the eviction
of Cuban tenant farmers to make way for Soviet occupancy.
20. Despite suspicions generated by a long history of
false missile reports (see Section V, paras. 1 and 2), the
analytical system fed into the COMOR targeting program those
refugee and agent reports that helped lead to the photographic
discovery of the MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba.
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21. In sum, the analytic effort, using a variety of sources,
identified each of the major weapons systems introduced into Cuba
before the system reached operational capability. This could not
have been achieved without painstaking preparation of collection
guidance, continuity in following similar developments in other
areas, and meticulous attention to the hundreds of information
reports received.
22. Finally, any post-mortem of the U.S. intelligence effort
in. regard to the offensive missile build-up in Cuba must take into
account whether there was a planned Soviet deception program to
help cover their activities. There is little hard evidence on this
pro or con, and may never be unless there is a knowledgeable
Soviet defector, or Soviet files become available. However, we
know of the extensive activities of the Soviet "Disinformation"
bureau, which is charged with covert psychological warfare against
the West. We would also cite the frequent assurances by various
Soviet officials to U.S. policy-level officials that there would be
no offensive weapons placed in Cuba, and particularly the use of
one low-level Embassy official in Washington to allegedly carry a
personal message from Chairman Khrushchev to the Attorney General.
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VIII. THE INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS
1. The most immediate reflection of the intelligence analysts'
work appears first in current intelligence publications and later in
estimative papers.
2. The only fully and formally coordinated all-source com-
munity publication dealing with current intelligence is the weekly
USIB Combined Watch Report. It is not a comprehensive current
intelligence publication but rather presents community conclusinns
as to indications of hostile intent on the part of any Sino-Soviet
Bloc country toward the U.S. , U.S. forces abroad, U. S. allies,
or areas peripheral to the Bloc. It also examines situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Communist hostile action which
could jeopardize U. S. security.
3. Thus the Watch Report's content is confined to crisis
areas and situations on which the community needs to be kept informed.
Such topics are treated in the Watch Report only after they are Form..311,
placed on the agenda of the Watch Committee. On 21 August the USIB
Watch Committee placed Cuba on its agenda and initially asses ed
the situation at its 28 August meeting. Verbatim extracts on the: arms
build-up from this publication appear as ANNEX E.
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4. The most comprehensive all-source current intelligence
publication which is widely circulated in the community is the
Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), printed at about 0400 even, day
except Sunday. It is published by CIA after formal consultation with
representatives of the other community members.
5. From 14 April to 4 August there were only two Cuban
items in the CIB, On the latter date all-source intelligence on
shipping had led to the conclusion that "Soviet military aid deliveries
to Cuba may have been accelerated recently," and the CIB so stated.
6. Thereafter the CIB continued to report much of the
evidence as it came into the possession of the community, with
five other items in August, twelve in September, and six in the
first half of October.
7. The DIA Daily Intelligence Summary similarly reported
the Cuban military build-up and subsequent developments on an
all-source basis (extracts in ANNEX H).
8. Because of restrictions on publishing information con-
cerning offensive weapons in Cuba, there we re delays and gaps
in the published information (see paras. 19 through 27 below).
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For example, in early September printing of information about a nev1/4
kind of missile site in eastern Cuba was delayed until its nature
could be identified by a detailed study of U-2 photography, although
key officials with a need to know were kept informed.
9. The purpose of the restraint on publishing was to restrict
the information to those who needed to know it for purposes of
analysis and action. The effect was to concentrate the information
at the decision-making levels of the Government.
10. Within these restrictions, departmental current inteEli-
gence publications recorded the progress of the build-up. Among
those were the State Department's Diplomatic Summary (extracts
in ANNEX I) and the CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Review.
These, of course, reported Cuban matters along with intelligence
from the rest of the world.
11. CIA current intelligence publications dealing only with
Cuba require special mention. In March 1962 the Cuban Daily Summar T
and the Cuban Weekly Summary were established to furnish direct
support to officers responsible for clandestine collection operations
in Cuba. Although not originally created for that specific purpose,
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these publications reported in more detail than any others on the arms
build-up but they too were subject to the publishing restrictions. As
the community effort against Cuba gathered momentum their circu-
lation was broadened.
12. Extracts from the Current Intelligence Bulletin, the
Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and the two Cuban summaries
appear in ANNEX G. Also included are extracts from the Current
Intelligence Digest, the "Secret" counterpart of the CIB. (See
similar extracts in ANNEX H from DIA's secret level publication,
the DIA Intelligence Bulletin.)
13. Two CIA publications of rigidly limited circulation were
issued daily for the information of the highest policy levels of
Government. The President's Intelligence Checklist was brief
in content and produced only for the President, and with the
President's specific permission it was provided to Mr. McGeorge
Bundy, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and General Maxwell
Taylor. Because of its limited readership it was specifically
exempt from the restriction on publishing information about
offensive weapons in Cuba. However, it contained none because
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the information available, even after 20 September, was not hard
enough to permit the writing of a credible item. Checklist excerpts
dealing with Cuba are given in ANNEX D.
14. Cuban Highlights was established on 27 August because of
concern over the Cuban arms build-up and a desire to bring the
situation to the attention of policy makers. Its distribution was
broadened beyond that of the Checklist to include the Special Group
(Augmented). It was discontinued with the 19 September issue
because its content by then was duplicating that of the CIB. The
complete file appears as ANNEX F.
15. Based on current intelligence indications, USIB agencies
produced numerous departmental memoranda and briefing papers
dealing with special and general aspects of the crisis. Examples
of these are the State Department's Research Memoranda and
Intelliaence Notes, pertinent excerpts from which appear in
ANNEX J.
16. The various admonitions and restrictions that worked
to inhibit the flow of raw information into intelligence publications
require some explanation.
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17. Because of his reservations concerning Cuban order of
battle estimates, .Lthe DCI in May 1962 instructed analysts in CIA.
to check out with NPIC any report that was susceptible to photc-
graphic verification. Analysts in other agencies also made
extensive use of the NPIC facility. In mid-August the DCI briefed
the President on the increasing volume of refugee and agent reports
on the Soviet build-up in Cuba. The President directed that every
effort be made to check out these continuing reports. The DCI
instructed the DD/I to check every available source, particularly
including NPIC.
18. The instruction to use NPIC to check information
reporting was intended to verify by all available means the authen-
ticity of refugee and agent reports; however, the instruction came to
be interpreted by the CIA analysts as a restriction on publishing
anything that could not be verified by NPIC, and, with the exception
of an 18 August item suggesting the possibility of SAM site con-
struction., nothing susceptible to photographic verification was
published in the CIB, the Cuban Daily Summary or the Preside-It's
Checklist that had not been so verified. Thus, during the later
days of August when the SAM build-up was well under. way, an
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instruction to use all available analytical tools came to operate as
a limitation on publication.
19. The first instruction that intentionally restricted the
publication of information on the Cuban arms build-up was not
issued intil the end of August. On 29 August U-2 photography
first confirmed establishment of a missile defense in western
Cuba and also revealed a missile site in eastern Cuba,
the nature of which could not immediately be determined. On
31 August the President ordered USIB, through the Acting DCI,
not to allow publication of this information until U. S. policy-
makers had established a course of action. This initial
restriction was baloadened to allow analysts access to the
information. On 4 September the President announced the
presence of a missile defense system in Cuba. Thereafter the
community was able to publish information on SAM sites. The
information was published on 17 September
after detailed photo analysis had shown that site to be a defensive
cruise missile installation.
20. The restriction on publishing intelligence on offensive
weapons in Cuba was discussed in USIB executive sessions on
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7 and 13 September. USIB agencies were under injunction not to
print any such intelligence in any publication. Individual agency
instructions stressed that normal distribution of raw reports
was to continue. The CIA instruction specifically exempted
the President's Intelligence Checklist from the restriction and said
further that "any material which might ordinarily be thought to be
publishable on this forbidden subject" should be brought to the
attention of the Assistant Director for Current Intelligence.
21. The restriction was thus established just a few days
before reports of actual sighting of offensive missiles began to come
in from ground observers in Cuba None of this information,
indicative as it was of a qualitative change in the nature of the arrriE
build-up, appeared in intelligence publications, including the
President's Checklist, though it did go to analysts with a need to
know and was used in the targeting exercise which ultimately lcd
to the 14 October U-2 mission., (The information also was inc_uded
in briefingsfr and memoranda prepared by DIA for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.)
22. There was one exception to the restrictions. In early
October a shipment of IL-28 medium jet bombers arrived in Cuba.
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and the intelligence community had pictures
deck-loaded on ships to prove it. In order to publish this
information it was necessary to get White House permission
because of the offensive capability of this bomber. Permission
was granted and the information was published on 11 October.
23. Rowevci, AI the time this permission was granted
the President instructed the Director of Central Intelligence
to put into effect a system to ensure rigid control of information
on offensive weapons. A special USIB meeting on 11 October put
this verbal order into effect by establishing the
system effective 12 October.
24. The USIB implementation of the Presidential directive
provided that information or intelligence on offensive capabilities
in Cuba ". . . will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence
component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis
who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisors to the President
have a need to know" and that "there is no intent hereby, however,
to inhibit the essential analytic process. "
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25. The effect of this instruction was to limit dissemination
of raw information on offensive weapons in Cuba to USIB principals
only. Each principal was responsible for the handling of the
information in accordance with the criteria established above.
26. The
remained in effect until after the
President's speech on 22 October.
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IX. THE ESTIMATES ON CUBA
1. Before the discovery of strategic missiles in Cuba on
14 October the community had, in 1962, produced two National
Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and one Special National Intelligence
Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and one SNIE which dealt with Cuba in
the context of the Caribbean area. They were as follows:
SNIE 80-62, "The Threat to U.S. Security Interests
in the Caribbean Area," dated 17 January.
NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,"
dated 21 March.
NIE 85-2-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,"
dated 1 August.
SNIE 85-3-62, "The Military Build-Up in Cuba," dated
19 September.
2. Each of these estimates discussed the possibility of
Soviet use of Cuba as a strategic base, and each, including that of
19 September, concluded that the Soviets would consider the risk
of U.S. retaliation too great. The preparation and consideration
of each estimate involved wide community participation and
discussion. Many differing views were brought forward, but each
estimate was approved by the USIB without reservation.
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3. The problem with which the intelligence estimators were
faced was complex. It involved (a) over-all Soviet policy, including
Soviet policy with respect to the U.S. ; (b) Soviet policy in Latin
America; and (c) Soviet relations with Castro, Soviet purposes in
Cuba, and more specifically the military build-up.
4. Through long experience in estimating Soviet policy the
estimators had developed some sense of the limits within which the
Soviets might operate. Though there was less on the record with
respect to Soviet policy in Latin America as compared with other
parts of the world, until 1962 Soviet behavior in that area had been
consistent with practice elsewhere.
5. Estimates on the Soviet military build-up in Cuba were
based on three essential calculations:
a. That Soviet policy with respect to the U.S. was
to avoid the risk of a confrontation which would entail a
high degree of risk of losing Cuba or going to war;
b. That Soviet policy with respect to Cuba and Latin
America was designed to win a victory for communism by
other than conventional military means, and that the Soviets
considered that this policy would be compromised by the
establishment of a strategic base;
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c. That the Soviet military build-up in Cuba as known
to us before 14 October 1962 probably comported with these
policies.
6. Until 14 October the evidence on the military build-up did
not clearly indicate to the estimators that the Soviets would accept
the risks involved in deploying offensive weapons systems to Cuba.
The size and speed of the build-up and the obvious military advantage
the Soviets would gain from a strategic base in Cuba caused them to
examine this contingency in detail in preparing the 19 September
estimate. They concluded, however, that such an action would
involve an unacceptable degree of risk and would therefore be
unlikely.
7. The following are the conclusions of SNIE 85-3-62:
11a. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba
primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it,
and consequently that the main purpose of the present military
build-up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there
against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger
that the U.S. may attempt by one means or another to overthrow
it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by
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enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening
Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently
recognize that the development of an offensive military base
in Cuba might provoke U.S. military intervention and thus
defeat their present purpose.
"b. In terms of military significance, the current
Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and
coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political signifi-
cance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of
11 September, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the
continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent
discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The
threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent
that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at
home, it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in
fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America.
ilc. As the build-up continues, the USSR may be
tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to
be defensive in purpose, but of a more 'offensive' character;
e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of
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short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM' s). A decision
to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on
the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced
without provoking a U.S. military reaction.
"d. The USSR could derive considerable military
advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and
intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the
establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between
these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be
the more likely. Either development, however, would be
incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet
policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far
greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S. -
Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far and
consequently would have important policy implications with
respect to other areas and other problems in East-West
relations.
1#e. The Latin American reaction will be to the
evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather
than to the technical implications of the military build-up.
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Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military
intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem
as one to be met by the U.S. and not their responsibility.
We estimate the chances are better now than they were at
Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS
majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military
action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was
establishing an 'offensive' base in Cuba, most Latin American
governments would expect the U.S. to eliminate it, by whatever
means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to
avoid direct involvement."
8. By 19 September, the date of the estimate, MRBM's had
already been brought ashore in Cuba; however, reports of this
event
did not begin to reach the community
until a day or .two after the estimate was written. Once received,
these reports set off the targeting process that led to the discovery
of the MRBM's by photography.
9. Reviews of the four estimates are presented in ANNEX L.
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X. CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
1. Overhead reconnaissance of Cuba with U-2 aircraft begar
on 26 October 196C. Between that date and 12 October 1962, when
operational control of U-2 overflights was transferred to the
Strategic Air Command, USAF, CIA flew a total of 54 missions.
Of these, three aborted because of aircraft malfunctions, two
because of camera malfunctions, two because of contrails, and
two encountered heavier cloud cover than had been forecast. Map
showing tracks flown 5 August - 14 October 1962 appear at Tab D.
2. As of mid-April 1962, the beginning of the period under
review, missions were authorized at the rate of two per month.
3. On 14 June 1962, the Special Group approved a COMOR
recommendation that two additional flights be authorized for June.
LL At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 12 July
Mr. McCone pointed out that photographic reconnaissance of Cuba
had enabled NPIC to make a study of military barracks and other
facilities which showed that Cuba had sufficient housing on its
military installations to accommodate the existing order of battle
estimate of a 75,000-man military force. The Group agreed to
continue with the already authorized schedule of two flights per month.
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5.. Extract from Special Group Minutes, 19 July 1962
"Mr. McCone summed up his proposals for reconnaissance
overflights as follows: Cuba: Monthly coverage, requiring
two flights a month. It was noted that (the proposal) is covered
by existing authorization. ...It was further noted that the Group
will approve, through the medium of the CIA Monthly Forecast,
flights planned for each succeeding month. ... "
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7. In a memorandum (COMOR-D-24/14), dated 13 August,
Subject: "Requirements for U-2 Coverage of Cuba, " the Chairman
of the COMOR noted that:
"The last mission, one of two approved by the Special
Group on 30 July for reconnaissance of Cuba, was accomp-
lished on 5 August. Because of certain camera malfunctions,
the photography is not up to standard. COMOR Priority I
requirements were not adequately met. The photography
obtained did not satisfy the CLA/DDP requirement. In light
of the foregoing COMOR concludes as follows: ... That the
COMOR priority requirements in Cuba should be covered by
U-2 recce during August. (This would probably take two
missions.) It is proposed that these be planned so as to
meet those requirements and in addition the operational
requirements for CIA/DDP. "
8. Mission No. 3087 was scheduled for 8 August. Bad
weather and operational factors caused cancellation on that date.
The Special Group met on 9 August.
Extract from Special Group Minutes, 9 August 1962
"The Group agreed that the second mission authorized
for August should be undertaken whenever the DCI decides that
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the immediate situation with respect to Soviet material just fies
it. It was noted that this will use up the existing authorizat on
for August and that if a third mission should be cnme necessary
later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at
that time. "
9. On 10 August, the weather was looked at for a possible
mission 3087 on 12 August. The weather forecast resulted in cancel-
lation at the alert briefing. Another alert was scheduled for 17 August
Between 17 and 24 August, the weather was checked daily for a
possible flight. The mission went to Go-No-Go on 24 August; hov ever,
the weather still was bad and mission 3087 was cancelled.
11. In the 30 August meeting of the Special Group the CIA
forecast for the two approved flights for September was considered.
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Extract from Special Group Minutes, 30 August 1962
"The Agency's monthly forecast was reviewed and noted.
All of the flights contained therein had been previously apprDved.
General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional
requirement for flights over Cuba. "
12. A special meeting of COMOR on 1 September reviewed
the situation in Cuba in the light of results of the 29 August mission,
which made it necessary to recast the planning for the September
flights. A member of the CIA Operations Center (U-2) was present
at the meeting. The requirements for the next flight (the first in
September) were agreed upon and were immediately available to the
Operations Center through the presence of its representative at the
meeting. There was no necessity for Special Group action since by
its approval of 19 July two flights per month were permitted, and
none had yet been flown in September.
13. Because of the known existence of SAM sites on the island
and the consequent danger to overflight plus the need for clarification
of the nature of the site at Banes, COMOR thought the first flight
proposed for September to be of sufficient significance to warrant its
being brought to the attention of the Acting DCL A memorandum
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was forwarded to the Acting DCI on 4 September outlining the COMOR
recommendations for the flight then being planned and asking for
his approval. It reads:
"I. Your approval of paragraph 4 is requested.
Z. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
b. That the priority areas of interest should be
the areas referenced in a above and to include other
targets on a second priority basis which might requir,:
recoverage.
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"3. The targets for operational planning will be prepared
by the COMOR Working Group in pursuance of the above and
forwarded directly to the Intelligence Officer/OSA/DDR for
use in operational planning.
"4. Recommendation: That the foregoing be taken into
account in determination of when the next Cuban mission will
be flown. "
The recommendation was approved by the Acting DCI.
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15. In late August and early September the Acting DCI requested
that an examination be made of the feasibility of supplementing U-2
coverage with low-level tactical aerial reconnaissance. On 1 and
3 September COMOR met to consider the kind of information that
could be obtained through use of RF-101/F813-type aircraft. The,/
reported that:
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16. On 8 September the COMOR reviewe(
(5 September) and forwarded the results of its review to the Acting
DCI in a memorandum dated 9 September 1962:
"1 The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has
now reviewed the information obtained from the last U-2
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17. On 9 September the Chairman COMOR was informed by
the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State,
that the Secretary of State had raised a question whether the informa-
tion
could be obtained by peripheral reconnaissance
means. (Note: Peripheral photography in other areas had operated
from 20 miles out.) The COMOR met on 10 September to consider
the Secretary's question and concluded as follows:
"Peripheral photography could satisfy some of the
objectives planned for coverage in the current proposed
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18. On 10 September, the Acting DCI addressed a memorandum
to the Secretary of Defense (COMOR-D-24/16), which read in part:
"It is recommended that you initiate the necessary ac tion
(including Special Group approval) to provide for the employ-
ment. . . of tactical-type reconnaissance against
as are identified in COMOR-D-24/15, which
was made available to DIA on 1 September 1962. "
19. A special meeting was held in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's
office on 10 September. It should be noted that the meeting followed
closely on the heels of two U-2 incidents: the straying of a U-2
over Sakhalin
Mr. Thomas A.
Parrott, on 11 September, prepared the following memorandum
on this meeting:
"At a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office yesterday, attended
by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence and others, the Secretary
expressed concern at the Agency's (CIA's) planned coverage
of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well a:-
two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. Ile
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said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in
fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to
fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recop-
felt, however, that it is unwise to combine extensive overii-ying
of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed
out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention
to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into
enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would
put the U.S. in a very poor position for standing on its
rights to overfly international waters.
"Taking these views into account, the Agency (CIA)
plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts--the
(Note: The Secretary of State made the proposal that the Light
be broken into four parts.)
Because of the limited number of flights authorized, CIA made it a
practice not to fly unless weather over most of the critical targets
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was less than 25 per cent overcast. The poor weather in September
and the necessity to fly four separate missions instead of only one
resulted in prolonging the time needed to get the requested photo-
graphic coverage.
20. At its 14 September meeting the Special Group considered
the proposal that low-level photographic coverage be obtained on
certain targets.
Extracts from Special Group Minutes, 14 September
"Colonel Steakley (JCS) outlined the capabilities for
low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted
that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation
considered until the results of Agency (CIA) reconnaissance
in the same area became available. General Carter said
that special efforts will be required to identify certain
installations, the nature of which is not clear at present. "
(Note: The reference here is to the cruise missile site at
Banes, which had not been identified conclusively at the time
of the meeting.)
21. Mission No. 3090 was considered during the period 6 to
16 September. The weather was checked daily. The mission went
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to Go-No-Go on 16 September, but the weather turned bad and the
mission was cancelled.
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23. Mission No. 3092 could not be flown between 18 and 21
September because of bad weather and was cancelled.
25. CIA in its monthly forecast requested one mission for
October and permission to carry over into October any of the flights
approved for September which had not yet been flown. At the time
the forecast was drafted four flights remained in the approved
September program. The Special Group approved the request on
27 September.
26. Mission No. 3094 was alerted on 27 September, and was
cancelled on 28 September because of bad weather.
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27.
On or about 28 September, Mr. McCone called
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Undersecretary
for Political Affairs.
Department of State, and got
approval
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The flight
was successfully
flown on 29 September.
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28. Mission Nos. 3096 and 3097 were considered during the
period 29 September through 2 October. Both were cancelled
because of bad weather. A satellite mission, 29 September to
2 October, programmed to cover Cuba, yielded no usable photo-
graphy of Cuba because of cloud cover.
29. From 18 September through 2 October agent and refugee
reports (see Section V, paras. 15 through 23) dovetailed sufficiently-
to create the hypothesis that there was something of unusual impor-
tance going on in a definite area west of Havana and that ground
observer reports of missile site construction there needed to be
confirmed or denied by photography. The DIA on 3 October
forwarded to COMOR a memorandum stressing the need for pi-oto-
graphic coverage of suspected MRBM areas. On 3 October COMOR
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completed a targeting based on analysis of the reports. On 4 October
in a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) the DCI pointed oat
that CIA was restricted to using the U-21s in the southeast quadrant
of Cuba because of the SAM sites. He questioned whether this was
a reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when the SAW ts
almost certainly were not yet operational. The NRC together with
CIA and JCS were instructed to prepare and present to the Special
Group (Augmented) on 9 October a program for Cuban reconnaissance
involving all types of vehicles available for such use and considering
their vulnerabilities to Cuban air defense.
30. There was a difference of opinion in the 4 October Sp cial
Group (Augmented) meeting on whether a restriction had been im-
posed on overflying known SA-2 sites. Because of the skimpiness
of records, it cannot now be discovered whether there was or wis
not such a restriction. It is clear, however, that the operationa L
elements were under the impression that such a restriction did
exist. Evidence of this belief can be found in the reference to si)ch
restriction by the DCI at the 4 October meeting of the Special Group
(Augmented).
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31. Mission No. 3098 was delayed because of weather on
3 October. It was alerted on 4 October and successfully flew the
32. Mission No. 3099 was launched on 6 October, but it
aborted due to mechanical difficulties. For operational reasons
and for matters of record, when missions are cancelled or aborted
due to mechanical troubles or to weather after alert procedures have
been initiated, succeeding missions, which usually (but not always)
follow the same flight plan of the cancelled mission, are assigned a
new mission serial number.
33. Mission No. 3100 was successfully flown on 7 October.
This was a peripheral mission along the northeastern coast.
34. USIB-D-41. 5/25 (COMOR-D-24/20), dated 5 October
1962, "Intelligence Justification for U-2 Overflight of Cuba,"
recommended frequent and regular U-2 coverage of Cuba to the
extent that the primary objectives would be covered once a month.
This recommendation, which resulted from a DIA memorandum
of 3 October, together with the decision of the Special Group
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led to the track selected for the 14 October flight. The USIB
memorandum reads in part:
"There is now a pressing and continuing need for
up-to-date intelligence on the progress of the Soviet arms
build-up in Cuba. . . . The items of most immediate concern
are the missile installations springing up all over the island .
The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29
coupled with the rate of construction we have observed,
means that there may well be many more sites now being
built of which we are unaware. Ground observers have, in
several recent instances, reported sightings of what they
believe to be the SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These
reports must be confirmed or denied by photo coverage.
It is also necessary to know how many KOMAR-class PGMG s
may be in service. . . The COMOR recognizes the increased
risk to the aircraft in light of the SA-2 and MIG-21 aircraft
present there, but it must be stated that the current need is
extremely urgent and the risk involved should be very thor-
oughly weighed before this coverage is denied."
35. On 9 October the Special Group (Augmented) discussed
the spectrum of possible reconnaissance activities. It was agreed
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that first priority should be given to one U-2 mission in the western
part of the island. If this flight did not activate ground-to-air fire,
a number of similar sorties would be mounted.
36. The 7 October flight completed the four missions
authorized for September. Intelligence justification for an October
mission had been completed and was awaiting approval by a meet-
ing of the Special Group (Augmented) scheduled for 9 October. rhus,
there was a stand-down of aircraft on 8 and 9 October.
37. Mission No. 3101 was considered from 10 to 12 October.
The weather was checked daily, but there was no alert. On
12 October operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was
transferred to the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force.
Weather precluded a mission on 13 October.
38. Mission No. 3101 was flown by SAC on 14 October over
39. On 16 October approval was given for an unlimited number
of flights over Cuba.
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40. The Strategic Air Command, United States Air Force,
flew 20 missions between 14 and 22 October, two of which were
unsuccessful due to camera malfunction and one of which was a
partial failure because of film run-out.
41. At Tab D are appended maps showing the U-2 overflight
tracks, respectively for August, September, and the first half
analysts became suspicious as a result of an agent report); the
final map shows the tracks flown by SAC from 15 through 22 October.
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XI. COMMUNITY ACTIONS, 14-22 OCTOBER 1962
1. This section summarizes the actions of the intelligence
community from 14 October, when offensive missiles were first
photographed in Cuba, until 22 October when the President addressed
the nation.
2. Within 24 hours of the first tentative identification of
Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the community had
taken the dimensions of the crisis and geared to meet it. Round-the-
clock schedules had been set up to process raw information and
photography, correlate information from all sources, report
developments swiftly, and prepare estimates both as to the meaning
of the events and the likely Soviet reactions to U.S. moves.
3. On 14 October, U-2 Mission 3101 was flown. The photo-
graphs were analyzed at NPIC where, by the afternoon of 15 October,
a tentative identification of an offensive Soviet missile capability ir
Cuba had been made. By continuing analysis the identification was
made more firm and the missiles were determined to be of at least
700-mile and possibly 1000-mile range.
4. On the morning of 16 October, top government officials
were briefed on the photographs and on NPIC's analysis which
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concluded that there was now present in Cuba
5. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
(GMAIC) of USIB was charged with preparing an immediate evaluation
of the situation. The committee agreed that the missiles observed
were probably
that they were clearly under Soviet control, and that the site would
probably eventually hold as many as 24 missiles. There was no
evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads.
6. Also on 16 October COMOR met to review target planning_
the Watch Committee directed the National Indications Center to
monitor closely any Soviet actions elsewhere in the world to determine
how the Cuban events might fit into a broader picture, and the Board
of National Estimates concluded that the Soviets would not risk
nuclear war if the U.S. took direct action against Cuba.
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7. On 17 October the USIB called for a new estimate, and by
evening $NIE 11-17-62, "Implications for Soviet Policy of Missile
Deployment in Cuba", had been drafted. USIB also directed GMAIC,
together with NPIC and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
(JAEIC) to provide a continuing community assessment of the problem,
including 24-hour-a-day support from NPIC. Considering the results
of U-2 mission 3102, flown 15 October, GMAIC estimated that at
least 16 and possibly 32 missiles of 1020-nautical-mile range would
be operational within a week or so.
8. On 18 October the first GMAIC-JAEIC-NPIC Joint
Evaluation, one of a series issued daily until 11 November, estimated
that MRBM's could be launched from Cuba within 18 hours.
9. On 18 October the DCI asked USIB to consider the Soviet
reaction to three possible courses of U.S. action:
a. To do nothing about the offensive missiles.
b. To initiate a total or limited blockade under a
declaration of war against Cuba.
c. To take military action to destroy the missile sites
and to invade Cuba.
10. After USIB discussion of these and related alternatives,
(-)A-o4yeAr.
SNIE 11-18-62 was preparedii The main conclusions were:
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a. "If the U.S. accepts the strategic missile build-up
in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the build-up of strategic
weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force
level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear
already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They
would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make
some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis
the U.S.
b. "U.S. acceptance of the strategic missile build-up
would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-
Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion
in Latin America and elsewhere. Conversely, anti-Commun sts
and those who relate their own interests to those of the U.S.
would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially
over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in U.S.
power and determination and a serious decline of U.S. influence
generally.
C. "If the U.S. confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge
of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do
not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they
would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign
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bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and
assuring the U.S. of tight control over the missiles. They
would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize
their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that
Berlin was held hostage to U.S. actions in Cuba.
d. "There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro
might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as
a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers
to negotiate, continued build-up, and counterpressures, and
we think the result in the end would be the same.
e. "Any warning would of course degrade the element
of surprise in a subsequent U.S. attack.
f. "If the U.S. takes direct military action against
Cuba, the Soviets would be placed automatically under great
pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save
Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to U.S. interests.
This would be true whether the action was limited to an
effort to neutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles
plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile
sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the
Castro regime.
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g. "In reaction to any of the various forms of U.S.
action, the Soviets would be alarmed and agitated, since they
have to date estimated that the U.S. would not take military
action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear
war. They would recognize that U.S. military action posed
a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of
course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under
pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond
in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions,
could escalate to general war.
h. "On the other hand, the Soviets have no public
treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases
are on the island. This situation provides them with a
pretext for treating U.S. military action against Cuba as an
affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby
avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe
that the USSR would attack the U.S. , either from Soviet
bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were
operational and not put out of action before they could be
readied for firing.
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1. "Since the USSR would not dare to resort to general
war and could not hope to prevail locally, the Soviets would
almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba.
The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily
upon the immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation
of U.S. attitudes. The most likely location for broad retaliation
outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They might react here wIth
major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even
a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace
treaty.
j. "We believe that whatever course of retaliation the
USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate
general war or take military measures, which in their calcula-
tion, would run the gravest risks of general war."
11. Beginning on 19 October the USIB met daily at 0830. The
Joint Evaluation of that date concluded that there was a Soviet MRBVI
regiment at San Cristobal and one at Sagua la Grande and an 1RBM
regiment in the Guanajay area and that the Soviets intended to
develop Cuba into a prime strategic base.
12. On 20 October the Joint Evaluation stated that "an
emergency operational capability to launch some of the missiles
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TOP SECRET
on hand within about eight hours could now exist at the four MRBM
sites." It estimated full operational readiness for the San Cristobal
sites by 25 October, for the Sagua la Grande sites by 1 November
and for the Guanajay IRBM sites by 1-15 December, On 20 October
a decision was made to send key intelligence officers abroad the
next day to assist U.S. ambassadors in briefing the heads of state
of the prinicpal U.S. allies.
13. On 21 October the Board of National Estimates concluded
that the Soviets would initially try to forestall U.S. military action
and would confine themselves to political and propaganda moves and
probably an armed forces alert; also that they would be cautious
in the face of U.S. determination but would probably continue the
Cuban build-up if the U.S. position were ambiguous. They also
concluded that the Soviets would not retaliate with major military
action if the U.S. sank a Soviet ship while enforcing a blockade.
14. The Joint Evaluation of 21 October concluded that there
would be at least five Soviet offensive missile regiments in Cuba
with a salvo potential of about one half the current intercontinental
ballistic missile threat from the Soviet Union.
15. During the week each agency alerted all its overseas
collection facilities to give top priority to reporting any intelligence
bearing on indications of hostile Soviet action.
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16. On 22 October Mr. Roger Hilsman told the USIB of
arrangements for conveying U.S. policy decisions to the Organization
of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
Major General Robert A. Breitweiser briefed army, navy, and air
attaches of the OAS and NATO nations on the Cuban crisis.
17. The President's speech was given at 1900 on 22 October.
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XII. CONCLUSIONS
1. Although the intelligence community's inquiry into its
actions during the Cuban crisis revealed certain areas where
shortcomings existed and where improvements should be made
in various areas of intelligence collection and processing, the
intelligence community operated extensively and well in connection
with Cuba. Every major weapons system introduced into Cuba
by the Soviets was detected, identified and reported (with respect
to numbers, location and operational characteristics) before
any one of these systems attained an operational capability.
2. A relatively short period of time ensued between the
introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, particularly strategic
missiles, and the commencement of the flow, although meager, of
tangible reports of their presence; detection of their possible
presence and targeting of the suspect areas of their location was
accomplished in a compressed time frame; and the intelligence
cycle did move with extraordinary rapidity through the stages of
collection, analysis, targeting for verification, and positive
identification.
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3. The very substantial effort directed toward Cuba was
originated by an earlier concern with the situation in Cuba and
the effort, already well under way, contributed to the detection
and analysis of the Soviet build-up.
4. Information was disseminated and used.
5. Aerial photography was very effective and ourbest
means of establishing hard intelligence.
6. The procedures adopted in September delayed photographic
intelligence, but this delay was not critical, because photography
obtained prior to about 17 October would not have been sufficient
(A cz ticA"Act.kr-e 901.A.L4-e_
to warrant action ? support from Western Hemisphere
or NATO allies.
7. Agent reports helped materially; however, none giving
significant information on offensive missiles reached the intelli-
gence community or policy-makers until after mid-September.
When received, they were used in directing aerial photography.
8. Some restrictions were placed on dissemination of
information, but there is no indication that these restrictions.
necessarily affected analytical work or actions by policy-makers.
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9. The 19 September estimate, while indicating lack of
probability that MRBM's would be placed in Cuba, did state that
"this contingency must be examined carefully"; the estimators in
preparing the 19 September estimate gave great weight to the
philosophical argument concerning Soviet intentions and thus did
not fully weigh the many indicators.
10. The estimate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions
was correct.
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SE,CRET
TIMETABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA
Date
25-31 July
1-5 August
5-10 August
10-15 August
15-20 August
20-25 August
25-31 August
(July - October 1962)
(All dates approximate)
Western Cuba Central, Cuba
Upsurge of Soviet arms
shipments begins arriv-
ing in western Cuban
ports.
Construction begins on
SAM sites at Matanzas,
Havana, Mariel, Bahia
Honda, Santa Lucia,
San Julian, & La Coloma.
A B A
SECTION II
Ea-tern Ci ba
Soviet armored groups Upsurge of Soviet
arrive at Santiago de arms shipments
las Vegas and Artemisa. begins arriving
in central Cuban
ports.
1-5 September Construction begins on
Guanajay IRBM sites.
SECRET
Construction begins
on SAM site at
Cienfuegos.
Construction begins
on SAM sites at
Sagua la Grande,
Caibarien., & Sancti
Spiritus.
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Date Western Cuba Central Cuba Eastern Cuba
5-10 September
10-15 September
Soviet armored
group arrives at
Remedios.
15-20 September Construction begins Construction begins Upsurge of Soviet
at San Cristobal at aernedios IRBM arms shipments
MRBM sites, site. begins arriving
in eastern G than
ports.
20-25 September
25-30 September
Construction begins
at Sagua la Grande
MRBM sites.
Soviet armored
group arrives at
Holguin.
Construction be-
gins on SAM sites
at Los Angeles,
Chaparra and Jiguani.
Construction be-
gins on SAM sites
at Manati. Sen.ado,
and Manzani lo.
NOTE: Construction of the remaining SAM sites, which apparently were
considered less vital than those listed above to the protection of
offensive missile bases in Cuba, began in late September or early
October. Work probably began on the SAM site at Siguanea on the
Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the sites at
Esmeralda, Chambas, Maldonado, Santiago de Cuba, Ciego de
Avila, and Deleite during the first half of October.
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WESTERN COMPLEX
Martel
1-5 A.ug.
tdanic Honda
1-5 tug.
GucmajaY
1-5 Sept.
Santiago se
INtscI-V11.a.3
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UNITED
Matcazcs
- Aug.
Orerdir
Gtder0O
CENTRAL COMPLEX
? Oer Set
De..e
16- (jet.
_ rd
Sagua
la Grande,
25-30 Sept
Remedios
Mid-Sept.
Remesios
Sagus
5 - 10 S'ept,
Is Grasse
Sept
/
/ - Sept,
5- 10 Oct.
ettanPce''
?teem o
de &doses
5-10 Ot?,.
tSeedIrtrS
Ss0 Julian
i Aug. /
La Coloma
1-5 tug.
sit
PINtS
C -e-t4se;-,s.s
20-25
25-30 Sept.
Tunes .1
;
EASTERN
COMPLEX
Manati
25-30 Sept.
MRBM and IRBM Sites
" -4 - 1.4 r:ling if
SAM Sites
Es'''-nd?sd dste in:ng 3f sor.struct 'set
Arme red Groups
32810
6543 6.62
CUBA
(5-mi54u54 grief)
50
Siguanee
Late Sept.
Sancti
Spiritus
1-5 Sept.
Lrlopci-rc
20-25 Sept.
Holguin
lid - Sept.
Los Angeles
20-25 Sept.
0
Tete,
StSSER GreSteris
OterrSe: Crerkeerr
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Maldonado /
10-15 Oct.
SECRET
IT I
A?u
Seder., eAS
Geer o'er,
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