MEMO TO THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCHDEPT OF STATE FROM MARSHALL S CARTER RE CUBAN ARMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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7 January 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Intelligence and Research.,
Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director,' National Security Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, Army
Director, Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Air Force
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
1. On 3 January the United States Intelligence Board, in executive .
session, concurred with a proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence
that he advise the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boa -d that
the report on the Cuban arms build-up (14 April through 14 Cctober 962)
submitted on 26 December should be considered the final report.
2. A copy of the DCI's memorandum to the Chairman of the-,
President's Board is attached.
3. The page designating the report as a draft should be rem&ved
from each copy in your hands.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA,.
Deputy.. Director of. Central Intel lit,,ence
Attachment
DCI memorandum to Dr. Killian
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S E C RE T
7 January 1963
Memorandum for: Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
The report which you requested on 14 November
concerning the U. S.. foreign intelligence effort in connection
with the Cuban arms build-up (14 April through 14 October
1962) was forwarded to you on 26 December.
On 3 January an executive session of the United
States Intelligence Board concurred with my proposal that.
the report be considered final. Therefore the page designating
the report as a draft should be removed from each copy in
the hands of your board.
/signed/
JOHN A. McCONF:
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
7 January X963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT : Interim Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory 'Board., dated
December 28, 1962
Attached is a copy of a memorandum on the subject from the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
requesting the coordinated views and comments on the six recom-
mendations in the subject report of the President's Board.
In accordance with the attached memorandum, I would appreciate
your consideration of those aspects of the subject report which
fall within the areas of your respective responsibilities, in order
that I may obtain an appropriate contribution by your departments;
in the preparation of a response.
Since the subject report stems from the report regarding
Cuba which I submitted to the President's Board on 26 December i'?62,
I propose that the response to the attached request from Mr. Bundy
be developed by the same Steering Committee which prepared that
previous report, composed under my chairmanship of the CIA., State,
DIA and NSA members of USIB. As in the preceding case, I amth 'in CIA asking General Carter to establish a working g p
assistance from other agencies (including NRO) to provide-the
staffing required in the preparation of the response for consider-
ation by the Steering Committee and coordination with you.
cc: USIB Principals
Director, NRO
Copy 15- of S 21
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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McGeorge Bundy
D
January 3, 1963
MEMORANDUM TO: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Interim Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated
December 28, 1962
In the enclosed interim report to the President dated
December 28, 1962, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board has submitted six recommendations growing out of the Boarcts
study of general problem areas concerned with the future direction
of certain aspects of the over-all foreign intelligence effort of the
United States.
Before taking action on the Board's recommendations, the
President would like to have you present the coordinated views and
comments of the departments and a=encies primarily concerned.
Accordingly, it is requested that the desired views and comments
be provided to this office and to the President's Board by January 2i,
1963.
Upon receipt of the views and comments I intend to bring up
for discussion in the Special NSC 5412/2 Group those aspects of the
Board's report which appear to fall within the particular interest
of that Group, including Recommendation No. 3 and No. 5.
cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
December 28, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Since your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board first learned
on October 22 of the positive identification of the Soviet offensive
ballistic missile threat in Cuba, the Board has been condur:tinq an
extensive review of the adequacy and timeliness of the collection,
analysis, and reporting of intelligence on the Cuba buildup by the
United States intelligence community in the months precedng your
address to the Nation on October 22. While the Board is_ making
substantial progress in this review, it will not be in a position
to draw final conclusions or to make final recommendations to you
until it completes the review of a report from the Director of
Central Intelligence which it requested on November 14, and which
calls for a comprehensive all-source, community-wide study by the
several intelligence agencies concerned. Although the Director of
Central Intelligence supplied an advance draft of his report on
December 26, 1962, the final report has not as yet been received
by the Board. When we have received the final report and have had
an opportunity to complete our own study, we will submit the
results of the Board's detailed analysis.
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In the interim, on the basis of information we have had an
opportunity to consider, we have identified certain problem areas
which we suggest are deserving of your attention. Our observations
and recommendations regarding these problem areas are concernec
more with the future direction of certain aspects of our over-all
intelligence effort than with any after-the-fact assessment of
specific intelligence community activities relating to the military
buildup in Cuba. Our observations and recommendations are made in
clear recognition of the success thus far achieved in effecting
withdrawal from Cuba of selected elements of Soviet offensive
weaponry.
1. Great uncertainties about present Soviet efforts in Cuba
indicate the necessity of a continuing, aggressive intelligence
effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate infor-
mation to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontations
in Cuba. We must resist any tendency toward a. let-down in our
intelligence effort against Cuba in the wake of intelligence successes
resulting from our military reconnaissance missions over the
island. In making this observation we are mindful that, in a
quite different atmosphere, the Central Intelligence Agency did
not mount effective clandestine intelligence collection operations
in Cuba for an eight-month period following the Bay of Pigs
invasion.
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2. We recommend intensified, hard-hitting efforts to increas!
our capability for obtaining significant intelligence through
clandestine collection operations (espionage). Despite noteworthy
intelligence results obtainable through scientific and technical
means, we still have as great a need as ever for carefully selected.
human-resource espionage operations, professionally executed on the
basis of the soundest planning judgments and the most competent target
selection processes which the intelligence community can achieve.
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Events of the past few years suggest that dramatic advances
in advanced intelligence methods such as high altitude and satellite
photography have obscured the role of human beings as collection
and transmission media, trained and equipped with the most
sophisticated technical aids, and supported by essential logistics
and communications. We are gravely-concerned about the progrtssi5X1
3. We recommend, while it is still possible, continued high-
level and low-level (as required) aerial reconnaissance of Cuba as
one means of acquiring photographic and signals intelligence c.on-
cerning the military installations, the military forces,- the modern
military weaponry and the highly sophisticated communications
facilities which the Soviets retain in Cuba. This surveillance
effort must be accompanied by priority planning for the development
of acceptable substitutes (such as drones, improved satellite
reconnaissance, etc.) in lieu of present aerial reconnaissance
coverage, when and if such coverage is denied us by air defense
systems now being installed by the Soviets_ in Cuba on a scale
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