BRIEFING MATERIAL OF 14 NOVEMBER EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020035-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 14, 1962
• Content Type: HW

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LVI:T
NSC
REVIEW
COMPLETE
November 13, 1902
MEMORANDUM ON LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR CUBA.
It is my belief that a Castro-Soviet Communist Cuba, whose
stated intentions and past actions are to support and spread subvtrsio~i
throughout Latin America, is unacceptable to the United States and
should be unacceptable to most, if not all, Latin American states,
It can be said that through the removal of the missiles (and
we must assume but do not know positively that all are removed)
and the removal of the IL 28s (if this can be negotiated) the threat
to the security of the United States and the Latin American states
from a nuclear strike is removed. However, two serious problems-is
remain:
One, no means have been established to reasonably guarantee
that offensive missiles will not be reintroduced or, if offensive missiles
remain on the island, that they will not be secretly placed in oper;Ltional
status. Aerial surveillance will help, but will not guarantee our aLbilit-
to detect such an activity. Ground inspection would if properly
organized and granted freedom of movement. But this has been
denied by Castro and the denial is now supported by Mikoyan.
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Furthermore, the SAM sites if operating can effectively ciery
aerial inspection. There can be no explanation for Soviet ins stence
on leaving the SAM sites except to shield future clandestine implace-
ment of offensive weapons such as MRBMs and IRBMs if the Sovie:s
choose at some future time to reintroduce these weapons systems.
Secondly, Cas emai - r- equipped with-ground equip-
ment far in ex e~ss of his needs.
A combination of aerial inspection and properly organizes
ground inspection would give an effective guarantee against re-
introduction of missile systems. The ground inspecters would havi
to have freedom of action so that they could make on-site che;,ks of
the ever increasing refugee and agent reports of the storing of
missiles and their equipments in caves which can not be total y
dismissed.
Therefore prior to a "no invasion" commitment we must
have complete arrangements for inspections and they cannot be
frustrated by either the Soviets or Castro.
Secondly, Castro remains over-equipped with ground equip-
ment. He also now has xmbamphibious equipment capable of iuppcitimg
insurgency movements against any of the Caribbean, Central American
states or states in the northern tier of South America. Castro has
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never changed in his determined effort to subvert these states. He
has trained insurgents by the thousands; there are large numbers,
ek"d
they are in Cuba now in training. His i e directed again=st
a number of Central and South American states. He repeatedl" expresses
violent intentions against thexowgaaxbv&x organized governments of
these states. Therefore one can only conclude that he would use his
newly acquired amphibious lift and a substantial part of his exc-,ss
arms to support insurgents who can readily overthrow neighboring
governments. Our policy should anticipate this and should be
djas AB designed to take action regardless of how extreme to re.r oc e
this threat if the eventualities mentioned above materialize.
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 ~`. I (11/13/62)
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Courses of Action Open to U. S. in Cuban Situation
A/ If USSR agrees to remove IL-28s, U. S. will
1) lift quarantine and terminate 10/23 proclamation;
2) continue air surveillance - without further announcement
in part to guard against possibility that some offensive
weapons remain in Cuba;
3) withhold registering with SC-UN declaration confirming U. S.
assurance against invasion of Cuba until agreement has been
reached on "suitable safeguards" in support of Soviet under-
taking to halt further introduction of offensive weapons into
Cuba. Such safeguards should include some international
"presence" in Cuba - UN, OAS or Caribbean Peace
Commission - and could include some reciprocal features -
such as inspection of suspected refugee training areas in
Central America - as a basis for gaining Castro's consent.
The latter might also be obtained as part of the Latin
America nuclear-free zone proposal.
B/ If USSR refuses to remove IL-28s, U. S will
1) continue limited quarantine by boarding, as well as inter-
eepting and hailing all ships enroute to Cuba, applying such
procedures first to Free World non-Soviet charter ships,
next to Free World ships on charter to Soviet, then to Bloc
ships and finally to Soviet ships;
2) continue air surveillance with announcement as to its
necessity dictated by absence of on-site verification ofd
offensive weapons removal and presence of IL-28 bomber
threat;
3) treat assurance against invasion of Cuba in President's letter
of October 27th as not in effect because of non-performance
by Soviet.
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