THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020029-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: November 8, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800020029-2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 8, 1962
N$C REVIEW
C ; MPLETED
(Alternatively, we could deliver a message and reserve the attack
luntil we have heard Khrushchev's answer.)
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Subject: Revised course of action in the contingency that a
surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed
1. The importance and legitimacy of surveillance should be a con-
stant theme in our public and private discussions of the Cuban
problem, to build understanding at all levels of the contribution
which such surveillance is making to the reduction of danger.
2. In the event one of our surveillance planes is shot at or
destroyed, we should first establish the facts beyond any reason-
able doubt.
3. In the case of an attack on a low level flight, the President
should send an urgent message to Khrushchev stating that we will
be obliged to retaliate immediately in the event of any further
attack on our planes and ask that he urge the Cubans immediately
to cease such attacks. The President would inform Khrushchev
that our action would be limited to that necessary to enable our
surveillance to continue.
4. If there were an attack on a U-2 by a SAM site, we should
probably assume that this is a deliberate Soviet decision. In this
case, we should arrange for a message from the President to
Khrushchev to be deliveredy as nearly as possible s imultaneously
with an attack on the SAM site concerned. The
would explain the vital necessity of continuingaerial su v illanceshchev
pending establishment of other arrangements, would refer to
Kuznetsov's repeated statement to McCloy on October 31 (USUN 1581
to State) that all antiaircraft in Cuba is in Cuban hands, and state
that the action taken would be limited to that necessary to enable
us to continue surveillance.
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP8OB01676R001800020029-2
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800020029-2
TOP SECRET - 2 -
5. In both cases, the OAS would be informed of our intended action
as far as possible in advance, without request for an endorsement.
It would be advisable to inform the Secretary General of the United
Nations of our action and the reason for it.
6. In either case we should announce to the public that one of our
planes has been shot at or destroyed and indicate the nature of the
position we were communicating to the Soviet Union.
7. If it becomes necessary to act to defend our surveillance planes,
the specific action taken would depend upon the circumstances of the
interference. If a U-2 has been shot down, the appropriate action
w ould be first to eliminate the particular SAM site or sites responsible
for the action, then to communicate a second time with Moscow,
and finally, in the absence of satisfactory assurances, eliminate the
remainder of the SAM system. If MIGs are involved in an isolated
incident, the appropriate action would be against MIGs whether in
the air or on airfields. If short-range anti-aircraft were responsible,
this would presumably be action by Cubans not Russians, and action
directly against those positions would be appropriate.
8. After evaluation of Soviet and Cuban counter-action to any
actions under paragraph '7 above, we might proceed to wider
action, and such wider action might include approaches to allied
and friendly governments in an effort to prevent all shipments to
Cuba, or, if all else failed, a reimposition and expansion of the
quarantine. (Ambassador Thompson emphasizes that a renewal
of the quarantine against the Soviet Union at such a stage would
almost certainly require strenuous reaction from Moscow.)
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800020029-2