BACKGROUND MATERIAL OF 2 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 2, 1962
• Content Type: HW

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25 YEAR
RE-REVIEW
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
eittoratecti
THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
Information as of 0600
2 November 1962
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
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2 November 1962
THE SITUATION IN CUBA
Soviet offensive missile units are closing down their
launch sites in Cuba and removing their equipment, but the
assembly of IL-28 bombers is continuing.
missiles and basic launching equipment have been removel
from all the MRBM launch areas. Camouflage has been taken
down and support vehicles assembled for movement. The
launch sites have been partially destroyed, apparently by
bulldozing.
Construction at the IRBM sites has stopped and some
of the in8tal1ations at Guanajay have been destroyed. Work
on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers apparently has also
ceased.
None of the Soviet cargo ships now in Cuba has hatches
and holds suitable for handling IRBMs or MRBMs. The seven
ships which we believe delivered the missiles to Cuba could
return to Cuba between 16 and 25 November. Loading of the
missiles after the ships' return would probably take about
a week.
in contrast to the dismantl-
ing of the missile sites, there has been further progreF4s
in the assembly of IL-28 bomber aircraft at San Julian air-
field.
Monitors agree that Castro appeared nervous and hesi-
tant last night during the major portion of his radio-TV
speech, reading a transcript of his talks with U Thant. He
was somewhat more confident and forceful in the concluding
part when he spoke in his customary extemporaneous manner.
Throughout the speech he appeared to belch frequently. As
reported in the press, Castro reiterated his "five points,"
stressing the demand for evacuation of Guantanamo; announce?
the USSR had "some time ago" canceled all Cubansobligations
for arms; and claimed Cuba still has "powerful means
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defenc:' since all but "strategic weapons" were to remain
in Cuba. He said Khrushchev's decision gave his regime
"reason or discontent," but added: "We respected the de-
cision since these weapons were not under our command."
He confined Cuban refusal of inspection to the transcript
of his talks with U Thant.
During the entire crisis eriod there have been only
scattered and minor
n erna res s ance or sa o a e ac iv ies
One instance
Involved the cutting of a telephone
wire from a Soviet "base" in Camaguey province, possibly
a SAM site or related barracks area.
reported the Cuban
ert, depressed, and pessimistic."
.o.ulation
indicates that
the hopes and expectations of anti-Castro Cubans showed
some tendency to rise with the failure of the U Thant mis-
sion.
. that
officials in the Cuban foreign ministry were "subdued,"
and very sensitive to any mention of the Soviet role in
recent events. /said three middle-rank offi-
cials in the Ministry of Industries appeared "outraged"
at the ridiculous role Cuba had played and considered the
offer by Khrushchev to trade Cuban for Turkish bases espe-
cially humiliating. They felt the whole episode showed
the bankruptcy of Castro's policies, and said Cuba would
sooner or later have to come to terms with the US under
a modified leadership. noted, however, that
less well educated Cubans are being influenced by Castro's
propaganda, which is seeking to make recent events look
almost like a Cuban victory.
Cuban exile leaders report the Cuban community in
Florida to be depressed, heartsick, and convinced that
the only hope is to provoke Castro "into some mad action.
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in the Communist parties of
Chile and Uruguay repor con inuing evidence of a decline
in Soviet and Cuban prestige among Latin American Commu-
nists and other nvo-Castro groups as a result of the events
of the past week.
indicates
that Castro might modify his rejec ion o n r tional in-
spection in Cuba if such inspection were also to cover
other territories in the Caribbean area where Cuban exiles
might be training.
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U.,
BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
We have no reports as of 0700 EST on the New York con-
versations of Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan.
There has been no significant change in Moscow's prop-
aganda treatment of the situation. Soviet media continue
to emphasize that the USSR is strictly honoring Khrushchev's
pledges to President Kennedy. Moscow claims Cuba is ready
to cooperate with the UN in working out a peaceful settle-
ment, and continues to show sensitivity to foreign views
that Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missiles was
a sign of weakness.
Moscow has denounced the resumption of the US quarantine
and charged that "unprecedented war hysteria" still prevails
in the US.
Soviet commentators yesterday became markedly warmer in
support of Castro's five demands, but they carefully avoided
any suggestion that a settlement is contingent on US accept-
ance of these demands. A Moscow broadcast to Cuba endorsed
Castro's position that the US must halt the quarantine, eco-
nomic sanctions, subversive activities, and overflights. Mos-
cow hedged, however, on Castro's demand for the return of
the Guantanamo naval base, saying only that this question
"should be decided by negotiations."
The Chinese Communists have, in effect, urged Castro to
resist Soviet pressures for an early settlement. A note de-
livered to the Cuban charge in Peiping rejected as an "im-
perialist viewpoint" the suggestion that Cuban demands should
be ignored in a settlement between the "big powers." Peiping
promised resolute support "regardless of how complicated the
circumstances may be."
At a meeting of the presidium of
in Stockholm, the Chinese delegate
characterized Soviet behavior in the Cuban crisis
"cowardly."
the World Peace CounciA
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J1 arA...,.n.c.
BLOC MILITARY STATUS
No significant changes have been noted in the dispo-
sition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satel-
lite military forces.
Although much of the military force probably remains
in a state of precautionary readiness, some signs of nor-
malcy have been noted. Western attaches now have traveled
through key rail junctions in Belorussia and from Helsinki
to Moscow through Leningrad without observing any unusual
military activity or rail movements. Some military per-
sonnel may be on leave in the Leningrad area. Elements of
two Polish army divisions probably are continuing to aid
in the harvest. There are continued indications that the
Soviets may proceed with the normal year-end release of
GSFG military personnel.
There are indications that a rel-
atively large-scale exercise is impending in the Sea of
Okhotsk where submarines have
" ? 111
SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA
Two bloc ships which have been lying dead in the water
near the quarantine line have resumed their courses and
now are within the quarantine zone en route to Cuba. These
are the Soviet dry-cargo ship BELOVODSK, which is being
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accompanied by a US destroyer, and the Soviet tanker
GROZNY. The Czech dry-cargo ship KLADNO, which stopped
near the line for several days, has not returned from
her rendezvous off Bermuda with the East German passen-
ger ship VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT. The Soviet tanker MIR
crossed the quarantine line at about 0100 EST.
There now are 13 bloc ships en route to Cuba. The
latest additions are the Soviet dry-cargo ship ZYRYANIN,
with general cargo from the Black Sea, and the tanker
BALAKLAVA, with a cargo of crude oil from the Baltic.
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1 01-' 3MAt1 I
ANNEX
2 November
NUMBER OF SHIPS REQUIRED TO REMOVE
SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM CUBA.
1. We believe the main components of the Soviet offen-
sive weapons systems now in Cuba (as delined by Presidential
Proclamation 3504 of 23 October) could be returned to the
USSR in a total of 20 to 25 shiploads.
2. The MRBM and IRBM equipment presents the most for-
midable shipping task, We do not know exactly how many
erips were required to deliver the missiles now in Cuba, but
believe that their return will require between five and eight
trips with ships having hatches large enough to permit stowage
of the ballistic missiles. The principal components of the
missile systems probably would amount to about another four
shiploads. Some of the supporting construction equipment
such as bulldozers, trucks, and cranes probably would be left
behind, inasmuch as Cuba is receiving such equipment as
economic aid.
3. The 29 BEAGLE (IL-28) jet bombers known to be in
Cuba probably were delivered by three ships, and could be
returned by the same number.
4. The 12 KOMAR guided-missile boats now in Cuba ar-
rived as deck cargo on four separate ships, two carrying two
each, and two others carrying four each. Thus three or at
the most four trips would suffice to evacuate this equipment;
the missile and support gear would fit easily in the Tif:Ilds of
the ships carrying the KOMARs on deck.
5. We believe the three identified cruise-type coastal
defense missile installations could be sent back in three
shiploads.
Missiles:
Missile installations:
Jet bombers:
KOMAR ships:
Coast Defense Missiles:
Total:
5
to
e
4
3
3
to
e
3
18
to
1i2 shiploads
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4 0IUI uLuma
2 November 1962
THE SITUATION IN CUBA
1. Soviet
missile units in Cuba are in fact closing down their launCr
sites, removing equipment, and bulldozing the installa-
tions. We don't know yet just where the equipment wh:Lch
has been removed is being taken.
3. Castro seemed nervous during a large part or
his speech last night, but this could be because he was
reading instead of speaking extemporaneously as usual.
5. Regime Cubans are so angry over the withdralval
of Soviet missiles that three officials in one ministy
told Cuba is going to have to
come to terms with the US under a modified leadership.
7.
reported Cuba might consider international inspection
if it applies to possible Caribbean training sites of Cu-
ban exiles as well.
8. Soviet propaganda is giving some support to
Castro's demands for broader guarantees from the United
States, but is weaker on his demand for Guantanamo, lit)s-
cow claims Cuba will cooperate with the UN in working
out a peaceful settlement.
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9. A Chinese delegate at the World Peace Coun-
cil presidium in Stockholm is supposed to have referre(i
to Soviet behavior in Cuba as "cowardly."
10. There are no significant changes in bloc mili-
tary readiness. Western attachds have done some travel.-
ing in Belorussia and through Leningrad without noting
anything unusual.
11. Soviet ships are moving again. Three have
crossed the quarantine line, and 10 more are en route.
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No. 10
We conclude:
a.
b.
SPECIAL DAILY WATCH REPORT
of the
USIB WATCH COMMITTEE
As of 0800, 2 Novembef 1962
that, except for developments in Cuba, there has been no significant
change in the readiness status or positioning of Soviet Bloc armed
forces since our last report.
that the Soviets are dismantling the known strategic missile site',
in Cuba. The present location of the removed missiles and equip-
ment is unknown.
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I UP SLIM I
NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER NIC No, 2-0$67
Room BC 956 45 C,- :as
Pentagon
1 November 11;62
MEMORANDUM FOR WATCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS
SUBJECT: Warning Problems During Soviet "Holiday" Period, 3-10 Novembe.
1. Monitoring and assessing activities of the Soviet armed forces,
particularly Long Range Aviation (IRA), is a critical aspect of the Watch Committee's
mission during the present period. In the coming week to 10 days, i.e., during the
October Revolution holidays, our normal warning capability, such as it is, will
probably be further restricted. If the Soviet forces follow ? ? st tterns there will
appear a marked decline in military activity
The LRA can be expected at times to reach the status of a virtual strnd-
down. During the holiday period we will in effect be "blind" for some days as to
possible Soviet intent to prepare the LRA for rapid offensive action or to deploy
heavy bombers (or other forces) under cover of what we are conditioned to accept
as a "normal" holiday. Considering the pattern of LRA activity to date, and .n
view of the current critical situation, the possibility of such a move must be vlioes
considered by the Watch.
2. It is recommended that all collection assets of the Watch agerr ies
be alerted for particularly vigilant coverage of and rapid reporting on Bloc mi:itary
activities during at least the period 3-10 November, The Committee should aiso
consider the need for instituting extraordinary collection measures during this periou
Director
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We would anticipate from the pattern of LRA activity in previous years
that a period of very low levels of activity can be expected during the Octobet
Revolution holidays, at times approaching a virtual standdown. Such a develop-
ment, should it occur during the present period of tensions, will render it more
difficult than usual to detect possible Soviet intent to utilize this period to brig
LRA units to an even higher state of operational reaJilfew, Dr to detect initial
deployments under maximum communications security.
Since LRA normally maintains a certain degree
of readiness and, therefore, could move into a high state of readiness with little
or no detection, Soviet deception tactics could seriously affect our capabilitY-7
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-7-General Carter asked that the attached
e
o? Tot
WHICH MAY BE USED,
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2 November i ib2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Executive Committee of thi. NC Meeting 11.00 a. a.
2 November 1963
The President opened the meeting by expresiing oc3ce
of Roland Evans article in the Herald Tribune of this morning anc,.
again reported that no one should talk to the Press except
Sylvester and ;tate Press representative.
IdcCone reviewed the CIA Memorandum as summit
in the attached summary, the Watch Committee Report and tha
Memorandum for Watch Committee members NIC t-,2-08671
This was followed by reports of Ball sad Gilpatric
developments in the UN which followed the telegraphic report*
received in the DCI's office prior to the meeting.
Further actions and decisions of the meeting are c-lverc-..
in penciled notes attached.
The CIA was requested to prepare an immediate r POT L
on the effectiveness of the blockade, i.e. the number of ships wh-
have been stopped or turned back, those boarded and allowed 1)
and the shipping which has proceeded through the blockade unr *let e_
The purpose is to have an appraisal of the effectiveness of the
blockade and some indication of its effect on the Cuban econorvy, t q.
JOHNi. McOL
Director
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Attachments to report of Executive Committee Meeting 11:00, ,
4 pages penciled notes
1 page brief re Cambodia-South Vietnam
1 page brief re Laos
Summary - Situation in Cuba 2 Nov. 62
Watch Comm. Report 2 Nov 62 (No. 10)
Memo for Watch Comm member? NIC 2-0867
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