THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010031-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 13, 2004
Sequence Number: 
31
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 30, 1962
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010031-0.pdf186.71 KB
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TOP SECRET Approved'For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80B01676RO01800010031-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA Information as of 0600 30 October 1962 PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010031-0 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010031-0 Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010031-0 25X1 Approved 'For R (ease 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010031-0 I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA Photographic coverage of 29 October on Sagua La Grande sites 1 and 2 and the Remedios site was poor in quality and does not permit any judgments regarding the nature cf A activity there. Yesterday's coverage of the San Cristo- bal and Guanajay sites is not available for interpretation as of 0700 EST. Castro continues his effort to insinuate his own con- ditions into the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Cuban exile organizations are despondent. Castro insists that the US must meet his conditions before he will be satisfied with the US assurance that it will not invade Cuba. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rllease 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80B01676F 001800010031-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Re the Kennedy- 1 ev agreement has plunged mos of the Cuban exile community into despair. According to one UPI dispatch, some of the bore aggressive anti-Castro groups such as Alpha--66 and the Revolutionary Student Directorate have pledged that they will renew their armed fight against Castro. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rel 25X1 12- Approved For The USS is also tryingfto tie the US' hands by suggest- ing in its opaganda that/President Kennedy's commitment not to invade Cuba includes putting a stop to anti-Castro activities by "counterrevolutionaries." viet Mur; ch.' i- a SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MOVES The USSR'is maneuvering to bring its agreement on with- drawal of offensive missiles from Cuba into line with its general disarmament stand. Soviet propaganda continues to work on portrayal of the agreement as a successful Soviet peace initiative, Ibut in Peiping political circles, accord- ing to one Western press report, it is,descred as a "So- Moscow's refusal to allow UN inspection of the actual dismantling of the missiles appears to be at least in part an'attempt to avoid setting a precedent which could be cited in general disarmament negotiations. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told U Thant in his first dis- cussion with him on 29 October that a UN team can be sent to verify the dismantling after the USSR informs the Secur- ity Council that the process has been completed. This fits with the standard Soviet position on inspec- tion--that there will be no inspection of armaments, but only of disarmament, and then only to verify that the dis- armament has been completed. Kuznetsov said the missiles were already being dis- mantled in preparation for shipment. He did not say spe- cifically how'long the process would take, but U Thant re- ceived the impression it would not be more than "a week or two." Kuznetsov also made it clear that the Soviet govern- ment would not permit UN teams to inspect incoming Soviet ships to verify that they were not carrying offensive arms. He noted that Moscow would accept such inspection by Red Cross representatives.from neutral countries if they boarded the Soviet freighters from other Soviet or neutral ships. Kuznetsov offered no objections to a suggestion that inspec- tion be carried out in Ctibanports, if the Cuban government agreed. Approved Fo 25X1 25X1 t( Approved For R The central theme of Moscow's propaganda commentary for the last 24 hours has been to portray Khrushchev's 28 October letter to the President as a new peace initiative by the Soviet leader. Specific indications as to which areas of international dispute may become the subject of new Soviet initiatives for negotiations are lacking, how- ever, The USSR is still attempting to broaden the President's commitment not to invade Cuba. Talk of the alleged anti- Castro activities of Cuban "counterrevolutionaries" contin- ues to appear in bloc broadcasts, with a Soviet commentator asking whether President Kennedy, in permitting the "shady maneuverings" of these counterrevolutionaries to continue, is living up to his guarantee that Cuba will not be invaded. Reaction from Peiping continues to be at variance with the propaganda from Moscow and Eastern Europe. Peiping yes- terday carried an extensive TASS item on Khrushchev's 27 October offer to swap missiles:in Cuba for US missiles in Turkey, but has played down the final agreement. An NCNA review of the October 30 Peiping press says that "top promi- nence" is given to Castro's "important" statement of Sunday upholding Cuba's independence and sovereignty. A Western news agency in Peiping reports that news of Khrushchev's Oc- tober 28 letter was received with "surprise and disapproval, and that the highest political circles in Peiping are talk- ing of a "Soviet Munich. " SOVIET MILITARY STATUS Approved For R4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010031-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010031-0 TOP SECRE f Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP8 01676R001800010031-0 Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010031-0 TOP SECRET