BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR 18 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 18, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/09/11 :CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010013-0
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Approved For Release 2002/09/11 :CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010013-0
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Approved For Release 2002/09/11 :CIA-RDP8dB01676R001800010013-0
October i~3, ; ~%6~'
USIB should address itself to the following problems at or..ce
and be prepared to report at a meeting Friday morning.
The question is to analyze the effects of probable courses oT
action which might be taken by the United States. The courses ai?e
three:
1 . To accept MRBM and other offensive capabilities in C~~b
as a fact of life and do nothing about it.
2. To initiate a total or limited blockade under a declara.ria,-~
of war against Cuba.
3 . To .take military action ranging from:
(a) Take out of the identified MRBMs.
(b) (a) plus concurrent take out of Cuban air car+abili~ie s
- - MIGs, IL 28 s, etc .
(c) (a} plus (b) plus take out of SAM sites and cruise
missile sites.
There are two alternative approaches to 2 and 3 abov.~. ThF~;
(a) Confrontation of ILhrushchev with our knowledge c,f whet is
going on and determine his willingness to cease ~tnd dy_ng
their restrike capability that they cannot strike back at us inflicting
unacceptable damage to us. Therefore, it is thought that the nuclear
offensive power is "in balance" and will remain so until some defensive
mechanisms come into being. In view of this, the question is raised ~,~ i,
whether MRBMs in Cuba alter this particular equation.
This question should. be analyzed as part of USIB's study without
reference to the political implications. As a collateral part of th~> sttic%y
USIB should address itself to the following:
(a) The political implications which involve enhancement of ttSSR
prestige throughout the world and particularly on Latin America ci73c~
Africa by "getting away with the installations"
(b) The probability that this will turn out to be a rallying poi,?
for the Communist minorities throughout Latin America and
conversely result in a loss of prestige to the United States, b~rcause
the Soviets got away with this;
(c) The effect on our position throughout the world and. our frienr.s'
appraisal of our courage and determination in such troubled a eas ~
Berlin, Nationalist China, Korea, etc, if we "buckle under" trs an
established offensive capability in Cuba, which is a situation acre hears
repeatedly said we would not tolerate.
John A. Mc Cone
Approved For Release. 2002/0. 9/11 :CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010013-0
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Approved For Release 2002/09/11 :CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010013-0
A discussion among the principals on October 18th indicatc~~
a probab]e decision, if any action is taken against Cuba, to i?~itiate a
]ignited blockade designed to prevent the importation into Cuha of
additional arms. To do this the United States would make su~-h st~.tr -
ments concerning a condition of war as is necessary to mee?, the eta]
requirements of such a blockade, but a formal "declaration of war
against Cuba" would be avoided if possible and resorted to only if
absolutely necessary.
The blockade could be extended at our discretion to include
POL and possibly a total blockade if Castro persisted in the ~lffensivr~
build -up .
Continued surveillance -would go forward so that we would
know of the siutation within Cuba as it evolved.
The blockade would start possibly on Monday, following ~~
public announcement by the President which would include a displ~~y ~f
photographic intelligence, persuasive notification to our Allies
`_rnon~-the Soviets and the Cubans, but with no prior consultations
with our Allies or any Latin Americans unless it proved necessary
for legal reasons to assemble the OAS and secure the necessary
approval to invoke the Rio Pact.
More extreme steps such as limited air strike, comprehensive
air strike, or military invasion would be withheld awaiting dc~velo~~-
manta. The possibility of more extreme actions has not been
dismissed,however initiating such actions was considered unEVise.
 Approved For Release 2002/09/11 :CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010013-0
The argument in favor of the blockade was principally that it
Initiated a. positive action which could be intensified at our will or
could be relaxed depending upon evolving circumstances. Soviet
reactions are expected to be severe and veryprobably involve a
1> ockade of Berlin and a widespread propaganda effort, however it was
considered that we could have some contrgl over the extent of Soviet
.reaction and in the event of a confrontation, would be negotiating from.
a position of positive action which would be inter'nsified at our own
direction.
The obvious disadvantages are the protracted nature of the
operation, the difficulties of sustaining oizr position in world opinion
because of our own complex of foreign bases and our deployment of
offensive mit~siles and nuclear weapons -and, finally,' the action dc>ea
not reverse the present trend of building an ,offe.nsive cap~.bility within
Cuba nor- does it dispose of the existing missiles, planes, .and nuclear
weapons if the latter now exist there.. '
~ ~ un
Positive military action initi~.ted now appeared/desirable beca.s~s~~
of the impact of current and future: world opinion, .the spectacle of a
powerful nation attacking by surprise attack a weak'and insignif scant
neighbor, engagement by the United States, in. a "surprise attack?" thalz
giving license to others to do the same;. the ind.efend'able positions we
~.
would be in with our allies, and finally, the price to us of,extreme
actions of which the Soviets appear capable of executing.
The above course of action. is by no means` unanimous. rfihe
opinions range from doing nothing on the vne hand,' to immediate military
action an the. other. There exist differences of opinion as to the handling
of Khrushchev, Castro, NATO, the O~A5 and Latin American states;
and. finally, a question of the? "declaration of war" awaits legal cpiniou;
also differences exist concerning- the intensity of the blockade with scame~
advocating a mare comprehensive blockade which would include POL
at the very start. '
I would like guidance from USIB members for my use?in furtl^.er
discussions which are to take place- commencing at 11:00 a,.,m.
October 19th, and will. probably continue thrr~ughout the week ens .
~Jghn A. McCone
Approved For Release 2002/09/11 :CIA-R?P80B01676R001800010013-0