NRO EXCOM MEETINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: LIST

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INDEX
TAB A
TAB B
TAB C
TAB D
.TAB E
Meeting of 26 August 1964
Meeting of 1 September 1964
Meeting of 10 September 1964
Meeting of 29 September 1964
Meeting of 6 October 1964
TAB F
TAB G
TAB H
TAB I
TAB J
TAB K
TAB L
TAB M
Meeting of 14 October 1964
DDCI Memo re "Next NRO ExCom Meeting"
Meeting of 1 December 1964
Meeting of 5 January 1965
Meeting of 12 January 1965
Meeting of 21 January 1965 (DDCI did not attend)
Meeting of 27 January 1965
Meeting of 2 February 1965
04040
USAF review(s) completed.
NRO review(s) completed.
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TAB
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Mr. Knoche: r /
General Carter asked that you do a rrfemo
on the action item in para 5, and then I think he
plans on showing this full memo only to certain
interested people.
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NOTE FOR THE RECMD:
NO DISTRIBUTION WAS MADE OF THE
ATTACHED MEMO. DCI W IN DRAFT
FORM. DR. VTHEELON,
AND MR. BROSS READ THIS COPY HERE
IN THE OFFICE.
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30 January 1965
SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 4:00 p. m., 27 January 1965
1. Present were Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Carter,
Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.
2. The meeting opened with a general discussion of KEY-
HOLE photography of the first package of 1016 and the inability to
interpret exactly what the picture of the Soviet vent hole might
mean. It was decided to wait for analysis of the second bucket
of 1016 plus some possible KH-7 photography before taking any
further action.
4 General Carter reported on the results of the
flight as passed to him. just prior to the meeting. No action
was required and the matter was noted with interest. (Memo attached)
5. Dr. Fubini then brought up the question of the pro-
gram as to security classification for briefings on the Hill in connec-
tion with the budget. Mr., McCone asked the cost of this project and
PUPS 11.
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No decision action was taken as to either of the two programs. I
undertook to determine whether or not it was necessary to have
anything other than a Secret classification for both projects since
they did not involve overhead reconnaissance of denied areas.
Fubini said this would help a great deal in the budget preparations
if it could be done. Action: Dr. Wheelon, please take up with our
Security people and make a recommendation on the security aspects.
Also, please brief the Director and me on the current status of your
discussions with Fubini on these systems in light of the foregoing
remarks.
6. Mr. Vance then brought up the problem of discussing
space and space systems on the Hill, especially when the questions
involved payload. Mr. Vance stated that in appearing before Clint
Anderson's Space Committee, there was considerable probing as to
what was in the payloads and he, Mr. Vance, had ducked any
responsive answer. General Carter stated that it would simplify
our problems of security handling of payloads and contracting in
this program if the United States Government would acknowledge
that they were taking satellite photography. No action was taken.
7. There then followed a general discussion of the TITAN
program, and Fubini staged that the TITAN III with an AGENA
spacecraft would carry approximately 7200 pounds and that they
called this the III-X AGENA. He stated that the TITAN III-C would
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carry 25, 000 pounds and was the III-X without the AGENA but with
three strapped-on boost assisters. For a polar launch it would
carry only 19, 000 pounds. Although it was not quite clear from
the discussion, I got the distinct impression that if it had not
already been done, the DOD was phasing out the TITAN II booster
but not the missile for the TITAN II.
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17. Upon the departure of Dr. McMillan, General Carter told
Secretary Vance that he, General Carter, was sorry if Secretary
Vance had become upset or disturbed at General Carter's remarks.
General Carter said that while Mr. Vance might consider the remarks
intemperate, they were based on General Carter's judgment of the
situation in the light of all facts available to him. General Carter
stated that he felt Mr. Vance was not being adequately informed by
his advisers, did not have either the full or true facts, and that the
views put forward by McMillan and Fubini on which Mr. Vance was
apparently basing his judgment were biased and not in the national
interest.
18. Mr. Vance stated that at no time had he ever made a
decision with a political bias and that everything he had ever done
or said was, in his judgment, in the national interest. General
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Carter stated that he had always operated on the same principle.
The meeting ended on this most unhappy note.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
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Na d'~str.ba't:nv. - c sc ~ ~~ c~~o-f} .
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ADDENDUM #1 to M/R on Meeting w/Secty Vance - 41 Jan 65
I told Vance that 1 would like to have a statement on the appropriations
provided in Fiscal 166 budget for all elements of the Intelligence Community,
i.e. , NSA, crytological services, DIA, mapping, service intelligence units,,
NRO, etc. Vance expressed surprise that through John Bross's staff this
information was not known to me. I pointed out that of the work done by Bros s
with the various units of the Intelligence -Community, it had in effect produced
figures which were claims on the final budget. However what was not known
by Bross or anyone else was the manner in which these claims had been tailored
to the final budget figure of Vance had no knowledge of the final
answer and said that he would have i c develop the figures and review them
with Bross and subsequently with me.
Vance said that he had received, but had not studied, my letter on
the proposed schedule of overflights over Cuba which was the subject of a draft
NSAM he and McNamara had prepared. I said that upon review'I had concluded
that the USIB requirement was about right and since it was met in December and
January by less than 8 flights per month, which seemed to be about the frequency
that the McNamara/Vance NSAM was aimed at, it was my personal view that
the USIB requirements as established on November 25 should stand, b%,.Possiblyl
be amended with respect to the 8 flight per month limitation. I pointed/that
in some months when we run into toad weather this might have to be exceeded
but this would have to be with authority from the Special Group. I said that if
he and McNamara wanted the present requirement established by USIB reviewed,;
I would be glad to bring it up at an early USIB meeting if he so desired, but I
felt it should stand for the reasons outlined. He said he would discuss this with
McNamara and communicate further with me.
JAM/
mfb
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TAB
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opt
14 January 1965
SUBJECT: NRO Ex Com Meeting, 1130 hours, Tuesday, 12 January,
in Secretary Vance's office
PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, General Carter,
Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan
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2. This led Fubini into a discussion of drones and he indicated
that an improvement package would be available in about six to eight
months for the BLUESPRINGS drones which would increase its
altitude to 60, 000 feet as well as increasing its range and speed. He
said that the drones cost I ach. It was agreed that the
project for improvement of the BLUESPRINGS drones would proceed
immediately, that we would make as many feasible improvements as
possible and go as far as we can to increase performance in order to
get above the fighters. It: was also agreed that two more C-130's
would be modified as mother ships. There was a short discussion of
the status of TAGBOARD but no decisions were required or made.
3. Mr. McCone stated that he had just had a cursory glance at
the FY 66 budget, and, while he could not comment in detail on it at
this time, he wanted to make sure that there was nothing in the budget
or in his review of it that indicated a frozen commitment on an item-
by-item basis. He was assured by Secretary Vance and Dr. McMillan
that %v,gg ~eW,#.W V 9ft 17e ~Z$LQ 4~~ @l A~}1 t$m e . It
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was generally agreed that the budget was adequate and perhaps more
than that. Mr. McCone said that if we get a reliable Iwe
might not need as many I Fu ini said that NRO 25X1
it was his understanding that McCone and Vance had agree 25X1
and with an 80% confidence factor this require NRO
Dr. McMillan stated that in order to get
the wrinkles out of and to get some real quality control
into the program he had directed that 25X1
11 fort the next six months and that
experimentation with the I Iwould be delayed for 25X1
the next three months.
4. Dr. McMillan stated, in response to Mr. McConets question,
that he had not looked at the E since November and he 25X1
therefore could not report on developments, but that he was being
briefed next week in full and would be able to report after that. He
stated that th 25X1
I and he contemplated reconvening the Land
panel to make a formal review of the project. Mr. McCone and Mr.
Vance both expressed their interest and stated that they intended to
participate fully in this review.
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NRO
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7. Dr. McMillan asked me to check on the
since it was his understanding that the General Electric and Lockheed
contracts with the Agency had not been modified to allowl
access for systems engineering. I stated that I would. (The present
contracts which expire in March do include and will in-
clude them when renewed. The contracts which expire in August
are being continued by letter which do not include but
when formal contracts are negotiated will so include it. There has
been no attempt, however, to excludel rom information
or access, the written contract is simply a formality. I asked Dr.
Wheelon to inform Dr. McMillan accordingly.
9. Dr. McMillan stated that he had reviewed the proposed
I agreement and thought it was generally all right but might
need clarifying. I told him I would sign it and send it over and
hoped we could get on with it in a hurry.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
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MSC:bec (14 Jan 65)
Distribution:
Cy #1 - DDCI (via DCI)
Cy #2 - ER via Ex Dir
Cys #3 and 4 - O/DCI
Cy #5 - DD/S&T
Cy #6 - D/NIPE
Cy # 7 - Mr. Lundahl, D/NPIC
Cy # 8 - DD/I
Cy # 9 -
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'Aw
4 December 1964
Have reviewed your minutes of the NRO Executive Committee
meeting and feel they are o. k. As you know, I signed the letter to
Vance approving the establishment of a Study Group and Task Force
on reconnaissance satellites with the caveat that I have not checked
the terms of reference, but would do so and offer comments.
I think CIA should appoint very competent, objective men to
both the Steering Group and the Task Force. What about Rod Scott? --
if this would not involve a conflict of interest. What I want to do is
to put forth top men and then examine the credentials put forth by NRO,
Air Force, etc.
I think the assignment of Lundahl is o. k. but it should be
cleared out with Cline. The reason I brought this question up was to
put a stop to McMillan's going directly to CIA staff people and not to
their supervisors or superiors.
I have reviewed the McMillan communication on 25X1
but I think you should discuss this with Vance. What is
involved here, is an NRO decision approved by the Executive Committee
to initiate a program, money set aside and contracts let and then, all
of a sudden, McMillan and Fubini decide I land 25X1
therefore want to wash it out. They give no consideration, or even
think about, the fact that one of the basic parts of the stud by three
competent contractors E- I I don't think 25X1
that they should turn this one o unti we have at least fully explored
the subject.
But what is even more important, and you might tell this to
Vance, is that you and I this afternoon, I Iwhich is a totally
inadequate estimate because of lack of intelligence and the above-
mentioned project, if successful, will close the gap.
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25X1 I think you
can make quite a point of this as it is one more example of the theory
that "two heads are better than one" -- so let's not cut off one head
at this stage of the game.
Dictated but not read by
JOHN A. McCONE
Director
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 2 December 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR ThE RECORD
SUBJECT: NRO ExCorn. Meeting At 3:30 on 1 December 1964
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position unequivocally tha, the NRO Ex Corn had served, and s40a,3,
1
s
at this level, it was a desirable thing to do. Mz. Vance eta e
with Vance but certainly in the interests of Governmental operations
t d hi
>rw of no requirexrient to clear the Mcivlillan report with him or
even when they were contrary to Vance'*. Mr. McCone said that he
Vance and presented his views to the President's Board and others
questioned the appropriateness of either Vance or McLane reviewing
- ~-- ----a asst
to a ain present his views to the President's Board. Lit. -rubani
management procedures and give necessary leadership, guidance,
and support to Director, NRO. He pointed out that the report had
been sent to Mr. McCone for review xr:d had not yet been delivered
to the President`s Board no:r had he personally read it. Mr. McCone
stated that the views expressed by McMillan were diametrically
opposed to two presentations he had made to the President's Board
and if the report went forward in this form. he would be constrained
McJ~3amara had established 14RO ExCoai in an e#ort to improve
appeared visibly shaken and it was quite apparent he was not aware
of the phraseology McMillan, used. Vance agreed that be and. Mr..
2. Mr. ivicCone opened the rnesting by quoting appropriate
excerpts from McMillan's proposed report to the President's Board
in connection with management procedures for the NRO. Mr. Vance
1. Present were Mr. Vance, htr? McConS, General Carter,
Dr. g'ubini, and Dr. McMillan.
should continue to look to it. for his guidance. Mr. McCone agreed.
au
continue to servo, as a very use:Eul function and that McArIi1
3. Dr. McMillan then brought eip the message In can
nection with the review of photographic processing facilities around
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 the world. lie stated that Ccdonel Ohimeler is the head of the
processing facility at I am not quite sure why
McMillan brought this subject up uniess he thought it was contro-
versial. I pointed out that we had agreed to go ahead with this
review and, specifically, that any recommendations for changes
should be processed to USIB for final approval since the intel-
ligence community had printry interest in this matter. (This
phraseology was used also irk my :letter of concurrence.) Dr.
McMillan and the others agreed that this was a proper procedure.
4. Mciv:il.lan then brought up message I in which he
proposes to test determine whether or not they have
an operational capability and can quality for the processing of
KEYHOLE film from "womb to tomb. " (Although this had given us'
some trouble initially, we have gone along with it.) I informed
McMillan that we had gone along with this study and while we bad
made no commitment as to the allocation of resources for future
use, we would expect any substantive changes between Eastman
Kodak and be thoroughly surfaced and discussed with
us since we xa a major responsibility in this area. There was no
objection to this procedure.
5. Mcly illan then displayed the K}[-4 mosaic of Cuba which
indicates clearly that while it can be of some help in Cuban cur-
veillance, it is a long cry from adequate surveillance to meet the
needs of the intelligence community.
6. Mr. McCone pointed out that he had asked NPIC and the
.CIA staff to conduct a thorough review of our KH-4 photography
capabilities to determine means of getting more information from
it as well as comparing it with U-Z photography. In response to
Mr. McCones's question as to the launcher to be act up at Cape
Kennedy, McMillan stated that Mr. McNamara had said if Mr.
McCone's provisos were met, he. McNamara. would go along
with it. It appears. therefore, that DOD will establish a launching
pad at Cape Kennedy although it has not yet been programitm ed.
7. General Carter then passed out the SKYLARK status report
which did not generate any substantive discussion.
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 8. Yubini then reported on some budget adjustments he had
made with the Bureau of the 'Budget. (:please note that these
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were unilateral adjustments and apparently unknown to Vance
and Mr. McCone.) Fubini said he reduced the drone
purchase from twenty to fifteen and felt sure that this would not
technical appliances connected thetrewith. le said they had knocked
--
contract to a white contract aaui. intended to make some savings in
give CIA any trouble. He said they had transferred the 417 weather
Dr. McMillan continued to be evasive and both Fobini and Vance
expressed concern as to just where the program stood. Mr. McCone
canted out that he and Vance had agreed to go ahead oni 25X
cussion of just what the programming and funding status was. 25
I his thee brought up a die. I
off F
J. e.. fund the developmental stage
in the neighborhood o then take a good.
hard look at it with t h e experts a n d whether to go forward
McMillan was directed to lsy, out a schedule of various points of
development at which decisions can be made on proceeding or can
celing. (We must be sure to follow up on this. )
however, suffering terininaUon costs in the event of cessation.
t)r. iubini was finally
abbe to pin MclAillan down to the fact that re were a number of
checkpoints at which the program could be reviewed and
decisions could be node on whether or not to proceed -- probably,
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k! F, ri FS
10. Mr. A.acCone then referred to the proposed establishment
steeri=:g group and a. task force to look into. overall recon-
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naiseance requlrenients and plane as proposed in a letter from
Vance to hJcCone and as already implemented by 4 message from
Mtchlillan. Mr. McCone stated his feeling that this task force, if
organized, should not duplicate nor overlap studies and areas of
responsibility of other Covtiernrvent agencies. He specifically
mentioned USIB and COMDR. He referred to the fact that
ha-d already been turned over to contractors for
eve opment and that these two atadies should not be included in the
task force and steering group analysis and that research and develop-
ment currently ,.inder way with contractors should not be disturbed.
He said, therefore, that the terms of reference of the task force and
the steering group needed to be revised to accord to his desires and
he would look forward to seeing the proposed revisions. He also
stated his concern that Director. NRC), was. addressing invitations
directly to Lundahl, the Director of MPIC, when Lundahl was in a
chain of ccnamand which included Cline. Carter, and himself, Mr.
McCoue. Such invitations, he said, should therefore come to the
Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Vance pointed out his agree-
ment to Mr. .I tcCone's concerns? Dr. Fubini stated that this task
force In fact had been generated by a JCS statement of military
regturement for a quick reaction satellite, a requirement based on
statements from SAC. The JCS wasted teckaical advice from the
NR.C) as to whether or not this could be done and Dr. Fubini said
he would try to lot therm know by February 1965. Dr. Fubini made
it clear that the whole purpose of the steering group and task force
was to address itself to this problem and Mr. McCone pointed out,
in accordance with his draft letter, that there might well be other
areas that the task force and steering group could look to in the
overall interests of the reconnaissanco program. (Mr. Mc Cone
should forward to Vance his written response as contained
draft from which he read.)
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 U. Dr. McMillan reported on Table V - J?58 engine require-
scents and stated that Colonel Ledford
t the re+qui:ran en~ were
getting together to determine just
to cone to an agreement an reco.e irnendations as to how we procaeed
41,
MM3arshiU S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Dep+aty Director
MSC? blp
Distribution:
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Copy ?- - l)DCI
Copy 3 - DD/S&T
Copy 4 - ilI NIP E:
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Next NRO i Com Meeting
076R001700150001-9
16 October 1964
1. You and Secretary Vance agreed that the NRO '65 budget
program would be discussed at next Tuesday's NRO #xCom
meeting on 20 October.
2. You will recall that at the previous meeting on the '65
NRO budget you had available staff rr.embers to assist you,
specifically Bross and Wheelon.
3. I cannot urge too strongly that you have Bross and Wheelon
attend this upcoming meeting and that whatever other staff assist-
ants, such as John Clarke or rr;errsbers of DD/S&T as may be
necessary, also attend. You are entitled to the same budgetary
advice as anyone else.
4. Attached is your memorandum of 23 July to McMillan on
the '65 plan (Tab A), his response of August 14th (Tab B), Wheelon's
comments of 25 August (Tab Q. You will recall that Secretary
Vance and I had agreed that we should continue the '65 budget
presentations as soon as we were able to do so upon your return.
This appears to be the first opportunity.
5. Specifically as regards: Wheelon's memo of 25 August, ray
comments on the following numbered paragraphs are:
Paragraph 1: Agree
Paragraph 2: Agree
Paragraph 3: Restoration of funds to Program B is
considered to be a major, unfinished problem.
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Para raph 4: YE bile 'Vance has agreed to sending the
organization to the West Coast, he has made no
commitment to funding the contracting through Program B.
This remains to be agreed.
Paragraph 5: I think this needs further technical analysis.
Paragraph 6: Agree
Paragraph 7: Agree
Paragraph 8: Agree.
Paragraph 9: Agree
Paragraph 10: Needs considerably more information before
you are in a position to comment.
Paragraph 11: This is a very fuzzy area for which we do
not seem to be getting proper answers from NRO.
Paragraph 12: Agree. We have inadequate information
upon which you can base a decia_on.
Paragraph 13: Agree
Paragraph 14:
Paragraph 15: In, view of SKYLARK and the extraordinary
measures being taken. in this program, I feel quite certain that
the program funds will be inadequate.
Paragraph 16: 'While the conversion pro razn has been
agreed, I am not up to date on its progress. s
preparing a status report on this.
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Paragraph 17: No problem
Paragraph 18: As regard* the
funding problem at the moment has been solved although the
interference by McMillan in the managerial aspects remains
a continuing problem?
Paragraph 19: No comment
Paragraph 20: No comment
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
Distribution:
Copy I - DCI err/attachcaeiits
py 2 - DDCI
Copy 3 - Executive Director
Copy 4 - DD/ S&T
Copy 5 - D/RIPE
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8. Dr. McMillan stated that the manner in which Wheelon
was letting contracts without McMilian's prior approval prevented
McMillan from conducting an, objective review as well as injecting
his own thinking into the projects. He added that this procedure
also prevented the contractors from contributing anything such as
new ideas into the program. lie stated that this was a Wheelon
project and that the contractors were inhibited in adding their
talented contributions and thoughts to the basic idea.
9. General Carter stated that it was incomprehensible to him
,
how five high -paid Government officials could be continually,
arlZuing about the precise management arrangements for a
program, when other programs costing
vrithin the NRC) bad little if any supervision at
all, especta y trom these officials.
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10. Mr. McCone stated his complete and total disgust with
the entire NRO arrangements and especially with the arrogant
intransigence of Dr. McMillan. He said he could not see how.
NRO could ever work properly with Dr. McMillan in charge of
the program. He stated that Dr. McMillan's activities throughout
their association had bordered on deceit in many instances. Dr.
- -
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......,....- ____ -..--- -
his fair-haired boy Wheelon, and that Dr. McMillan
rotectin
g
p
had asked for such statements in writing. Mr. McCone stated
that as far as he was concerned, the Department of Defense had
ne ed on the basic NRO .agreement as well as subsequent agree-
16 60001700150001-9
re
merits he had made in good faith with Vance, Fubini, and McMillan
and that he, Mr. McCone, was thoroughly fed up with the whole
procedure. There was no further comment and the subject was
changed.
11. Mr. McCone distributed copies of the weekly SKYLARK
report but no discussion ensued.
12. General Carter asked Dr. McMillan's assistance in
getting some of the new fast eo that the
could work on it General
e3 i m from
Carter stated twat IIhad been unable to get any o
He h'
pointed our.
nique depended in arse measure on this fast film which was alleged
to be 60% faster than anything presently in existence and perhaps
might even have a factor of two to four times as great. He said
while he could understand some reluctance on the part of
because of proprietary interests, it should be noted that
is not in the film manufacturing business and that there could well
be some other reason for failing to provide the film. Dr. McMillan
stated that he was sure the only reason was that the film was not
available in sufficient quantity but that he would look into it and see
what could be done.
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14. The meeting then broke up in general disarray.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General. USA
Deputy Director
MSC: b1p
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
Copy 2 DDCI
Copy 3 - D/ NIPE
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4. 1 stated that I had not seen the panel report on security
but that if CIA members had agreed to it and as soon as I had
checked it out in the Agency with my own Security people and
it gave me no problem. I was prepared to accept it. I stated.
however, that this was not prejudging the merits of having Greer
complete the three contracts in question. McMillan said he took
-a. dim view of holding up' projects on the basis of security when in
was not the matter questioned. I stated clearly for
it
y
fact secur
the record that, so far as I knew, the Director had not authorized
any changes of any kind in the CORONA Program and that it had
25X1 been agreed that no changes would be made without DCI approval.
This included contracts as well as security procedures. I further
_
hat
~
s 4e? i
25X1 I had reiterated this state meent. confirmed that this was
his understanding and this w:ts the bass for a letter he had fur-
ld
d
to
.wished McMillan. I stated that I had called McMillan an
conversation with F----]and that there should have
25X1 hi
f xr
y
m o
nderetasndin McMillan then quoted from a letter
i
su
been nor
25X1 Greer had gotten from I tending to substantiate McMfllar-'e
claim that Mr. McDonald. our contracting officer, had instructed
25X1 I Inot to sign the contracts. I stated I had not seen the
t __..
ld'S instructions to Lockheed were
McDona
identical with my instructions to that it would }ilea sure
25X1 me to get a copy of the IILetter. cmillan said he would
furnish me a copy. McMillan on said that it was his clear
25X1 understanding that taking I Ion in the CORONA Program
included adjustment of the systems integration and systems
engineering contract with Lockheed so that it would be an Air
Force contract. He stated that it involved nineteen people out of
Lockheed and that the contract had reviously been Air F'orce's
All he wanted to do now
but last year had been handled by had
id this
l
an sa
was to get it back under Air Force auspices. McMil
25X1 was part and parcel of the unction and he could not
operate without it under Aix Force auspices. I stated that I had
ntion of authorizing this kind of contract without Mr.
t
i
n
e
na
McCone's approval and, further, I had no intention of establishing
the kind of CIA backstopping and input that had previously been
agreed on the West Coast wader these circumstances. I stated
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that participation in the CORONA Program was a two-way street
and required not only clean intent but cooperation as well. I
stated that I bad no intention whatsoever of building up a CIA
asset an the West Coast to leave it out in left field and that it was
my clear understanding that we had agreed to consolidate the CIA
assets under to have a definite and clear-cut input
into the CORONA Program across the boards and, specifically,
to cover the entire payload w1rxich was CIA responsibility. Fubird_
interjected at this point to indicate that I was welching on a prior
agreement and that the understanding was purely to send one or
two men to the West Coast to work with Greer's organization to
learn more about the program and increase their competence.
? I refused to accept the word "welching" and required him to with-
draw it which he did threefold. McMtllan stated that it was his
understanding that I was to develop a plan by which
and others would go to the West Coast. I stated that I had such a
plan but the Director had Left, in such a hurry on his trip that I
had not had time to clear it with him; that as soon as he returned
I would develop the full particulars and inform the Executive
Conunittee of what we plan to do. I reiterated that I was not pre-
pared to establish a group or., the 'West Coast to "watch the parade
go by, " but that they would have full responsibility for all security
and all contracting presently handled by CIA and, in addition,,they
would sign off on and deliver a complete payload to the agency
responsible for tying it into the booster and firing it. In addition,
they would follow along throughout the entire process to ensure that
the marriage was properly consummated. I stated that I was not
reneging on Mr. McCone's prior reluctant acceptance of the majority
view to Val in the act although. we were still of the opinion
it was a bad idea. I stated that I was not agreeing to the Stellar Index
Camara changes at this time because samy main concern was the col-
lection of intelligence and that we had had a remarkably successful
CORONA Program throughout the months since k "y. It was my under-
standing that the changes proposed for SIC would probably not be
effective until late next spring and that they were designed primarily
to augment a military mapping program.. Fubini confirmed this
and I said I was not prepared to take the risk of messing up a
good intelligence collection .program until our technicians and
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experts had fully signed off on the now proposals as being totally
feasible and in keeping with intelligence collection. McMillan
said he had written in June of 1963 to Greer and Ledford, telling
them to get on board this program and work jointly on it and that
CIA bad had every opportunity to be a full participant in the new
program but, had been uncooperative throughout. I reiterated
my position that I was not here to indulge in vituperation and
histrionics but I was here to protect the interests of the intel-
ligence community and I was not convinced that this type of
activity would so protect it.
5. Vance asked me to take a look at the panel report on
security handling of the contracts at the Advanced Projects Area
and if this gave me no problem. to see if I could not go along
with the systems integration transfer to Lockheed as an Air Force
contract and the small harderare contract. I told him if
it did not involve the payload which nobody seemed to know). I
would discuss it with my people and see if it gave us a problem.
McMillan said it was his belLef that it did not in any way involve
the payload but was purely the systems engineering of tying the
payload into the booster. However, he was not sure of this and
would have to check it him self. As can be seen from the fort-
,going. the discussion was relatively inconclusive and I made no
commitments except to look at the problems in the light of this
discussion. Action: DDIS&T to advise me so that we can
thoroughly clue in Mr. McCune prior to any other meetings.
Also, advise .me as to any agreements we have made on security
handling in connection with the panel report mentioned by Dr.
McMillan. Also, to got the copy of the Lockheed letter and
analyze it as to facts. It is perfectly apparent that NRO and
McMillan are keeping very close book on all of the CIA actions
.and responses to their requests.
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7. Dr. McMillan handed. me an envelope containing a copy
of the memorandum to Dr. 1theelon reference I
asked if I should read it now or take it back with me. Mr. Vance
said It did not snake any difference since it had already gone.
This indicates clearly that Mc .iillan's memo to Wheeloh was
cleared in advance by Vance. I did not read it at the table but
merely took the envelope. Action: DDCI to talk to DCI. This
again throws in the gauntlet on how DCI intends to operate the
DD/S&T to prepare briefing memo for DC!
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with particular reference to the memo signed by Mr. McCone
directing DDIS&T in specific detail how they were to conduct
the program.
8. 1 distributed copies of the 28 September report on
talus There was no particular discussion except
s
LAft
25X1
Y
Fubini pointed out on the page of "Decisions" that items 3 and 10
- - - ----ti__'-- o... 11,a .,tw Af
electronic countermeasures had been obtained whereas in fact
ld them that a COMDR estimate had indicated
I t
d
o
none existe
. the necessity of making from three to six flights almonnthly through-
general coverage of
out the next calendar year to get the "me
the U- ;'s as required by USIB, and that this would total 53 suc-
cessful flights from November through October.
25X1
10. bring the conference Mr. Sylvester asked Mr. Vance
for permission to send Pentagon accredited foreign press to the
demonstration at Edwards. After some discussion, he and I
agreed this would be all right.
11. 1 discussed the subject of -x.dth Mr.
Vance and he agreed that we ahoul go ahead an ` y' m Without
25X1
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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
MSC:blp
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
Copy 2 - DDCI
Copy 3 DD/S&T
Copy 4 - D/ NIPE
Copy 5 - ER via Executive Director.
Copy 6 - EA/ DDCI
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 3:30 p. m., on Thursday,
10 September
PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, Dr. McMillan,
and General Carter
1. The meeting opened with distribution to each member
of a copy of "SKYLARK Status Report for Week Ending 4 Sep-
tember. " Each member read the entire report thoroughly and
questions were asked and answered b those resent. Great
interest was shown in the report.
fications and estimated completion dates and to include a listing
of the actual modifications required. The general consensus was
that modifying to U-2H was probably as far as we should go.
Action: Colonel Ledford to prepare such a plan and show it to
by Colonel Ledford. This plan is to develop a schedule of modz-
t was also agree a e y
Johnson should be Mn orm iat the Executive Committee of
NRO laid great stress on this project and was following it
closely on a weekly basis through the SKYLARK weekly reports.
Action: DD/S&T to follow up on the above two requirements
and report results.
2. The future U-2 program was then discussed and it
was generally agreed that the best solution to the problem
would be to modify existing SAC aircraft on a reasonable turn-in
basis without establishing a crash production line -- say on the
basis of modifying four per year. It was also agreed that we
should see whether or not some other contractor was in a position
to do the work on a much cheaper basis than Lockheed. Both of
these agreements are to be considered in a plan to be submitted
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General Carter prior to any further action with the NRO Executive
Committee. Action: The charts used by Colonel Ledford at the
prior briefing were supposed to have been reproduced, at my
direction, on 8 x 10 sheets and provided all members of the
Executive Committee. Mr. Vance was provided some sort of
photographic copy about 3 x 4 inches, and these were not satis-
factory. I gave him the book of 8 x 10 reproductions provided me
by DD/S&T and he retained that book. I want to know why my
instructions were not comp:ied with, and soon.
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3. Dr. McMillan then briefed on the problems causing the
I and indicated that they centered
around command and control instructions being reliably received --
apparently electrical malfunctions of some sort. The latest date
5. Dr. McMillan reported that he did not yet have signa-
tures of all members of the Land Committee on the Land report
but that it was generally encouraging as to the prospects for
Certainly he was all ready to proceed on a Phase I type of oper-
ation, and it was agreed that when the final Land report was sub-
mitted, Dr. McMillan would review it and report to the Executive
Committee prior to going ahead with any big program.
6. Mr. McCone then reported that in following up on sug-
gestions made at previous meetings of the Executive Committee,
a plan had been developed to establish a small CIA element to
assist General Greer by having this element co-located with
General Greer and conduct CIA CORONA activities on the West
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301
25'X1
Mr. Mc Cone said he contemplated having
{ erations. in addition to being the head of the
would also provide a single point
of contact for Greer and for Washington on CIA CORONA
matters. He would provide advice. and guidance to General
Greer, would be responsible for all CIA contracting and all
securit responsibilities. In addition, he would control the
CIA
.
25X1 All of this was designed to give a single
cohesive input to the CORONA program from the CIA and to
revit 1erQ'fr, p~,arpa do as;bt ragram.
would b Gral Greer. would
h ve ~,~ FKgea ry namon back to the DD/S&T here in
Washington so that he could obtain additional advice, guidance,
and assistance from our Head uarters competence as might be
25X1 needed. We might augment by the assignment of
a couple of additional technical people at a later date. Mr. Mc Cone
pointed out that the successful operation of this plan required a
clear-cut understanding of the Executive Committee as well as
clear-cut instructions to Greer. I stated that these instructions
should include participation of the CIA in all contractor/ supplier
meetin s a satisfactory working relationship with
g
25X1 ho now has a systems engineering role, and a firm
position in the Configuration Control Board or whatever new
coordination mechanism is established for the system. Mr. Vance
and Mr. Mc Cone agreed that the veto concept of the Configuration
Control Board was not working properly and that the Control oard,
O-~t
g
~~ rot in acrrec,mPnt should
vs to e rear decisiona~srJClrrtht-eerent"iese`a e
' y Waste -l l') All of these points seemed to be agreed by
one present but it was decided that I would prepare a memo
ever
y
for Dr. McMillan establishing the working relationships as we see
them and proposing the type of guidance General Greer should
receive from Dr. McMillan. Such a memo is being prepared and
I will furnish the Executive Committee copies of it. Action:
25X1
25X'1
5X1
General Carter to prepare appropriate memo.
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in place in several weeks to be in charge of the C
.. ei-i :icon rnig~rt 3 e-_tv-i,e-m&de---ba the
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7. Mr. McCone then brought up the p of competing
contracts being negotiated by General Greer
He specifically mentioned ^?
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
.
ns
s
and that Greer may have misunderstoo
McCone said that a senior executive of I I whom he knew
indicated that he may have been responsible for Green's actions
Mr.
tructions
i
d hi
had telephoned him inquiring as to a proposed con-
ersonally
,
p
h a eared to be in direct competition with
hi
c
ith Greer w
tract w Uk!
a CIA pro ram
Dr. McMillan
7-r 4-J
he contract and would look
t
#
y
ac
e of this
said he was not awar into it right away. Mr. Mc Cone pointed out that we had alread
contracted for a backup study
- ~ __ ..
a
s one o
`'9
a
y
s w
1
P
one required by CIA until McMillan reports back.
N-tL
C44U -4L
re orted back to the next Executive Committee meeting. Action: C"
y.
h ~
d-Sig e to do would like to have this gone into thoroughly by Dr. McMillan and.
pnsitiQu..Ahksi two separate agencies ~'-e negotiati c cq XII-q
X 1- 4-u
He said he
c
ensure success, he thought
encourage the greatest diversity in thinK projects in uruar
8. There was general discussion of the USIB actions at
the morning meeting same date, particularly with regard to the
crisis satellite. Nothing new was added that had not already been
discussed at USIB. Both M:r. McCone and Mr. Vance thought that,
perhaps we were looking at the same target too often in the Soviet
Union and Dr. McMillan confirmed that he had the same impression.
In other words, we should be careful that COMOR was not getting
into a repetitive rut, doing the same thing over and over again
with inadequate imagination as to new areas, new targets, and
frequency of observation. Action: please take a look
at this and give me an informal memo.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy. Director
-"Dictated but not read by General Carter
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1 September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
. SUBJECT: NRO Ex Cora Meeting, 3:00 to 4:00 p.m.
1 September
25X1
Present were: Mr. McCune? Mr. Vance, General Carter, Dr. McMillan,
and Dr. Iubini
decision.
reproduced in miniature -- ft x 10 -- and provided to the members of
Ran Corny. There was considerable clarifying discussion without major
lity of the CIA. He also compared the operational capabilities of the
11-2 with those of the A?12. (Thee charts for this briefing are to be
1. Colonel Ledford, the Director of Program S of the NRO,
presented to the Committee his views on the upcoming requirements
for Q-''s for overhead reconnaissance of denied areas as a respoasibl-
Mr. McCone expres.js.d the opinion that we should undertake
conversion program rather than establishing a new production line
and this appeared to be generally agreed by all. No decision was taken
however, because Mr. Vance wished to review the charts at greater
length, particularly the one. on cast and capabilities of the various U-2
types and the one on possible options. It was agreed to review the
matter at the meeting next week and probably take decision them
ACTION: Colonel Ledford to reproduce and distribute the charts
on as possible and prepare any recommendations for my use for
be meeting next week.
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ILLEGIB
subordinate echelons of another agency. no said that We cwtvwx 01-C
Z. Mr. Vance then brought up the subject of CORONA contracting,
and pointed out that there had been a misunderstanding as between the
meeting of August llth and the meeting of August 26th concerning transfer
of contracting responsibility for CORONA, but that he thought this mis-
understanding had been cleared up by the exchange of correspondence
between himself and General Carter. Mr. McCone then stated that the
problem was much more basic than the simple transfer of contract
responsibility. H. said he k"d a tressed himself in prior memoranda
to Mr. McNamara and to n an organisational changes of the
NRO as proposed by the President's Board, and that be was firm in the
positions stated therein. He felt that the NRO organization was basically
wrong and that it crested impossible situations when an official of one
agency was placed in the position of giving orders to and directing
worked perfectly when an agency head had overall responsibility for a
program and was able to teak other agencies as complete entities for
r- thous of that a resno neibility. Be said, therefore. that the NRC1
a aheiulcl be organized so that the CIA with its competence could be tasked
1 for certain responsibilities and that the Air Forces with its competence
t ztie+slarly the Systernns Command) could be tasked for other teepee:'
?
Be stated that obviously the authority xna,-et accompany, cedarponsibi -
lili
s
e
.
Iity. Be said that the NRO with a staff of
and General Greer,
h
t
25X1
an the West Coast, with a staff of perhaps
c
could not possibly ma
25X1
1C-1. i r?as
in depth and competence true trexn*n ua assets of enexs
and until the entire NRO organizational Concept was worked out properly.
interest of the intelligence collection program. Mr. McCone then said
that he would propose no changes in any of our existing procedures unless
o
procedure as a ~ttly established if uns was Sr. hda~ a aau
iFS+..I.,0L .. . - -_- - ---s s& --- sLe..~I.,..s anrs.akA th&t the con..
management concepts he was prepared to continue the CORONA contracting
? is desixe:
t;
-
- -
and Mr. M stated ? t aCcordagge W 1-%L1 SA RS 25X1
he would probably cut the -cost of the program by Be 25X1
stated that he would relue:antl accept the decision 25X1
Mr. Mc one are agree o tals
- y astxnu
nt... F.>.... -~,....~ ..Pa, _ - - - _-
- -
tracting responsibilities wn)uld remain as currently assigned. Dr. McMifls
-- . - .. - - -...J__ ~..ai.....st.. s..~ !"[n'Q4 nNA
at week
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After the meeting, Mr. McCune directed me to take these actions
ILLEGIB
He said he wanted to
enter s new y developing oping phase with complete and total objectivity
and to provide the greatest possible assistance to the CORONA program.
ACTION: I have already already -discussed this matter with DD/S&T and
they will present me a first draft of a plan by 2:00 p.m. tomorrow for
discussion with Mr. McCone prior to his departure.
3. Mr. McCone "ported that as a result of his directive of
August 14 to Dr. Wheelon and my following directive of 27 August
which he had approved. Dr. 'Yt'heelon had prepared his comprehensive
plan of action for He said that in keeping
with his responsibilities or eepiug ea O Ex Corn informed. he
herewith handed over to each Ex Corn member a copy of the plan he
had approved for These were handed out but
of read at the meeting.
4. Upon being asked by Mr. McCone when the Land report L- I `
would be ready. Dr. McMillan stated be had received it this afternoon
and that Land had asked him to get the signatures of the other Panel
members on It. Until this was done. be did not feel free to give the
report. any general distribution but said he would furnish Mr. McCune
a copy for his information as soon as be got back to his office.
5. Mr. McCone reported on the OXCART directive for a SKYLARK
capability by early November and stated that he had arranged for a weekly
report so that the NRO Ex Corn would be kept currently advised of progress.
ACTION: DD/S&T to prepare this report for presentation each week.
6. As Mr. McCone was leaving the meeting, he reminded Dr. Fubini
to read and absorb the two memoranda to which he had referred earlier,
with a possible view to discueising them at the meeting next week. Dr.
E ini held up, the papers and said, TIE 0 mean thee see ? "
and ~.
1004
C T. Mr. McCone replied, "No. I mean my memoranda to
to, McNamara those you have there are already
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 Approved Foeleas
27 August 1964
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting of 26 August
1. Present were Secretary Vance, myself. Dr. Fubini,
and Mr. Kiefer. Both Fubini and Vance had left a speech-
writing meeting in order to hold the PRO ExCorn meeting which
lasted one hour.
2. Vance asked if there was any unfinished business
that we needed to discuss other than the FY '65 and '66 budgets.
Flee felt that most of the NRO problems could eventually
be solved by this type of informal discussion between Vance and
in epteznbeer and October of '64. FabinI stated that at previous
to contract for the CORONA payload, than fund8 should bee avai1-
ablee since present funds cover only the contracts that terminate
might discuss today. I pointed out that if CIA I. going to continue
advisers and that before proceeding with the remainder of the
program, those briefings should be hold. Vance agreed but
asked specifically if there was anything on the budget that we
for additional briefings for Mr. McCemo, myself, and our
had been built up over the ;past several years, and a change in
these relationships would not occur overnight. Vance agreed
and said we should work toward theme objectives.
3. 1 pointed out to Vance that the response from Mc}4ililan
to Mr. McCone'e budget mernaranduzu clearly indicated the need
with NRO was the attitude and the frustrations to the Agency rimr.
i agreed in part but pointed out that the major probtem
meetings Mr. McCone had reluctantly agreed that since we
majority wanted as Systems Manager for CORONA.
he had reluctantly gone along with it but pointing out his distaste
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 established be utilised in all pertinent NRO programs. Fubini
denied that we had the comet once, especially on the West
Coast, and stated that to all, intents and purposes the Agency
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25
Proararn B. I stated that I felt it was essential that the high
exercise included the transfer of contracting responsibility to
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or the procedure. Fubini amid that the whole package for this
Greer should do it. Upon being questioned by Vance; Fubini
pointed out that it was not absolutely necessary to transfer the
was an unsatisfactory arrangement for him and he wanted one
individual who could be responsible to him and to Mr. McCone
for a complete program. Us thought that this should be Greer
and that if it required Greer to do the contracting as well, then
Coordination Board activities and Vance pointed out that this
contracting to Greer although it vas probably neater to do so.
4. 'Mr. Vance read from. a memorandum for record dated
12 August by tcMUlan in which McMillan stated that Mr. Mc Cone's
agreement on accepting an 3 sterns Manager also
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cons er
for Tuesday morning and I charged .ilia/S&T (OSA) with preparing
an up-to-date briefing on this .matter.
mee
4.4 g a
+4 of the A-l2 fleet. This meeting is tentatively set
an this matter both as to requirements and as to costs a
avallabilitiess. Vance agreed to have this presented at the
tin r~eea Tuesday and thought that it should also include
to Most CIA needs. H-iowetverr, he said that what we needed first
was a areq~atrements study to indicate just vet the needs were
and that he had heard nutty varying figures, I pointed out that
before we made the final decision an conversion or new produc-
tion, I wanted the committee to hear the analysis we havemad*
were satisfied that a delineation of workload and responsibilities
was agreed by Mr. McCone. Dr. Fubini pointed out that, much
to his horror. SAC was building a very fancy system for proces
sing R-l2 photography and that it had gone so far before he lcntew
about it that he could not stop it. I "de no coca ment.
b. 1 then stated that as decision must be made very soon as
to whether we are going to convert W VC U.?2'e to CIA modifica-
tions for the CIA inventory or whether -we were going to purchase
U-2L's. Vane said he had already made the decision to tr lace
SAC U-2'e with RD-57's
would take a look at the proposal to send personnel from the
Agency out to be advisory in Greer.
5. I then m entioneed that we continue to have problems as
between the allocation of responsibility from # RG to eastman
Kodak and Westover, particularly since there appears to be a
steadily increasing workload an Eastern Kodak while we are
required to hold them to a fixed personnel ceiling. I said that
this is a problem that rust be resolved and that we would not be
have to check it out with m?ir records an wy , __ .~ ... x
P0B016Z001 700150001-9
included the contract changes as proposed in. Mc Ulan's original
tago. This vas all news to trio and I told Mr. Vance I would
par
d i r c Cone.
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8. I then referred to the letter that I had sent Mr. Vance
reference speed trials using 121 or 129 and he agreed that
from what I had said, this prop mal would not work. In this
connection. Fubini oven ed nn ffe3 that Vance had not clued
him in on my letter. .C then told Vance that I was taking neces-
sary action to ensure that the highest priority activities of the
entire OXCART system would be placed on achieving an oper-
ational capability with four aircraft at mach 2.8/80. 000 feet,
refueling in flight, and operating entirely from and
that nothing else in the programs would be allowed to interfere
with meeting this requirement. Vance agreed and Fubw pointed
out that we should not be too arbitrary on the 2.8 mach since
Kelly Johnson had told him he was having difficulty making this
figure with that number of aircraft.
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Distribution:
i< r.ball S. Carter
L: leutenant General, USA
Acting Director
Original - DCI Copy 3 - 1313/ S&T COPY 5 - ER
,C )py 2 - DDCI Copy 4 - AD/ c ec b jN , Q L
Apprnvpd Fn
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