IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF 28 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700130012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 29, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE
OF 28 OCTOBER
1. The offer to dismantle the Soviet bases in Cuba
under UN supervision is a clear backdown with the only
quid pro quo exacted a US promise not to invade Cuba.
This action appears to have been motivated almost entirely
by fear that US military action against Cuba and the So-
viet bases there was imminent. The Soviet leadership saw
that the USSR would either have to swallow this, with
enormous damage to its world position, or make a response
which, given the state of mind they believed existed in
the US, would carry risks they could not accept of escala-
tion to general war.
2. There does not appear to be much danger that the
Soviets will attempt to delay implementation of the prom-
ise to dismantle and inspect. The "wish" that the US dis-
continue aircraft reconnaissance was almost certainly not
intended to provide a pretext for procrastination. If the
US insists upon initial steps to get observation under
way in Cuba within a day or two, the Soviet negotiators
are unlikely to stall.*
3. The letter carries no hint of any demand for re-
ciprocal concessions elsewhere. At most a moral obliga-
tion is laid on the US to behave with similar restraint
in other dangerous areas of conflict. The letter does in-
dicate that the Soviets wish to take up negotiations with
the US on broader issues, in hopes of re-establishing So-
viet prestige.
Implications for Berlin
4. While Berlin is not specifically mentioned in the
letter, the analogy of blockaded Cuba to surrounded Berlin
is a close one. The Soviets may feel that their behavior
*For a discussion of some of the immediate issues involved
in implementation of an agreement, see Annex.
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IiCRE 7 T
over Cuba will win them broader support for a settle-
ment in Berlin which makes some concessions to Soviet
interests there. They will have difficulty in demon-
strating, however, as the US did successfully in Cuba,
that Berlin poses a large and immediate threat to
peace which must be regulated by immediate concessions
if war is to be avoided. In short, any Soviet move to
activate the Berlin issue in the immediate aftermath
of the Cuban affair is likely to start in a low key
and be directed to an early face-saving adjustment.
They may undertake no serious initiatives for a time.
In the wake of a major defeat, they might prefer in
accordance With characteristic Soviet behavior, to
"reappraise the balance of forces" and simply await
the emergence of new opportunities for forward action.
5. There is one other possible line of Soviet
behavior in the wake of Cuba. The Soviet leaders might
conclude that US success in the Cuban crisis arose en-
tirely from the great preponderance of power enjoyed
by the US in the immediate area of contention, a situa-
tion which left the USSR no recourse except to action
which carried unacceptable risks of nuclear war. Some
of them might be tempted to believe that Berlin, where
the situation of local power is reversed, could be
handled;by the USSR as the US has handled Cuba. There
is, however, nothing in Soviet statements or conduct
during the Cuban affair to suggest that this would be
the course of action.
Internal USSR
6. We do not know what convulsions may have oc-
curred in the Soviet leadership over the Cuban issue.
It is possible that the outcome will strengthen a view-
point in the Soviet leadership that the policies of the
last few years have in several areas committed the USSR
beyond its important national interests and beyond the
reach of its power. This might in time lead in the di-
rection of altering the general Soviet approach to in-
ternational politics.
7. The Soviet Union will probably be faced with a
further open deterioration in its relations with Commu-
nist China. The Chinese will undoubtedly interpret Mos-
cow's latest moves toward a solution of the Cuban crisis
as weakness in the contest with "the imperialist enemy"
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and will exploit Khrushchev's backdown to undermine
confidence in Khrushchev's leadership. In eastern
Europe, Khrushchev's whole conduct of the affair--ma-
jor risks followed by a major backdown--will under-
mine confidence in his leadership among the many Com-
munists who have long harbored reservations about his
policies. The East German leadership in particular
will fear that it must now wait yet another turn for
progress on the Berlin problem.
The Cuban Side
8. It appears that Castro was not consulted by
Khrushchev on his recent approaches to President Ken-
nedy. The public statement of the Cuban Government is-
sued after the Khrushchev letter of 28 October indicates
that Castro is acting on his own and is seeking desper-
ately to retrieve some advantages for himself in a sit-
uation which he must regard as a disaster. Castro prob-
ably feels that he has been sold out, but his continuing
dependence upon the Bloc is likely to restrain any temp-
tation to renounce his relationship with the Bloc.
9. Castro has resigned himself to the withdrawal
of Soviet offensive missile bases. His demands that
any guarantee by the US of Cuban security be supple-
mented by cessation of the economic embargo, subversive
activities directed against Cuba, violations of Cuban
air and sea space, and withdrawal of the US Naval Base
at Guantanamo may have been tossed out in the hope,
which we believe to be entirely unrealistic, that the
Soviets would work them into their agreement with the
US. Regardless of how Castro may feel, however, he will
probably have little leverage with the Soviets in any
attempt to interfere with the implementation of an agree-
ment on withdrawal of Soviet military equipment.
10. The withdrawal of Soviet missile bases will
gravely affect Castro's position in Cuba. There will
be a decline of his prestige among the population at
large. More important, there will probably be serious
differences between the "new" or Castroite Communists
and the members of the Cuban Communist Party. Castro
and his followers might go down in the turmoil, but we
believe that Castro has a better than even chance of
rallying forces loyal to him and of maintaining precar-
ious control. In any event Castro's ability to survive
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will depend on the extent of continuing Soviet economic
aid as well as on the policies pursued toward Cuba by
the US and other American states.
Elsewhere in Latin America
11. Latin Americans, whether friendly or hostile
to the US, will regard the missile withdrawal as a re-
sounding US victory and a Soviet setback. Castro sym-
pathizers in the area will be profoundly discouraged,
and both they and the regular Communists will inevit-
ably suffer considerable disillusion about the USSR's
capacity and reliability as a protector in this hemi-
sphere. We see no way in which the Soviets can, for
a long time to come, compensate for this loss so far
as Latin American Communists and Castroists are con-
cerned.
12. Some Latin American governments which are
strongly anti-Communist and anti-Castro, while ap-
plauding US success in obtaining the removal of Soviet
missile bases, will be quick to deplore US willingness
to give assurances for the continuation of a Communist
regime in Cuba. Some will accuse the US of having
stopped short of achieving essential goals. They will
urge a continuation of pressures on Castro. The less
militantly anti-Castro governments, though perfectly
happy to see Castro rendered militarily weak or im-
potent, would probably tend to resist any US policy
which appeared to reflect a determination to dictate
the internal outcome in Cuba.
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29 October 1962
ANNEX: PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE DISARMING OF CUBA
1. The USSR has avoided any description or defi-
nition of Soviet weapons in Cuba, and Khrushchev has
left it to the US to choose which it shall term "defen-
sive" and which "offensive." The distinctions drawn
by the US in recent weeks make logical the argument
that surface-to-surface missiles and bombers are of-
fensive, whereas surface-to-air missiles, coastal de-
fense cruise missiles, missile patrol boats, and fight-
ers are defensive.
2. The USSR would accept these lists, and world
opinion in general would regard the removal of surface-
to-surface missiles and bombers as consonant with our
aims. On the other hand, US demand for the removal of
fighters or other weapons which it has already termed
defensive would produce some Soviet resistance and
would be generally interpreted as an attempt to dis-
arm Cuba against a possible invasion. Castro might
try to oppose removal of the bombers, claiming owner-
ship of them, but they have never been flown in Cuba,
and we believe the Soviets would override such com-
plaints.
3. Khrushchev's letter of 28 October states flatly
that, in view of US assurances against an invasion, So-
viet military assistance has become unnecessary. Earlier,
he indicated that, if the US gave such assurances, the
need for Soviet military specialists in Cuba would dis-
appear. The USSR might agree to a demand that all mili-
tary specialists return to the Soviet Union, although
some pressure might be required to extract this agree-
ment and it might subsequently be violated. World opin-
ion would probably consider a US demand for withdrawal
of military specialists as not excessively onerous or
vindictive.
4. The departure of Soviet specialists would ini-
tially render inoperable the surface-to-air missile
sites and the coastal defense cruise missile sites and
possibly the guided missile patrol boats and a portion
of the MIG-21 force. We know of no training of Cubans
to operate the surface-to-air and coastal defense sys-
tems. Cubans could subsequently be sent to the USSR
for this purpose, but this depends upon future Soviet-
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Cuban relations, which cannot now be foreseen. Some
Cubans have probably been trained on the patrol boats
and, over time, Cuba itself could probably restore an
operational capability. Some Cuban pilots have appar-
ently flown MIG-21s, and after some months the Cuban
Air Force would probably be able to operate the entire
complement of these planes.
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CENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~emarnn~iun~
IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEVIS
MESSAGE OF 28 OCTOBER
O,--'L&sjr1962
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 7(93 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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