POSSIBLE WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF MILTIARY ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700130007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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POSSIBLE WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION
The consequences of military action may be considered
under two headings: First, the effect on our alliances; and
second, possible Sino?Soviet responses at various vulnerable
points around the world.
1. Effect on Alliances
The effect of military action on our Alliances would
depend to a.considerable extant upon accompanying diplomatic
moves, both prior and subsequent. The key elements would be
the degree of consultation with our allies; the nature of the
notice given to our allies; the opportunity given to both
Castro and Khhrushchev to.take present military attack by
making adequate concessions; and, finally, the nature of any
measures taken simultaneously with military action or
immediately thereafter to bring about consultation with the
Soviet Union. Also relevant would be the character and
severity of the military action itself.
If little or no opportunity were provided for consulta-
tion with our allies -- or alternatively if they were given
only brief advance notice of our action -- the chances of
damage to our alliances would be greatly enhanced. Moreover,
if we were to act not only without consulting our allies but
also without providing either the Cubans or Russians with an
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opportunity
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opportunity to avoid attack, we might put ourselves in the
eyes of the world in a position similar to that of Britain
and France at the time of Suez -- with irrevocable harm. both
to NATO and the OAS.
A. Effect on NATO
Unless adequate political preparations were made prior
to military action we could not expect to receive sympathy or
support from any of the major NATO powers. If the Soviet
Union were to respond vigorously ..- for example, by moving
against Berlin ..`.. the United States might be held responsible
in European eyes for having endangered its allies in a
reckless manner.
European nations are clearly not sympathetic with the
United States position regarding Cuba. They regard our reaction
to the recent Soviet buildup as hysteria; many have argued
that our national preoccupation with Cuba proves that
are not fully responsible and should not have such a large
influence in deciding the fate of the Free World. Since the
Europeans live with 400 la's pointed at them every day, they
cannot be persuaded that the location of a few batteries of
MRBM's in Cuba is a serious military threat to the United States.
For us to respond to that threat by unilateral military action
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would seem
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would seem to them, therefore, out of all proportion to the
provocation and a reckless act endangering the peace of the
Id.
We might expect Rhrushchev to seek to capitalize on this
European reaction. He would try to increase the division and
disarray of the West.
To an extent, of course, the European reaction would
depend on the speed and decisiveness of the military action
as well as an its character, i.e., whether limited or general.
It would also depend to some extent upon the steps we might
take to follow up that action that is, whether or not we
would seek immediate discussion with the Soviet Union.
B. The 29
The shock of United States action against Cuba. might
well result in the Camist takeover of several Latin
American Governments. (Develop).
2. Possible Sino?Soviet Res e,sees
A. Berlin
If we were to take military action against Cuba,
Khrushchev might well respond with direct military action
against Berlin. His temptation to do so would be affected by
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two circumstances.
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two circumstances. First, the extent of the apparent
disarray in the NATO Alliance; and second, the degree to which
had committed United States forces to Cuba. If the effect
of our action were to produce a considerable appearance of
division within NATO, Khrushchev might well believe that he
could safely move against Berlin -- particularly if he joined
this action with some diplomatic gestures toward West Germany
and possibly Britain and France. If we should have ol- as it
is estimated we might have in the event of an invasion of
Cuba -- 90 to 150 thousand men immobilized, Khrushchev could
well feel that he could move against Berlin without danger of
effective American military resistance.
. Turkey
Khrushchev could argue, in a manner that might persuade
a substantial part of world opinion, that if the United
States found it intolerable to have MRBM's near its borders
in Cuba, he could not accept to have MRBM's on Soviet borders
in Turkey. He might, therefore, attempt a quick strike at
Turkey.
C. Iran
Khrushchev might also attempt to justify some aggressive
actipr$Re040$rFD~O Ii61~~APld? US
installations
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installations on the borders of the Soviet Union. Iran would
be a much smaller bite since it is not a NATO member and
does not itself possess a military capability comparable
to that of Turkey.
D. North Korea
(Develop)
E. Quasi and Matsu
With or without goading from Khrushchev, the CHICOMS
might well regard an American action against Cuba as providing
the excuse for a movement against Quemoy and Matsu -- or
possibly even against Formosa.
. Other Possibilities
One cannot rule out the possibility of Soviet action
against Pakistan or a Soviet wove against Finland and even
Norway.
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r srxut to Ct
puuicv
s unir eemi . They not 1i
of tori
renuociat. by him of oie 33vists a iVa des .
yea tr r1ca in return rcr= vt to (JA S. inchaton A FP and
1. W. Var pure
miatence pact with C
consider such a deal, the t
d up ea
A trial
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doftlol. nt ,d~U a tai
p o t of ntc1ity, m ar,
pr c tical at
WID
not add into sra o];
expected to be T c willing.
--O a
a. aeati :U= t:- A-
f, -1
% l' h aeti n?t kht 67
rexi, a ,d urge wor start and. op a ve ii_ me of ,Ali:
,'rw-' atr ever uwa.
31fiyt
co fete isolation
in th6 pants nary VW.
by t n
a.?-ra n t
+c : ntri?ra in this regard? the
; i ry
tar ed on key
pri i t:1 , but er.-k pa si 4Abama
-less 41t,_04 Cavaui.x
de mrive d by t
s%.:1. ry actions and More
X.i .ica; , action.
be
:vav is
in Cub,
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t cI 1 it i.TI t iOn a ? WM' S in s,,'
we wot bo, u ti .ine
-t ion, tt a Uy tae ttYe behavior of
1 '-a in pmhinr
fJfxw nothLlg of t$:
I o rxi o1n:
y tihrea froi
b uW an uole resooi , ca : vw bt: regard,
.? s and d# t"
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JLITARY AC iOI
1. ;end :]enior srry< ~~; us 'ioaa1 emissary to Castro.
!.This could be done by 1'ar Ai eriiian ?1i j it from Miami with
Prior noti Pica .iota through rims Embassy here.
Ern L sar y wouici t
ii ke3 -.dear to o! or willingness and aosil i.ty, respite
any Iovia- a threats, to dest basea$
point out to Ca?;tro ,hF =ushchev in playin him for a
sucker by using Cuba as a pawn in the Berlin situation:j
ma >e clear to 11,, itra only non-negotiable poi.nte with
him axe presence of ";oy _et offensive bases directed
and Unitc d Mates, and his sport of revolution elsewt ere
(teerica 3
Castro 1 hours or other suitable ;period in'tihich tb
attnokmoe seen begin 1 a u:.dation of Soviet missile bases, to be
accomplished under closes It. 6. air au'v'eillance1
accept OAS 'cant for observation inco ins cargoea assure
'urt or of cnaiv ow-sons are not brought into Cuba.
2. 3imultarteously tran trr.t rwssa. e from the Preeiden
v generally in ormi*ii him of poach being made to Ca-strop
pointing
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out direct violation these bee
assurances, and asking for x z r t v? $ "cooperation" with Castro.
(It will be important that this sessage leave KhrusdioheV "a tray outs.
The two foregoing actions are essential to demonstrate to A riCar
pecplt, ai to the world that nay. is effort has been pie to liquidate
problem without hDstilit -ies at1 to,
base if hostiliti?e nevert1helese ens
these advantages override. ihabever military disadvantages these steps
Shortly after (perhaps rot sore t
taking foregoing e?tepv Preeident should issue a public atataient
which would include t e followtriJ: ele eats t
a. Facts on bases, aq}basizirig nature of threat V-) all of
Caribbean ?ai
b. Preaauticniar' military steps that have been taken to
neutralize threat. (This ahould L ly but of specifically ets=t e
that nuclear apomva are deployed for i dts use against
bases if necessity er-Imes. )
c. Fact of emissary to Castro and message
possible political
It is believed irk stance of
1 s personal
ho,zrs)
d. Regret at `sot rd to which MASIC*
rash Castro action,
?4. Immediately prior
ople exposed
a. Unilaterally
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a. Uni.3.atera.l r inform key TO countries (Geraany,
-U.K., France) and key Latin arrtean countries (14oxico,
, ColotLbia, krazi) of action taken
support. A Special effort si oold be made to have V
Colo bia, and Central A ican countries istue
appeals for effective action keyed to threat bases represent
to them.
'b. Inform N*C of action taken.
c. Seek aplpro wia e action in O.A.S.
5. i diately n der?takQ eva vatit)n of d ndonts
tuaz'itaanai io
6. Q .etly put all U. 3. forces on appropriate alert status
k similar action
orders for Reserve.
ISM-MBITM
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POSSIBLE COU
TIOE
This aeoranch= is an attempt to set down the full
spectr of possible actions ?-w beginning with pure political
moves having no military aspects and pro cessing, in an
ascending order of ante1eit:y of izilitary commitment, to
action involving an invasion of Cuba. Obviously there are
=any variants possible, ane, can elments may be differently
nixed to produce different results.
Pure Poi.i ti: pl Action
There are sral kinds of political action that might
be taken ..? counterploys In other parts of the world desied
to harms or threaten the bloc, an increase of the hemispheric:-
pressure against Castro, the argsnis*tion of economic
pressure by the NATO conentries, or even efforts to buy off
Castro. It is highly doubtful that these actions, taken
either individually or collectively, would by theaselv*a
produce t1%* desired result.
A. Ppjsible Countearpio s
The Soviet Union has long been obsessed
with the fear that. Germany might acquire
nuclear capabi :L i ty.
Aisady nta s
a. We are in no position to impleemeent
this threat inside of a year or more.
b. The Soviet Union would be more lilc.ely
to respond by aggressive action against
$erlin then by relinquishing its
arrangements with Cuba.
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IttpuW i
Aw.
Giving hmi
present, a serious
a. he most px-:>bably imediate effect
world be i areas pressure b
CHICC 4S for increased nuclear caP&Qity
of the ,.r ow,.t -- a dsvalo ulent that
co :d be of real concern to the West.
b.
an act. as A-mrican suppor
invasion.
The Iranian frontier has always been senstit -ve
from the pout o : view of Russian policy.
I3 dente:
a. It would it creease t
.
cap ac : ty.
cox ider this as an act o MMpon$ ` i.,.I I ty.
Our bU allies would be tacit
b acir ail
response might well be a
eve against Iran which we
would be it no position to counter.
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SEWTTIVE
'r .d+ * that this would cause
to yield his o M capability. Be rrul:
we could not fire our w" pons without
Mr of stash a general iu:ls
2.
The principle utility of this action would
be as a prel.iaatsar:;
big
e?
if such action were possible it ld hardily
be achieved by a ise us vote. ice? h4sispberic
pity would be strained. reov+ r, having
action the United States would alMOst
tech to follow it by a military
of Cuba from son-Bloc trade
ficultg and cost of Soviet
anony sad perhaps decrease
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:TI
expeot the Pius support of
Even iiitb the r avid *=* of a Soviet
aggressive intention in Cuba we could
the OM or *T+ countries in en f: Or. t r--
?ything approaching a complete
costs imposed an the
y a substantially
iti
complete embargo would pr*bably not
prevent it from continuing its Cuban
build-up.
a slight but real of fec t on
opinion.
Cubas it self, would not be sear
of a e ct.d, by the breaking of dipl oatic relations.
5.
This effect aa man public opinion of the
escab is t of a Savo-t- - t in exile
uaitt~ with Usited S tat" backin might
servo to encourage dissidence within Cuba,
particularly if we coupled the ostablisbeen,
of such a v.rmont with a threat to help it
g~M+ee1tOO7T9--
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TOP SECRET
otaid have great difficulty setting
up a reasonably representative pro-
Visional
b . T Cuban. refugees would
be used as trading pawns to bring about:
actions by Castro that might be useful
or ou.r purposes but not for theirs.
We would compromise our
Guars tang
Met
viv
Castro.
By separating ! str from complete dependence
on Soviet support we aught neutralir* him as an
eesivt Force is the Western Hemisphere.
Dis4dye ut a :e s
1. There is real doubt that Castro could
survive i. he repudiated any of his bas
relations with the Bloc, particularly
s incee he is surrounded by hardeore
Covauni sts s
21 The Ameri - public is in no wood to
crept a deal with Castro and Con ress
o ou.d be unprepared to provide the
wssns to Mike that deal of fect.ive, such
as the restoration of the sugar qua,
a program (3f foreign assistance, the
hcbev.
In view of the great increase of t ions
n 5,
>CID67~?1-girepact
Approved Fo 241(%
conxyersatioc: setwem the President and lrushc
Might help -avert a major conflict.
ration of the eeabargc , etc.
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TOP SBCM w ITII
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11
ve threat is
L . t o O A S Foreign asters comm
,tober 6, iaa1ud
cube.
ftecoutimaxy military stems that have
aeutraltze threat. (This ld I
specifically I
iaaerdiat* use against
Fact of iaatit stie* of
that arse provided .sera
offensive action but, if attic
vauld be taken to protee
B.
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trias (terry,
can coatries
Brasil) of action
I s
should be so
Central IlieI
appeals for *f
represent to tbm
MAC a
3. Beek appropr
issue prompt public
1=64"taly undertake, evacuation of
from Gusntan .
US forces
10 AUUA
Allied rem ctios would be nixed and would
depend upon our aaceampanying diplaeaeic moves. on the ha
asny would privately Welcome a l r incisive action
United States while being relieved that the acti did net
further. On the otle r band, t * re old be stronS public
recriminations on our lack of consultation and sow allies
might seek to divest dwas*Ives of responsibility for ensu
c es. Howwwor,, the nature of this would be tapered
by the niter of the a we made on Cuba and the Soviet
Union.
D.
aibaa Wmi
IWac and
Yj, counter-r+ tio* could include attacks
an our r*ccsaissaoce aircraft both by fighter aircraft and
SAMS and/or an attack an thumbs awo or an aircraft entering and
#_r support. A speeal effort
vs Venezuela, Col a, and
threat bases
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leaving au . This,
"fire the first shot". Cu the a
difficult for ,Cuba and the Soviets to permit such rant lss-
thaingea.
prestige factors, such a nstratl e:
part of the Castro raeg would severely strain its 4
to maintain its intezvol control. It such attar
r o naais .e aircraft took place there tad? of ruse,
casualties and the public reaction would m it
t for t e it ed Stash to keep Its responses within
precisely defined ilitary limits.
of such flights our cessation of
III
+edby a
is that would seaek is forestall Cuba
against the United States or the Soviet Union from
--
directly. Such a move could be ;s public call on
fa a bilateral summit oonfera t?.. From a poll ticaa
view, such an action would d as tra to incisive ss
,t of the United States? tbus raeinforcii
r elites a W the trio t Union -- t
rtiavl*rly with respect to
.Alt responses might include ava
Pr s t (desk d to bring p
the iaaestallatisaa), and the ,gip
seas to ;Js pan, etc. The Soviet Union
mess to ixe teat . Such
be aoqp"i ad
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the suss of t
for firings de
hoot of actions,
at heart ca an targets cam*
to be a hi&
We e$,
the Other
An action
M
is aaat m
err $ t s bad
11 as d w r.adiaaaa al of thit
be
successful
prey xt the a lsc*msnt of ad
in Cuba or +e rout.
Soviet reach s would
to which the action was presentud an
ion and to what degg" it s kept a
Castro. The riot ies, havi dad
or intended to establish. bases
itself from the matter if it so cbmw
is A refer tam Of
udea ac.ti aiea
in lia,
awossive action
Pokistan based on, ie talla s
IV
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Blockade
A. YEAaxis O t
Y~^ 11 I~ Y1 Y ~
A possible
strike vould be the is t t uti
blockade. A limited blaackade
tica!n of ve
military materials o
national lane -- ace ptad an
States -- blockades of arty k
except under conditions of &
ly doubtful Vhe
and Rio Treaty
a major politictl
lital that
Soviet reaction,, bietween
bloclaaa or taking direct
t
of fo=e
bloc vessels.
B- $ _ ie R-OUSIAM2
d seek to escort their vessels so
enf
situation
ships or
their pars could
only American fore,
blockade waald eventually result in a
would be. required einst Soviet war-
this cou
C. MOM _ a tic 1.
each a blockade. It could be pr,sa ad that
It is
of the
ly directed against diet
It is certain that the Soviets would not as uL4
tiva to a single limited air
1 or limited navel
be conceived of as inspect-
ty supported by the Vaited
apons or possibly for
Ib r principles of inter-
ad or afoed
sviant, an obvious c enters ove a
i blockade against
ther with
a a condition
Cuban reactions could i lucze an attack against
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Or SICM - O
12 --
A. Politically, there is little difference, in terms
either of all.i.ed' o r possible Soviet reactions whether the attack
is at the top or the bottom of the range. If this action should
be taken without prior consultation with our allies and an
opportunity for both Castro and Khruslehav to avoid attack by
making reasonable con easicua, the effects on our al .iancos,
particularly NATO, could approach the catastrophic. If the
Soviet Union were to respond vigorously .... for example, by
moving against Berlin -- the United States would* in the eyes
of s" t Ett mums , be hold responsible for having endangered
its allies in a reckless steer, and many would probably be
relieved at the opportunity for disengaging themselves from
the embarrassment of Berlin.
A=ep"n nations are clearly not sympathetic with the
United States position regarding Cuba. They regard our reaction
to the recent Soviet buildup as hysteria many have argued that
our national preoccupation with Cuba proves that we are not
fully responsible and should not have such a large influence
in deciding the fat* of the Prot World. Since the Europeans
live with 400 )VJV's pointed at them every day, they cannot be
persuaded that the location of a far batteries of MKWs
in Cuba is a series military threat the United States.
For us to respond to that threat by unilateral military action
would seem to tom, therefore, out of all proportion to the
provocation and a reckless act endangering the peace of the
world.
C. We nigh expect russhciiev to a
this European reaction. He would try to
and disarray of the West.
capitalize on
the division
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~..rwr wr.rr
1.
D. On the other hand, prier: consultation is at unlikely
to pie any consensus and raos of our allies would seek to
bring to bear the strongest possible pressure to deter us from
the action. Prior approaches to Castro and to the diet
won would also open to the Soviet won the possibility of
making such strong threats of nuclear retaliation against
the United States as to make it difficult for the Soviet
o fail to implement the threats if ed we subsequently
ch action against Cueba. Lt would also give Cuba and
the Soviet Union sufficient strategic Warning to enable
thus to ready the l M' s in Cuba for prompt firing aga ins t
US targets with or without action from the Soviet Union
against the United States.
V1
FULL-SCALE (2,000 sorties sage) AIR A'
SUESKiENT lNYASICIR
WITH OR WIT
A. Such action is subject, in an incr+e sed s u
all of the political disabilities and dilemmas of prior conO
sultation end notification set forth in V aberve.
S. t ban reactions would probably include, subject to
their capabilities, an attack on G uantaww o and the possibility
of an att t to use *4's against American targets. It is
difficult to foresee Cuban domatic. read and ugh can
depend an the political context of the attacks. A h i& rate
of civilian casualties would, of.' caw", produce strong
senti nt. National foolings would be highly aroused. The
attitude of the "July 25 Group"' would in part be determined b:
estinats as to the reprisals it might expect from the
from the United States if it lost ctrol. it
that an air strike in itself ht produce such a
condition of disorder within Yon as to require US ground
intervention, whether or not : desire to undertake such
intervention.
C.
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Soviet rea.ctilt .
H any lines of r
the Soviet Union.. These I
Berlin which Khrushcher
undertake, particularly f
ion would be oper, to
take-over of West
cell believe he could safely
aed the action with some
di plc atie gestures t *wards Western Germany and possibly
Britain and France, Other saible actions include a quick
Soviet strike against thFt, Jupi ttra it. Turkey, action against
Iran on the grounds tha,s: it rise contains US installations
on the bo c der of the Sovw et Ur_ien, renewal of the action in
Lees , ate With or without Sov i e t concurrence the Chinese
Cos mist3 might well so . to tae tevantsge of what t:hiEy
could regard as an epportuxni ty, for a mov nt against Quemoy
Matsu.
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P AASW - RAMILVE
the wax
ete ge aft". Pre hly th e
a matter of 01=1
B.
#ibmwm ...2
brie plan
C.
I. Mum - . ft
ft"m
fte teas of the ms~ wmId be not* sorrow than
z t would.
The P?t+leatd sut wwAlc ee a t m%e to ehthtv
praeeuted in aec s1 1tu aetely with the mill t
edid ..'s shock at
ihle
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(b) p
assured
iot eGuld put w o
c ba;
(c) ri
lt4Cly t 0,
sired Offens:
he would take appropriate
(4) recite that U mw President was, takift
the specific
so far itiftsd and that similar
action sue, be taken a st any
additional ilia' installations as son
as they were discovered; and
(a) W ~ mum 1e r .ted States mod, as
a matter of sslf defems e, fly law- vtl
recv afssa a sissions over tuba:,
Ci
The mess
t the U . of the attack,
(a
act for the del
and those of the Latin
and
(C)
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w sir - Muive
tl Statat;
wises.
i+ -tit ?*d,
offt*w
The toold i t would at the tLi of
(a) that limit
take is in deter a
it d? Stat a au4 the ether American
Status;
k also
sae desi d as to result
ae j eorw4y of eaesa li
.asuru that the Las
beeaw* aPOMtii;
(t ps uti
ram tartly cad that t prior a
assuraas
placed
arcs pass i L* cause of the iaae t dang
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of this
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ire
sa
is treaty liga
states, it u1
fly close surv:iII*i c sissi .s
t Bloc Once t
tuation night rapidly do t+ rior .te.
L.
of tti! v espo*s t iag fix
3tat would fool compelled i
(b) uw*lng clears bow*-#,
atota basis i
t&Le Similar action again
to disc =v
for dof t of t W4 pL for a military po
of view is Wit, in pr ridia , W x t elimination merely of
the, knows MW installatic , it lases
off ivo capabilities. Thus,-, r1wr* is
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Approved For Relea
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Top sf-T
MOCIUOU
MNWMr11wIM+f
ed naval IxIoelcadii
d : &astra and a mint art
action o the G Z a ml tbx R&4
U4 i
2.
f ~a ce m
j iLo, Yen i e
counts ie
Meatsadora, a
terq O.AS ac
elset d Ucn
o (loot
3? s r us1y ir,Joru jy V) counter
u. A. and .;taly) 0 fa
lxowir: ;f or
4.
ion into Cuba u_f e!f n dve weepo". Suth a bIOCIM& O&As
h a C c ^atioxi > ' :d* vithin the
tioT :i lam awl po1tt, .vaUy
;h a fcrT' . dec arzd ion of
bia, Ike
ii clm r
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700130007-5
WMWMwMY.MgMe-+ie:f ~yllMyt
s '
fi x ii:&Qf rx:tu, wt F R
in Cuba and GwWo"Imml
6.
TOP ~narr...rwn..r it
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#icL,n k: d i# V~rect 'IactMl i141:6i
ia' ,. k n cm-,
uad g a I' t "=-g.
to Co < y .
.
.2. I: d Lai 1y -c']
bLociw+ o.
r.`
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WitA Ubt1 s
ic.p-wotad to
rid nt tie ; t1rg Uw Cub=- -aa-
W1
.--Ue t r tom.; 3r ? u; "f # i ' t t, 1 i ' x
a s P e-- ~. ~, ~' th
to l r & w '- 9 *-11
4~wCi.tt.:-syy9~#~ R3.Side I.t is i.. -.
'o v t il"k risowf is 1,z:
44-hat t K3 i. ^1o+y..1-nd
by thr, "t!: , JALan ,t<
1* t r to
4U-m- blo -e
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VI 'ti .3it -
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700130007-5
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
ATTACK 3 - INVASION
1. It is assumed that an attack of the magnitude of Plan 3
will almost inevitably escalate into an invasion of Cuba
through either attacks by air or sea on US territory,
attacks on Guantanamo, or internal uprisings of the Cuban
people to which we would be compelled to respond.
2. There might be some advantages in minimizing negative
reactions by both Soviets and free world by initiating only
an attack on offensive capabilities in Cuba and letting
escalation take place in response to Cuban initiatives.
, `fie should make our military plans on the assumption
that we would have to continue the air assault into the pre-
invasion softening-up phase and at the appropriate time
land in force.
3. The effectiveness of Plan 3 in achieving its military
objective of knocking out offensive capabilities in Cuba
would be seriously diminished without strategic surprise.
Opportunities would be given to disperse and camouflage
targets and alert air defense forces. Therefore, there
is a strong argument against either Congressional actions,
TOP SECRET
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-2-
private exchanges with Soviets or Castro, or consultations
with our major allies.
3(a). There are also possible political advantages in
surprise. A sudden attack, over in a day, would become so
quickly a fait accompli, that foreign ministers would have
no time to develop attacks on the action but would be busy
with its aftermath., On the other hand failure to give
notice is subject to the charge of sneak attack or rerse
Pearl Harbor, which is not considered really cricket in
some quarters.
4. If the initial decision is for invasion, this is no
longer a problem as invasion preparations would deprive
us of strategic surprise in any case. In addition the
intensive and continued air attacks incident to invasion
should make possible the destruction of most priority
removal
targets. The xannmm* of the Castro Government would
deprive any remaining/of their threat.
5. It should be noted that iftnvasion does not take place
Plan 3 cannot be assumed to be a one-time affair. As new
targets are discovered or arrive in Cuba, prompt new strikes
will become necessary to eliminate their threat to the US
and f$~ e r J4A9 /0 ? I BQe a 300Q7t5
may be difficult to adiust their timing t the crrnt
 Approved For Release 20 10j/08 : -R4&$OBO x1700130007-5
international situation. we will still have given the Soviets
the power to force us into military action in Cuba at times of
their choosing.
6. Plan 3, itself, involves no sure threat to the Castro
regime. it therefore involves some risk of our having
undertaken a warlike act which will displease many people
in the free world without unseating Castro' s regime and thus
pleasing all the others, particularly our best friends in.
Latin America.
7. At the _ same time it would be difficult for the
Soviets to resist pressures to retaliate, preferably in
kind as in Turkey. would have killed Soviets in Cuba
certainly, in addition to many Cubans, and an attack an
Turkish bases is almost sure to involve killing Americans.
it would then be very difficult to s avoid an escalation
into general nuclear war as feelings would be high among
both peoples. A retaliation by major moves in Berlin would be
equally difficult for the west to accept.
. if NATO were forced to choose between defeat in Berlin
or disgrace in Turkey, on the one hand, or nuclear war on the
other, because of 204Aa, against Cuban facilities which
p~envt~~e~a8iit~eQ7/ti~tR1700~`0
might
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-4-
sort the Europeans have long lived with, the alliance would
be put under serious strain indeed.
9. Similar issues might be raised for the US if instead of
Soviet retaliation in Europe, our bombing was not wholly
effective, some of the M's were operational, (much
lees likely that MIG's would have nuclear bombs) and in
the heat of combat Soviet crews with poort connections to
Moscow, perhaps believing the attack on them was only part of a
general first strike by the US on the Soviet Union, should
launch nuclear missiles on the US. It would be exceedingly
difficult to prevent US retaliation on the Soviet Union.
Their ability to do this might be enhanced if they had
several days warning of a possible attack.
10. It is difficult to be persuaded that these difficult
dilemmas are worth creating unless the military pumaxis
posture of the US vis-avis the Soviet Union were to be
seriously impaired in the absence of this action. But from
the standpoint of relative nuclear balance it is most
difficult to make this argument. The basic justification
xtaec#c-xe
must then be the need for the US to act to support the
creditq*O d Qjr Ik aW OFf;. D08*Bd' 67tk01AG*3007 e
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of its psi s. If et r metime eo%Ad
LI t* sue'
aIliss Will
at.
ks *Lth
nsil
of the
ww1A p
** Clifforams .
bored
asy so
meant lov"tea
cr tras, $trr
Of
c uLtativ .
from their standpoint in t invesion
Problem
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no advance c
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
tion can be rec > d. l ferabiy
tld be as fa:
b, 0 + 2 ticatLoa a jastifLaaticn delis
a,
p*rs letters from
to heads of state or
countries and Canada.
c. D +- 24"23
a basis, while reinforcing ships s
4.
limits of tai action
f. D + " *c>de0 l.a ne d ourr t oil
a~ar~nt rep,
pro
to en rid by Steveamm in spew t at UN. 0
f Organ of Cotwults
action
by
a in light of new situation
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2004/07, L IA-RDP80BO1676R001700130007-5
48 in accordance with notice given
use forums US plans start overland sun.
lia "way bonee
*scort to protect
D -j 48 j liar tip as necessary to
sot significant rebel
e tpons as discover
el
offensive
us forces for +c world 24 how
t available in
Canal Zone for air transport to assist in
aibls att
of Latin America
Cast-soviet
sympathizers.
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700130007-5
2.
.d be
es ze4uir*d t
Vill
o iavad*
ti rstl than notificatiea.
b. D +' l~tterr M Wt to Etta a*4 W. K.
A. m
- Desixim to iv
of prase t drafts.
Inas
e ire s, Pr*side t
I. for O & . of
g 'OVA special 3O meeting
situation. due is pull
sue.
I) + 5-6 Win. of Coesuitation aut ri
to ltd ne"sre 44""t
Including armed attar
Winces total blockade of Cuba
state of war.
04- 6
prssents4 by St
Latin :dean allies alerted to possible
disorders, U$ sWport standby basis in Canal
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$.
provided
it ummea"M78 all
U e around rtdd on
no political moves
11-14 Invasion
dram
with help O
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Cen
October 17, 1962
1. Ajr6 -Vie. without any politicas4 noti cYation, it the strike was a
a1r, was in general eucces , and completely n
before the" would be any chance for reaction, it to probable that
the Soviets would confine the elves to polities action in the
United Nations propaganda, and attempt to exploit any divisions
which might appear in the `% ` est n Alliance. They might conceiv-
ably take some action in Berlin, but would be unlikely to initiate
any form of military action.
t l v b r - air
1 I 1 Y~IrIIY
e. , a denial that M bases were under con-
took in his reply. Assuming a completely
et reaction would deed, to some degree, upor.
etruction in Cuba, which conceivably might indicate a physical re-
construction of arose bases - which we could only
h photographic connaluueance ..- or he might, in
take a very tough line, drawing the analogy between our
e and ley and the Soviet bases in Cuba, he might
ten general nuclear war it the event of a United Sates
action. If such were the reply, the situation would obviously be-
come more dangerous, although it would not be conclusive evi-
dence of met willings to respond militarily to an air strike.
We would have to -wait to judge the temper, as well as the text of
his reply.
Fro
e point of view of Soviet reaction, this would probably lie the
most dangerous course of attic which we could take. expanded
operation against Cuba weld no longer be merely to eliminate the
MRBM bases and would confront the Soviets with a series of very
difficult choices. It is po sssilale that limited military action against
some of our NATO des or direct action in Berlin might be the
Soviet response.
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eaction, tyre to a. very good chance that
coiine thexnsebreees only to action In the
Na o propag nda, etc. , and not InstibitA any mili-
tsxy action under is course of action.
The foregoing analyses deal only with probate Soviet reactions and
do not dog with the general effect on the U sited .S s position
ouahout the world.
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EC ?T
CEB:mac
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TOP SECRET
1. The US has full info on the missile bases being
constructed in Firm del Mar province. Medium range
missiles capable of reaching a substantial portion- of
US territory and most of the countries in the
Caribbean area are being stalled at three sites.
They obviously have no use except with nuclear heads.
It also seems clear that they can only be operated
by Soviet military, not Cubans.
2. Their presence raises ;rave issues of national
security for the US and the Western Hemisphere as
a whole as the President end the Congress have made
clear. They represent Soviet offensive bases in Cuba
as well as a ground-.to-ground missile capability
capable of attacking the US and many of the Caribbean
countries. In Soviet hands they are clearly offensive
and not defensive weapons.
3. By putting these in Cuba the Soviets have also
raised grave issues for Cuba. To serve their interests
they have justified the Western Hemisphere countries in
making an attack on Cuba which would lead to the
immediate overthrow of your regime. At the same time
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the Soviets have quietly suggested to others that the
threat these weapons represent may make it worthwhile
to the US to trade concessions on Berlin for' Soviet
abandonment of Cuba,
4. The US will have to informs its people of the threat
which now exists in Cuba within the next day or so and
what it and its allies intend to do about it in
conformity with the requireuiei"Ats of our security as
previously made plain in various public documents and
statements. Unless It Sian receive assurances from you
prior to that time, by public or privde channels, that
you will not tolerate this misuse of Cuban territory,
measures of vital significance for the future of Cuba
will have to be initiated.
3. The US expects to continue to be well informed
about the status of these facilities. If action does
not follow immediately on the heels of such assurances
as yo nay feel impelled to give, then we and our friends
shall, of course, have to act.
6. If an attempt by you to deal with this problem
should create difficulties within Cuba, I assu$e you
will recall that President Kennedy said a year and a
half ago that only two points were non-negotiable between
the Western Hemisphere and Cuba- the Soviet tie and
gtM"eRgc4/N. i/0- ~f 76 1 0
ry
if ,
-TOP -
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TOP ECRU
Ce T O RESPONSE r U31 FIPPi AL,
Few public figures have proven to be unpredi bl
Fidel Castro. V Co not know whether he could take
the decision alone, but would guess he wou
consult several of hit aeeociates including one or two
Old-line Cc runist . He would almost Sure
compelled to check with oscow,, especiall
.tce. Probably the
he bed
es are
g-j t4
there as part of
e'L whose terms
adversely for Castro if he could no l
accu iti
be Changed
r provide 3s
unlikely short notice to be able to
iase:f to the idea of help from the US for
it stru ;f;l i a favarsble response might
caulw.
,.Wey /Funty,?of c}rae, be q eps e L
ap l,aei ante, Revealbi, and denouuoin
a 4 hour
might also go to U}t to charge interference in hie
inter al affairs.
ear .1k?.ly that he
offers of eupport have not bey made categorical
terms and that hir internal position is not one of g ;
str z tho In this situation he might try to c+nfu
the issue and stall for time, hoping for a solution to
his dilena to appoi r.
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SE An- Z1
he Q3-c1-lisle Cc
pium for flat rcjec
gbt le" to ma
j or
r' L
of coonoiderab1c, poter
f the
iproR h. mi
up betwen tht two groups,
v taje to its.
' O ' SECRET
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which You
reaurim, to C
e
U,
., 4
system.
tPreuuiez t o to brti iii be d t M these. e3.
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kit
O -W
at A
his eo
can bases t
I t c
nt
4 Z t is CO& and
'AN -
thruat r; the
United &W" Butt
with Cuba, but with
v - Tr y
d. I remind you that }4A
other co
protesW these
Turlwy &U-4 It . -. There are no such bues In the
Cra: ar
utter to
1"Mi fl* 04gre-A
are c , + tit bou r our, th 0 ' wtdc
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Cum
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700130007-5
p prWOM _ DL;
}d
in V
YIC
11 th ~ AUIAIw L. nd I Ala b I
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it *IV
Urfa ac ` , and It
In CL
14 view of w
0 U:
di
i GGv cn a to
mutu
da
y-
er,
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