MEMORANDUM CONCERNING ACTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET- CUBAN MILTIARY THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700130003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 19, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 October 1962
ILLEGIB
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING ACTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET -
CUBAN MILITARY THR,AT.
The Intelligence Community has provided the Administration
r,.
with comprehensitie and current information concerning developments
in Cuba. The Jnited States Intelligence Board has prepared several
estimates on the implication of these developments and the conse-
quence s of possible United States action.
Since I have been participating in the policy discussions concern-
ing possible actions and from time to time have expressed views on
poky matters beyond my competence as DCI, I feel compelled to
n7'w express my personal opinion concerning the course of action
,how being considered.
First, I think we are having difficulty in determining a clear-
cut course of action because we have not clearly defined exactly
wherein lies our most important and vital interest.
It is my conviction that, while Berlin is important and also
the NATO alliance and arrangements with many other countries
throughout the world, nevertheless, I have reached the conclusion
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that maintaining maximum security and safety of the United States
and of the Western Hemisphere, cementing Western Hemisphere
relationships, and reversing the growth of communism in the
Western Hemisphere represent our most important national
interest and must be our over-riding concern.
I feel that a continued build-up of a Soviet-Cuban military
capability of an offensive nature, with the strong probability that
there will exist in Cuba a large number of operational missiles and
aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons of the megaton range capable
of striking the United States, the Panama Canal and most Latin
American countries, constitutes a situation that we cannot tolerate.
Of equal importance is the fact that Castro's accomplishments
will be a challenge to every dissident group in countries throughout
Latin America. It is my personal opinion that this will result in
Latin American countries from Mexico in the north to Argentina in
the south seeking ever closer ties with the Soviet Union because of
demonstrated Soviet strength and power. Conversely, these Latin
Americans will move away from " - dependence upon
the United States because of our own demonstrated weakness and
lack of resolution.
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What is at stake here then, in my opinion, is/Western Hemisphere
security and the inevitable growth of communism in Latin America.
These two considerations are over-riding in their importance. Actions
required to insure Hemisphere security and stop the advance of
communism in the Hemisphere are of more immediate concern to our
vital national interests than are the problems that confront us in more
distant areas.
Turning to the suggested plan of action, I do not bel ieve a partial
blockade or, for that matter a total blockade, is a tsatisfactoryanswer.
gA4vL
It might have been an acceptable answer had the offensive missiles and
planes not been delivered to Cuba. However, they are there now. They
represent a serious threat, and a blockadeiwil.l not remove them.
Indeed, the blockade, which must be maintained for a protracted period,
4'1 roe e fo, -t' V& tE;a g atv o k" d,6
will provide ~~.i. y to place all systems,in an operational statust
tea i - -
This means the establishment of a capability of
delivery of a substantial megatonnage of nuclear weapons. At this point
the opportunity of reversing the situation is remote for then military
action on our part would possibly invite a retaliation which would inflict
upon us unacceptable damage. Hence, the blockade,will not solve then*protlem
that confronts us . 0 )16 , r -Ute
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During the period of the blockade, Khrushchev will lay before
world opinion through the United Nations and elsewhere, facts with
respect to United States deployment of offensive capabilities and
nuclear weapons throughout the world and thus establish that in
effect what has occurred in Cuba is only a small fraction of that
which we have done through the years in many places throughout
the world. It is my opinion that the propaganda attack and the world
public opinion which would support it would be of such intensity that
we would have to reconsider our blockade policy almost immediately.
The American public will realize that there exists in Cuba the
power to wreak the greatest of havoc in the United States and in Latin
America. Hence there willbe great fear and distress among the
American people and disenchantment with our policies. The same
attitude will prevail among people in all countries of Latin America.
I therefore oppose the blockade idea, and strongly recommend
that we act more decisively. I think we should issue an ultimatum to
Castro at once. I think we should tell him to cease and desist and to
remove all such offensive armaments, including missiles, MIG 21s,
IL 28s, etc., or we will remove them for him. I think we should
give Khrushchev notice of contemplated action and tell him to remove
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the Soviet bloc technicians and military personnel at once or assume
the inevitable consequence of having his people harmed. Such warnings
should be planned and timed to be adequate for their purpose, but to
have the minimum effect upon any military operation. If, in the opinion
of military authority, the consequences of the warnings would render
a military operation of questionable effectiveness or risk the possibility
of a missile being fired at the United States, then there should be no
warning.
Having done this, I believe we should take over Cuba by military
means, remove the threat and also remove the Castro-Communist
government and establish in Cuba a government which will serve the
interests of the Cuban people and become a member of the Western
Hemisphere community of nations.
The action I am proposing is drastic. However, I believe it
conforms to, and the risks are consistent with.American policy as
stated publicly by President Kennedy on 13 September. The President
said in part:
"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger
or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at
Guantanamo, our passage through the Panama Canal, our missile and
gr, RET
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space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens
in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive
purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this
Hemisphere, or become an offensive mil_itary_ )3ase of significant
capacity fo? the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must
be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."
The above is representative of the personal views of John A.
McCone, as an individual, and is not to be construed as representative
of the views of, or a recommendation of, the United States Intelligence
Board or the Central Intelligence Agency.
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