MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR FROM L. K. WHITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600250019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 17, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director
17 June 19"
George:
1 ,regret that our review of Agency policy and
regulations governing speaking and writing in the public domain by
CIA employees has not yet resulted is clear-cut guidance for you, the
Director of Security, and employees generally. I hope and expect to
revise our regulations without much more delay. In the interim,
however, you should use the following as official guidance.
a. Employees will not speak or write in
the public domain unless they can be publicly identified as Agency
employees without jeopardizing security.
b. If there are no security reasons why
the employee cannot be so identified, you should next consider the
subject and content of his remarks, which should be very carefully
scrutinized from a security point of view. While you should look
to the Office of Security for official guidance in this respect, the
employee and his supervisors in the chain of command have a heavy
responsibility in this regard.
c. If it is determined that there are no
security objections to the employee's being publicly identified with
the Agency and to the release of the information to the public, each
such case must then be considered as a matter of policy. There
may be many cases in which security is not the primary considera-
tion and where approval or disapproval of the request is an impor-
These determinations and
tart policy consideration for the Agency.
decisions require keen insight and judgment, and any questions
for
whatever should be referred to the Director or Deputy Director
final determination.
Of course. there may be exceptional cases which
merit special consideration and do not readily lend themselves to the
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foregoing guidance. Lach such request should be considered on its
own merits on a case-by-case basis.
/-614 Xi. L., White
L. K. White
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x,@tutive Regi&try
MAY 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director -Comptroller
SUBJECT Agency Interface with the Public
1. This memorandum and its attachment is for your infor-
mation and comment only.
2. Attached is an expanded outline prepared by this Office
entitled, "Agency Interface with the Public". It is, I hope, respon-
sive as at least an initial effort to crystalize the factors involved
in the entire matter of Agency relationships with the public. I be-
lieve that it is comprehensive in its coverage not only of the various
aspects involved, but also in listing the advantages and disadvantages
to both employees and the Agency in each category.
3. I have difficulty in agreeing with the conclusions and recom-
mendations which advocate a greater exposure of employee activities
to the public. I had the outline prepared assuming that the DCI wishes
to pursue a course of action designed to increase the Agency's public
exposure in certain areas.
4. However, as your Director of Security, I believe that
the disadvantages inherent in public identification of our personnel
as Agency employees; the exposure of information gained through
an employee's association with the Agency; the risk of continued
publicity; and continued Congressional scrutiny due to such articles,
outweigh the advantages. I believe that you will agree that the relative
balance of advantages versus disadvantages can be rationalized either
pro or con dependent upon a basic decision by the Director as to how
he wants this Agency to appear in the eyes of the outside world.
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5. After you have had an opportunity to review the attached
outline, I would like to discuss it with you to determine your views
as to its responsiveness to your request. Once you have approved
the outline or modified it, it will take only a matter of a day or so
to "put flesh on the bones".
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nowarCL
Director of S urity
Attachment:
"Agency Interface with the Public"
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AGENCY INTERFACE WITH THE PUBLIC
OUTLINE
Security Staff Study
21i May 1966
SECUT
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The purpose of this Staff Study is to examine the primary consid-
erations related to the Agency interface with the public and the public
media with respect to the identification and participation of Agency em-
ployees at meetings, seminars, societies, conferences and the like; their
publication of unclassified articles and studies, including revelation of
their Agency affiliation; and to submit recommendations for consideration
in updating current Agency policies, criteria and regulations on these
subjects in the light of present conditions.
II. SYNOPSIS OF CURRENT REGULATIONS, TO INCLUDE POLICIES,
CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS HAVING A BEARING ON THESE SUB-
JECTS
"The security of CIA is dependent upon the conduct and
activities of every individual who, through his employment
relationship to the Agency, has access to classified informa-
tion. In order to ensure that the security of CIA activities
is adequately protected, it is necessary to prescribe certain
standards and procedures for the guidance of individuals in
the conduct of their private affairs and to place some limi-
tation on their participation in unofficial outside activities.
(Synopsis is attached as Tab A)
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL AS
AGENCY ASSOCIATED IN THESE ACTIVITIES
A. Employees Affected
(1) Those who should not identify themselves with CIA.
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(2) Those who may identify themselves with CIA.
(a) Those Staff Employees with no for seeable
cover requirement.
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(Those individuals covered in paragraphs (2)
(a) and (b) comprise the bulk of analysts and
scientists whose open identification might
benefit the Agency through gaining assistance,
support of key individuals in academic, private
and professional enterprises).
B. Degree of Present Participation in Speaking and Writing -
Period 1965 to March 1966.
(1) 119 professional articles, 71 amateur submitted to
OS and Assistant to DCI.
(2) 60% "professional" category, 62% of which from
DDI - essentially from 25 employees, with 44% from
2 employees assigned in NPIC.
(3) Represents about 1% of analysts in DDI, which
Directorate believes percentage would go much higher
with wider participation permitted. DDS&T input
presently negligible in number of employees concerned.
C. Presentation of Papers, Active Participation in Symposiums,
Seminars, etc. with Identification as CIA Employee.
(1) Advantages
(a) Employee benefits
(i) Would receive academic /professional
recognition.
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(b)
(ii) Would be permitted activity normally
denied employee but allowed consultant in
some instances.
Agency benefits
(i) To enhance "image, " would reflect Agency
as employer of scholars, scientists, profes-
sionals of high achievement and stature.
(ii) Would attract young scholars/ scientists
for recruitment.
(iii) Would assist in retention of professionals
through permitting them recognition in their
fields.
(iv) Would bring about closer relationships
between Agency and colleges, universities,
private organizations and professional enter-
prises and mitigate to a degree the growing
hostility of some toward the Agency.
(v) Would tend to convey to a degree to the
general public that the Agency mission is not
exclusively a clandestine one.
(2) Disadvantages
(a) To employee
(i) Reduced future personal movement abroad
and in professional fields where CIA affiliation
not desirable.
(ii) Acts to limit opportunities for assignment
by Agency.
(iii) Possibly stronger criticism of activities
and statements than would be expected - due
to his association with CIA. Greater difficulty
handling questions on subject matter and on the
Agency itself.
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(iv) Difficulty in divorcing personal achieve-
ments from Agency - in minds of persons with
whom associating in seminars, etc. Similar
difficulty in divorcing Agency acquired data from
that personally acquired otherwise.
(v) Preclude participation because sponsor
(college, professional organization, etc.) is
opposed to any overt tie to CIA or its employees
due to the public image of CIA as a clandestine
organization.
(vi) Confirm identity of employees as Agency
affiliated and thus establish them as targets
for opposition. (We already know of one such
case
(,vii) Permit the opposition to compile a roster
of known Agency personnel.
(b) To Agency
(i) A greater exposure of Agency, undermining
public image of anonymity and silence. A
danger of over-exposure of the Agency if
participation is not fettered somewhat.
(ii) Criticism of Agency for "permitting" dis-
closures - whether valid or not.
(iii) Employees will be considered to be voicing
Agency positions and levels of knowledge - even
on nonsensitive matters as well as on subjects of
direct or peripheral intelligence interest.
(iv) Agency cannot be consistent - cannot permit
all analysts/ scientists to participate - resultant
questions, possible undermining of impact of
participation, further mistrust, suspicion of
Agency's motives -- if persons not identified are
"surfaced" by outside action. Morale factors
if some employees are permitted to participate,
others not.
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(v) Psychologically, a more liberal policy in
this respect would act to affect present controls
over the release and declassification of clas-
sified materials.
(vi) Possible attraction to Agency of persons
who, while qualified professionally and
academically, wish to enter CIA to avail them-
selves of data for future personal use and
aggrandizement.
D. Authoring Manuscripts for Publication in Outside Media
With Identification as a CIA Employee
Comment: Advantages and Disadvantages, cited above,
apply equally. Published writings, however, are usually
more widely disseminated, provide a permanent record,
are more easily accessible. Additional comment is thus
in order:
(1)
Advantages
(a) To employee
(i) Authors can point to published works for
further academic and professional recognition
at the appropriate level - where publication
is both desired and necessary to gain individual
respect.
(b) To the Agency
(i) Publication by competent professionals
strengthens the Agency's position of intellectual
ability and integrity.
(2) Disadvantages
(a) To the employee
(i) A published work permits more time for
critical review, opens up the arena for charges,
replies, etc. As with a sponsor, a publisher
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may well not desire to reflect any association
with CIA or an Agency employee, either pre-
cluding publication or forcing omission of the
association. An author may have more dif-
ficulty convincing the public his work is his own
and has no Agency connection.
(b) To the Agency
(i) Published works can more easily be used
as a vehicle for attacks on the Agency, and by
a larger number of persons.
(ii) Due to the wider dissemination, published
works are more significant from standpoint of
release of information, would require closer
review to protect the Agency.
(iii) Attribution to the Agency would be more
likely, acceptance of work as authentic would
be more prevalent, solely by identification of
author with CIA. That a CIA employee publishes
would imply approval of a work by the Agency -
when the work deals with matters of current
national or international interest. This could
well have embarrassing repercussion in a
political sense, i. e. Senator Fullbright.
E. Use of Congress to Sponsor Unclassified Publications
The use of Congress to sponsor certain unclassified
publications - under the Congressional masthead - is
of advantage to the Agency and should be continued.
F. Agency Employees as Teachers
The use of Agency employees as teachers and instructors
at colleges and universities would be an advantage to the
Agency provided these employees are clearly known as
CIA employees.
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IV. FINDINGS
Comment: Based upon study of this matter and related data, the
following findings are submitted:
A. Current Agency policies permit the activities in question
but restrict identification of employees with CIA.
B. Current Regulations and Notices take negative or nonpermis-
sive rather than positive approach.
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E. Personnel now engaging in these activities are assigned
primarily in DDI and could be identified with CIA.
F. There are advantages and disadvantages to the employee and
to CIA in identification with the Agency in these activities.
G. Assuming that current Agency policy is trending toward
improvement of the Agency's public image, the disadvantages do
not outweigh the advantages pre-supposing appropriate command
level and security controls.
H. Present procedures in the submitting of requests for approval
to engage in these activities do not place sufficient responsibility
on the requestor or on the command level to assure protection from
disclosures of sensitive information, or embarrassment due to
improprieties.
I. Identification of an employee with CIA increases the require-
ment for placing this responsibility on the requestor and his command
channel.
J. According to present regulations, without exception, employees
must request approval to speak or to write on virtually every con-
ceivable subject, ranging from highly sensitive and/or controversial
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matters to completely nonsensitive subjects. Examples drawn from
both over the past several months are:
Rules and Instructions for a Parlor Game
"Problems of Economic Developments in Indonesia"
"Ways to Use Solar Energy"
Song "The Ballad of Huey and Charlie"
"Postwar Economic Development in Eastern Europe"
"Prospects for Military Intervention in African States"
"Living the Third Commandment"
K. To preclude statements or publications by CIA personnel on
matters of concern to the intelligence community after they leave the
employ of this Agency, there is only the Secrecy Agreement signed
by the employee.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. An Agency Notice be published to establish clear policies
and procedures on the Agency interface with the public and the public
media concerning the identification and participation of Agency em-
ployees in meetings, seminars, societies, etc. and in the publication
of unclassified articles and studies. Such Notice should:
(1) Emphasize that it is Agency policy to permit the
identification of employees with CIA - other than those who are
prohibited for cover reasons - in such activities, contingent
upon approval, on a case-by-case basis, by operating officials,
the Office of Security and the Assistant to the DCI.
(Z) Emphasize that it is Agency policy to encourage greater
camaraderie with key individuals in academic, private and pro-
fessional enterprises.
(3) Include the placing of initial and continuing responsi-
bility on the employee and on the operating official concerned to
prevent the release of sensitive information and to protect the
Agency and the U. S. Government from embarrassment due to
improprieties.
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(4) Operating officials should be responsible for making
an initial determination that the activity is clearly divorced
from matters of Agency interest and not objectionable from an
Agency point of view. Each case, however, should be sent to the
Office of Security and to the Assistant to the DCI for a final
determination that there are no special security or policy factors
involved which would preclude the activity.
B. Revise Agency regulations after a reasonable period of time
to incorporate the above policies.
C. Action be initiated by the Office of Security in coordination
with the Office of the General Counsel to establish what can be done
to effect controls over former CIA employees who may wish to make
statements or publish articles on matters of concern to the Agency.
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