ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES THROUGH 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600130004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 110
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/DEFENSE INTELLIGE CE AGENCY
24 August 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
A copy of the newly published JAG Study, "Alternative Projections
of Chinese Communist Forces Through 1975, " is forwarded for your
information.
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Copy No. 1 of the study together with your transmittal memorandum,
was sent to the Secretary of Defense via Mr. on this date. 25X1
At the same time we told Mr. II that the Joint Analysis Group would 25X1
be pleased to brief the Secretary on the study if he so desired.
The general distribution of the study to intelligence and operational
users will take place on 26 August when all copies have been received
from the printer.
DIA review(s) completed.
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JAG: 16-66
DATED: 15 AUGUST 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
JOINT ANALYSIS GROUP
GROUP 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
4~..,
15 August 1966
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Attached is the first report relating to the potential threat
of Communist China prepared by the CIA /DIA Joint Analysis Group.
Four alternative Forces are projected, extending through 1975.
These projections have been subjected to explicit economic and
technological constraints in the course of their preparation.
This study is primarily intended to meet the need of military
planners for projections of the types of military threats which the
Chinese might pose over the next ten years or so. Substantial un-
certainties exist as to the ultimate priorities and objectives that
the Chinese have set regarding the many modern weapons programs
they are now pursuing. For this reason, we have attempted to
project Forces that would illustrate the principal approaches open
to the Chinese. This study is not to be construed as an intelligence
estimate of probable developments during the period.
This report has been reviewed by other members of the USIB
and by the Board of National Estimates. While giving no formal
approval, they do agree that the study provides a reasonable set
of projections of Chinese Communist military forces.
General Carroll and I are pleased to forward this report by
the Joint Analysis Group for use with other intelligence publications
in long-term planning studies conducted in your office and by the
military services.
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Richard Helms
Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS
OF
CHINESE C ST FORCES THROUGH 1375
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ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS
Or
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES THROUGH 1.975
The Report in Brief
This study projects possible alternative courses in the evolu-
tion of the Chinese Communist military-establishment through 1975, with
the aim of providing the planner with specific illustrations of the poten-
tial character and magnitude of the military threat which China could
pose during that period.
Four alternative Forces are developed, each reflecting an approach
which the Chinese leaders might adopt in determining their military re-
quirements and force goals. All the Forces are primarily concerned with
enhancing China's ability to deter hostile powers from attacking China
or interferring with Chinese-supported operations, rather than with pre-
cipitating full-scale war.
:: Force A is a low-side force, designed to depict the most
modest goals the Chinese leaders might reasonably be expected to
set for themselves in light of the vigorous effort they have made
to date to acquire modern weapons.
Force B is a high-side force differing sharply from Force A
in its basic outlook and depicts the maxImm strategic attack capa-
bility the Chinese might be expected to achieve without neglecting
other military requirements.
.. Force C projects a vigorous modernization program com-
parable in economic magnitude to Force B but with main emphasis on
improving China's defenses rather than on developing strategic
offensive forces; a high side force.
.. Force D, a high-side force, postulates a major effort to
modernize China's general purpose forces, carried out in conjunc-
tion with continued work on development of strategic offensive and
defensive forces.
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The study udy accepts the intel9.igerace judgment that the basic goals
of the ` Chinese I&aderehlp._will .remain gih6ral uh6haAged_ .and. projects
it through - the. newt decabde"even? "tfiaugh tae- departure df'Mao may bring
modifications in emphasis at acticer approaehe ' In addition, the study
proceeds on the basis of'certain.asiaiiI tions,.two of them being that
Sino-Soviet relations during this decade would remain strained, and that
the Chinese would not obtain significant amounts of assistance from
either the Soviet Bloc or the West.
There are a wide variety of possible developments over the next ten
years or so which might significantly-affect Chinese military planning,
developments which would Occur both iineioe China and in China?s relay-
tions with the rest of the -world. r--Appendix A discusses several major
contingent developments, both favorable and unfavorable to the Chinese,
and the possible effect of these contingencies on the projected Forces.
The present Chinese leadership'Wis-clearly been willing and able to
deprive the civilian economy of sa'bstential: 'resources in order to main-
tain the ambitious array of military-programs it is now trying to carry
forward. However, -there-are ikportaurt_'limits as to how far the regime can
go in this direction on a sustained basis. A central problem in formu-
lating the projected Forces has been that of-aeveloping and applying
realistic economic and cost oonatr?aint Appendix B sets forth the
methodology of the economic and cost analysis used in this study and
itemizes the projected costs of the individual Forces.
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ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS
General 1
Alternative Force Planning Concepts 3
Assumptions 6
CHINESE COINIST MILITARY FORCES THROUGH 1975
Force A 11
Force Concept and Its Implications 11
Strategic Offensive Forces 14
Strategic Defensive Forces 16
General Purpose Forces 17
Force B 25
Force Concept and its Implications 25
Strategic Offensive Forces 27
Strategic Defensive & General Purpose Forces 31
Page
1
Force C 37
Force Concept and Its Implications 37
Strategic Offensive Forces 38
Strategic Defensive Forces 38
General Purpose Forces 40
Force D
Force Concept and its Implications
Strategic Offensive & Strategic Defensive Forces
48
48
48
49
64
General Purpose Force
III. GLOSSARY OF PROJECTED "BCX? WEAPON SYSTEMS
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A2PENDIX A. MAJOR CONTINGENCIES AND THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECT ON
THE PROJECTED FORCES A-1
General A-1
Possible Adverse Developments A-1
Serious Worsening of Relations with the USSR A-1
Sizable Diversion of Resources to Support of the
Vietnam War A-2
Increased Military Assistance Requirements A-3
Economic Setbacks A-4
Possible Favorable Developments A-4
Accelerated Economic Progress A-4
Increased Access to Free World Credits and Technology A?5
Marked Improvement in Relations with the USSR A?7
APPENDIX B. ECONOMIC AND COST ANALYSIS USED IN DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ALTERNATIVE FORCES B-1
I? METHODOLOGY B-1
Introduction B-1
Determination of Present Levels of Expenditure B-4
Determination of Maximum Growth Rates B-7
Projecting Future Costs B-12
II. PROJECTED COSTS B-18
Force A
Force B
Force C
Force D
B-18
B-2O
B-22
B-24
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LIST OF TABI
EMe
Table 1 Force A 20
Table 2 Force B 32
Table 3 Force C 43
Table 4 Force D 54
Table 5 Comparison of ForcesA 1 70 and 1975 60
Offensive 60
Defensive 61
General Purpose 62
Table 6 Chinese Communist Hardware-Associated Outlays, 1965 B- 5
Table 7 Chinese Communist Hardware-Associated Outlaya
B- 6
Table 8 Projected Hardware-Associated Outlays, 1965-75 B?14
Table 9 Projected Hardware-Associated Oath s for
Force A 1 B?19
Table 10 P$ o acted Hardwaar?e-Associated Outl s for
Force Bs 1 ?75
Table 11 Projected Hardware-Associated Outlays for
Force C,9 1969- .15
B-23
Table 12 Projected Hardware-Associated 0utla for
Force k 1 B-25
Fo1lowiM
Fags
Figure 1 Economic Pr?ojectionse'1966?75 B? 8
Figure 2 Chinese C iet Military Hardware-Associated
Outla,3rs 9 1956-75
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ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF CHINESE
COWUNIST MILITARY FORCES THROUGH l9J5
1. SCOPE AND APPROACH
General
This study represents an exploratory effort at projecting how the
Chinese Communist military establishment might evolve through 1975,, with
the aim of providing the planner with specific illustrations of the poten-
tial character and magnitude of the military threat which Communist China
might be able to pose for the US and other possible antagonists during
that period.
The study essentially consists of four alternative force projections,,
each reflecting a different approach which t
Chinese leaders,, for one
reason or another, might adopt in determining military requirements and
force goals. One projection is designed to portray the most
goals the Chinese might reasonably be expected to set for themselves In
the light of their vigorous force develo
indicate how far they might reaeo
bly be expected t
particular,-"-set of capabilities (strategic attack in
in developing
se,, air and
naval defense in another,, theater forces In a third) without neglecting
other essential military requiremmentso Each of the forces includes all
of the major elements which make up a military establis
ant,, projected
in accordance with the over-all planning concept used for that force
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In developing these projections., we have taken as a point of depar-
ture the best available intelligence and intelligence judgments, regarding
the progress of the Chinese Co met military effort to d*te: and its
prospects for the future o Economic and technological constraints.have
played a major role in determining both the composition and magnitude of
the various programs herein projected. In applying these constraints to
the-duo nt of the high-side forces,, we have attempted to resolve un-
certainties concerning capabilities in favor of the inese o Proma tech-
ological point of view, we have done so by introduci
t the earliest
dates deemed possible, systems being emphasized in a particular force al-
ternative and by including a substantial number, of new systems on a con-
current or overlapping basis. In the economic sphere we have done so by
postulating rates of growth., hence availability of resources for military
programs., that we believe to be optimistic. Moreover, we have assumed
that with these rates., it would be possible for the Chinese to ha
enough technological and industrial resources both to carry out present
programs and . to develop the additi
would require. (See the Assu mptio
p0 B=1)G
pall resources that future programs
ginning P. 7., below., and Appendix B.,
The projections contained in this paper are not intelligence eats-
m 4 Rather,, these projections are designed to illustrate the r
of options which appear to be open to the Chinese leaders and not to indi-
cate a most likely course of action and possible variations. No one of
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the four courses herein projected is likely to be adopted in its entirety
and no one of them can be singled
however, they do indicate re
expected of the Chinese over the next ten years or so
For the most part, the forces postulated are not projected past 19T5-
Howevers the study does include likely post-1975 IOC:'s of major weapon
systems projected as under develo
nt in the late l96's and early 19TO's
It also takes account of likely force goals beyond 19T5 as they might
affect procurement and dept
cant to imply that this date would have
out as the most probable Taken together,.
onable and practical limits on what might be
nt up to that point. The use of 1975 as a
any special significance for the Chinese
Alternative Force FIL
In preparing this stu
telligence jud
me followed the generally accepted in-
gnat that the basic goals of the Chinese leadership will
remain generally unchanged, even th
ough t
and other old-timers may bring changes In e
,ph
as suggested in the alternative projections we have developed. We assume
that the Chinese military establis
probable departure of Mao
is and tactical approach,
,cent will continue to play a key role
in maintenance of internal security and that Chinese
ilitary policy will,
also continue. to be d ,rected toward supporting the major external goals
of: (a) defending the Chine
e homeland (b)
ntrol over Taiwan
and other lost territories (c) neutralizing and eventually expelling US
and other "imperialist" forces from the Far Basta (d) restoring China's
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historic preeminence in Asia and its standing as a world power; (e) winning
acceptance of Chinese leadership and doctrine in the Communist movement;
and (f) leading the struggle for national liberation throughout the under-
developed world.
'Within this general setting,, the study allows for four different
approaches which the Chiniese Communist leadership might adopt in establish-
ing its long-term military force requirements. All of these envisage a pro-
longed period of continuing tension, probably extending far past 19759 in
which Communist China might become militarily embroiled not only with the
US and the Chinese Rationalists but with other nations including the USSR
All approaches are primarily concerned with enhancing China's ability to
operate effectively and securely at the lower end of the military spectrum,
that is, with deterring hostile powers fro
attacking China or interfering
with (:hinese-supported operations., rather than with precipitating or inviting
full-scale war. Hence., they differ mainly in their approach to the problem
of deterrence.
Alternative Force A is a low-side force designed to depict the most
modest goals the Chinese leaders might reasonably be expected to set for
themselves in the light of the vigorous effort they have made to date to
provide themselves with modern weapons. It assumes a decision to hold
spending for development and production of military hardware at approxi-
mately present absolute levels, reflecting a belief that there is no over-
riding; need for a more rapid buildup and reinforced perhaps by concern over
the need to build up the civilian economy. This approach probably would
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contifue to stress such concepts as the superiority of properly trained and
motivated men over mere technology on the battlefield and would value
modern (and especially nuclear) weapons primarily for their psychological
value in reinforcing China?s claims to great power status rather than for
their specific military potential.
the Chinese might re
depicts the maximum strategic attack capability
nably be expected to achieve without neglecting
other military requirements and is a high-side force which differs sharply
from Force A in its basic outlook. It assumes the emergence of a more pro-
fessional and systematic approach to military problems, and reflects a
cent by Chinas leaders that they cannot be assured that their modern
weapons will be effective in restraining the US and overawing China?s
neighbors unless these weapons provide a substantial and reasonably
credible retaliatory capability.
Alternative Force C projects a vigorous modernization program com-
parable in economic magnitude to Force B but with main emphasis on imm
provi
China?s defenses rather than on developing strategic offensive
forces. Fo
rce C thus depicts the maximum air and naval defense effort
the Chinese might reasonably be expected to carry out in the light of
competing military requirements. Like Force B, Force C is primarily
directed at deterring US attack on China and at impressing China's neigh-
bore with its ability to defend itself.
Alternative Force D postulates a major effort to modernize China?s
general purpose forces, carried out in conjunction with continued work on
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development of strategic offensive and defensive systems. Although a
high-side force, it would represent a less drastic shift from the Force A
outlook than postulated in Forces B and C, reflecting a continuation of
the present emphasis on the ground forces as the mainstay of the military
establishment. Thin is a direction the Chinese military planners might
take should they become convinced that the acquisition of nuclear weapons
would provide China with greater opportunity to threaten or actually under-
take aggressive military operations in peripheral areas. Conversely, such
a buildup might be stimulated by continuing or enhanced concerns over the
possibility that China might be compelled to intervene, say, in Vietnam.
Assvations
In developing these alternative forces, it has been necessary to
take account of a wide range of uncertainty about the specific conditions
and situations which might confront Communist China over the next decade.
In general, we have envisaged the alternative force projections as long-
term programs designed to take account of a variety of possible develop-
ments rather than as lists of requirements tailored to meet particular
sets of contingencies. The projections do not, for example, make specific
provision for such possible developments as Indian development of nuclear
weapons or a sharp decline in the GRCas internal position. However, we
have found it necessary to make some specific assumptions about the Chinese
economy and about certain other circumstances likely to confront the
Chinese leadership and have also noted in Appendix A how certain develop-
mente, such as a severe worsening of Sino Soviet relations, might affect
Chinese force developments. These specific assumptions are listed below.
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Assumption 1. The Chinese will have a considerable degree of
success in coping with their economic and technological problems
over the next ten years or so.
This is an optimistic.assumption but one which appears to provide
the most practical approach for two reasons. The first is that these
projections are primarily aimed at indicating how much of a military threat,
rather than how little, the.Chinese might be able to develop and sustain
during the next ten years. The second is that, while we certainly cannot
exclude the possibility of one or more bad crop years or another mana-
gerial aberration like the "Great Leap Poward," the likelihood and extent
of such setbacks and their quantitative impact on military programs are
essentially unpredictable. The spoaific economic implications of this
assumption are discussed in Appendix B.
Assumption 2. Although development and production of military
haar?dwa will continue to be heavily favored in the allocation of
scarce technological and industrial resources, the Chinese leaders
will not be able to provide the military mo on a sustained basis --
with any significantly larger share of these resources than it is
now getting.
This assumption serves to provide some objective basis for assessing
economic constraints. It represents an economic judgment (discussed,
along with other points made here, in Appendix B) that any significant
increase in the already substantial proportion of. scarce industrial and
technological resources now devoted to military purposes would severely
cramp the growth of the economy, which in turn would severely cramp future
growth of military program. We have considered spending for military hard-
ware in relation to outlays in a specific sector of the economy, i.e.,
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heavy industry sector, and not in relation to total GNP. This is not only
because of the great uncertainty about the actual size of Chinese GNP but
because GNP, in a vast, predominantly peasant economy like China's does
not adequately reflect the burden on that sector of the economy which is
most responsive to the impact of military programs. For related reasons,
we have not sought to calculate the....cost of food, clothing, and pay for the
armed forces, which are assumed to remain at approximately the present level
in all forces.
There is no implication in this assumption or in the study that the
Chicoms are following an orderly detailed fiscal and developmental plan.
We do not know. The limitation on resources exists, however, whether the
Chinese are rational or irrational in their planning. It is conceivable
that they could go to a crash program of intensive production of weapon
systemu$. At the end of some period however they would pay a severe penalty
for having overworked facilities, and for having ignored the needs for
capital reinvestment.
Assumption . The Chinese will not obtain significant amounts
of military equipment or technical advice from either the USSR and
its European partners or from other countries.
This is a necessary assumption if we are to assess China's own capa-
city to develop its military capabilities. It allows for some continuing
shipments of spare parts, etc. We cannot exclude the possibility that
the Soviets may provide China with some interceptors or other defensive
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-war proviso is not intended to rule out the possi-
f such a development but merely to reflect the fact that the out-
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equipments they did in 1962 and possibly later? but have excluded it
from the projections However, the possibility of significant aid --
with particular reference to the circumstances under which it might become
available, the types of aid which might be extended., and China's ability
to absorb it is discussed in Appendix A.
Assu Lion 4 o Although SianooSoviet relations will remain
atrainnd9. t y will not deteriorate sufficiently to generate major
new requirements for defense against the USSR
nn! r#rh5-4+W r}pA
In other words., no specific provision is made in the alte.tiv8e
forces for possible requirements for increased capabilities via-s-vis the
USSR. This provides the only reasonably firm basis for projecting force
requirements
matters now stand. Possible effects of a worseni
Sino-Soviet relations on Chinese f
of increased Soviet aid are s
rce planning,
well as the p
ever, considered in Appendix A.
seibility
Asation 2. Regardless of how the Par Eastern situation m
otherwise develops a substantial and possibly increased US milita
presence In the Far East will continue and related US-Chinese str
will persist, but not to the point of direct hosti,ities
In other words, it will continue necessary for Chinese military planners
to take account of the possibility of US opposition to military operations
they might consider and of US or -supported attacks of one kind or another
on China proper. The n
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break of war would mean, at a minimum, the end of any orderly military
force development program for China. Appendix A notes the possible impact
on China's ability to carry out military development programs of heavy
but indirect Chinese involvement in a long-drawn-out conflict in Vietnam.
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II. THE ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS
ALTERNATIVE FORCE A
Forge Concept and. its Implications
Alternative Force A is a baseline force, representing the most
modest military goals the Chinese leaders could reasonably be expected
to set for themselves in the light of the heavy commitments they have
already made to development of nuclear and other modern weapons and
their normal requirements over the next ten years for elimination of
outstanding deficiencies and replacement of obsolescent equipment within
the existing force structure. In developing this force we have assumed
that spending for development and procurement of military hardware would
continue at approximately present absolute levels and that China would
continue to maintain approximately the present number of men under arms.
A very considerable though declining proportion of China's critical
industrial and technological resources would still be going to the mili-
tary on this basis. However, the leveling off of expenditures for procure-
ment of military hardware at a time when various weapon systems programs
were approaching the costly production stage would make it difficult to
pursue all.production programs simultaneously and would sooner or later
impose sharp limitations on what the regime could procure. A decision
to level off such military procurement expenditures would thus involve
some slowup.in the over-all pace of the military program as it has de-
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merit.of an ICIM. However, it does call for completion of
veloped so far. The Chinese certainly could not settle for any lower
level of effort without, in effect, confessing that they had overreached
themselves, and though they might be forced by circumstance to do so
would presumably not do so voluntarily. Indeed, even a leveling off of
military procurement expenditures would involve some unpleasant decisions.
In general, Force A calls for continuation of work on all three
major. types of strategic delivery systems now apparently under develop-
ment (i.e., the MRI+i, the submarine-launched missile, and the medium
bomber) but with actual production and deployment relatively limited.
China?s airdefenses would be improved somewhat with the introduction of
native-produced interceptors and improved detection and communication
equipment but would still have but few SAMes. Similarly, China?s coastal
and naval defenses would remain weak despite an active naval building
program aimed at phased replacement of older ships. The ground forces
would continue to be the backbone of the Chinese military posture and
because of the magnitude of their requirements for new or standardized
weapons, even at a relatively modest level of sophistication, would
remain a major claimant to Chinese military resources.
.For the most part, Force A does not call for construction of major
new production or test facilities before 1975, the principal exception
being the new rangehead (and instrumentation ships) required for develop-
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Adoption of force goals at or close to the Force A level would
be quite consistent with the regime's continuing heavy emphasis on
the superiority of properly motivated men over mere technology on the
battlefield and its efforts to discourage professional as against essen-
tially political loyalties and modes of thought within the officer corps o
Force goals of this sort might also be favored out of concern over the
need to build up China's civilian economy,, perhaps coupled with a belief
that China's military establishment itself would be better off in the
long run if extensive production of expensive military hardware were
foregone at this stage,, thereby making funds available for building
up China's industrial infrastructure (or for military 1T&E beyond that
actually projected in Force A).
Even under this approach the Chinese would presumably be well aware
of the value of nuclear weapons as a potential retaliatory threat against
the US and other possible enemies and would envisage the eventual achieve-
ment of an arsenal of modern weapons of considerably more than token num-
bers. But it is assumed that they would feel under no great pressure to
speed up the military buildup and,, though mindful of the possibility of
all-out war with the US,, would remain reasonably confident that the US
already had strong inhibitions against undertaking an all-out attack on
them. In this view,, the modern weapons program would initially have the
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primary aim of demonstrating China's progressive achievement of all
the attributes of great power status and its ability to gain them
despite the cutting off of Soviet aid.
Str,c Offensive Forces
We assume that the Chinese would seek to develop: an SS-4-type MR BM
with a range of 1000 rm which could be used to threaten US bases and
population centers in Okinawa, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and South
Vietnam. The MREM would also provide valuable experience which could
be used in development of an ICHVI. However, requirements for deployed
missiles would remain relatively modest. Assuming that the Chinese
can achieve an IOC by 1970, we project production averaging 15 missiles
per year through 1974, using existing Rt &E facilities, for a total
production of 105 missiles and a deployed total of 35 missiles in 1975.
We assume that they would be deployed in soft sites.
We envisage, for this Force, only the one G-class submarine now in
existence. A compatible missile for it is projected as becoming available
in 1969, using the same missile test and production facilities used for
the MMRW. No production line mould be set up; the very small requirement
would be met from the RITE program. This submarine would give the
Chinese navy a token strategic attack capability and, primarily, the
means for learning more about missile submarines. However, no more of
this class would be built, with attention instead focussed on develop=
ment of a more advanced hull design (see General Purpose Forces, p. 19).
m14-
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and on RD'1'&E for a nuclear-propelled submarine which, despite its even
greater expense, would have unique advantages. Under this projection, a
nuclear-powered submarine would not be completed earlier than 1980.
We assume that the Chinese would wish to produce at least a limited
number of BADGER-type medium jet bombers, in part as a hedge against
slippage in the missile programs, in part as a means of diversifying
China?s attack capabilities, and in part for the purpose of gaining
experience in large military aircraft design and construction. It
is considered most unlikely that the Chinese would seek to produce the
generally unsatisfactory transport version of the BADGER, with better
and: far cheaper cargo planes available both from the USSR Hand in Western
Europe On the assumption that production could begin in 1967, with the
first plane rolled out in 1969, we project a total of 46 HERS pro-
duced and 36 deployed by 1974. This number, equivalent to one Soviet
regiment, represents considerably less than optimum utilization of the
plant m? 100 would be a more reasonable "minimum buy" in Western cost
accounting terms but such a cutback in procurement goals would be
virtually unavoidable if the Chinese were to adopt the Force A concept
of holding military development and procurement expenditures at approxi-
mately present levels. We postulate that after completion of the BADGER
run the plant involved would be converted to production of a native-
design transport of the AN-12 (CUB)-type. First roll-out is projected
for 19T6.
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'W'hile the Chinese leaders might decide to forego development of
an ICB14, especially in the face of US (and Soviet) ABM deployment, we
assume here that the prestige and deterrent potential of an ICBM would
make it attractive even in the Force A context. However, research and
development on an ICBM would be carried out at a moderate pace, with con-
struetion.of new rangehead facilities commencing in 1973, a pilot model
appearing in 1976, and IOC being achieved in the latter 1970's. An IRBM
would not be deployed under the Force A concept although China would
acquire the capability to assemble such a missile from components re-
quired for the ICBM and might actually test an IRBM configuration.
Strategic Defensive Forces
The chief improvement in strategic defense forces would be the
introduction of increasing numbers of interceptors. Production of
MIG-19's has apparently already begun at Shenyang and in this projec-
tion is estimated to continue through 1970, for a total production run
of about 900 aircraft. We have assumed that the aircraft turned
out at the Chung-Tu plant will be the MIG-21 and that production will
begin in 1967. The decision to go ahead concurrently with the less
effective MIG-l9 as well reflects some technical difficulties with
the MIG-21 and the regime's unwillingness to wait for these diffi-
culties to be resolved. In Force A production of MIG-21's is
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 projected as continuing through 1975, for a total production of about 600.
Air-to-air missiles are projected for both the MIG-19 and the MIG-21.
It is assumed that the obsolescent MIG-15 and MIG-17 would be retained as
long as possible, then placed in reserve for emergency use in either the
interceptor or ground support role.
Under this force concept we envisage continuation of China's esti-
mated modest capability to maintain necessary stocks of SA-2-type missiles,
to take account of the retirement of no longer serviceable missiles as
well as actual firings. We also project continuation of the SAM RDT&E
program. Under the Force A concept, however, we assume that cost considera-
tions, together with range and other limitations of the SA-2 missile system,
would militate against significant production and deployment of weapons of
this type.
Olerothe course of the ten-year period, we would expect a consider-
able improvement in the air defense infrastructure of airfields, radars,
and communications. We also project a modest increase in the number of
AAA batteries.
General Purpose Forces
This alternative projects a continuation of the army at approximately
present strength, with present T0&E's remaining for the most part unchanged
and only minor changes taking place in the order of battle -- notably to
provide a modest buildup of AAA, combat engineer, signal and motor trans-
port units at the army and higher levels.
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The principal ground force planning goal under this concept would
be the standardization of weapons and equipment, so as to eliminate the
many obsolescent and heterogenous items in the inventory and to provide
all regular units with their full T0&E requirements in standardized items
of currently accepted Soviet or Chinese design. A related goal would be
the building up of adequate ammunition reserves. We also project much
greater numbers of ground force radios, especially below regimental level,
the provision of MII.4 helicopters to each of the 34 armies for command
and contra 1, and a modest start toward setting up some units equipped
with pontoons and other special equipment for crossing water obstacles.
The hardware requirements of a standardization and reequipping pro-
gram would vary. The army is probably well on its way to achieving such
standardization with respect to artillery. For our calculations we assume
that the army's entire present stock of wheeled vehicles will require re-
placement by the end of 1975, for an annual requirement of some 10,000
new vehicles or about half of China's present truck outputs
With respect to tanks, we assume that the Chinese would wish to stan-
dardize on the T-54, with all of the T?34's in the inventory replaced by
1974 at a retirement rate of about 300 a year. This would involve annual
production of 400-500. We also project development (primarily
for reconnaissance) of a light amphibious tank comparable to the Soviet
PT-76 with an IOC of 1973, introduction of a follow-on medium tank which
would begin entering the inventory in 1975, and development of a heavy
assault gun to replace the obsolescent JSm21s and assault guns now in
the inventory.
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On this basis the army would have more than made up the deficiencies'
which plagued it during the any 19601s. By Western standards, however,
it would still be relatively. weak in motor transport and in specialized
equipment such as dozers, mine-layers, amphibious vehicles, etc. It
is assumed, moreover, under the present force concept, that some 75 of
China ? s line divisions would continue to live largely on the land and
would have only about half their time available for training. This would
leave only 42 line divisions able to spend virtually full time on train-
Ingo
On the naval side, we project an increased level of shipbuilding
activity after 1970, primarily for the purpose of replacing obsolescent
ships now in service but also with the hope of effecting some improve-
tent in coastal patrol and other defensive capabilities and of paving the
way for future improvements in the submarine force.
Much of the construction would go for replacement of various types
of small craft, at a rate of about 5 percent a year o The projection also
calls for ten more submarines of the R -class, the improved version of
the Wmciass, in addition to the two now complete, in part to replace
seven smaller and increasingly obsolescent submarines now in the
inventory. Construction of the SS CXml, a new torpedo-attack submarine
with diesel propulsion and more efficient hull design, would begin in
the early 1970's. A hull, of this design, embodying the lessons learned
in production and operation of the SS-CX-I, would be used in the nuclear-
propelled submarine projected for 19
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TABLE 1. FORCE A
ST ATTC OFFEI'I3IVE FORCES
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
BALLISTIC MISSILES 21
MPli4 (SS-4-Type)
1
6
Ballistic Missile Subs.
SSB-G a/
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
BOERS J
BULL/TU-4
13
12
10
8
6
4
BADGER/TU-16
2
2
2
2
2
3
10
TOTAL
-
---9
12
10
10
J SS-N-4-Type missile available in 1969 from RDT&E program.
IL-28, IL-10 and TU-2 bombers are listed under General Purpose Forces.
J Missiles and aircraft will have nuclear warheads and bombs respectively.
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1972 12D 1974 IM
12
20
1
1
18
--
26
18
26
28
35
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SECRET
(Table 1 Cont.)
25X1
FORCE A
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
1965
1966
196T
1968
1969 197
0
M
1972
IM
1974
1975
SURFACE-TO-AIR-MISSILES
SA-2-Type Sites
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
INTERCEPTORS J
FAGOT/MIG-15
408
400
350
275
200 5
0
FRESCO/MIG-17
1107
1100
1050
1000
950 8
50
700
550
350
200
50
FRESCO D/MIG-1 -D
325
325
325
290
230 2
15
200
150
100
50
25
FARMER/MIG-l9c/
175
350
500
650
800 8
75
900
900
900
900
900
FISHBED/MIG-21
35
35
35
_.35
35 _
50
100
140
200
300
400
TOTAL.
2050
2210
2260
2240
ala 20
40
1900
1 0
1450
1M
CONVENTIONAL AAA GUNS
Light
1900
1950
2000
2050
2100 21
50
2200
2250
2300
2350
2400
M
dium
15To
1600
1600
1600
1600 16
00
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
e
60 0 18W 80 Sao ?- 4000
zmcmz=
J Includes Naval Interceptors
The category Light AAA Guns includes the 37 and 57 mm; the Medium the 85 and 100 MM-
2/ The mid-1966 figure shown fcr MIG-19's is believed to be a reasonable reflection of the
size of the OB. However, it should be noted that there is still uncertainty in the
community on this subject.
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FORCE A
(Table 1 Cont.)
GENERAL. PURPOSE FORCES
1965
1966
196
11968
1 7O
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
GROUND FORCES
Line Divisions
Infantry Conventional)
Armored
Horse Cavalry
Airborne
Naval Infantry
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
106
5
3
3
BS/MIS Divisions
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Combat Support Divisions
23
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Service Support Divisions
ll
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
ll
11
Combat & Service Support
Independent Regiments
121
123
123
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
AMW
T-54-Type
Improved. T-54-Type
PT-76-Type
HELICOPTERS
Mi-4
TRANSPORTS
Light
Medium
Total
LIGHT BOMBERS
BAT/TU-2
BEAST/IL-10
BEAD /IL-28
1300 1650 2050 2500 2950 31400 3850 4300 4650 4800 4800
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20 80 180
18 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330
347 359 440 505 565 630 695 745 845 920 995
6 10 1 25 30 _30 0 A_ 0 2
50 25 --
30 10 --
159 130 100 80 55 30 15
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FORCE A
(Table 1 Cont.)
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
12a 1966 1967
1968
1969
1970
1971 M2 M 1W4 lW5
NAVAL FORCES
Submarines
SS-MV and S-1
7 7 7
7
7
7
7 6 5 5 4
SS-w
24 24 24
24
24
24
24 24 24 24 24
SS-R
2 4 6
8
9
10
11 12 12 12 12
SS-CX-1
1 1 2
37
33 35
39
40
41
42 42 4242 42
Naval Aircraft
X
MADGE/BE-6
6 5 3
2
BEAGLE/IL-28
118 100 80
70
45
20
Surface Shins
Destroyers
DD Gordy Class)
4 4 4
4
4
4
4 4 4 4 4
ASW Escorts
DE Riga Class)
4 4 4
4
4
4
4 4 4 4 4
LE (Kiangnan Class)
1 1
2
2
3
3 3 3 3 3
DE-CX-l
1 1 2 2
Torpedo/Patrol Craft
PC Subchaser
PTG (Ms1.Launching)J
PT/PTF/PF/PW
25 26 27 28 29 30 30 30 30 30 30
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 6 8 10
250 280 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
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(Table 1 Cont.)
FORCE A
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1965 1966 196T 1968 1969 19TP 19T1 19T2 IM 19T4 IM
NAVAL FORCES
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Minesweepers
T-43-Type
Other
14
59
15
59
16
59
17
59
18 19 20 22 26 30 35
59 59 58 56 52 48 44
Amphibious
LSM-Type
59
59
59
59
59
60
60
60
60
60
60
Misc.Nav.Ships & Craft
435
440
445
450
455
460
465
470
475
480
485
COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES
SS
-CD-1-Type Sites 3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
a/ Missile available in 1971.
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ALTERNATIVE FORCE B
Force Concept and its Implications
Alternative Force B projects the maximum strategic attack capa-
bility the Chinese might reasonably be expected to achieve in the next
ten years or so without neglecting other essential military require-
ments. Main emphasis would be placed on prompt development and subse-
quent maintenance of as formidable and credible as possible a capability
to strike with nuclear weapons, first against US bases and other poten-
tial targets in the Far East but as soon as possible thereafter at inter-
continental ranges against the US and (if need be) the USSR. Given the
heavy allocation of resources which would be required for this purpose,
defensive and general purpose forces would be restricted to the Force A
level.
This approach is not intended to imply any greater willingness to
risk war with the US or any greater belief that war with the US is:;more
likely than is the case with Force A. It rather reflects a harsher
view of the requirements of deterrence: a belief that China cannot be
assured that its modern weapons will be effective in restraining the US
and in overawing China's neighbors unless they provide a substantial,
well-organized, and reasonably credible retaliatory capability.
An essentially professional and systematic approach of this sort
to the problem of determining military requirements might develop as
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a natural result of the increased exposure of Chinese military leaders
to the problems of dealing with modern weapons. Its adoption would be
a strong indication that the efforts of the old leadership to stifle the
growth of independent thinking and professional attitudes among the mili-
tary had failed. This approach might also be encouraged by a belief that
other nations were not taking China's modern weapons program seriously
enough, by a desire to keep well ahead of possible (or impending) Indian
nuclear weapons programs, or by a simple desire to have more
assured diplomatic leverage against China's weaker neighbors.
In projecting this force we have assumed that expenditures for de-
velopment and production of military hardware, instead of leveling off
(as in the case of Force A), continue to grow at about the same rate as
that postulated for the machinery sector of heavy industry as a whole.
This implies that the Chinese could not afford, at least on a sustained
basis, to allow such military expenditures to grow much more rapidly than
those for the comparable portions of the civilian economy.* Although
this rate of growth would permit a doubling of military procurement ex-
penditures by the mid-1970's,** there would still be significant limita-
tions on what the Chinese could procure. At the same time, the economic
and technological resou?ces which could be used for non-military purposes
would: be severely limited. A serious attempt to develpp and maintain a
* See Appendix B for a discussion of the economic considerations on
which this assumption is based.
** As measured in dollars; somewhat more in yuan terms. See Appendix B.
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a reasonably credible deterrent force as postulated here would involve
China in an unending problem of trying to catch up with US technology and
deal with possible US countermeasures. Though we have not detailed all
of the improvements and follow-on systems the Chinese might seek to develop
in the latter 1970's and thereafter, the cost would amost certainly be
high.
Most of the programs here projected could probably be handled by
existing plants and facilities. However, a new rangehead for the IRBM
and ICl'M would be required. In addition, there would probably have to be
some expansion of nuclear facilities, notably of the
Strategic Offensive ForcesF;
This projection calls fora considerably more rapid and extensive
buildup of strategic offensive forces than does Force A. It is assumed
that targeting would be more systematic and rigorous under this approach.
It is also assumed that the Chinese planners would regard a rapid buildup
in the number and types of deliverable weapons as initially offering the
best assurance that at least some of them could survive enemy defense or
counterforce operations. Thus, we project continued work on all three
major delivery systems now apparently under development.
In the case of the SSm4mtype MRBM,which is assumed to be now under
development, we project a buildup to 80 deployed in 1973 (out of a total
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production of l$0), with 30 in the inventory by 1970 as against only I
for Force A. It is assumed that these would be deployed against targets
in Okinawa,, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines.,
and Thailand. It is assumed that'even under the Force B approach the
Chinese would be reluctant to take on the design problem, heavy costs,
and long construction time (with its risks of detection) inherent in
hardening of sites. We., therefore, have projected the use of road-
transportable MRB4's, multiple (including dummy) sites, and camouflage
to dleal with the threat of preemptive attack.
This MRBM deployment would be supplemented by the introduction of
an IBBM in 1973, with total deployment reaching 50 in 1976. This would
give China a capability to hit Guam, targets in India and, if need be,
a number of major centers in the USSR. (Moscow itself would be within
range of a 2000 nm IRBM sited at Urumchi in the northwestern part of
China). We assume that a significant number of IRBMBs would be located
deep within China, where they could be used either to supplement the
MRBMAs in coverage of major Far East targets or to cover potential tar-
gets in India and the USSR. Since the IRBM?s would be too large to be
moved readily to alternate sites, the Chinese would have to rely primarily
on hardening to protect them from missile attack. However, they might
also hope that locating many of them far inland,
might make it more difficult for an attacker to hit.
them accurately.
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With respect to the ballistic missile submarine, we project a total
of 4 G-class submarines equipped with a 350 nm missile by 1970. This would
be a large enough force to permit the establishment of regular and contin-
uous sea patrols as far out as Hawaii and would give the Chinese a SLBM
capability against more than one target area concurrently. We also postu-
late two follow-ons to the G-class submarine: (a) a 4-tube improved diesel-
propelled submarine, utilizing the Albacore-type hull, with greater cruising
range than the G-class, but using the same missile; and (b) a 6-tube
nuclear propelled submarine with a submerged-launch missile of 600 nm range.
Under this projection, the first follow-on would be completed in 1970 and
become operational in 1971, with a total of 4 deployed by 1914. The first
nuclear submarine is projected for IOC in 1978.
For Force B we also projected a much larger BADGER program than in
Force A -- with 36 in the order of battle by 1970 and 130 in 1972 and
thereafter. This would provide a more substantial and flexible air threat
to an area including all US bases west of Wake and including major Indian
cities.
It is assumed that an ultimate goal of the Force B military buildup
would be the achievement of a capability to strike the continental US
with ICBM's, submarine-launched missiles, or both, and that the IRBM
would provide components which could be used in an ICBM. As far as we
can determine, the Chinese could not significantly speed development of
an ICBM by omitting the IRBM stage.
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Our projection calls for a 5000-nm ICBM to have an IOC in 1971+, with
ten missiles deployed in hard sites in mid-19759 and with the deployed
total reaching a level of 72 in 197&. Launched from Manchuria, a 5000. nm
missile could reach targets as far out as a line extending from Los
Angeles through Denver, Omaha, and Milwaukee to Montreal.
This timetable would call for flight testing of the ICBM to begin in
1972, with construction of a new rangehead for ICBM testing beginning in
1970 and construction of hard sites for the first deployed missiles begin-
ning in 1972. It is assumed that extended range tests for an ICBM would
require use of a Pacific Ocean or Indian Ocean impact area, using ship-
based or island-based instrumentation.
In addition to development of these major systems, the Force B
approach would also call for continued RDT&E to improve the. effectiveness
and survivability of Chinese modern weapons in the light of what would
presumably be a vigorous US program to counter them. The Chinese would
have to consider the use of penetration aids for their. missiles. To
reach additional US -targets they would teed an ICBM of more than 5000 nm.
In addition, they might be impelled to devote greater attention to active
defense of their missile sites once the strategic offensive forces had
been built up. These additional requirements would add to the difficul-
ties with which the Chinese would be confronted in trying to develop and
maintain a reasonably credible deterrent force. Sooner or later the
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Chinese might have to concentrate on more secure systems such as the
nuclear missile submarine. In the end, they might settle for a deterrent
posture in which the US could probably deal with most Chinese offensive
weapons but could not be completely confident of eliminating them all be-
fore they reached their targets.
Strategic Defensive and General Purpose, Forces
Sane as Force A.
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TABLE 2. FORCE B
BALLISTIC MISSILES
MRBM(SS-4-Type)
IRBM-CX-1
ICBM-CX-1
. &
Ballistic Missile Subs.. J
SSB-G J
SSB-CX-l
SS-N-4-Type Missiles
TOTAL
Ba[ M. S CJ
BULL/TU-4
BADGER/TU-16
OTRAT LJ.U Orr iSIVE FORCES
12a 1966 1967 1968 ?-969 1WO 1971 1W2 lW3 1974 ?M
22 .40
-- -- 8$ 1 0
_12 _30 17'0 1.QJ
-- -- -- -- 1 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 4 5 6 7
-- -- -- -- 6 12 16 20 24 28 28
3 12 30 50 70
-- 6 12 16 20 24 28 28
13 12 10 5 -- - -- -- --
2 2 2 2 12 36 80 130 130 130 -IM
15 14 12 12 X36 80 . 130
J Construction of an SSBN is projected to begin in 1975. See p. 29.
SS-N-4-Type missile available in 1969.
IL-28, IL-10 and TU-2 bombers are listed under General Purpose Forces.
Missiles and bombers will have nuclear warheads and bombs respectively.
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(Table 2 cont.) 25X1
FORCE B
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970 1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
SURFACE-TO-AIR-MISSILES
SA-2-Type Sites
8
8
8
8
8
8 8
8
8
8
8
INTERCEPTORS/
FAGOT/MIG-15
408
400
350
275
200
50 --
FRESCO/MIG-17
1107
1100
1050
1000
950
850 700
550
350
200
50
FRESCO D/MIG-1
325
325
325
290
230
215 200
150
100
50
25
FARMER/MIG-19.
175
350
500
65o
800
875 900
900
900
900
900
FISHBED/MIG-21
35
35
35
35
35
50 100
140
200
300
40o
2050
2210
2260
2240
2215
1940 1900
1740
1550
1450
1375
CONVENTIONAL AAA GUNS`/
Light
1900
1950
2000
2050
2100
-2150 2200
2250
2300
2350
2400
Medium
1570
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600 1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
TOTAL
3470
,3.o
36O2
3650
3700
3750 3800
3850
3900
3950
4000
J Includes Naval Interceptors
b/ The category Light AAA Guns includes the 37 and 57 mm; the Medium, the 85 and 100 mm.
c~ The mid-1966 figure shown for MIG-19's is believed to be a reasonable reflection of the
size of the OB. However, it should be noted that there is still uncertainty in the
community on this subject.
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CIA-RDP80B01676 6761~001 600130
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
(Table 2 - Cont.)
1 o4,c 1044 i o4,7 i of i Q Q 1070 1 Q71 1079 1Q7q 1974 1975
GROUND FORCES
Tt..
LJ.L& l+
.-t ..l
Yiol~Vna
Infantry Conventional)
106
106
10
6
106
106
106
106
106
106
106
106
Armored
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Horse Cavalry
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Airborne
Naval Infantry
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
BS/MIS Divisions
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Combat Support Divisions
23
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Service Support Divisions
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
3.1
11
11
Combat & Service Support
Independent Regiments
121
123
123
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
T-54-Type
1300
1650
2050
2500
2950
3400
3850
4300
4650
4800
4800
Improved T-54-Type
--
--
--
25
PT-76-Type
--
20
80
180
HELICOPTERS
Mi-4
18
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
270
300
330
TRANSPORTS
Light
347
359
440
505
565
630
695
745
845
920
995
Medium
6
to
25-
3
0
- - LO
30
30
30
Total
59
-
-
7
2
1
LIGHT BOMBERS
BAT/TU-2
50
25
--
BEAST/IL-10
30
10
--
BEAGLE/IL-28
159
130
100
55
30
15
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 r I. 1 Approved FI)r Release 20d3/10/21: CIA-kDP80M01676t20016001300(4-9
SECRET
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(Table 2 Cont.)
FORCE B
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1965
1972
1
1974
NAVAL FORCES
Submarines
SS-MV and S-1 7
7
T
7
7
7
7
6
5
5
4
SS-W 24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
214
SS-R 2
4
6
8
9
10
u
12
12
12
12
SS-CX-1 --
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
1
1
2
40
41
42
42
42
42
42
Naval Aircraft
MADGE BE- 6
5
3
2
--
--
BEAGLE/IL-28 118
100
80
70
45
20
Surface Ships
Destroyers
DD (Gordy Class) 4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
ASW Escorts
DE Riga Class) 4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
DE (Kiangnan Class) --
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
DE-CK-l
1
1
2
2
To edo Patrol Craft
PC Subchaser 25
26
27
28
29
30
30
30
30
30
30
PTG (Ms1.La3nching) J 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
6
8
10
PT/P Y/PF/PC +t 250
280
300
300
300,
300
300
300
300
300
300
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(Table 2 Cont.)
FORCE B
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969 1970
1
971
M 1M 1W4
M
NAVAL FORCES
Minesweepers
T- 3-Type
14
15
16
17
18 19
20
22 26 30
35
Other
59
59
59
59
59 59
58
56 52 48
44
Amphibious
L M-Type
59
59
59
59
59 60
60
60 60 60
60
Misc. Nav. Ships & Craft
435
440
445
450
455 460
465
470 475 480
485
COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES
SS-CD-1-Type Sites
3
3
3
3
3 3
3
3 4 4
5
J Missile available in 1971.
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 Approved For Release
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01676R001600130004-9
ALTERNATIVE FORCE C
Force Concept and its, Implications
Alternative Force C projects a vigorous modernization program com-
parable in economic magnitude-to Force B but with main emphasis on im-
proving China's defenses rather than on developing strategic offensive
forces. Force C thus depicts the maximum air and naval defense effort
the Chinese might reasonably be expected to carry out in the light of
competing military requirements. This projection also calls for a modest
but continuing program of ground force improvements along the lines of
Alternative Force A.
Like Force B. Force C is primarily directed at deterring US attack
on.China and at impressing China's neighbors with its ability to defend
itself; similarly, it implies a more exacting and professional assess-
ment of the requirements. of deterrence than is the case with Force A.
Primary emphasis on strategic defense would be very much in character
with the historical concern of the Chinese for the security of their own
territory. The decision to develop such a force might also be stimulated
by a professional judgment that the strengthening of strategic defenses
would significantly complicate the task facing the potential US attacker,
or by a judgment that while Chinese strategic retaliatory forces could
effectively deter US nuclear attack they would not necessarily stave off
conventional bombing. It is assumed that the Chinese leaders would also
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favor a buildup of air and naval defenses in order to make it progressively
more dangerous for the US and GRC to overfly Chinese territory or operate
off the Chinese coast in peacetime.
For this Force the level of expenditures. for development and procure-
ment of military hardware is approximately that of Force B, with similar
implications for the economy as a whole. It is assumed that nuclear re-
quirements would be lower than for Force B.
Strategic. Offensive Forces
Given the emphasis on strategic defensive forces in this alternative,
the strategic offensive forces are those of Force A. It should be noted,
however, that provision is made below, under General Purpose Forces, for
the conversion of W-class submarines to cruise-missile launchers. Al-
though these submarines would be used primarily against US naval task
forces, they could be used to make nuclear strikes with cruise missiles
against ports and bases in the Western Pacific.
Strategic Defensive Forces
For this Force, we postulate a major buildup of all elements of the
air defense system, including the control and warning infrastructure. Ex-
pansion of the interceptor force would take place at an accelerated pace.
Assuming that the manufacture of the MIG-21 could commence at Cheng-tu in
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1966, we project a production run continuing through the period, with a
total of 800 in the force by 1975. Production of MIG-19'a is assumed to
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continue at the Shenyang plant until 1970, with the plant then converted
to production of a new native-design interceptor with improved high alti-
tude and endurance characteristics. It is assumed that this interceptor
would begin to enter the order of battle in 1971, with 50 of these aircraft
in units by 1975. The inventory of conventional anti-aircraft artillery
would also be greatly expanded, with the total number of gun mounts
reaching about 5000 by 1975. Finally, the Force would provide for a sig-
nificant buildup of the presently very small SAM force. For this purpose
we assume that RIT&E,now apparently in process, on a Chinese version of the
SA-2 would permit factory production to begin in 1967 and continue through
1971, for a total deployment of 100 6-launcher batteries.
These weapons would be deployed as an integrated system, AAA being
associated with SAM's to provide low level coverage and interceptors being
used to provide coverage in areas outside the SAM envelopes. Ij is assumed
that limitations on the number of SAM batteries available would force
the Chinese to use them mainly for point defense, with the capital at
Peiping, the nuclear installations, and key military control centers
getting primary attention. However, the Chinese would continue to deploy
some SAM's along reconnaissance routes. In time they might develop
shifting barriers along the coast, building up a multiplicity of sites
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to create uncertainty as to which ones would be occupied. Such a barrier
might appear for a period of time along the coast opposite Taiwan and at
a later period along another border or coastline across which the Chinese
might expect intruders into their airspace..
It is assumed that while the Chinese would probably be compelled to
standardize on their version of the SA-2 for a first generation. weapon,
they would continue.RDT&E on some sort of follow system. This newer.-system, which would appear late in the period, would have better guidance
and control, greater maneuverability,, and improved low altitude capability,
as well as somewhat longer range and better performance at higher altitudes.
Further, we project that some time in the latter 1970's the Chinese might
be able to develop a dual purpose SAKI/AM system, perhaps using MRBM
missiles and long-range low frequency radars, and relying on longer-range
effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations on both missiles and aircraft.
Even if a major deployment was beyond their capabilities.-the Chinese
might seek to develop a pilot model for its psychological effect.
General Purpose Forces
Under this alternative, ground forces would be maintained at the
Force A level but naval and coastal defenses would be strengthened along
with air defense. The existing coastal defense early warning network,
with its radars for detecting aircraft and surface ships, would be ex-
panded and improved. It is assumed that by 1970 this surveillance
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network would be augmented and extended seaward by the introduction into
the order of battle of the RB-CX-l. This would be a long-range reconnais-
sance aircraft, a modification of a standard transport model with long
endurance, such as the IL-18, and equipped with electronic reconnaissance
systems.
We assume that the Chinese in this Force would make a greater effort
to deny US submarines access to their territorial waters than in the other
Forces and would hope eventually to be able to seek out and to destroy US
submarines in the seas bordering their coast. For this purpose we project
the construction of four new destroyers and eight more destroyer escorts --
of which six are a new class and two of the recent Kiangnan class -- as
well as additional submarine chasers and various types of patrol craft.
The Chinese would also deploy sound detection systems (i.e., buoys and
shallow water arrays) off port and estuary entrances and would be prepared
to use mine fields if necessary to achidve control of these vital areas.
This would make it more difficult for hostile submarines to operate well
inshore, particularly in strategic coastal areas. However, the great
expense of developing ASW weapon systems and procuring them in numbers
required for adequate coverage would limit the achievement in this period
of any broader ASW capability, particularly against nuclear-propelled
submarines.,
TheeCbinese in this projection would also attempt to strengthen
those forces capable of attacking US naval forces operating,in the seas
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bordering China. To this end, it is assumed that they would strengthen
their submarine force through development of the SS-CX-l, an.improved
torpedo-Attack submarine, of which 10 would enter the force by 1975, and
through the conversion of 4 V class submarines into cruise missile launch-
ing platforms. The BEAGLE light bomber would be retained in the naval
order of battle until the early 1970's, when the BADGER with the AS-1
anti-ship missile would become available. Some 30 BADGES would enter the
naval forces by 1974 to be employed in conjunction with submarines and
reconnaissance aircraft to provide a long-range strike capability. It is
also assumed that the Chinese would produce additional numbers of various
types of torpedo boats, including the missile-equipped OSA/KOMAR type.
Such boats, supported by destroyers and land-based fighters when available,
would be used for close-in defense.
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 II I t ( t k Approved Flor Reliiase 20*13/10/2I : CIAIRDP8Cb01674R0016601300b4-9 I
TABLE 3. FCC
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
1262 1966 196 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
BALLISTIC MISSILES c/
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MRBM (sS-1+-Type)
--
--
--
--
--
1
6
12
20
28
35
Ballistic Missile Subs.
SSB-Ga-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
BOMBERSW
BULL/TU-1+
13
12
10
8
6
4
--
10
--
18
--
26
--
36
--
36
2
2
2
2
2
3
BADGER/TU-16
4
2
10
8
I
10
18
26
3
6
15
1
1
__
TOTAL
SS-N-1+-Type missile available in 1969 from RDT&E Program.
IL-28, IL-10 and TU 2 bombers are listed under General Purpose Forces.
e Missiles and bombers will have nuclear warheads and bombs respectively.
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D
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(Table 3 Cont.)
~STD.ATEGItCC
D irSIV FORRCES
1
96
1966
1967
1968
1270
1971 19W 1973
1974
19
75
STMPACE-TO-AIR-MISSILES
SA-2-Type Sites
SA-CX-1 Sites
INTSRCB'FPORS-/
8
8
14
36
58
80
100 100 100
100
100
FAGOP/MIG-15
FRLSCO/MIG-17
FRESCO D/MIG-1
FARM/MIG-19 W
FISHBED/MIG-21
FI-CX-1
1
408
107
325
175
35
400
1104
325
350
35
350
1050
320
525
35
275
1000
290
700
50
200
950
260
875
100
125
850
230
1050
175
1
100 50 25
700 550 350
200 150 100
100 1100 1100
250 400 550
250
50
1100
700
3
100
25
1100
800
0
50
M
LO
2210
2285
2315
2385
2430
2
0 22
3
50 2125
5
2103
2075
CONVENTIONAL AAA GUNS
Light
Medium
1900 2000
1270 1600
2100
1650
2200
1700
2300
1750
2400
1800
2500 2600 2700
1850 igoo 19500
2800
2000
2900
2050
TOTAL
3470 3600 E50
3~ 30
46
4200 4
4
50
350
00
4800
4950
Includes Naval Interceptors.
The category Light AAA Guns includes the 37 and 57 mm; the Medium, the 85 and 100 mm.
c The mid-1966 figure shown for MIG-19's is believed to be a reasonable reflection of the
size of the OB. However, it should be noted that there is still uncertainty in the
Community on this subject.
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FORCE C
(Table 3 Cont.)
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1
1975
GROUND FORCES
Line Divisions
6
6
106
Infantry (Conventional)
106
106
106
106
106
106
106
106
10
10
Armored
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Horse Cavalry
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Airborne
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Naval Infantry
BS/MIS Divisions
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Combat Support Divisions
23
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Service Support Divisions
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
Combat & Service Support
Independent Regiments
121
123
123
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
T-54-Type
1300
1650
2050
2500
2950
3400
3850
4300
4650
4800
4800
25
Improved T-54-Type
--
--
--
--
--
--
20
80
180
PT-76-Type
HELICOPTERS
18
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
270
300
330
TRANSPORTS
Light
Medium
Total
LIGHT BOMBERS
BELT/T Y--2
BEAST/IL-l0
BEAGLE/IL-28
347 359 440 505 565 630 695 745 845 920 995
6 10 1 5 300 O _ 30 30 ? _ 30 30
:M :IN _5 -M _ 102
50 25 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-
30 3.0
159 150 140 130 120 110 100 80 60 30
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FORCE C
1965 1~66 L96 1 1968 1969 ! ~~
1972
NAVAL FORCES
Submarines
SS-M-V and S-1
7
SS-W
24
SS-R
2
SS-CX-l
SSG-W Conversion
33
Naval Aircraft
MADGE BE-
6
BEAGLE/IL-28
118
BADGER/TU-16 a/
--
RB-CX-1
--
Destroyers
DD (Gordy Class)
4
DD-CX-1
-
ASW Escorts
DE (Riga Class)
DE (Kiangnan Class)
DE-CX-1
To edo/Patrol Craft
PC (Subchaser)
24
PTG (Msl. Launching b
2
Pr/PTF/PF/PGM
250
Minesweepers
T-43-Type
14
Other
7 7 7 7 7 7 6
24 24 24 24 24 23 22
4 6 8 l0 12 12 12
1 2
1
3 9 41 43 43 43
6 5 5 4 4 3 2
120 110 100 90 8o 6o 40
-- -- -- -- 2 2 10
-- -- -- -- 4 8 12
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
-- -- -- 1 1 2 2
2 3 3 4
-- -- 1
26 28 30 33 36 36 36
2 2 3 4 8 12 18
280 300 320 340 360 360 360
15 16 17 21 27 35 43
58 56
(Table 3 Cont.)
1973
2I 1_2l
5
4 3
21
20 20
12
12 12
4
7 10
2
4
44
46 49
1
-- --
20
-- --
20
30 30
16
20 24
4
4 4
3
3 4
4
4 4
2
4 6
36
36 36
24
30 36
360
360 360
53
65 70
62
48 44
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SECRET
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(Table 3 Cont.)
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
.
1265
1966
1
967
1968
1969 1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Amphibious
LSM-Type
59
59
62
65
68 70
74
78
82
86
go
Misc.Nav.Ships & Craft
435
440
445
455
465 47
5
490
515
540
570
600
COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES
SS-CD-1-Type Sites
3
3
3
3
4
8
12
16
20
24+
28
a/ These aircraft are not included in those listed under Strategic Offensive Forces.
b/ Missile Available in 1969
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 Approved For Relea
ALTERNATIVE FORCE D
Force Concept and its I lications
Alternative Force D postulates a major effort to modernize China's
general purpose forces. Principal emphasis would be placed on moderniza-
tion of ground and supporting air forces, but there would also be some
buildup of naval and amphibious capabilities. Work on development of stra-
tegic offensive and defensive systems would continue. Over-all expenditures
would be about the same as for Forces B and C.
This projection represents a less drastic approach to modernization
than that of Forces B and C, reflecting a continuation of the regime's
present emphasis on the army as the key element in the military establish-
ment? Such a major effort to modernize China's general purpose forces might
be undertaken in a belief that acquisition of nuclear weapons might give
China greater opportunity to threaten or actually undertake conventional
military operations in peripheral areas. Conversely, it might stem from
continuing basic concerns over the defense of the Chinese homeland against
invasion and over the possibility that situations like that1?in Vietnam
might come to require direct Chinese participation.
Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Forces
No change from Force A.
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General Purpose Forces
The principal aim of the major ground force modernization program
called for under this approach would be the development of an improved
capability for dealing with hostile ground forces equipped and supported
on the US or Soviet level. The main features of this program would be:
a. Creation of an elite force of 15 armies, consisting of
I.5 improved line divisions (5 of them armored).
b. Development of a tactical nuclear rocket, for eventual
.deployment down to army level, primarily as a deterrent to enemy
initiation of tactical nuclear warfare.
c. Establishment of a tactical air force equipped with air-
craft specifically designed for the ground-support role.
d. Initiation of a modest program for improvement of amphibious
capabilities.
The reconstitution of 15 armies and their 45 line divisions into a
fully modernized elite force would entail major changes both in organiza-
tion and equipment and in such matters as training, where the present
emphasis on individual and small unit proficiency would presumably be
broadened to provide for larger-scale field exercises. It is assumed that
these troops would have virtually all their time available for training or
other military duties.
We project a new-type infantry division for the elite force which
would have about 2000 fewer personnel,but would be considerably stronger
than its present counterpart in mobility, firepower, and other respects.
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The three infantry regiments would be motorized, with one battalion of
each equipped with amphibious armored personnel carriers and the other
two battalions with conventional cargo''truckso Division artillery
would consist of two battalions of 122.mm howitzers, 12 guns each,, and
one battalion of twelve 160mmm mortars. The tank regiment would be ex-
paraded from 32 to 64 medium tanks and would include 12 Chinese-developed
heavy assault guns as replacements for the present assault guns. A main-
tenance battalion would be-added to the rear services of the division.
The reconnaissance company of the division would have six amphibious
P-76 type tanks and division .headquarters would have three helicopters
for command and observation use a Anti-tank companies of the infantry
regiments would be equipped with BAGGER-type missiles.
The armored divisions would be similarly strengthened. By 1976 all
medium regiments would have improved T-54 tanks and would have BAGGER-
type AT missiles and heavy assault guns to replace the present AT guns
and the present heavy tanks and assault guns respectively.
At the army level, the chief innovations would be the expansion of
signal and transport battalions into regiments, the addition of an
engineer pontoon regiment and
aintenance battalion, and provision of
Six helicopters for, couaand and control
It is assumed that the Chinese planners would recognize that many
of their troops, including but not restricted to those deployed along the
Southeast. Asian and Indian borders, would be most likely to fight in
terrain where heavy, complex equipment could not be effectively employed.
For these units, comprising some 65 divisions, present TO&B's would be
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 Approved For Release 29eaffom - 01676 R001600130004-9
retained and the planning goal would be essentially that of Force A
--
the re-equipping of all units with standardized arms and equipment of
currently accepted Soviet or Chinese design. As at present, these units
would continue to devote about half their time to raising food crops
and livestock or to road construction and the like.
We assume that technological and cost constraints would preclude
development and quantity deployment of a HAWK/SA-3-type SAM, forcing
the Chinese to depend on conventional AAA for air defense of ground
troops. However, a simple, man-packed SAM might appear in the latter
197OBso
In the tactical nuclear field we assume that the Chinese would be
primarily interested in deterring the use of such weapons, rather than
in concentrating on the requirements of the nuclear battlefield, and that
their needs in this respect would be satisfied by a relatively crude capa-
bility to strike back at the zone of command, supply, and supporting
weapons installations a few miles from the front. This would imply a
weapon of 15-30 nm which could be deployed at the army level. We assume
that the Chinese would not see a need for a weapon with the range (150 nm)
of the SCUD and would want something .(easier ";.`itt o move. Our projection
thus calls for a FROG-type weapon which would initially be held under cen-
tral control for assignment to particular theaters and units as necessary,
but which would eventually be made organic at the army level. We assume
that the Chinese would also seek to develop a nuclear bomb deliverable by
tactical fighter-bomber.
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Under this projection the tactical air force would be initially equipped
primarily with MIGm15's and 17's as they were retired from the air defense
forcee, together with some BEAGLES and other types now in the inventory. Some
MG-19's would be built for use as fighter-bombers; these would be introduced
slowly until the latter part of the production run. A native-design fighteer-
bomber would enter the order of battle in 1974, with 80 in units in 1975 and
250 in 1977. We envisage a subsonic, long endurance aircraft which could
use low-level evasive tactics if attacked by fast interceptors.
China can now lift about 5000 lightly armed troops for a distance of
5Wnmo Improvement efforts would be primarily on internal rather than ex-
ternal capability. Troops and supplies would need transport to remote Chinese
areas, from one command to another, or for support of operations in contiguous
areas;, trans-oceanic military transport, for example, would not be a factor.
Modest purchases of transports, which could be used for military purposes,
would continue until about 1972. Beginning in 1973 we project the production
of a :Pour-engine turboprop with approximately the same characteristics as
the Soviet CUB (AIVm12), It is assumed that the Chinese will receive the rem
quired outside assistance to have this. capability. By the end of the period
about 80 CUB=type aircraft would be produced, or enough to lift simultaneously
approximately one-third of an airborne division with a three-day basic load
or about 7,500 infantry troops with individual weapons and light machine guns
and 60 mm mortars. It is assumed that enough nonmilitary transport aircraft
could be made available at that time to lift an additional 5000 troops, carry-
ing their individual equipment and weapons only. The total lift capability at
the end of the period would be about one and one half airborne divisions.
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The Chinese are aware of the vulnerability of their large land army
to tactical chemical warfare attack, and of the vulnerability of their
population and agricultural centers to strategic chemical and biological
attack. To meet this threat they will find it necessary to improve their
CW and BW.defense'by allocating an increasing share of theirwacarse indus-
trial and technological resources. In addition, we assume that in Force D,
the Chinese Communists will achieve in their tactical forces in the mid-70's
a significant offensive CW capability.
On the navy side., we project a buildup of naval and coastal defense
capabilities generally like that of
concomitant of an increased emphasis on capacity to f'i
roe C, in that this would be a likely
ght on or near China's
borders. However, the postulated Force D naval force does differ in pro-
viding a somewhat larger amphibious force and a much larger buildup of the
follow-on torpedo-attack submarine, SS=CX 1, 16 of which would be in the
fleet by 1975. We assume that the emphasis on building up amphibious capa-
bilities would initially be light, in part because of cost considerations
but mainly because the Chinese naval buildup pr
cted for this period
would not be enough to permit large-scale or long-range operations in the
face of likely opposition. The increased submarine construction reflects
the concept that if the Chinese felt confident that they could engage i
ground hostilities of some scale without risking nuclear escalation.,they
might also feel they could interdict enemy supply lines without undue
danger of escalation and at least would wish to be in a position to threaten
such action.
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TABLE 4+. FORCE D
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969 1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
BALLISTIC MISSILES W
MRBM (sS-4-Type)
1
6
12
20
28
35
Ballistic Missile
SSE-G_
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
BOMBERS b/ al
BULLJTU-4
13
12
10
8
6
4
--
--
--
--
--
BADGER/TU-16
2
2
2
2
2
10
18
26
36
36
TOTAL
15
14+
12
10
,
8
7
10
18
26
36
36
of SS-N-4-Type missile available in 1969 from RDI'&E program.
IL-28, IL-10 and TU-2 bombers are listed under General Purpose Forces.
J Missiles and bombers will have nuclear warheads and bombs respectively
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FORCE D
(Table 4 Cont.)
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
19 1
1972
1
1974
1975
SURFACE-TO-AIR -MISSILES
SA-2-Type Sites
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
INTERCEPPORSa/
FACOT/MIG-15
4o8
400
150
100
50
--
--
--
--
--
--
FRESCO/MIG-17
1107
1100
1050
850
750
650
500
350
170
100
--
FRESCO D/MIG-1'7A
325
325
325
290
230
215
200
150
100
50
25
FARMER/MIG -19 c
175
350
500
650
800
875
900
900
900
900
900
FISHBED/MIG-21
35
35
35
35
35
50
100
140
200
300
4oo
2050
2210
2060
1925
1860
17990
1700
190
1-370
1350
1325
CONVENTIONAL AAA GUNS
Light
1900
1950
2000
2050
2100
2150
2200
2250
2300
2350
2400
Medium
157o
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
2470
3550
3600
3650
3700
3750
3800
I~LO
3900
3950
4000
TOTAL
a/ Includes Naval Interceptors but not those fighter aircraft assigned to the Tactical Air Forces.
b/ The category Light AAA Guns includes the 37 and 57 mm; the Mediums, the 85 and 100 mm.
The mid-1965 figure shown for MIG-19's is believed to be a reasonable reflection of the size
of the OR. However, it should be noted that there is still uncertainty in the Community on
this subject.
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GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1965
1966
GROUND FORCES
Line Divisions
Infantry (Conventional)
106
106
DIV-CX-1
Armored
5
5
Horse Cavalry
3
3
Airborne
3
3
Naval Infantry
--
--
BSLMIS Divisions
20
20
Combat Support Divisions
23
23
Service Support Divisions
11
11
Combat & Service Support
121
123
Independent Regiments J
T-54-Type
1300
1650
Improved T-54-Type
--
--
PT-76-Type
--
--
Assault Gun-C%-1,122 mm
--
--
APC (BTR-60P-Type)
--
--
1261
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
lol
98
93
88
83
78
5
8
12
17
22
27
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
2
20
20
20
20
20
20
23
24
24
24
24
24
12
12
12
12
12
12
125
129
134
139
144
149
2050
2500
2950
3450
4000
4750
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
20
80
--
--
--
--
--
20
20
125
375
750
1200
1650
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1973
1274
1975
73
32
5
3
3
68
37
5
3
3
65
40
5
3
3
2
2
2
20
20
20
24
24
24
12
12
12
154
160
166
5000
5200
5200
40
300
800
180
280
400
100
300
525
2100
2550
3000
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THEATER TACTICAL MISSILES J
FROG (Launchers)
HELICOPTERS
Mi-4
TRANSPORTS
Light
Medium
TACTICAL AIR FORCES
Fighter - Bombers
FAGOT MIG-15
FRESCO/MIG-17
FAAKER/MIG-19
FB-CX-1
TOTAL
LIGIRT B VIERS
BAT/TU-2
BEAST/IL-10
BEAGLE/IL-28
175 150 125 100 50 25 -- --
150 200 200 200 200 180 150 100
50 75 175 200 200 200 200 200
FORCE D
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1975
4 16 36 64 100
18 60 110 160 210 260 310 360 410 4,60 510
347 359 440 505 565 630 695 745 845 920 995
6 10 _12 25 30 40 45 57 81
0 595 7900 902 1001 1124
55 T25 2
200
25
(Table 4 Cont )
M M = 0 MM M
50 40 30 20 10 --
30 25 20 15 10 5
159 150 140 130 120 110 100 80 60 30
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(Table 4 Cont.)
FORCE D
GENERAL P
URPOSE
F0RCE
3
1965
1966 19
67 1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
NAVAL FORCES
Submarines
SS-MV and S-1
SS-W
SS-R
24 24
2 4
24 27
6 8
27
10
24
12
27
12
26
12
2
12
214+
12
2
12
SS-CX-1
1
2
4
8
12
16
33 3 3
3
39
41
49
,
52
Naval Aircraft
MADGE/BE-6
6 6
5
5
4
4
3
2
1
BEAGLE/IL-28
118 120 1
10
100
90
80
60
4o
20
BADGER/TU--162_/
--
2
10
20
30
30
RB-C%-1
4
8
12
16
20
24
Surface Ships
Destroyers
DD Gordy Class)
4 4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
DD-CX-1
ASW Escorts
DE Riga Class)
4 4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
DR (Kiangnan Class)
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
4
DR-CX-1
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
Torpedo/patrol Craft
PC Subchaser ,~
24 26
28
30
32
36
36
36
36
36
36
PTG (Msl. Launching)-!
2 2
2
2
2
4
6
8
12
16
2
FP/PTF/PF/PGM
250 280 3
00
320
340
360
360
360
360
360
0
360
Minesweepers
T- 3-Type
14 15
16
17
21
27
35
43
53
65
70
Other
59 59
59
59
59
59
58
56
52
48
44
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(Table . Cont.)
FORCE D
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
196
1966
1967
1968
196
1970
1
1972
Amphibious
LSM-Type
59
60
65
70
80
90
100
105
110
115
120
Mis.Nav.Ships & Crafts
11.40
440
11.45
455
465
475
490
515
540
570
600
COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES
55-CD-1-Type Sites
3
3
3
3
4
5
6
8
10
10
10
of Of the increase of 45 regiments during the period, 30 are projected as resulting from an
expansion of current battalions.
These aircraft are not included with Interceptors on the preceding page.
21 These aircraft are not included in those listed under Strategic Offensive Forces.
Missile available in 1969.
2/ Nuclear warheads will be available for these missiles.
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TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF FORCES, 1970 and 1975
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
1966
12L
BALLISTIC MISSILES
MRBM (SS-4-Type)
IRBM-CX-?1
ICBM-CX-1
MISSILE LAUNCHING SUBIARINES
SSBG
SSB-CX-1.
1a/
1 a/
BULL/TU-4 12
BADGER/TU-16 2
TOTAL 14
35 80 35 35
40
1 1 saran= 1
1 4 1 1
1 4
36 130 36h/ 36/
3666 10 366W 6/
J G-Class submarine here is without missiles; projected as available in 1969.
Excludes BADGERS in Naval Air Force.
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(Table 5 - Cont.)
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
0
SAM/ABM DEFENSE
SA-2-Type (Sites) 8
SA-CX-1 (Sites) --
AAA (Guns)
Light 1950
Medium 1600
INTERCEPTORS* a/
- FAGOT/MIG-15 400
FRESCO/MIG-17 1100
FRESCO D/MIG-1 325
FARNER/MIG-19J 350
FISHSED/MIG-21 35
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8 8 80 8
2150 2150 2400 2150
16oo 1600 1800 1600
8550 850 8 0 650
215 215 230 215
875 875 1050 875
50 50 175 50
2040 2040 2410 17
8 8 100 8
-- -- 15 --
2400 2400 2900 2400
1600 1600 2050 1600
50 50 100 --
25 25 25 25
900 1100 900
400 400 800 400
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1375 1 75 2075 12 2/
Includes Naval Aircraft, but excludes fighter aircraft assigned to
Tactical Air Forces in Force D.
The mid-1966 figure shown for MIG-19's is believed to be a reasonable
reflection to the size of the OB. However, it should be noted that
there is still uncertainty in the Community on this subject.
c/ Fighter-Bombers are listed under Tactical Air Forces on page 62.
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GEIMRAL PURPOSE FORCES
2
GROUND FORCES
(Table 5 Cont.)
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Line Divisions
Infantry
Conventional Type 106
l0
6 106 106 88
106
106
1
6
6
DIV-CX-1
17
--
--
0
--
5
40
Armored
5 5 5 5
5
5
5
5
Horse Cavalry 3
Airborne 3
3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
--
--
--
2
BS//.IS Divisions 20
20
20 20 20
20
20
20
20
Combat Support Divs. 23
24
24 24 24
24
24
4
4
Service Support Divs.u
11
11 11 12
11
11
2
1
2
Combat & Service
1
12
Support Indepen- 123
125
125 125 139
130
130
130
166
dent Regiments
Armor
T-54-Type 1650
3400
3400 3400 3450
480
48
Improved T-54 --
0
25
00
25
4800
25
5200
800
RP-76-Type --
180
18o
8
4
Asslt.Gun-CX-1,122r,.m --
AP
6
1
0
--
00
525
C (BTR.-
0P-Type) --
--
3000
TREATER TACTICAL MISSILES
Launchers FROG-Type-
HELICOPTERS
Mi -+
180
180 180 260
330
330
330
510
TRANSPORTS
Light 359
Medium 10
630
0
630 630 630
30 30 35
995
30
995
2
995
30
995
129
TOTAL
660
660 660 665
1025
1025
10!25
3-124
TACTICAL AIR FORCES
Figs ter-Bombers
FAGOT M1G-15 --
125
FiESCO/MIG-17 --
200
100
FAR: R/MIG-19
175
200
FB-CX-1
80
-- -
LIGHT BO?,Pa__M9
BAT/TU-2 25
BEAST/IL-10 10
BEAGLE/IL-28
30 -o 110 uo
TOTAL 165
30 30 110 115
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(Table 5 Cont.)
1966
NAVAL FORCES
Submarines
SS-MV and S-1 7
SS-W 24
SS-R 4
SS-CX-l
SS-G (W-Conver-
sion)
Naval Aircraft
11-U-28 100
BADGER/TU-16
RB-CX-1
Surface Shins
Destro} era
DD Gordy Class) 4
DD-CX-l
ASW Escorts
DE Riga Class) 4
DE (Kiangnan Class) 1
DE-CX-1
To edo1Patrol Craft
PO Subchasers 26
P'!'G(Ms1.Launching) 2
PT/PTF/PF/PGM 280
Minesweepers
T-43-Type 15
Other 59
Aarohibious
LSM-Type 59
Misc.Nav.Ships & Craft 440
A B C D
7 7 7 7
24 24 24 24
10 10 12 12
41 41 44
20 20 80 80
4 4
4 4 4 4
1 1
4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3
30 30 36 36
2 2 8 4
300 300 360 360
19 19 27 27
59 59 59 59
6o 6o 70
90
46o 460 475 475
COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILE SITES
SS-CD-1-Type 3
4 4 3 3
24 24 20 24
12 12 12 12
2 2 10 16
42 42 49 55
30 30
24 24
4 4 4 4
4 4
4 4 4 4
3 3 4 4
2 2 6 4
30 30 36 36
10 10 36 20
300 300 360 360
35 35 70 70
44 44 44 44
6o 6o 9o 120
485 485 boo 60o
3 3 8 5( 5 5 28 10
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III. GLOSSY OF PROTECTED "CX" WEAPON SYSTEMS
This glossary defines the postulated, Chinese developed, weapon
systems introduced in the alternative forces. All such systems have
a "CC" designator for easy recognition, e.g., IRBM-CX-1.
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
Ballistic Missile Systems
IRBM-CX-1
A storable; liquid-fueled missile designed for ranges
of about 2000 nautical miles. This missile would be
launched from a silo. It would probably be a follow-on
to the SS-4-Type MRBM.
ICBM-CX-l A storable liquid, long-range, follow-on to the IRBM-
CX-l, also silo-launched.
SSB-CX-1 An improved diesel-propelled submarine, utilizing
the Albacore-type hull, with 4 tubes for the same
surface-launched missile as the G-class submarine.
The improved hull design and propulsion plant
would give this submarine a greater operating
radius.
SSSBN-CX-1
#i-N-CX-1
A nuclear-propelled submarine using a hull similar
to that of the SSB-CX-1 with 6 missile tubes for a
new 600 mile, submerged-launched, missiles
A 600 nautical mile missile designed for submerged
launch from the SSBN-CX-1
STRUTEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
Interceptors
FI-CX-1 A Chinese-designed follow-on to the MIG-2l with
improved high altitude and endurance characteristics.
SA SA-CX-l A Chinese-developed modification of the Soviet SA-2
system, incorporating improved guidance/homing and
maneuverability.
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GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
DIV-CX-1 An infantry division fully modernized, incorporating
major changes both in organization and equipment.
This elite-type division would be considerably stronger
than present units, particularly in firepower and
mobility.
FB-CX-1 A native-design fighter-bomber designed primarily for
ground support. It is envisaged that this aircraft
would be subsonic, but would have long endurance and
high maneuverability.
SS-CX-1 A torpedo-attack submarine with a new hull design and
propulsion plant, providing improved maneuverability
for submerged operation.
RB-CX-1 A long-range reconnaissance aircraft resulting from the
equipping of a standard commercial transport model with
electronic reconnaissance systems.
DDD-CX-l A native-designed destroyer, outfitted with ASW weapon
systems, and with naval surface and AAA guns. These
destroyers could carry the Chinese-produced SS-N-2
missile used on the OSA/KOMAR torpedo boat and in
Force C would have a naval version of the SA-2 system
as well, although these weapons are not postulated for
this destroyer in the period through 1975.
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DE-CX-l An ASW escort ship, smaller and slower than the destroyer,
but with long endurance and good sea-keeping capabilities.
ASSAULT GUN-CX-1,122 mm A 122 mm gun mounted on an anphibious,
full-tracked chassis.
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR CON2INGENCIES AND THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE PROJECTED FORCES
General
There are obviously a wide variety of possible developments over
the next ten years or so which might significantly affect Chinese military
planning, such as changes in the relationship with the USSR, changes in the
military position or alignment of countries like Japan or India, differing
outcomes of the Vietnam conflict, changes in the strategic relationship
between the US and the USSR, or variations in China?s economic fortunes
or in the availability of credits or assistance from other countries.
We have generally avoided specific treatment of such contingencies in
the above projections, not only because of a desire to keep the study
within manageable proportions but also because of the sheer difficulty
of defining possible developments or of assessing their likely effect on
Chinese force planning with any precision. However, we have found it
desirable to note the possible impact of certain critical contingencies
below.
Possible Adverse Developments
Serious Worsening of Relations with the USSR.
This could have auvery significant effect on the development and
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deployment of Chinese military forces, depending obviously on the
seriousness of the rift and on the extent to which the USSR built up
its military forces confronting China. Even if Soviet troop dispositions
vis-a-vis China were relatively limited and intended to provide a demon-
strable capacity for harassing or punitive action rather than for a
serious invasion, it is possible to visualize Chinese requirements for,
say, up to a dozen heavily armored and mobile divisions to cover major
border crossings from the USSR and Outer Mongolia, for significant
numbers of air defense interceptor and patrol units, and for at least
limited numbers of MRBM's (or preferably IRBM's) which could be deployed
for targeting of Soviet cities. Conceivably, there might eventually
be a heavy troop buildup, especially in the Manchurian-maritime province
area, comparable to the Soviet-Japanese troop buildup there during World
War II. Such developments would, of course, significantly reduce the
forces which could be deployed in other areas and would also be expected
to influence the relative emphasis given the various kinds of forces and
weapon systems.
Sizable Diversion of Resources to Support of the Vietnam War.
China's indirect participation in the Vietnam war has already involved
the provision of substantial supplies of ammunition, POL, etc., to the
DRV, the allocation of construction and other support troops to main-
taining the LOC in North Vietnam, and the buildup of air defense facilities
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and forces in South China. The intelligence community's present judgment
is that this does not involve a significant diversion of resources from
China's military establishment. Conceivably, however, support of the
DRV and precautionary deployments of Chinese combat forces in nearby
areas could increase to a point which would require diversion of equipment
and reserve supplies from other units. Indeed, the Chinese effort in
support of the DRV, or in preparation for contingencies that might grow
out of the Vietnam war, could become so large as to force a slowdown in
the modern weapons program or a significant weakening of China's over-all
military posture.
Increased Military Assistance Requirements
The Chinese Communists will presumably continue to supply military
advice, training, and materiel to friendly regimes and revolutionary
movements in various parts of the world. For the most part, this type
of activity does not appear likely to cut very heavily into Chinese
military resources; the principal requirement will probably continue to
be for small arms and similar equipment, and the number of governments
or revolutionary movements in places like Africa and Latin America which are
willing and physically able to accept Chinese arms is unlikely to be very
great. It appears likely that most such programs could be supported with
surplus weapons made available through the re-equipping of Chinese Communist
general purpose forces. The only exception involves the kind of equipment
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furnished Pakistan. If the Chinese Communists should undertake to furnish
Pakistan or other parties with tanks, aircraft and other major items in
substantial quantities, it could significantly affect their own military
buildup.
Economic Setbacks.
Finally, the Chinese may well fall short of fulfilling in toto the
generally optimistic assumptions we live made about their economic and
technological, prospects. Indeed they may run into another series of
disastrous growing seasons or grossly mismanage the situation as they
did in the late 1950?s and early 1960?so The extent and military pro-
gramming implications of such setbacks, however, are virtually unpredict-
able.
Possible Favorable Developments
Accelerated. Economic P greys
The possibility that the Chinese economy might perform considerably
better than predicted, thus making important additional sums available
for military use, appears remote. The judgment that the Chinese could
fford to let military procurement costs grow at the vigor
postulated for Forces E, C, and D is predicated on a series of highly
favorable aasumaptionsa that food production grove faster than population,
that foreign trade grows by a
ome 5-1O percent a year, that the regime will
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make effective use of its resources in expanding industrial output. This
requires not only good fortune but a degree of moderation and managerial
judgment which the Chinese leadership has shown little disposition to
practice: even on its best.behavior.
Conceivably, unusually favorable growing conditions might make
possible a bumper crop year -- perhaps of sufficient magnitude to permit
a substantial cutback in that year's requirement for imported foodgrains,
which have been costing about $400 million annually in recent years.
However, the chances that food production could be pushed up much faster
than population growth in any one year appear poor and the possibility
that this might happen more than once during the next ten years even more
so. And even if the Chinese experienced such good fortune, they might feel
compelled to spend the money on foodstuffs anyway -- either to build
their depleted grain reserves or to help restore pre-Great Leap Forward
levels of individual food consumption.
Increased Access to Free World Credits and Technology.
Although much of the rapid growth in Chinese trade with the free
world during the last two years was a one-shot phenomonen, representing
the reorientation of much of China's trade away from the Bloc, trade with
the free world will probably continue to grow -- and along with it,
credits. Industrialists in both Japan and Western Europe have been
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eyeing the Chinese market with increasing interest, with China's acute
need for modern machinery providing an area of special appeal. While
this study has not specifically projected foreign trade and credits as
a factor in China's ability to sustain military programs, it has assumed
that such trade would grow by about 5-10 percent.
It is conceivable that China might over time obtain substantially
greater amounts of manufacturing equipment and accompanying technological
assistance on credit, thereby contributing at least indirectly to its
industrial and technological capabilities in the military field. However,
there would appear to be two major limitations on how much assistance the
Chinese might obtain in this fashion. Large-scale industrial and techno-
logical assistance would require a far more open attitude on the part
of the Chinese themselves, who have thus far been reluctant to admit
foreign technicians or to take on long-term obligations. Perhaps more
important, China's ability to pay off the credits which might be offered
is limited -- at least unless Japan or other potential creditors were
willing to provide assistance on very long-term, easy credit terms
such as those being provided to India, in whose case political rather
than financial considerations were primarily responsible for provision
of,,-the assistance. If credits to China were limited to the short and
medium term -- i.e., up to 5 years -- credit drawings would very quickly
be balanced off by repayment requirements.
Conceivably, France or some other non-Communist country might be
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willing to supply China with equipment or parts of at least indirect
military application.
Marked Improvement in Relations with the USSR
Despite the intense bitterness of present Sino-Soviet relations,
the possibility of some future rapproachement between a successor
regime in Peiping and the USSR cannot be ruled out completely. Such
a rapproachement, should it occur, could be of considerable benefit to
the Chinese military effort, since it could open the way to resumption
of some forms of direct military assistance and technological advice by
the Soviets. On the other hand, there would almost certainly continue to
be major limitations on how much the Chinese could obtain. If past
practice is any guide, the Soviets would be unwilling to provide any
more in either economic or military aid than the Chinese could pay for,
although they might be willing to extend long-term credits and to permit
payment in goods. Moreover, it appears most unlikely that even a marked
char43e of heart on the part of the Chinese would permit establishment of
a genuinely cordial relationship or that the Soviets -- however convinced
they might be of the bona fides of a particular set of new Chinese leaders
-- would be willing to rule out all possibility of a return to the type
of leadership provided by Mao. Presumably they would be extremely care-
ful about assisting the Chinese in ways which would increase their ability
to threaten the USSR or increase their ability to drag the USSR into
conflict with others.
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APPENDIX B
ECONOMIC AND COST ANALYSIS USED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ALTERNATIVE FORCES
SECTION I METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The present Chinese leadership has clearly been willing and able
to deprive the civilian economy of substantial resources in order to
maintain the ambitious array of military programs it is now trying to
carry forward. However., there are important limits as to how far the
regime can go in this direction on a sustained basis. A central prob-
lem in formulation of the alternative forces projected above has o.
accordingly been that of developing and applying realistic economic
and cost constraints.
In dealing with this problem., we have adopted a relatively simpli-
fied approach., in the belief that there is not enough certainty either
about performance to date or about the future to warrant very elaborate
or highly sophisticated calculations of what the Chinese economy can
bear. In this approach we began with three basic concepts:
1. Present levels of spending for military purposes should pro
vide the most practical and realistic yardstick for measuring the pos
sible future magnitude of the military effort. This concept says that
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the starting point should be what can be observed; the best indicator of
the future is the present. In a senses it says that the Chinese can do
what they have done and that we can project from such a base. Moreover,
theoretical considerations (such as would be involved in determining the
burden of military expenditures on the economy) which require more detailed
knowledge can be by-passed.
2e The basic calculations, at least this time, should be made in
ddo}lars rather than Yuan ?? in other words, with both present and projec-
ted future military hardware programs measured in terms of what it would
costto carry them out in the US. Although we would hope that projected
forces could eventually be costed in both dollars and yuan, we do not as
yet have any idea of how much the Chinese charge themselves for the more
complicated and modern items of military hardware which are of greatest
concern to the US or of how accurately such Chinese `prices" would!:reflect
actual costs. The use of dollar costing of course does contain possibili-
ties for biases of certain kinds; China is manifestly not the US. How-
ever, many of these distortions would tend to cancel out, since the same
costing factors would be used for the base period and for projected
future forces. As indicated below, others can be adjusted fore
3. Zhe costing exercise should be concerned soled with expendi-
turesfor development and procurement of military hardware and should
not attempt to cover other military expenses such as the costs of
clotehin and feeding China?s large existing forces. This concept was
adopted for several reasons. Many military expenses are more or less
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irrelevant to the problem of how far and how fast the Chinese can go in
building a modern military establishment. The critical items are those
involved in development and production of military hardware. It is here
that the competition for scarce resources between the military establish-
ment and the civilian economy and among various military programs is and
will continue to be most severe. Covering the entire range of present
and possible future military expenditures would, at this stage,, only intro-
duce opportunities for error. Finally,, an attempt to price the cost of
maintaining present Chinese forces in dollar terms -- i.e., charging for a
Chinese rifleman as though he were a US soldier -= would give a misleading
impression of over-all costs. Although cost projections concentrating on
hardware do not give a complete picture of total military expenditures,
they do provide, in our view, the most realistic approach at present to
the problem of economic constraints.
The application of these concepts has involved three stages of
analysis: (a) the determination of expenditure figures for develop-
ment and production of military hardware for 1965 and preceding years;
(b) the determination of the maximum rate at which such expenditures
might be expected to grow under the optimum conditions assumed in develop-
ing Forces B, C, and D; and (c) the pricing of the components tentatively
assigned to each of the projected forces and the adjustment of the size
and makeup of these forces to make them compatible with the cost ceilings
assigned to them. The tasks basic to this analysis are discussed in the
two sections that follow.
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Determination of Present Levels of Expenditure
The first basic task was that of costing present programs for develop-
ment and production of military hardware. Cost figures were built up in-
crementally on a system-by-system (or in some cases factory-by-factory)
basis. Incremental costing was used in order to reproduce as faithfully
as ;possible the actual pattern of expenditures. We were able to account
for tooling costs in this manner but not the costs of basic plant and
equipment.
These calculations were made both for the base year 1965 and for the
period extending back to the mid-1950's, when a significant proportion of
military procurement outlays represented end items or major components
for aircraft) imported from the USSR for assembly in China. The
purpose of building up these historical cost series was twofold: to
facilitate the allocation of costs to the year in which they were probably
actually incurred, and to provide a basis for judging how well our military
cost projections fitted with other indications of how the Chinese economy
and military establishment fared during the ten years between 1956 and the
present and how well 1965 performance appeared to represent Chinese capa-
bilities.
The results are summarized in Table 6,* which shows that expenditures
for military hardware-associated purposes totalled $1.8 billion in 1965,
and in Table 7,** which projects costs for these purposes back to 1956.
On the whole we believe these results are reasonable approximations of
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TABLE 6. ONINE$E CO ST NB MARE.ASSOCIAATED OUTLAX$A 1965
(Billion 1963 US Dollars)
PROCUREMENT
Land Armaments
0.14
Ammunition
0.12
General Purpose Vehicles
0.06
Naval Ships
0.08
Aircraft
0.13
Missile Systems
Neg. a
Other Electronic Equipment
0.50 I
Organizational Equipment
0.05
Subtotal,
1.1
SPARE PARTS 2.41
Of which for Other Electronic
Equipment
0.17
NUCLEAR PRO CTION AND FACILITIES
0.10 Ij
RDT&E (Including Nuclear)
0.20
TOTAL
a/ 0.005 or less.
All electronic equipment except for that included as integral
part of other systems or programs.
May not add because of rounding.
Excluding RA71&E.
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MWZ COD41UNIST HARFhiARE-ASSOCIATBD o 6-6 J
(Billion 1963 US Dollars)
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 L961 162 1963 126425
PROCURP2
Land Armaments o.14 0.16 0.18 0.27 0.16 o.w
~ o xg o.10 0.14
ChiCom 0.0 7 006 007 0 010 0.07 0.07 0.09 0-w o`.
Imports o.08 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.06 -- -- -- --
Ammunition 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.12
Chicom 0 0 0 -6737 070.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 012
Imports 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 -- -- -- -- --
Oen'l. Purp. Vehicles 0_0 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06
ChlCom Neg. 0.02 0 0-10 0 0.02 0.02 0 -6-37 357
Imports 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -- -- -- -- --
Naval Ships 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.04 o.og 0.08
ChiCom 0. 0.1 017 0 008 0 0 0.09
Imports 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -- -- -- --
Aircraft 0-34 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.1
ChiCom 0.02 0.01 0.0 0.09 0019 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.13
Imports 0.32 0.22 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.08 --
Missile Systems -- -- -- 0.01 0.02 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg
ChiCom Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg.
Imports -- -- -- 0.01 0.02 -- -- -- -- --
Other Electronic Eqp _ .0 0.0 0.l 0.20 0-38 ~0~.-38 0.46 L. 0
ChiCom r 0.02 0.05 0.12 0 -0M 0?18 Obi 0-50
Imports 0.01 0.02 0.05 -- -- -- -- --
Organizational Equip. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.b4 00-05
ChiCom 0.01 002 002 002 0.0 002 00+ 007 0 0.05
Imports 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -- -- -- -- --
Subtotal: Procurement Q Q 0.76 0 94 0 95 0.49 0 69 Q 0 6 1.1
ChiCom 0.25 0. 0 0 O. ST 0. 0~ 02- 0,,7 0 $ 1.1
Imports 0.50 0.42 0.35 0.40 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.08 --
SPARE PARTS o.16 0.18 0.21 025 030 0.22 0_25 0.36 0.38 L4 Of which forjher Elec.
Equipment V Neg. 0.02 0.03 0:04 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.17
NUCLEAR PROD. & FACIL. 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 00.10 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.08 0.10
Chicom 0.01 0.02 0707 0 0.05 .0 7.07 7.07 0.0 olo
Imports 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 -- -- -- -- --
RDT&E (Including Nuclear) 0.05 X0.0 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10 " "1 0.20
~- s -
Chicom 0.0 0.05 O~.00 0.15 '0 e.15 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.20
Imports 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 -- -- -- -- --
ChiCom 0.35 0.44 0.63 0.88 1.1 0.81 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8
Imports 0.63 0.57 0.51 0.60 0.47 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 -
a/ Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding. Neg. used when 0.005 or less.
1 All electronic equipment except for that included as integral part of other systems or
programs.
Production and imports in 1956-57 were small and did not exceed requirements for other
systems and programs.
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the actual state of affairs.
Although we haveehad to make some arbitrary Judgments as to the
timing of payments 'to the USSR for military hardware, the cost projec-
tions for the historical period appear to fit reasonably well with the
general picture we have of an ambitious and many-faceted military develop-
ment program. This program swas begun with Soviet help in the middle
and late 1950's, slowed after the Soviet withdrawal, but is now going
forward vigorously again. The $1.8 billion in hardware expenditures for
1965 compares favorably with the $1.5 billion projected for 1959 and
1960 respectively, which included the costs of material imported from
the USSR. This indicates that in a gross sense the Chinese are by now
doing better on their own than they were doing at the end of the 1950's
with Soviet help. It should be noted, however, that much of the estimated
1965 expenditures represented the output of the relatively advanced elec-
tronics industry and the production of ammunition and spare parts for the
existing military establishment, with many of the other major elements
of military industry still at the preproduction or early production
stages.
Determination of Maximum Growth Rates*
The second basic task was the determination of optimum growth rates
for the high-side forces. This required quantification of Assumptions 1
and 2 (see p. T and 8 , respectively): what would constitute a con-
Rates of growth for the CRiinese economy are based :tin calculations in
yc.azn.
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siderable degree of economic success and what proportion military hard
ware programs would be able to absorb. As a point of departure, we had
calculations by the Office of Research and Reports, CIA,* to the effect
that a most likely projection for China's economy would be for GNP to
grow by as much as 3 percent a year and industrial output by some 5 to
6 percent, assuming average growing conditions for crops and increasing
access to Japanese and Western technology over the next decade. In addi-
tion, ORR indicated that an optimistic projection would show a rate of
growth for GNP of as much as 4-5 percent and for industrial output of as
much as 7.8 percent. Unusually favorable conditions would be required,
such as agricultural output growing more rapidly than population, greater
access to foreign trade and credits, good management, no further increase
in the military share of the economy's resourcesq,arnd political stability.
In order to insure that Foro'es,B, C, and D were indeed high-side
forces reflecting optimum economic circumstances, we took the high side of
the economic projections and assumed that industrial output as a whole
would increase at an average rate of 8 percent a year. Because the focus
of our efforts is on hardware programs, the machinery sector of industry
* See Pp 35_36, ER 65.32, :.Economic Prospects for Communist China, Decem-
ber 1965, SECRET, for the basic discussion. In
reviewing these calculations in April l ORR was more categorical in
characterizing a GNP growth rate of as much as 3 percent as the most likely
case and the higher rates of GNP and industrial growth here cited as being
optimistic.
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ECONOMIC P ROJ ECT ION S,1966-75 0
* Superimposed red bars indicate the lower values obtained from
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I I
62308
Figure 1
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is of most interest. Consequently, we allowed for the possibility that
the machinery sector might grow at a different rate than the rest. of
industry. We. chose 10 percent as a suitable rate of growth for this sector,
with the intent of erring on the high side. Although it.is certainly
posisible that machinery output will grow more than total industrial out-
put (and :inn: such case the relationship of 10 percent to 8 percent :is a
reasonable one), the past history of China suggests otherwise. Both
during the .1952-57 period and in the period of recovery.since 1961,
machinery output grew at about the same annual average. rate as total
industrial output. The 10 percent rate (in Yuan terms),. therefore,
was used as the constraining rate for the growth of military hardwere,t
Then, because we found it necessary to work in dollar terms, account
had. to be taken of the fact that costs of moving to technologically more
advanced systems are rel vely greater for lesser developed economies like
that of China than for advanced ones like that of the US. This factor
would make our calculation of the dollar costs of the postulated Chinese
forces -.,. i.e., the costs of duplicating them in the US m- progressively
understate the growth of costs of advanced military programs to China.
For this reason, we adjusted the average annual rate of growth for mili-
tary hardware from 10 percent in Yuan terms to 702 percent in dollar terms.
At this rate annual expenditures would double in ten years.
esse differential rates of growth would result in military industry
accounting for an increasing share of GNP over time, ass 'Figure. 1, below,
indicates.
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This rate of 7.2 percent was then applied to the 1965 base in
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-developing cost ceilings for Forces B, C, and D. A faster rate of in-
crease for short periods of time is possible. However, if the Chinese
are going to optimize for the 10-year period, i.e., have the resources to
carry out present programs and develop the resources that would be re-
quired for future programs, they would not be able to exceed a rate of
this magnitude on a sustained basis even with the optimistic assumptions
made about economic and technological performance.
As an additional check we then calculated how sensitive these per-
centages would be to gross error in calculation of the 1965 base --
first assuming that expenditures for development and production of mili-
tary hardware in that year were in fact 25 percent lower than we had
calculated, then assuming that they were 25 percent higher. In the for-
mer case, if the actual expenditures in the base year were overstated by
25 percent, the calculations for Forces B. C, and D would provide for a
growth rate of 8.8 percent rather than the 7.2 percent it was supposed to
represent. In the latter case, if actual expenditures in 1965 were under-
stated by 25 percent, the calculations for Forces B. C. and D would pro-
vide for a growth rate of 6 percent mm i.e., a rate still somewhat above
that associated with the most likely rate of growth of the Chinese economy.
The 1965 estimates probably do underestimate to some degree actual expen-
ditures for development and production of military hardware, mainly be-
cause of the difficulties of breaking out all of the expenditures involved
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in setting up military production. We think it most unlikely, however,
that any such understatement is more than a modest fraction of 25 percent.
We also made some calculations to test the sensitivity of the 7.2
percent growth rate used to project annual rates of increase in spending
for military hardware as they would appear in dollar terms. Here again
the results indicated that our calculations would have to be very grossly
in error to make any major difference in the final results. If the figure
used. should have been 8 percent -- implying a still higher basic growth
rate, an incorrect adjustment for changing dollar-yuan cost relationships,
or a combination thereof - the cumulative outlays for the 10-year period
would be only 5 percent higher, and most of this increase.-:would come in
the last few years. If the dollar growth rate used should have been 9
percent (which would be an error of 25 percent), cumulative outlays
would be 11 percent higher, with most of the increase again coming after
1970. It would require a drastic and highly improbable compounding of
gross error in the base year figures as well as in the assumed yuan growth
rates and in the dollar-yuan conversion adjustment -- to produce any markedly
higher cumulative totals.*
* An increase in 10-year costs by some 50 percent over that assumed
here,, for example, would require that base year expenditures be under-
stated by 25 percent, that the output of military machinery was growing
by 12 percent, and that the change in dollar-yuan costs was grossly over-
stated. It might be noted that the assumed theoretical rate of growth
for Forces B, C, and D was substantially exceeded for the period 1966-70,
with the weapon systems attributed to these forces calling for expendi-
tures to grow by 7.9 to 8.7 percent a year.
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Projecting Future Costs
The projected alternative forces were coated out by means of the
:same methods and costing factors used to establish 1965 development and
procurement costs. Equivalent US costs for the Soviet versions of the
equipment projected for the Chinese were applied on a system-by-system
or item-by-item basis. These costs were then totalled for each of the
projected forces, which were then expanded or reduced in size to make
them reasonably consistent with the over-all cost constraints applicable
to them. In some cases individual procurement programs were stretched
out so as to avoid an undue piling up of costs for a given year. It
was assumed, however, that some variations in rates of expenditure
would take place under the best of circumstances, and that an attempt
to make the computed cost projections match postulated cost levels ex-
actly would bei unrealistic.
In general, the calculated costs of the alternative forces as
worked out to date run somewhat above the postulated figures, especially
for the period through 1970. Even with the numerous constraints built
into it, Force As rate of spending for military hardware, instead of
remaining unchanged at the 1965 level, increases by an average of 203
percent a year for the 1966-70 period. During this same period, the
military development and procurement depicted in Forces B, C, and D
would require outlays to grow at annual average rates of 8.7., 7.9, and
8.0 percent respectively. For the 1971?75 period, the calculated costs
of the forces grow more slowly, reducing the 10-year average annual growth
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rate of Force A hardware spending to 2.1 percent and those for Forces B.
C, and D to 6.3, 6.3, and 7.2 percent respectively -- below the postu-
lated 7.2 percent rate for Forces Band C. However, this fallin;>; off in
the growth of military hardware expenditures for the 1971-75 period.
probably reflects an underestimation of likely RI7r&E and electronics
expenditures which, as indicated below, were projected on a very con-
servative basis. Thus by 1975 the actual costs of hardware for the mili-
tary establishments called for under Forces B and C would probably be
running at $3.6 billion a year or more, rather than at $3.4 billion
(shown in Table 8* and Figure 2**, below). Force D already at :$3.6
billion would necessarily go even higher.
With respect to specific cost calculations, ground force equipment
(land armaments) and ammunition were priced on a flat unit cost basis and
allocated to the years in which they were procured. In the case of air-
craft and missiles, however, allowance was made for preproduction costs
such as tooling up and for the learning function, whereby the costs of
turning out a particular item of equipment progressively decline as those
producing it gain in experience. These costs were allocated on the basis
of production schedules worked up in terms of normal leadtime relation-
ships (e.g., the time between initiation of aircraft production and first
rollout). Aircraft production was assumed to precede entry into order of
battle by a year but the presentation of order of battle on a midyear
basis has in effect reduced the lead to six months. As appropriate,
missile site construction, launcher production, and missile production
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TABLE 8.
PROJECTED HARDWARE-ASSOCIATED OUTLAYS, 1962-_U
-
9 3 US Dollars)
(Billion 1973
FORCE
1965
1968
12LO 197
1 1972 M
1974
1975
A
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.0 .
2.1 2.
1
2.1 2.2 .-
2.1
2.2
B
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8 3.
0
2.9 3.0
3.1
3.4
C
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.7 2.
9
3.0 3.1,.
3.2
3.4
D
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.7 2.
8
3.1 3.4
3.4
3.6
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CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY HARDWARE -ASSOCIATED OUTLAYS
BILLION
1963 US
DOLLARS
4 a--
1956-75 *
SECRET
I 25X1
B=D'
B-D
A
'56
'65 '70
* Projections labeled A, B-D represent calculated values; those labeled A', B'-D' the constraining values.
ppr ed Fc IiRelea 2001 0/22 CIA- P80B 16761 016001J3000 ; u#
A'
'75
62264
Figure 2
Ti Jim ; ~f,I
 Approved For Release ?003i I W22 ! - B01676R001600130004-9
were phased and.costed separately. Costs of naval ships were prorated
equally over the construction cycle, assuming that the period between
initiation of construction and dperational deployment would be three
years for submarines, two years for larger suz'face ships, and one year
for smaller craft.
Four special series warrant special mention:
a. Other Electronic. Equipment. Total military electronic pro-
duction through 1965, the largest part of which was for ground-based air
warning and control radar, was calculated separately from industrial and
other data. In the case of Force A it was assumed that total electronics
production would remain at the 1965 level, but that increasing portions of
this output would be absorbed by air, sea and missile systems incorporating
electronic gear and by requirements for electronic spare parts, so that
the residual entry for Other Electronic Equipment would decline over
time. For Forces B, C. and D it was assumed that total electronic pro-
duction would have to increase to take care of the increased requirements
for qllectronic gear integral to other systems but that the totals for
Other Electronic Equipment would remain at the Force-A level. These are
conservative assumptions, especially for the last three forces.
b. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. RDT&E had to
be projected on the basis of very scanty evidence and is another major
item which has probably been understated. Because of the conservative
assumptions we have made about future RDT&E requirements, the extent
to which it will preempt scarce resources which might otherwise be
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directly committed to future production of hardware has probably been
at least equally understated. In brief, we have assumed that in the
case of Force A these expenditures, now calculated to be about 10 percent
of the 'military hardware budget, would grow modestly and only at the end
of the period. In the case of Forces B, C, and P we have allowed RDT&E
expenditures to grow at about the same pace as overall hardware costs mm
i.e!., approximately doubling mm with that for Force B rising somewhat
more than the others in recognition of the new and expensive systems pos-
tulated for that force. Given the need to acceleratel.RDT&E as the Chinese
shift from Soviet-design items and attempt to develop new and more advanced
systems of their own, actual RDYT&E costs would probably come considerably
higher. Projected levels of RD'f&E for the intermediate years were
adjusted where necessary to reflect the RDT&E requirements for support of
specific postulated weapon systems.
c. Spare Parts. These were calculated as percentages of in-
ventory value and are consistent with per man factors and the specific
systems estimates developed for Soviet costing. However, except for
Other Electronic Equipment, it was assumed both for the base year and for
the years immediately following that Chinese parts supply levels were
below those for the USSR. For elements given special emphasis in the
projected forces (e.g., air defense in Force C) the level of spares
was increased to the Soviet level by the end of the period. Otherwise,
the lower rates were continued.
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,SE CRET
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d. Organizational Equipment. This is a residual category de-
signed to encompass engineering equipment, special training equipments
and the like. Both for the base year 1965 and for the projections, this
was assumed to be five percent of other procurement rather than the higher
per man factors used in projections of Soviet forces, to take account of
the generally lower level of equipping of Chinese forces. This may under-
state the case somewhat but since this figure is used for the base year
1965 as well as for the projections, any resulting distortions tend to
cancel each other out.
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SECTION I.I. PROJECTED COSTS
Force A
The projected costs for Force A are presented in Table 9*e Generally,
they reflect the posited continuation of programs currently observed or
believed to be under way, but at a moderate pace given the constraint that
outlays should remain at the 1965 level. It is evident, however, that
some increase has been permitted. This averages 2.1 percent a year for
the 10-year period.
The costs of aircraft (MIG-19.. MIG-21-type, and the TU-l6) provide
most of the increase in outlays through the mid-years of the period. By
the late years, when requirements for existing or imminent programs have
been largely fulfilled, the level is maintained by an increase in outlays
for-RDT&E which is associated with the postulated programs for the post-
1975 period and by the growing requirement for spare parts.
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 Approved For Release 2003
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TABLE 9
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1676R001600130004-9 25X1
PROJECTED HARDWARE-ASSOCIATED OUTLAYS FOR FORCE A 1966-75 J
Billion 19 3 US Dollars)
1966
1967
1968 196
1970
1971
1972
1974
PROCUREMENT
Land Armaments)
0.14
0.16
o.16 0.18
0.17
0.18
0.18
0.13
0.10
0.11
Ammunition
0.12
0.12
0.12 0.12
0.12
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
General Purpose
hicles
Ve-
0.06
0.6
o.o6 0.06
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
Naval Ships
0.08
0.06
0.05 0.05
0.07
0.08
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
Aircraft
0.23
0.24
0.26 0.29
0.30
0.20
0.24
0.26
0.17
0.23
Missile Systems
Neg.
0.02
0.04 0.02
0.05
0.08
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.05
Other Elec.Egpt
.J 0.44.
0.40
0.36 0.32
0.29
0.26
0.24
0.21
0.19
0.18
Organizational
Eqpt. 0.06
0.06
0.06 0.06
0.06
o.o6
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
Subtotal
]..l
1.1
1.1 1-1
.
1.1
1.0
1?0
SPARE PARTS
o.48
0.53
0.57 0.62
o.66
0.69
-
0.73
0.76
0.81
0.84
Of which for Other
Electronic Eqpt.
0.22
0.26
0.29 0.32
0.35
0.37
0.40
0.42
0.43
0.44
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION
AND FACILITIES CL
0.10
0.10
QQ$ Q
.Q$
Q
Qa
o. o8
Q.D$
Q..4$. X48 c Qa
RDT&E (Including
.
.
Nuclear)
0.20
0.20
0.20 0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.250.30 0.35
TOTAL
1
2.0
2.0 2.0
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2 2.1 2.2
J Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding. Neg. used when 0.005
or less.
J Includes AAA for air defense.
J All electronic equipment except for that included as integral part of other systems
or programs. Total military electronics production has been projected at the 1965
level. Hence, the decline in this series is a reflection of the increase in elec-
tronics integral to other systems and the increased requirement for spare parts.
J Excluding RDT&E.
 Approved For Release 2 EOW E DP80B01676R001600130004-9
Force B
The projected costs for Force B are presented in Table 10.* They
reflect the emphasis placed on atrategidc!offensive systems, other pro-.
grams being carried at the same level as for Force A.
Most of the increase in procurement costs through the mid-years
of the period reflect aircraft programs (particularly a TU-16, BADGER-
type) and to a lesser extent missile programs (MRBK, SS-i.-type). Their
role is reversed in the later years when missile costs predominate (IRBl,
SS-5-type and ICBM, SS-7-type). However, costs of naval ships also
sharply increase with the projected construction of the SSB-CX-1 and
an SSBN-CX-1.
The other hardware-associated programs all show appreciable increase,
Costs of spare parts steadily increase as the inventory of strategic offen-
sive weapon systems rapidly expands. The nuclear program, because of the
enlarged requirement for weapons to go with the projected delivery systems,
reflects a doubling of facilities. The costs of RDT&E display a comparable
rate of increase for the related reason that the new delivery systems and
weapons would have to be developed largely with indigenous technological
resources.
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SECRET
D
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TABLE 10
PROJECTED HARDWARE-ASSOCIATED OU'T'LAYS FOR FORCE B. 1966-75
(Billion 1963 US Dollars)
1966
1967
1968
1969 1
970
1971
1972
1974
=
PROCUREMENT
Land Armaments J
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.18 0
.17
0.18
0.18
0.13
0.10
0.11
Ammunition
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12 0
.12
0.14
0.111
0.14
0.14
0.14
General Purpose Ve-
hicles
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06 0
.06
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
Naval Ships
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.11 0
.12
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.12
0.16
Aircraft
0.24
0.28
0.42
0.50 0
.51
0.41
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.23
Missile Systems
0.03
0.03
0.11
0.19 0
.24
0.37
0.41
0.45
0.55
0.71
Other Elec.Egpt.2/
0.114
0.40
0.36
0.32 0
.29
0.26
0.24
0.21
0.19
0.18
Organizational Eqpt.
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.08 0
.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
Subtotal
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.6 1
.6
1.7
1.1E
1.4
1.4
1.7
SPARE PARTS
0.1E
0-55
0.61
0.68
0 73
0 79
0.8
0.21
0. 96
1.0
Of which for Other
Electronic Eqpt.
0.22
0.26
0.29
0.32 0
.35
0.37
0.40
0.42
0.43
0.44
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION &
FACILITIES
0.12
0.14
2.15
0.16 0
.18
0.20
0.21
0.22
0.22
0.23
RDT&E (Including
4
N
)
l
0
2
0.2 0.2
0.2 0
030 0.38
0441
45
0 45
0.
ear
uc
.
TOT
AL
J Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding.
Includes AAA for air defense.
J Same as for Force A. See Table 9, p. B-19.Total electronics production increases some-
what for this Force, however, because of the greater amount of electronics integral to
other systems.
J Excluding RDT&E.
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 Approved For Release 3D08MV/~2~CEXDP80BO1676R001600130004-9
The projected costs for Force C are presented in Table l1.* They
reflect the emphasis placed on defense of the Chinese mainland hence
on strategic defensive systems and naval elements of the general purpose
for-des. Other programs have been projected at the same levels as for
Force A.
Costs of aircraft (MIG-19 and NIG-2l-type) provide the major incre-
ment to growth of procurement outlays through 1970, with substantial help
from the costs associated with naval programs (particularly MSF?s and the
early construction of the SS.CX-1 torpedo-attack submarine) and missile
systems (SA-2-type and the MR I, SS-4-type). After 1970, the costs of
naval ships continue to display uninterrupted growth, as do the costs of
ammunition at a somewhat lower level, whereas the other major hardware
series become more irregular as programs are completed and new ones are
phased in.
The other hardware-associated costs all show appreciable increase.
Costs of spare parts increase as the inventory of equipment undergoes
substantial growth. The nuclear program increases in the latter part
of the period, as capacity is enlarged in anticipation of-'greater
weapons requirements later in the decade. Costs of Rin&E double, most
of the increase occurring after 1970 as more self-developed"programs are
postulated.
*:, .sage B-23
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TABLE 11
PROJECTED HARDWARE-ASSOCIATED OUTLAYS FOR FORCE C, 1 667-U-2/
Billion 1963 US Dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1 0 171 1972 = 1974
PROCUREMENT
Land Armaments) 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.14
Ammunition 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
General Purpose Vehicles 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Naval Ships 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.38 0.37
Aircraft 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.45 0.46 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.35 0.50
Missile Systems 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.23
Other Electronic Equipment2/ 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.19 0:18
Organizational Equipment 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Subtotal 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1. 1.6 1.8
SPARE PARTS o.49 0 0.64 0.71 0.77 0.84 0.90 0.96 1.0 1.1
Of which for Other
Electronic Equip. 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.43 o.44
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
AND FACILITIES-uJ
RDT&E (Including Nuclear) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.40
TOTAL 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.4
J Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding.
J Includes AAA for air defense.
c~ Same as for Force A. See Table 9, Page g 19.Total electronics production increases
somewhat for this Force, however, because of the greater amount of electronics
integral to other systems.
Excluding RDT&E
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The projected costs for Force D are presented in Table 12.* They
reflect the emphasis placed on the ground and naval elements of the gen-
eral purpose forces. Strategic offensive and defensive programs are
carried at the levels projected for Force A.
The early increase in procurement costs again is largely a function
of interceptor aircraft, but by the mid-years some of these costs are
attributable to tactical air and increasingly so in the late years of the
period. A similar pattern holds for missile costs -m the costs are ini-
tially dominated by the MR I program but later on are increasingly for
such genera]. purpose systems as a SAGGERmtype anti-tank missile and a
FROG-type surface-to-surface rocket. However, it is the other series --
land armaments, ammunition, general purpose vehicles, and organizational
equipment ?d all of which are predominantly general purpose in nature,
that establish the basic pattern of steady increase of procurement costs
throughout the period.
The other hardware-associated outlays also increase throughout the
period.. Costs of spare parts increase as the postulated programs would
substantially increase equipment inventories. Nuclear costs are projec-
ted at the same levels as for Force C the projected tactical nuclear
delivery systems would require amounts of nuclear materials iii excess of
the production capabilities of facilities now in being or under way.
RDT&E costs are projected to keep pace with the general development and
costs of hardware programs.
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TABLE 12
PROJECTED HARDWARE-ASSOCIATED OUTLAYS FOR FORCE D, 1966-75 a
(Billion 1963 US Dollars)
1966
97
1968
1969
1979 12
LI 1972
1973
1974
=
PROCUREMENT
Land Armaments
0.14
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.20 0.
21 0.24
0.24
0.28
0.28
Ammunition
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.14 0.
15 0.16
0.17
0.18
0.18
General Purpose Ve-
hicles
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.08 0.
10 0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
Naval Ships
0.09
0.13
0.15
0.19
0.25 0.
32 0.38
0.40
0.42
0.43
Aircraft
0.28
0.32
0.32
0.38
0.46 0.
38 0.51
o.65
0.50
0.58
Missile Systems
Neg.
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.07 0.
10 0.12
0.12
0.11
0.07
Other Elec. Eqpt.
0.44
0.40
0.36
0.32
0.29 0.
26 0.24
0.21
0.19
0.18
Organizational Eqpt.
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.08 o.
o8 0.08
0.10
0.10
0.10
Subtotal
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.6 1.
6 1.8
2.0
1.
1.9-
SPARE PARTS
0.49
0.56
2.6a
0.69
0.74 0.
80 0.88
0.95
1.1
1.1
Of which for Other
Electronic Eqpt.
0.22
0.26
0.29
0.32
0.35 0.
37 0.40 0.42
0.43
0.44
NUCLEAR PRODUCTOI &
FACILITIES /
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10 0.
12 0.14 0.15
0.16
0.18
RDT&E (Including
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25 0.
25 0 25 0.30
0.35
0.40
Nuclear)
2.0
2.2
2 ,
2.4
2
8
.4
_4
6
a/ Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding. Neg. used when 0.005
or less.
Includes AAA for air defense.
J Same as for Force A. See Table 9o p.B-19.Total electronics production increases some-
what for this Force, however, because of the greater amount of electronics integral to
other systems
Excluding RDT&E.
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