CI STAFF DISCUSSIONS WITH FRED C. WOODROUGH, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600030011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 15, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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1 5 APR 1963
SUBJECT: CI Staff Discussions with Fred C. Woodrough, Jr.
1. Fred C. Woodrough's analysis of Japanese captured
records regarding Herbert 0. Yardley led to the assumption that
the Japanese documents might contain counterintelligence data on
Soviet intelligence operations and agents.
2. CI Staff has taken up this question with Mr. Woodrough.
He believed that the records might contain scattered items on Soviet
intelligence. The Staff is now examining a set of published guides
to the records in order to determine whether they provide any indica-
tions of materials of specific counterintelligence interest. Mr.
Woodrough is agreeable to undertaking an examination for us and we
will proceed with him accordingly after we have completed the examina-
tion of the document summaries.
/4' 9 Fiue 'Ns
SECRET
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REPORTS ON ITEMS BASED ON MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE
"ARCHIVES IN THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1868-1965".
1. "Yardley" Oriented
a. Herbert 0. Yardley, who subsequently published the infamous
book, "The American Black Chamber", was personally and directly
involved in a transaction which he, in consideration for the pay-
ment of a sum of $7,000, turned over to Japanese Ambassador Ddbuchi,
in Washington, a large volume of decrypted Japanese messages in
the diplomatic systems and papers describing the cryptanalytic
processes which lead to their being read. The deal took place in
1930. A documentconcerning this transaction is attached as
Attachment 1.
b. On the surface, even after duely considering the economically
depressed times, the sum of $7,000 seems indeed nominal for the sell-
out. However, in view of the subsequent (only about six months
later) publication of his book "The American Black Chamber," in
which much of material with the $7,000 price tag, was made publicly
available for the price of the book, it was indeed no bargain. It
is understandable that the Japanese were incensed. But this was
among the minor of the repercussions in Japan to the book's
publication. There was much discussion of whether to attempt the
book's suppression, and, if affirmative, how to accdmplish it.
A thought was to confront Yardley with a charge of bad faith, on
the grounds that the Japanese had bought sole "rights" to the
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material when they paid him the $7,000. All proposals for such
action, however, were eventually rejected, generally on the basis
that any act would draw unfavorable domestic and international
attention to the Japanese. As far as the "bad faith" charge, the
thought was turned down by the suggester on the grounds that a
man who would sell out his country for $7,000 wouldn't know the
meaning of "good faith". The overall policy adopted was, apparently,
to try as hard as possible to ignore the whole thing and to mini-
mize whatever attention that might be given the book.
This did not absolve those in the inner government from working
at a feverish pitch on the implementation of the "ignoring" policy.
Several drafts of answers by Cabinet Officials at a hypothetical
legislative hearing on the matter are among the papers in the file.
There are also reports in depth of the status of Japanese crypt-
ography and of the science of cryptanalysis in the world; there
are a couple of references to the Japanese efforts in that science;.
there are also papers on how to cope with the problem of secure
communications in the future, and how to implement stop-gap measures
pending the manufacture and distribution of cipher machines on a
world-wide scale. Some points which were brought out were:
(1) That almost a year was required for the preparation,
compilation, and distribution of a set of cryptographic
material (code books) under the then existing policy of
relegating such duties to a "time available" basis
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(2) That the diplomatic cryptographic systems could not be
made more complex without a substantial increase in the
telecommunication sections' staffs, both at home and
overseas; and that the year's lead time required for the
activation of new code books precluded more frequent
changes of systems without considerably increasing the
size of the crypto-security section.
(3)
That under the rather limited effort assigned to it,
the results being obtained in the field of crypt-
analyses were satisfactory.
(4) That crypto and communication security measures,
including physical security pertaining to them,
already promulgated should be more strictly adhered
to.
(5) That cipher machines are the answer.
The publication of the Black Chamber had, taken all in all,
very little immediate effect on Japanese cryptography; few if any,
"over night" changes were implemented by the Japanese with the
publication of what must be one of the greatest overt cryptanalytic
compromises of modern times. This was due, simply, to the fact that
the Japanese were operating under what to them was their optimum
cryptographic conditions involving time and complexity. In other
words, no immediate fundamental changes could be made because under
the circumstances, they were already doing the best they could.
However, the publication did make the Japanese very cryptology
conscious. They went tlifough, in currently popular jargon, a
traumatic experience which, whether or not it made of them a great
cryptologic people, undoubtedly left a lasting mark. There were
those of the "out" party and its press at the time who charged the
ins with4f)PosvedinAkraMa0N613/124q1kkeNt3gOlfetER6646666516blVf
n's
*me
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adversary to take advantage of Japan at the London Naval Conference.
(Newspaper clippings of these charges are among these papers). A
subject which causes a governmental crisis is bound to make an
impression, regardless of whether it is publicly white-washed or
glossed over.
From these papers, there is no way of knowing precisely how
this reaction manifested itself. One thing seems evident, however,
and that is that by and in the 1940's, at least, the Japanese
showed a high degree of sophistication in the art of decrypting
other people's messages (U.S.'s included), which is reported in
c. below.
c. Among the papers in these Foreign Pffice's files, is a
group of about five thousand pages, filed under the heading of
"Japanese-U.S. Diplomatic Discussions During the Period Immediately
Preceeding the War". It consists mostly of copies of messages
between the Foreign Office and Admiral Nomura, the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington. In this file was a scrap of paper
with a scribbled memo, apparently notes from which to draft a
message. The scribblings read:
"A message decrypted (KAIDOKU) by Yardley, from the British
Ambassador to Tokyo to the British Foreign Minister (Info
to British Ambassador in U.S.) dated 30 September contained
his opinions, the gist of which follows (Because of the
source Lpf this informatioE/, it is for your information only)
Lone or two characters illegible =,/ "Ku" (Craigie) states
that Grew is also of the same opinion. Minister met with
Craigie, 28th, same night Craigie met with Grew."
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11202 Healy Street
Silver Spring, Md. 20902
28 November 1967
Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, USN
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Admiral:
During the past ten to twelve weeks I have read or
scanned approximately 40,000 pages of material in Japanese
selected from the "Checklist of Archives In the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1868 - 1945" which lists
material microfilmed for the Library of Congress during
1949 to 1951.
Results, from the standpoint of uncovering items or
situations of specific interest which are applicable to
living things and events, must be considered almost totally
negative. The few exceptions are appended in the form of
reports. I don't think that Faragoe's reference to Yardley
which was instrumental in the initiation of this investigation,
nor my personal background, unduely influenced the fact that
all of these exceptions are cryptology-oriented; that it
did so turn out, is due only to their being in the sole
category in which there seemed to be items of possible
current interest.
The appended reports are divided into two general parts:
The Yardley and the non-Yardley. The Yardley part is broken
down into three sections: (a) in which Yardley himself is
the central figure; (b) in which repercussions of a Yardley
action, i.e., the publication of his book, "The American
Black Chamber" is narrated; and, (c) in which evidences of
Japanese cryptologic achievements, to which Yardley may
have made a direct contribution, is reported.
s
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The non-Yardley part--so-called because he did not
figure in it personally--is a report on compromises in
crypto- and communications-security. The report treats
available material in a rather cursory manner only because
the subject matter does not meet this undertaking's specifics.
All the material from this source pertaining to this particualr
matter was copied and is on file in NSA. I am hopeful that
at some future date, time and circumstances will permit a
report in more depth. I think it would make for good
reading and may have some value as training material.
Though the search bore generally disappointing results,
this appraisal is not intended to apply to any but the
specific objective for which the project was undertaken.
Students of the history of events leading to World War II,
more specifically the Japanese-U.S. involvement in it, or
of the many by-plays during the Manchurian and China
"Incidents" would find this cache a veritable treasure trove;
those who may be interested in Japan's introduction into
western style diplomacy would find much to intrigue them in
the complete files of Baron van Siefold's papers for the
years 1868 to 1905. Siebold was an advisor to the Japanese
Foreign Office during those formative years and as such,
apparently had 'carte blanche' use of all of Europe as his
stage of activity.
For those and many other subjects, this material held
in the Library of Congress should be of interest in varying
degrees up to and including invaluable. All of the 2,000
plus reels of micro-film (about 1,000 frames to a reel) of
which I viewed only about 40, is well catalogued and cross-
indexed in the "Checklist of Archives" referred to above.
This volume is well worth a place in the reference libraries
of all researchers and students of the histories of foreign
affairs, of Japan, and of international politics of the past
00 years.
I would like to add a word about the environment in
which this project was carried out. The cooperation and
assistance extended by concerned elements and individuals
at NSA were of the best. These include but certainly not
limited to who provided me with working spaces
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and permitted his staff to give unstintingly of their
and efforts--particularly those of
and and their assistants, to each
am individually indebted; to through whom
availed myself of the generous services of
and
time
of whom
I am also particularly indebted
to Mr. Pforzheimer and
at NSA, and member of their staffs- , for one.
These persons among others, made the project a most pleasant
undertaking.
Though little results of a positive nature can be shown,
I hope that my efforts were of some value, even in a negative
sort of way. In any event, I hope that I may again have the
opportunity to try to serve.
Sincerely,
/
/
FRED C. WOODROUGH, JR.
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Two messages which undoubtedly relate to the above scribbled
notes are translated in full as follows:
TO: Ambassador Nomura, U.S.
FROM: Minister Toyota
Drafter: 3 October 1941
Nr: 38168
Sent: 6 p.m., 3 Oct 1941
Message No. 627 (Chief of Office Code; Private)
On 28 September I outlined my opinions regarding Japan-U.S.
problems to Craigie, the British Ambassador who i shortly to go
on a "leave" trip to the U.S. (He had planned to leave Nagasaki on
the 30th and board the Coolidge at Shanghai on 4 October, but due
to the illness of the Consul who was to be Charge d'affairs in his
absence, he has apparently postponed his trip for about 3 weeks).
I added that he could get further details from Ambassador Grew.
I understand that he did meet with Ambassador Grew that night.
According to extremely reliable information, the Ambassador
(Craigie), subsequently explained the need for speedy conversations
and agreements between Japan and the U.S. to Foreign Minister Eden
and Ambassador Halifax, expressing opinions in a message to them,
the gist of which is contained in Separate Message No. 628.
Because of the source of this (information) this is strictly
for your information only.
Full text of message Nr. 628.
To: Ambassador Nomura, U.S.
From: Minister Toyota
Drafter: 3 Oct 1941
NR:
Sent:
381--
6 p.m. 3 Oct 1941
Message No. 628 (Separate Message)
(Chief of Office Code)
1. With the resignation of Foreign Minister Motsuoka, there is
an increased possibility of a shift from Axis policy to a more
moderate policy.
2. The difficulties in the Japan-U.S. talks are, with the
Japanese though time is of the essence, they cannot obtain anything
more than a generalized understanding; the U.S., on the other hand,
is playing a delaying game, insisting on discussing each word and
phrase 651;4321di:FaciecW4PRIM8 : Sllik-RINSOB01WM001 stolAgai 40-f
5 ,, under-
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standing of the Japanese psychology or is ignorant of the fact that
the normal situation of Japan does not permit any delays. It would
be indeed regrettable, if such (lack of understanding or ignorance)
should be the cause of missing the best chance for settling the
Far Eastern problem since I assumed its post 4 years ago.
Prince Konoye sincerely desires the prevention of dangers which the
Tripartite Pact and Axis relations, for which he has personal
responsibilities have brought on Japan. In changing his policy from
this stand, the Piince faces considerable opposition domestically,
and unless the Japan-U.S. talks progress speedily, he will lose
those who presently support a revision of national relations on,
if by some chance, the talks end in a miscarriage or are unduly
prolonged, the Konoye cabinet will face a crisis.
Though I realize that there are several difficult problems in
the negotiations, both the U.S. AMbassador to Japan and I feel that
to miss this excellent chance through undue amount of caution, would
be exceedingly unwise.
Of course, it goes without saying that no lessening of its
economic retaliatory measures should take place until Japanese
foreign policy does an about-face, or, in other words, until the
Konoye principles actually are manifested. "
The latter of the above two messages is undoubtedly a trans-
lated gisting of a portion -- that portion which starts with the
bracket, midway in para (3) on page 3 -- of the message from
British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo to Foreign Secretary Eden,
dated 30 September 1941, a copy of which was in the files under
investigation and a copy of which is here attached:
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iFI Hi I eal, ,1,11 " . '
vrr:v ' If 117 II I II
401 I,,,IIMIIIIIIII,IMIIIIIIIII121111E111041111111210 I I!
,FF III !iilUFiIlii
jaanuJo-ikmeri,:an ConversuLlons:
craigies vicw3
(1:: figure cli:ht:r)
Fro
To Lonio%
Japtel,:ur 4.%,;
Summary:
Japan is/An haste. Ar.1,eria 13 ilnyine,
for ti.rm), without Lakin...2 -1ue %ote or
:the situation in
Konoe sincerely deulreJ Jeer
clear of Ax13.1anzur3.
The present woment is tLe t,e3t chance
Of sottling Far :Aater:1
keantime, continue cc,1-.1 reprlJa13
In full /igour.
Torch.
Addreased to Foreign 0ff1ce.iio. 1853,
September 29tb, repeated tO Washington No. 293,
"Torch" No. 160. Your telegram No. 1187.
Secret.
\ J: *
While'I find yself in general agreement with
,
,
the views expressed, I do not think this tologran )
-- \
t.lthe.whole story, and, tcil bring the narrative
_
R
immEEELliomuDIA
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observatic,t1s.
(2) I 10 Lut
Japsn'3
itself a reuzi%
Jau.610n LL...1
idea that identbul e..bitt ns car. fu;*
not. alto4ieLl.er
--there Is riU Juktin's
?SIBS bei: 6 ruallied In thu 2.260,11uLe i?out-wur
.?
future, once Geetaiu7 Las been dereutwl. Y(..)r
this reason and because L keep japan neutral will
contribute to the defeat of 'Clemany, I venture
the opinion that a post-mortem on uur horizon
HAT part) may legitimately be bounded by limits
-
- - - - -7-"'
'1,1v 11,01 ' 11111111I
rlo'F'1111'1,711 l',`11111 lemospold,mfrel,11 ;Fir 11111
des-rat.:- No,
appreclate-,i
a time when Lr.
Ministerirrtn ? ve:i
able ? brier' notable
occurre,1 in 'tne 41t4ation
tnd thepb_eXi8t5 TO reta., 1rOb.07101. *.tAit at
that time
away from the AALL ar?., towerue ora. mouerate
The eli-important question at the
snt Is the discussion now proceedin6 between
the_Ohited States and the Japanese Government.
The main difticulty appears to be that, while
the Jepapeee iant speed and cannot yet atfor4L
go beyond generalisations, the Americana
__::,,V),Att=pi.kying for t las and to demand' the
?no ? on stnytntqr..aitm..r
roohensont.
Tills _(4 Mere Is) reuLo:.
_
American :'eluirement, ,lu1utacdtea,4
account of Jnuee
internul 31tUdtQL uere
If cerLlstel :n, i oluL
FR: Masten
- 5
(5) My United States colleague and I consid
that Pri-poe Konoye is telei.hOne (7 most) sincere
in his desire to avert the dangers towards Eliot'
he now sees the Tripartite Pact and the Alai con-
nection (fur whIch he naturally accepts his share
of reaponsibity) are rapidly leading Iaian. Etu
the streagth of the opposition to his nay policy,
nurtured by the anniversary of tre stratnical
reconnlissanoes C? reminders, of the Tripartite
Pact, leads the :apinese Government to feel that
they can only retain a sufficient body of suppor-
ters for this polloT and face deeidedly int C?
the risk of arousing the) wreak of their Ails
partners, if some overt and sttlkile sign of
progress in the discussions can be given at an
early date. The prime Minister has staked his
pcilitical future on this move and loneurs (?
drift). Despite the lemperor,i strong backing,
I doubt if be and, his Goverment latish 2onsulir
.: ?
2fLion (?..ean) survive if the dtseussions prove.
411102111,0 or Arog on nniuly.
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- -
(5) Admittedl, ure entla:.s (? aangerous
_
fat...rs) in t:.e _:ituation tamage (? trtLeJe)
points of vl,JA: (a) A preilry eireeleLts mere-
ly on general prIn'll les may conta..% 5U3 of ruture
misunlerstandin.. e worA.-
ed out; (t) t'nere1 uf n
couralL.3m-Int at lr
-general principles c,Dhts.n a%! am:1:'.11t"; 0:1 t'.e
subject of pla-zeter. t_ offer o C,hinu; ic
partisan of t.t Ayis In Jac ir ti ver:
onr: both nunerIca__ and v,.a:Ly, fin: se ban7lot ex-
ciuda t'ae 3oit"; t..at radi,7al u cine In
forei6n policy if_all (? may) pre.lipitute serious
tf?161.4 -th)
the bottom of it; (d) finaj.y, kner1,7..a's interrlets
in the Far ::aat aru not-*no:ly identical it curs
and, when the tim-f comes for conJultation, diver
tences of view may oe foend to exist. But thu
,risks must be faced either rIpaired (? in any case),
and my United States aolleaexe and I are firmly of
--worropinion that on balance thislis a chance which
? ? -
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it would be
Blip. Caution must Ue axerciai, ,J7o9asiva
cynicism brina
(7) liaa:it t.? t t-ht, we
should maintaln t%e full
re?r1.66 unti: sun ti-' Avidnce of a
lneyldzw:1fO7 to let
ohano of Japufn:)se policy in ft_A-t,comt!
until there neginz th3t ;-:radicw: a7)pilcat1on of
Prince Konoye's ,:eneral principleeiii a1on.4 can
-Justify te makin: of conzreta conc,831)ns on our
? ? ?
ii11,,,11,111dPii!IIIINI1W11111111111011 IPSIIICM11111111111111911111111111111111:1T11111119111111M11111111111111111111M111
:2;7_7.=.411:176=::=MtuinTrutrZIM.
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This British message and its existence among other Japanese papers
gives rise to some questions, a number of which are as yet an-
answered:
(1) What is the significance of the reference to Yardley as
the decrypter? It would seem to indicate that he was engaged as
a member of a Japanese counterpart of "The American Black Chamber".
He was known to have been in the employ of the Chinese Nationalists
as a cryptanalyst from 1938 to 1940; he has definitely been placed
in Washington in March of 1941; he was in the employ of the
Canadians in a similar capacity in 1941, an employment which may
have been terminated in about September of that year. If he sub-
sequently found employment with the Japanese Government, it would
be a fact which was unknown till now. It seems unlikely, though
probably not impossible, that he could have traveled to Japan in
the environment of the fall of 1941 without its becoming known.
However, Japanese ships were still plying the Pacific and it is
possible he could have boarded one of them without attracting
attention -- especially if he departed from a Canadian port. Again
it seems unlikely, but how else can the reference to him be
explained?
(2) How was the British Ambassador's message "decrypted"?
Because of the degree of completeness of the text, we were at
first lead to believe that it had been obtained through "direct
methods", i.e., that it was stolen or directly copied. From the
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fact that the copy contained some garbles, (underlined in the
text and followed by the most probable correct value) we had to
assume that the theft took place at the receiving end, i.e.,
either at the Foreign Office in London or at the British Embassy
in Washington, the two addresses to which the message had been
directed. These facts, at least, seemed to point to the falseness
of our assumption: (1) the spelling of the word cipher with an
fl,fl
instead of a "y"; (2) the improbability that papers received
in London or Washington no earlier than 30 September 1941, could
be in the hands of the Japanese Foreign Minister on 2 October;
(3) the unlikelihood that a gist translation of the British
message would have to be sent to Ambassador Nomura in Washington
if it had originated in either London or Washington.
Practically all thought of "direct method" acquisition in
Washington or London were discarded, when further search of the
Foreign Ministry files revealed the existence of at least two
more "decrypted messages", one from Secretary of State Hull to
Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on 28 November 1941, and the other from
Hull to Gauss in Chungking on the same day, copies of which are
attached. (Attachment 2). There are other references, direct or
indirect, "information based on decrypted messages":
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FRAME No. 0211, Cut No. 65 (Latter Part of Reel) Reel No. UD 43
TO: Ambassador Shigemitsu, in China
FROM: Minister Tani
DRAFTER: 7 Jan 1943
NR: 147
Sent: 0800 7 Jan 1943
SUBJECT: Chinese Declaration of War and Other Arrangements,
the speeding up of.
Message No. 14 (Chief of Office Code) URGENT.
Ref: Message No. 16 from Great East Asia Minister to you.
According to absolutely reliable information in our
possession, the U.S. is at present negotiating with the
Chungking Government, change of status of extraterritorial
and other settlement rights in China
Talc-5 NO Y15.SURU KAKUJITSU NARU Tai5 NI YOREBA,
BEIKOKU WA
FRAME NO. 0195, Reel No. UD-43, Cut No. 64 (First part of reel)
TO: Ambassador Shigemitsu, Nanking
FROM: Minister Tani
NR. 2571
SENT: 17 Feb 1943
SUBJECT: Items pertaining to returning the Settlements in
China by the French.
Message No. 58 (Chief of Office Code ) URGENT
According to absolutely reliable information in our
possession (Decrypts), in issuing a statement pertaining
to the returning of French Settlement and renouncing other
extraterritorial rights, The French are planning to issue
them to the Foreign Office of the Ghungking Government.
Tak7 NO YT7SURU KAKUJITSU NARU T(71443 (ANG-0- KAIDOKU)
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All of these decrypts and references to decrypts seem to
conclusively point to the fact that the Japanese Foreign Office's
Telecommunications Section had the capability of reading the
diplomatic systems of Great Britain (1941), U.S. (1941, 1943),
and Vichy France (1943). The evidence seems to point to the
probability that the Japanese had available to them the code books
involved, although it is barely possible that the results were
obtained by cryptanalyses only.
The questions which are as yet unanswerable in all of this,
are under investigation at present. As the answers become known,
they will be reported.
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2. Non-Yardley Oriented
This incident of a security break is reported here not for its
direct pertinence to the project at hand, but because in its
development, it unfolds the complexities and involvements that
such an incident can be held responsible for. The report is a
cursory one; names of persons and places have not been researched
in any depth. It is in a continuous narrative form, based solely
on the material contained in the Foreign Ministry Archives
(Reel No. UD-30; file No. UD-53 entitled TA Suspicious Document"
Incident - May 1933 - February 1940) and because little attempt
has been made to fill in any gaps, it may lack coherence at times.
The scene is laid in Manchuria (Manchukuo to the Japanese
at that time) during the early post "Manchuria Incident" day of
1933. The story begins with a message from Ambassador Ota in Moscow
to Foreign Minister Uchida, (Msg. No. 282) on 25 May 1933. He
reports that a news story appearing in the local press treats with
considerable sensationalism a story attributed to "an unimpeachable
source", of a plot by the Japanese in Manchukuo to seize the
Chinese Eastern Railroad.
Ambassador Ota followed this message up with another (No. 286)
on 26 May 1933, in which he notes that the wording of the press
story referred to above closely resembled the contents of a message
(Circular No. 2142 ((msg. No. 536))) from the Ambassador to Manchukuo
to the Foreign Minister. He further recalls that the contents of
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an earlier message from Consul-General Morishima (Msg. No. 199)
to the Ambassador to Manchukuo, was reported in the Russian press
in a story which originated in the same place as this later one.
On the basis of these, Ambassador Ota suggests that there was some
sort of a security breach, crypto or otherwise.
Ambassador Muto to Manchukuo, whose office has to be one of
the prime suspects of being the source of these leaks, is quick
(27 May 1933) Msg No. 568 to Tokyo) to attribute these developments
to (1) National trait of Russians (treacherous); and (2) cryptanalysis.
That his office could be the source of any physical security laxness
is just too incredible. His solution: a new code to be issued to
the Embassy in Moscow and that all messages to or from Moscow to
points other than Tokyo, be relayed by Tokyo. In other words,
tighten security measures in Moscow, not Hsinking.
The facts of life are now explained to Ambassador Muto in
Hsinking in a message which is couriered to him on 30 May. Actually
the originator is the Chief of the Telcommunication's Section and
the addressee is Secretary Kurihara of the Embassy in Manchukuo;
so, officially it is not a non-concurrence of the Foreign Minister
to Ambassador Muto's hints. The facts of life, as explained in
this letter-message, are that there are three ways by which an
encrypted message can be read by the unauthorized: (a) by stealing
or reproducing the code; (b) by obtaining the original text of the
message; and (c) by scientific attack (cryptanalysis).
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There ensues a long dissertation on these three methods, the
upshot of which is that though which, if any, of the methods was
used in this instance is unknown, it was probably not cryptanalysis
because of the very short duration of the cryptographic system's
effectiveness; because it is unbelievable that cryptanalytic
successes which are one of the closest held secrets, would be so
blatantly compromised by publishing the fruits of such efforts
in the press; and because these two messages are the only ones
which have given rise to such suspicions. It concludes that it
is much more probable that some Manchukuan in the known about the
subject (Japanese Manchurian discussions on how to take over the
Chinese Eastern Railroad) had leaked, inadvertently, the information
to the Russians.
The letter-message then goes on to say that even though
crypto or communications-security was probably not involved here,
one has to assume in all such cases that it was, and reviews the
security measures which must be observed. It also orders that
Circulars Nos. 1192 of 9 Sep 1930, and 1088 of 17 Sep 1931 pertaining
to crypto and COMSEC be reread.
That seemed to be that. Until the Fall of the same year.
Whether there were other suspicious incidents in the interim or not
is not known. There is some evidence that non-telegraphic means of
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communications were resorted to - mailgrams, "Ko" mail, and courier-
on at least some occasions.
In any event, on 9 October 19332 the Chief of the Tele-
communications Section, Sakuma, wrote a "think piece" entitled:
"Matters Pertaining to the Russians Publishing Our Secret Document".
The opening sentence reads "The message in question was in the
Top Secret "Ha" system" and goes on from there to report at great
length to the Foreign Minister on the complete picture of Japan's
cryptography. -- past, present. and hopes for future. Although the
message which was published by the Russian press cannot be specific-
ally identified, its (their) pertinence was such as to cause world-
wide press repercussions, most of which denounced Japan's apparent
intent to seize.
Whatever the subject matter, the Chief of the Telecommunications
Section, Sakuma, feels that because the "Ha" system with which the
message was encrypted, had been used sparingly during its compara-
tively short period of its effectiveness, and because it was a
fairly complex system, it could not have yielded to cryptanalysis
to the extent necessary for the compromise involved. (This was the
opinion of cryptologic expert, Navy Captain Inouye, of the Tele-
communications Section). Therefore, Sakuma reasons, the Russians
must have obtained their results by covertly making photographic
copies of the code book. He concludes his lengthy dissertation
with a plea for more funds, part of which is to be used for cipher
machines.
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On 17 November, Ambassador Ota in Moscow, in a message to
the Foreign Minister (Top Secret; No. 589) tells of an informal
dinner with the acting Far East Department Chief. During the course
of this friendly gathering, the Russian guest made reference to the
published papers in question, and stated that he hoped the Japanese
would speedily release those who had been arrested. Sako, another
guest, took the opening and said that that incident lead him to
believe that the Russians must have a second Yardley to which the
Russian guest replied that he was not aware of the means by which
that information was obtained, but in his opinion, that because of
the complexities of the Japanese language, he doubted that they would
have been able to get such a complete text as was published, by means
of cryptanalytic decryption. In any event, what the Russians had was
a copy of the original text and this is also true of the portions
which have not yet been public, he said.
About this time, the Foreign Ministry sent a circular to all
of its installations in the Manchuria-USSR area, asking them to
report on any security irregularities which may have been noted dur-
ing the past one or two years. Among the flood of negative replies,
there appears one interesting exception:
Acting Consul Izumi in Manchouliin top secret message No. 84 of
15 October 1933, advised the Foreign Minister that he had noted no
irregularities. However, he continued, a guard who had been on dtty
since the beginning of the SuPingWen Incident told him the following
story in confidence:
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"On 27 September, when the consulate was under heavy fire from
the rebel forces, some important papers were destroyed by burning in
the consulate. The remainder was taken to the larger furnance in
the movie house next door, and after starting a fire in it, the
papers were fed to it. All the personnel then took refuge in the
projection room upstairs. About a half an hour later, it was
discovered that the papers were not completely burned, so the
furnace was fired up again and the destruction completed. During
the interim, however, one or two Russian employees of the Consulate
(one of which was subsequently fired on suspicion of being a
Russian agent) had remained. Though it does not seem likely that
they had the time to steal the papers, in retrospect, there does
seem to be room for doubt."
Acting Consul Izumi continues by requesting information as to
the motivation of the security investigation. He asks, "Is it due
to (1) this particular office being suspected of a leak; or (2)
overall investigation stemming from the Russians publishing those
official Japanese papers. If the latter, I may have some very
confidential information concerning the local military authorities'
handling of secret papers around the time of the SuPingWen Incident.
If you think that it might pertain, I shall divulge the information."
This was followed up by a written report, apparently not sent
electrically, entitled: "An Item Concerning the Handling of Secret
Documents by the Army .Special Service Organ on the Day of the Out-
break oL the SuPinaWen Incident
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Foreign Minister, as Top Secret document No. 439, dated 15 November
1933. A full, though rough, translation of the document follows:
"On 27 September last year (1932), the local rebel forces
of the SuPingWen gang requested the presence of Consul Yamazuld,
Capt. Obara (Army), and Chief of Border Police Unit, Uno,
to their headquarters and simultaneously opened fierce attacks
against those Japanese installations. At that time, employee
Chikamatsu was keeping watch at the Special Service Organ (Army).
When danger approached, he immediately took to his heels and
took refuge elsewhere, leaving behind a Russian maid-servant
by the name of GINA (sp?). Shortly thereafter, this office
was stripped of everything in it by looters.
Captain Obara was sent back to the Consulate on the following
(28th) day. He had not been there long when GINA called and
requested an audience, but was turned down because Captain
Obara was taking an afternoon nap. She then told Police Officer
Kanamaru who was on duty here, that Chikamatsu had been in such
a hurry to escape that he had left all secret documents un-
touched. GINA said that therefore, she herself had tended to
their destruction by burning.
It is not only very doubtful that said GINA would react so
quickly in an emergency and burn those documents, but her
impatience to have her alleged actions known makes her state-
ment doubly suspicious. Moreover, the subject GINA had been
generally rumored to be a Russian agent. This rumor is given
endorsement by the fact that while all other employees of
local Japanese installations had either run away to hide or
had been arrested and locked up, GINA alone seemed to be able
to freely walk the streets unmolested. There are many Japanese
residents here who are convinced that all of the secret papers
in the Special Service Organ were stolen on the day of the
SuPingWen Incident.
Incidentally, Captain Obara is said to have certified that all
confidential documents were destroyed by burning by Chikamatsu.
The above is reported for your information."
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Nye
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This is about all there is to this story. There are many
other related messages in the files, some which insist that
cryptanalysis was the tool; others indicating direct method. It
is rather interesting that persons closest to the areas of potential
physical security breach, are loudest in the insistance that it was
a cryptanalytic break through, while those in the cryptographic
business, such as the Telecommunications Section, are insistant
that it was a physical break. The Diplomatic Service finds the
Army at fault.
The usual preparations for a legislative hearing were undertaken.
And what were the legislators, hence the public and the world, to
be lead to believe? The whole thing was a Russian hoax. There never
was any such secret document so what the Russians published was out
of whole cloth!
The Foreign Ministry, however, continued to exhort all of its
overseas installations to observe and enforce stringent security
measures.
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Matters Pertaining to Publication Authorized by Former
Chief of Cryptanalysis of U.S. War Department's Intelligence
Bureau
10 June 1931
Chief of Telegraph Section (Foreign Ministry).
(Seal of Sakuma)
("Initialed" by Minister and Vice Minister Foreign Ministry )
.
According to telegraphic advice of Ambassador to
the U.S. Debuchi during June, 1931, Herbert 0. Yardley who
was the Chief of Signals Intelligence of U.S. War Department's
Intelligence Bureau, has had published a book authored by him
entitled The American Black Chamber. In it he claims to have
read over 40,000 enciphered telegrams of Japan, Great Britain,
Germany and other countries between 1917 and 1929. The
information contained in them was passed to state and other
.4
.4
making of it a very influencial factor in U.S. diplomacy. During.V
by Soviet Union's Communist Party, brought to light the party's
secret plans. Yardley merits that systematic scientific
approaches will result in the breaking of any cryptography.
the war, it revealed Germany's agent activity, and after the
war, the solution of encrypted messages in invisible ink used
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He sta
hat after the expenditure of much effort, the
encrypted messages of Japan were all reduced to plain text
and that all of the messages between the Japanese Delegates
to the Washington Conference and the home government were
road We are told that he included many English translations
of the messages to and from the Ministry at that time as
substantiations of his claims, are included in the book.
The above undoubtedly will be picked up and reported by
the press and periodicals of our country. There is a need,
therefore, to start today, considering ways and means of
countering the impact it may have.
2. Is there a means of raising doubts as to Yardley's
sense of responsibleness?
a. Subject Yardley in the above, is assumed to be
the same Yardley who earlier approached our Embassy in the
U.S. with the proposition that he would sell the secrets of
how the Japanese government's cryptography was solved. The
upshot of that proposition was that U.S. $7,000 was passed
to him for which we received many copies of decrypted messages
together with a set of papers on how to destroy cryptography.
If, in fact, these two Yardley's are one and the same his
recounting of how Japanese codes and ciphers were broken in
his book, is a flagrant act of bad faith on his part since
2
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we had stressed the need for utmost secrecy as a condition
for our paying his the aforementioned U.S. $7,000. He was
asked to guarantee that there would be no revelation to others.
(In the Foreign Ministry's instructions, it was stipulated:
"...simultaneously with our purchase, the other party will
hand over to us the telegrams in question or to have such
telegrams destroyed to preclude the danger of any revelation of
their contents in the future.") Our Ambassador to the U.S.
*quested to obtain this assurance at the time (See message
105 from Misnister to Ambassador to U.S., June 1930).
It is true that the Ambassador's message reporting the
receipt of copies of Japanese encrypted messages and other
papers having pertinance, does not specifically refer to
Obtaining such assurances from Yardley. However, it is probably
that some such understanding was reachedleither directly
indirectly, between the Ambassador and Yardley.
Under such circumstances, it would be possible to have our
Ambassador to the U.S. confront Yardley and charge that his
revealing the secrets involved in spite of the payment of
U.S. $7,000, was indeed a stab in the back.
Fundamentally, however, when dealing with a character
such as Yardley who would sell his own government's secrets to
3
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y of 4 foreign country, it :Should be assumed in the
first place, that subsequent acts of bad faith would occur.
Moreover What if, as a result of pressing him at this date,
he should again try to withdraw that part which is offensive
to us from his book. There does not seem to be much likelihood
that the 1711pste't of the facts, once published would be reduced
by such action; rather, there is a greater probability that
doubts and suspicions would be generally intensified. There is
a further possibility that Yardley would try to counter our
pressures by threatening to publicly announce the fact that the
Japanese SMbassy in the U.S. had paid him U.S. $7,000.
For these reasons, not only should a confrontation be
avoided but it would be to our interest to completely ignore
Yardley insofar as Yardley's publication is concerned
b. Article 2 of the International Telegraph Agreement
pecifi s that:
"The signatory nations must maintain appropriate
measures to safeguard secrecy and for expeditious handling of
communications."
Article 73 of the Administrative Regulation attached to
that Agreement specifies that the originals of the telegraphed
messages or copies thereof be validated by the sender and that
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such may be seen only by a representative of the second party;
also that only the sender and the addressee or his authorized
agent are entitled to receive original messages or the copies
thereof. Article 91, No.1, of the same regulation further
stipulates that when a private telegraph enterprise engages
In international ihndetakings involving one or several of the
signatory nations, such will be viewed as an element of that
country's telegraphic enterprise and as such will be bound
by these regulations.
Under these circumstances, a signatory government Should
avail itself of telegraphic communications of foreign
eMbassies and legation for cryptologic research purposes
only in strict secrecy. Though the U.S. is not a signatory
of the Agreement there are several telecommunication firms
that do handle such communications for several countries
which are signatories. Therefore, it would seem appropriate
that if for no other reason then as a friendly gesture, it
would not openly seize copies of encrypted foreign government
messages from said commercial firms for the purpose of
cryptologically analyzing them. And in actuality, according
to Ambassador Debuchi's report, Yardley has stated that
5
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considerable difficulty was encountered by the U.S. Cryptologic
research station in obtaining copies of such messages from
the telegraph firms -- that certain employees had to be
bought off to gain access to them. Apparently, therefore
there is no arrangement whereby the U.S. government has free
access to the files of these private firms.
It is possible therefore, that representations be made
to the government of the U.S. that in view of the fact that
Yardley has openly admitted that the U.S. cryptologic research
station obtained copies of Japanese Governmental Communications
that it (the U.S. Government) take suitable steps. Since
Yardley is guilty of breaking the security of his own country's
government it is not beyond the scope if poss1tilty that
the authorities involved will take some such measures as
confiscation or prohibition of sale of the publication, or
find the author guilty of criminal action. For us to request
that some such action be initiated, may boomarang if by some
off-chance, Yardley should confess that he received $7,000 from
For this last reason, the initiation of a protest by us
is not recommended.
c. Another procedure may be to get together with the
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other countries which have been victimized, such as Great Brit* n
and Germany, And have an inter-governmental discussion on ways
and means. In view of the exceedingly delicate nature the
subject involved however, we cannot give our full endorsement
to this procedure.
d So, if none of the possible counter measures are
suitable, we come back to how do we reply to the Diet and the
press if the issue is raised by them. In other words the
question is *hat should be our domestic strategy.
3. The Status of Our Cryptography and the Degree of its
Vulnerability to afforts of U.S. Cryptological Research Center-.
Cryptographic security is dependent on the complexity of
the cryptographic system and to the frequency with Which it
is changed. We cannot vouch faultlessness in either of these
two areas. The attached table shows the types, direction of
usage and size (of code book) of all cryptographic systems
used by us from 1917 to the present.
We have never had a crypto-research (XEMS3C) organization
in the Telecommunication Section so code books were compiled
by. the Telecom. Officer as an aide line and on a time-available
basis. Under these circumstances, it is natural that our
cryptography has suffered from insufficient complexity and
have not been changed often enough. To compare and print an
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issue of a code has required several months and another 6
months to a year for distribution to all of our overseas
offices for implementation.
To undertake such a project on a spare time basis has
resulted in insufficient investigations into such as suitability
of degree of complexity and to change them with desirable
frequency has been out of the question.
At present there is a cryptanalytic research tea
by Navy Captain Inoue in the Telecom Section, which is
undertaking the study of cryptography of foreign countries.
(Our impression is that in comparison with similar research
organizations of the U.S. and other foreign countries, it
does not take a back seat. Of all of the foreign cryptographic
systems it has tackled so far, the only one which has not
yielded to Its efforts is the Russian which has been undertaken
only recently.)
The knowledge that is being gained by this team is being
utilized and the compilation of our cryptography being made
into a"routine business" so we are confident that our COMSSC
in general will begin to show a gradual improvement in the near
future
a
El
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Be that as it may, and though the production of codes
and ciphers is promoted to a regular function there are still
only a few cryptographic systems which can be compiled,
distributed and readied for implementation in less than a
year. In order to fulfill the personnel needs of this
crypto-research team, the costs were calculated and a request
for appropriations was submitted to the Diet, for inclusion
in the 1929 budget. We received the approval but the funds
were subsequently deleted by the implementations to conform
with the austerity policy. Every year, subsequently, e have
requested these funds, but they have yet to materialize. We
now feel more strongly than ever that the research teams
complement be filled without a day's delay.
As long as a "code" system is used, regardless of how
the plain text is converted it is vulnerable to scientific
attack if enough material and time is made available. This
asaution is undergoing study at the present time by our
crypto-research team. It is also studying the point of
maximum complexity of cryptography which is *ill the realm
of practicability from the viewpoint of it being operable
by personnel in the Ministry and in our overseas installations.
The study finds that this optimum is already approximated by
9
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the systems currently in use. Practical considerations also
places a limitation on the frequency with which changes can
be implemented. With the team at full complement the
prevention of cryptaualytic success during the effective
period of a cryptographic system may be assured, but there
cap be no guarantee that such success will not be achieved at
SOMQ subsequent time.. This is a problem common to all
countries.
An infinitely changing cipher machine is the only means
which can absolutely withstand scientific attacks. During
he London Naval Conference, we used a cipher machine built
by our Navy. Not only was this machine very unsatisfactory
mechanically but was rather costly. Our crypto-research
earn purchased a "Kryhan type which is the most modern
manually operated cipher *aching of German manufacture, and
is studying its practicality. This machine is very similar
in construction to the Navy's and with some modifications,
could be made into a practical device. However, a vast sum of
money would be required to simultaneously activate its use by
all of ur official overseas establishments. For that reason
we cannot but feel that in these tines of austerity, there is
very little hope of realization.
10
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the same time it is insult able that we Shall reach
the end of line cryptographically, if we remain dependent
on a "code" system. It was this bleak outlook which lead
to the research into mechanization and which motivated the
purchase of one "Kr ha" type electromatic cipher machine
mentioned above.
As described in considerable detail above, this Ministry
is doing its utmost in behalf of cryptographic security.
It is time that Yardley claims that he was successful in
completely breaking one of our cryptographic systems (Incl.-
dentally, one which was far more elementary than the oneo
currently in use). From preliminary investigations made of
the material purchased from him (there was so much of this
material that we have been unable to complete our studies
as yet), it appears that those cryptographic systems which
were used sparingly did not yield to his cryptanalysis and
that that which did yield as one which was used with great
frequency- and which was in effect over a long period of time
and of a simpler character than the one now in effect (See
attached table). There is, moreover, $ame room for doubts as
to whether the cryptanalytic success occurred during the
effective life of the system and whether success was achieved
solely through ascientific approach.
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3. Steps which Should be Taken Domestically With
Pertinence to Yardley's Publication
Zn the event that this Ministry is pressed for answers
from the legislature or others, some statement along the
following lines may be appropriates
Although there is no means of ascertaining the
extent to Which the published claims of Yardley is valid,
it is true that given sufficient time and material,crypto-
graphy of even considerable complexity is vulnerable to
scientific attacks. Since it must be assumed that all
countries are spending much effort in attempting to solve other
nation's cryptography, we cannot give positive assurances that
ours is invulnerable. The Foreign Ministry, however, is making
every effort to keep our communications secure."
in the event that Yardley confesses that he sold secrets
to us for $71000, the following could be offered as an
explanation:
"Yardley was the former Chief of the cryptanalytic
sec the United States War Department Intelligence Bureau.
When such a person offered to sell us material pertaining to
the solution of our cryptography, we found it difficult to turn
it down. We paid him the above sum to enable us to determine
whether he did, in fact, break our cryptographic systems."
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3trtet17 o,nfldent.al f4r the Ab*$*a1T ouXy.
On Noveabor 30th the Jai-,anuse addressed a five-
point prupussi for a telpscsrer7
prsjudioial to ;span's efforts
and ta restore allaaaroial relations. The
lilted States to as and required amount of pet-
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ILLEGIB
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under oonsiderstion ut twit time
period of three months, during which time conviir-
mations would oontinue towurd the working out of
a comprehensive peaceful
would oonfer at the request of either to determine
whether the extension of the aodus vivendi wee
-44stlfied iry -tte prospeat-e-of :sesta ACitiiiimmil
01110 $IM
an i en
undertaking by Japan to eitadra its f's. from
bowthera ?Tenon Indo*-Cnina (and) i1414 %hesein
Neramma inde-Cnina to Vie number there on Jily
Mkt 1941, Wile number should not be Napa% to
ty enditIapan should not in air same send
1014 SI 41.'_"*,
LEGIB
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4UMM61.17.
The drert sodut vivendi vas eband,ned
and wonosalld fr.ate Japnaties.
Aller careful o.)nsiderstl,n of eU. t*otri in
the situation within ths rAtited tItSI and in the
goners world situation, inoludint; the resntIon and
reolloo of the :roveraments atritionod 'bore, it sae
dooldod that is mould droi the draft sodas vivendi,
shish so tad ander ocsasidorstioa. .at troll Aladua
inroad/ ass sot hastoll to the Zaps's**, sad the fast
that this Governess% had eosSidorol s swiss vivo-s-
al swat nentioned to Ihsa.
Anforest pes is ewers..
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ILLEGIB
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" ??,w1r:trry
'4P80B01676R001600030011-2
4 December 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Proposed Employment of Herbert 0.
Yardley by OSS
1. With regard to the footnote in the Farago book The Broken
Seal which states that Yardley "would have been hired by Colonel William J.
Donovan for the Office of Strategic Services but Mr. Stimson vetoed his
employment ? ", a search of our OSS Archives reveals that this possibility
was brought to Donovan's attention.
2. On 18 December [1941?], Colonel Donovan received a letter
requesting that he interview Yardley. The letter to Donovan (which isnot in
the files) presumably was from Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, for it enclosed a
letter to Mrs. Roosevelt from George Bye who was the literary agent for
both Yardley and Mrs. Roosevelt. The matter was apparently referred to
Ambassador Wiley of the Donovan staff and there was apparently some cor-
respondence from the War Department which now seems to be missing.
In any event, toward the end of December [19417], Mrs. Roosevelt was
advised that there was no job for Yardley.
3. In April 1942, the subject of OSS employment seems to have
been raised again. There is a memorandum, dated 11 April 1942, in the
ass security file on Yardley signed by Ellery C. Huntington, one of General
Donovan's senior staff officers, in which Huntington notes of Major Yardley
that he "hardly needs a check or introduction" and a further statement that
"do not need to check," It was further noted in the file on Yardley that he
had worked for the British, Canadian and Chinese governments. There is
also an undated form in the file on Yardley stating "Security approved."
There is no indication of an investigation and no personal history statement.
The file also notes that at the time Yardley owned and operated a restaurant-
cafeteria and there was a subsequent notation that he ultimately joined the
Enforcement Office of the Food Division of CPA in Washington.
4. It is unclear what may have transpired between Mr. Huntington's
memorandum of 11 April and 28 April 1942. On the latter date,Colonel
Donovan apparently closed off the Yardley matter once and for all with a
memorandum to Colonel Preston Goodfellow of his staff. A copy of Colonel
Donovan's memorandum is attached.
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5. It is interesting to note that Yardley's obituaries (he died on
7 August 1958) make no reference to his employment by the Japanese,
although they do refer to undated employment with the Chinese and
Canadians. There is also no mention of Yardley's Japanese employment
in the column on Yardley in the Washington Times-Herald of 27 February
1945. This column is also referred to in Farago's footnote in The Broken
Seal mentioned in paragraph 1. above.
Walter Pforzheitmer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
Enclosures
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!pri1 28, 1942
TO: Colonel Goodf 110.
" M: -Colonel Donovarl
Detr
You. arc thine3._decent about uvoryth,lng-
tha.t you are ept to make the?rilistke of tiunin
krP-Jryone ix the ie Ar Yardley, he
may be ti 6 most honest and Competent mm -in the:
wor16,.. but his "'Black Chamber oula-tst.-doubt.
?t Let, on his discretion to oVery''government
rj l,For thA. re4son, we raustnot
(u)city.
About your friend. Major. Grumba.chl. he h
Rcted. in such a. way as Iiroula 3oprd1ze'-:.
our rLitions Y.,ith the Navy. Thi,CLnnOt.-136...-PlOase??
o not. crploy him in any way on on?.behalf.
mtv,t correct at once any imprecision in the--.NaVy
J.:re employing Y-dley.??or-tht,It'Te.. &re..tr-Y
.:.,et..up-;,:f:omethin?in.. Conflict vit:LI thom..*This?
.-.)articularly important .because -of
.
Lu
bc;ween the Army and -NavyAYQu- EcnoW.the.
? cret rcee I mean). .It rry e11bR th.4
oZie will be called -upon to..7?Jorlio?a8.a.kind:::
wediator. We must not haVe..anythin6 in our ?
c-ithr..Lepartment? th.4 would
our usfulness in any e*ergency 1ik.that'.
N-0-T-I-C-E !is
The attached prin4 wve for your
1-dor/nation, and should be destroyed
upon completion of your case.
Oincerely,
Donovan
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APITC.1 c' kiILT
By JOHN O'DONNELL
. .
F YOU think back to 1931 you may recall the name
of Herbert a A'?4,4,1zy,a fnajor in World War One,
AVM-) 1.1,e.1 1.10 ea. Moi e 1, .. 11 pa8;.drig ..l ame by setting
our distinguished State Department on its ear by print,
sag a volume of 'factual reports, entitled "The American Black
Chamber."
The American black chamber was the . exciting name for the
hideaway locations (one in the State, Wax' and Navy building
In Wasilington, two other ..;eii-reli ?Hi-a:Ts lxi Manhattan) in which
Yardley and his assistants decoded the diplomatic messages of
foreign governments, opened letters, or -forged or replaced broken,
diplomatic seals and in general tapped in time of war and, peace
(that was the catch) the private communications passing between
foreign governments and their Official :representatives here or
even abroad.
Back in World War I, Yardley, a code clerk in the State Depart-
ment, was grabbed ' by the 'War Department., given a commission
as a captain and ordered to create the outfit which tapped and
decoded the German messages on the Western Front. ?
? After World War I he was barb hi the State 1".epartment and
doing a peacetime job that reads as excitingly as Poe's "Gold Bug."
Most importantly, before and during the Washington Disarina-
, merit Conference of 1.921 when trainer Chief: Justice Cbarlei
/ Evans Hughes was Harding's Secretary of State, Yardley 'And
his black chamber crew broke the Jap code, I-ntercepted. the rues
sages passing.between Tokyo arid the Jap com.mission at the con-
ference and enabled Secretary Hughes to read over his morning
1 coffee the instructions which his diplomatic toes had received
! from their bosses the night before, ?
IAll of which was very helpful to we Americans at the' moment.
1 rtsittEN, with the election of 1:he Hoover '.A.dministration, present
i --A- Secretary of .War Henry L. Stimson entert'd the Cabinet as
1 Secretary of State, This was in `29.
i
He discovered that We were still engaged lEl tapping the niessag,es
1 of our so-called friendly associates in this family of nations. (The
secret budget called for an appropriation of $100,000 a year, split
1 between the State and 'War departments.)
,
,
IFrom the outbreak of World War f. Iii '17 to the day Stinison
abolished the black chamber hi T9 it had deciiihered. 45,009 code
1
messages Of foreign gaver"wnts' ftie:""s amid
ex'xcmies*
'During the piping days at peace in 1.021, it sent 0,009 deciphered
messages from thO New York hideaway laboratories to the U., S.
delegation at the' Washington Disarmament Conference. -
Once washed out in '29 on the basis that it wasn't cricket, the
secret, bureau was never re-established, :ft it had been, -there might
never have been a Pearl Harbor.
If the skill and training had been passed on. American arms
might never have telt the December reverse on the Belgian bulge,
which former Chief of Staff Gen. Pe.y-ton March blamed directly
on our inability to learn what the. enemy was doing or planning.
-TUST before Pearl Harbor we learned that the famed Yardley
41 was here in 'Washington. We looked him up. He was running
a restaurant, and didn't want to talk about the old code work.
All we knew was that he had been us China, setting up Chiang
Kai-shek's code organization and had been, called in because of
his former ability to break down the earlier dap codes In our
Later, we learned that :Brig, Gen. William "Wild Bill" 'Donovan
xotcd birn in his undercover., husii.hosh strategic services,xxx
then came the report from Inc undergmuldll'iat Secretary Stimson
, had heard of it, recalled the black chamber of 10 years ago and
turned thumbs down
1101190 the vrayr.,k.11oa.oi -N61riBe.sixii Xxiuilk,i xbhei the
Dominlmo's military in their establishment of a cods bureau. Back
cante the story to the Citnitiol ilott the British hiLondon had been
tipped oft' by Stitusen that 'Yardley was .persona. 4.9r1
SO ar aZ we've bekm. a7:le 71,arn from associates in tlic old
black chamber, neit12.7 the C.,iiadian3 rior the Chinest wasited to
part with Yardley. incidenta,ily, after his job of tripping up the
,7aps at the Washington conference he had been given a
tingulshed Service Medal 'hy_ the late Secretary of War Weeks,
'who wink-MT?when he: Teat; the citation, which x1.iplematXcally
made no reference to the work done (in the JaP dhspatehes from
Tokyo to then' representatives In Washington."
She we set out. on a search to discover what the most famed
code expert has been doing of late.
(We discovered Major YardleY... He's ari...enforeimitgit ?Meer xxi
I e- the rrieid"-ilitilsidn-at?OPA'S'INkishin4ett?huwiii,vtl..cs,..,..,.1,1:Pent1S'his
,hiemate tiMe up .P1n1:2
d t
1. Ayli g\e.h eig b.t .,0 re3Inethi ng . ot herd
ro,
D Y () II EMBE ?
(.3 R. A .nr517.Y
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--4.
It 8 F F R161WKIEHEERF344
ffir? -il. 1;4.? ,;t.?, :,; ., :14.. - cli 6000:1
p row elf
I UNCLASSIFIED
I CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DDCI: attn
2
3
4
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
t.
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COP4M ENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Jerry: Returned herewith are:
a) 28 nov 67 ltr to DDCI from Mr. Fred C.
Woodrough, Jr., together with atts.
b) Walter Pforzheither's memos to DDCI
dtd 4 and 12 dec 67, and atts.
c) Brief memo outlining action taken by
on above.
Bertha
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
0/CC/
16:6RsE0c0a6EUTUC
16 an 68
Vlipr UVefbrarAIMpmfi 2CO3/
I 3/gs. FARFATO
FORM NO. 037 Use previous editions
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