NRO EXCOM MEETING AT 11 A.M., 29 SEPTEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400050025-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 29, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For
Release 2006/11/08: CIA-RDP80B01676 00140005002,5,qGIB..
29 September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: NRO ExCorn Meeting at 11 a. in. , 29 September
1. Present were Secretary Vance, General Carter, Dr.
Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.
2. The meeting opened by Mr. ' Vance stating that he had
several things he wished to take up with me. It was apparent
that he had been well briefed prior to the meeting and had copious
notes from which he spoke. Action: For future guidance, this is
a technique that might well be adopted by DCI and DDCI. Also,
since McMillan appears to be thoroughly witting of most of the
activities on the West Coast and Fubini has no hesitancy about
speaking authoritatively on any subject, I consider it advisable
to have the DCI backstopped by Mr. Bross and Dr. Wheelon from
here on out. Additionally, I consider it highly desirable, as a
result of the attacks placed upon me today, that we have an
advance agenda if we're going to discuss matters substantively.
3. Mr. Vance stated that he had been briefed on a con-
tracting problem at the Advanced Projects Area for Lockheed
(Sunnyvale, which he called 'The Little Skunkworks"). He stated
that there appeared to be three contracts in question -- one on
the installation of the Stellar Index Camera, one on systems
integration with Lockheed, and one amounting to a piddling
$25, ODD for some pin-pullers or other incidental hardware. He
stated it was his understanding that our Security Officer had
instructed Lockheed not to sign any of these contracts and that
as a result thereof, Lockheed did not sign the contracts. Dr.
McMillan stated that as soon as he had found out there was a
security problem, he had convened a panel including CIA mem-
bership and that the security panel had now obtained full agree-
ment as to the procedures that should be followed at Lockheed.
Vance urged, therefore, that we now lift our ban on signing the
contracts.
NF_ revie(s) completed.
Copy #2
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IvioplICN
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4.. I stated that I had not seen the panel, report on security
but that if CIA members had agreed to it and as soon as I had
checked it out in the Agency with my own Security people and if
it gave me no problem, I was prepared to accept it. I stated,
however, that this was not prejudging the merits of raving Greer
complete the three contracts in questioA. Mcbdillan said he took
a dim view of holding up projects on the basis of security when in
fact security was not the matter questioned. I stated. clearly for
the record that, so far as I knew, the Director had not authorized
25X1 any changes of any kind in the CORONA Program and that it had
been agreed that no changes would be made without !)CI approval.
This incl dad as well as security procedures. I further
25X1 stated the had t e from Lockheed and I
had reiterated this s foment* onfirmed that this was
his understanding and this was the basis for a letter he had fur-
25X1 rushed McMillan. I stated that I had called McMillan and told
him of my conversation with and that there should have
25X1 been no misunderetandiu c n then quoted froze a letter
Greer had t tending to substantiate McMillan's
25X1' claim tha our contracting officer, had instructed
not to s g ts. I stated I had not seen the
25X1 I Metter bu structiona to Lockheed were
uJG Lea gee; d. copy ox sne letter. McMillan said he would
furnish me a copy. Mc an then said that it was his clear
understanding that taking Aerospace on in the CORONA Program
included adjustment of the systems integration and systems
engineering contract with Lockheed so that it would be an Air
Force contract. He stated that it involved nineteen people out of
Lockheed and that the contract had reviously been Air Force's
but last year had been handled bC All he wanted to do now
was to get it back under Air Force ausp ces. McMillan. said this
was part and parcel of the Aerospace function and he could not
operate without it under Air Force auspices. I stated that I had
no intention of authorizing this kind of contract without Mr.
McCone's approval and, further, I had no intention of establishing
the kind of CIA backstopping and input that had previously been
agreed on the.West Coast under these circumstances. I stated
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ILLEGIB
that participation in the CORONA Program was a two-way street
and required not only clean intent but cooperation as well. I
stated that I had no intention whatsoever of building up a CIA
asset on the West Coast to leave it out in left field and that it was
my clear understanding that we had agreed to consolidate the CIA
assets under have a definite and clear-cut input
into the CORONA Program across the boards and, specifically,
to cover the entire payload which was CIA responsibility. Fubini
interjected at this point to indicate that I was welching on a prior
agreement- and that the understanding was purely to send one or
two men to the West Coast to work with Greer's organization to
learn more about the program and increase their competence.
I refused to accept the word "welching" and required him to with-
draw it which he did threefold. McMillan stated that it was his
under standing that I was to develop a plan by which
and others would go to the West Coast. I stated tha F_1_T3 c su
plan but the Director had left in such a hurry on his trip that I
had not had time to clear it with hire; that as soon as he returned
I would develop the full particulars and inform the Executive
Committee of what we plan to do. I reiterated that I was not pre-
pared to establish a group on the West Coast to "watch the parade
go by, " but that they would have full responsibility for all security
and all contracting presently handled by CIA and, in addition, they
would sign off on and deliver a complete payload to the agency
responsible for tying it into the booster and firing it. In addition,
they would follow along throughout the entire process to ensure that
the marriage was properly consummated. I stated that I was not
reneging on Mr. McCone's prior reluctant acceptance of the majority
view to have Aerospace in the act although we were still of the opinion
it was a bad idea. I stated that I was not agreeing to the Stellar Index
Camera changes at this time because my main concern was the col-
lection of intelligence and that we had had a remarkably successful
CORONA Program throughout the months since May. It was my under-
standing that the changes proposed for SIC would probably not be
effective until late next spring and that they were designed primarily
to augment a military mapping program. Fubini confirmed this
and I said I was not prepared to take the risk of messing up a
good intelligence collection program until our technicians and
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experts had fully signed off on the now proposals as being totally
feasible and in keeping with intelligence collection. McMillan
said he had written In June of 1963 to Greer and Ledford, telling
them to get on board this program and work jointly on it and that
CIA had had every opportunity to be a full participant in the new
program but had been uncooperative throughout.. I reiterated
my position that I was not here to indulge in vituperation and
histrionics but I was here to protect the interests of the intel-
ligence community and I was not convinced that this type of
activity would so protect it.
5. Vance asked me to take a look at the panel report on
security handling of the contracts at the Advanced Projects Area
and if this gave me no problem., to see if I could not go along
with the systems sfer to Lockheed as an Air Force
contract and the __]hardware contract. I told him if
it did not involve the payload (which nobody seemed to know), I
would discuss it with my people and see if it gave us a problem.
McMillan said It was his belief that it did not in any way involve
the payload but was purely the systems engineering of tying the
payload into the booster. However, he was not sure of this and
would have. to check it himself. As can be seen from the fore-
going, the discussion was relatively inconclusive and I made no
commitments except to look at the problems in the light of this
discussion. Action: DD/S&T to advise me so that we can
thoroughly clue in Mr. McCone prior to any other meetings.
Also, advise me as to any agreements we have made on security
handling in connection with the panel report mentioned by Dr.
McMillan. Also, to get the copy of the Lockheed letter and
analyze it as to facts. It is perfectly apparent that NRG and
McMillan are keeping very close book on all of the CIA actions
and responses to their requests.
 Approved For. Release 2006/11/08: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400050025-7
rogram. DDIS&T to prepare briefing memo for DCI
0
cleared in advance by Vance. I did not read it at the table but
merely took the envelope. Action: DDCI to talk to DCI. This
again throws in the gauntlet on how DCI intends to operate the
7. Dr. McMillan handed me an envelope a opy
of the memorandum to Dr. Wheelon reference I
asked if I should read it now or take it back me. Mr. Vance
said it did not make any difference since it had already gone.
This indicates clearly that McMillan's memo to Wheelon was
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intended to discredit the capabilities of the
I
stated that the A. enc v was exerting every possible a
ort to
xnd
a 'means o
land
25X1
with particular reference to the memo signed by Mr. McCune
directing DDIS&T in specific detail how they were to conduct
the program.
8. 1 distributed copies of the 28 September report on
SKYLARK status. There was.no particular discussion except
Fubini pointed out on the page of "Decisions" that items 3 and 10
mi ht be construed as indicating that authority for th
had been obtained whereas in c 25X1
none exists told em at a COMOR estimate had indicated
the necessity of making from three to six flights monthly through-
out the next calendar year to get the same general coverage of
the 'U-2*s as required by USIB, and that this would total 53 suc-
cessful flights from November through October. I also told them
that our vulnerability studies indicated that the OXCART would
have increasing vulnerability over Cuba as flights increased. I
did not get into details.
9. 1 briefed Secretary Vance on the current status of our .
nd he was intensely interested. .McMillan and
Fubini winked at each other and Fubini made several comments 25X1
that this was one which pro s cons. era a success. ther,
that we were continuing biological studies and many exotic,
clandestine activities with a view to getting the basic intelligence
needed. Mr. Vance indicated his thorough support of this and
any other effort we were putting into this subject.
10. During the conference Mr. Sylvester asked Mr. Vance
for permission to send Pentagon accredited foreign press to the
demonstration at Edwards. After some discussion, he and I
agreed this would be all right.
 /s/
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
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MSC:blp
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
Copy 2 - DDCI
Copy 3 - DD/ S& T
Copy 4 - D/NIPE
Copy 5 - ER via Executive Director
Copy 6 - EA/DDCI
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