CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR PROJECT OXCART

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400010013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 8, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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M.RItORANAUty FOR: Dr. r+ne t'way lvMcN illan
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
SUBJECT ; Contingency Planning for Project OXCART
testing. Were this course of action to be continued without suitable
contingency planning, we would find ourselves in the late spring of
1964 with no suitable alternative to what amounts to do facto sur-
1. I am informed that the Director, Program L, is in ovin
ahead to formulate plans calling for the delivery of the first Air
Force OXCART version to . des Air Force Base,, California,
where it and successive prototypes are planned for initial flight
facing, when the first Air Force aircraft shows up at Edwards.
2. Accordingly, I request that you instruct the Director,
Program., to consult and confer with the Director, Program B,
toward developing in the next few weeks a contingency plan which
would permit the first prototype of the Air Force version of OXCART
to be accon modated where OXCART flight testing is cur-
rently in process. I understand that meaningful preliminary flight
testing of the USAF aircraft can be conducted I during the
period from roughly 1 August through 31 December 1964. This time
interval may be critical when viewed against the prospective oper-
ational readiness data of OXCART, now estimated for mid-summer
of 1964.
3. 1 have directed Colonel Ledford, as Director of 0,A, to
ensure that appropriate facilities of the Agency are made available
for the development of this plan, and to keep the Director periodically
informed.
NRO review(s) completed.
Marshall . Carter
,LAauterant General. USA
Deputy Director
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Cop
DA A) / USA / JA C unning ham: tea, cm
Rewritten: DDCI:MSC:bec (8 January 64)
Retyped for minor change at request of DD/SIFT: O/DDCI:blp (13 Jan)
Distribution:
Copies I and 2 - Dr. McM, Wan
Copy 3 - DDCI
Copy 4 - ER via ExDir
Copy 5 - U/DCI (Elder)
Copy 6 - D.U/S&T
Copy 7 - AID/2A
Copy 8 - AD/USA
(Concurred in as redrafted by ODCI on 8 January by Colonel Ledford
for USA. and Mr. Blake for DD/S&T; also routed through ExDir. )
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Top SEC 1ET
27 DEC 196
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: OXCART Surfacing as it Relates to On-coming
R-12 Delivery
1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the ADCI; this
action is contained in paragraph 5.
2. At the recent R-12 mockup conference in Los Angeles, attended
by some 116 Air Force Officers and contractor representatives,
Col. Leo P. Geary, USAF, AFIGO-S, in his introductory remarks to the
group noted that the Air Force was actively planning to flight test the
first R-12 aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base beginning in late July or
early August 1964. He was quoted as saying that the Air Force did not
intend to participate in any form of contingency planning, or looking toward
the initial flight testing of these prototype R-12 aircraft at any place
except at Edwards AFB.
3. When I challenged Col. Geary on his alleged statement, he said that
Air Force planning for the R-12 at Edwards was moving at full speed, and
would continue to do so unless the Director of Central Intelligence, whom
he agreed was responsible for the over-all security of the OXCART Pro-
gram, requested that a plan be developed to accommodate the initial R-12s
in the interests of the security of the clandestine reconnaissance
4. The fact is that while we have discussed informally with Col. Geary,
and throu h'him with DNRO, the possibility of moving the first three or four
R-12s to purchase additional secure time until approximately
1 January 1965, no formal action has been initiated in the Director's name.
Kelly Johnson tells me that from his standpoint at Lockheed there is no
problem in doing this and that he can conduct meaningful flight testing on
the R-12 in this interval. We do need time to plan for hangar, shop, and
living quarters for the additional people who would be sent if this
YOF SECRET
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5. To the best of my recollection we have been working, in one way
or another, in surfacing OXCART for almost three years. The latest
White House action postponing additional consideration of this subject until
mid-February, is but one in a series of such decisions which have had the
net effect of permitting us to continue in a secure fashion but without
really solving the basic issue of whether the cork should come out of the
bottle. I am worried lest we be placing too much reliance upon the in-
evitability of surfacing prior to July 1964, and I think we should, at a
minimum, request the Air Force to work with us on a contingency plan
such as that to which I have alluded. I think that such a request can
possibly be made within the framework of the NRO relationship and, if
you agree, I would ask that you sign the attached memorandum to
Dr. McMillan.
~~JAME;b A. JX.
Acting Assistant Lector
(Special Activities)
cc: DD/S&T
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14 January 1,964
RANDLWI FOR: Deputy Director
1. Confirming oral instructions. the JCI c:rsirea a
thorough study of the extent of Cuban involvement (to include
Cuban-trained Panamanian.) as well a& recognized Con, -
muMt involvement in the difficulties in Panama. There have
been conflicting reports along the line that there was no such
involvement coupled with reports listing known Con n unists
by name, indicating that tray were incitin the crowds.
Several reports indicate that had been phoning
Cuba daily. Some reports indicate that the National Guard
had picked up Communist agitators and others that they hard.
not; some reports that such agitators had been released and
other reports that students had been released, but not agitators.
2. Please pull together the most factual reports you
can on exactly what the situation was in this regard.
Marshall i. Carter
Lieutenant General, tISA
Deputy Director
Ijistribution:
Original - DD/P
I - DD/I
L-V- L)JCI
I - Executive Director
I - fA/DCI
I - ER
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13 January 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
1. I note in the minutes of the Morning Meeting of
9 January that the President may have a large dinner with
key Congressional leaders and their wives, and that following
the dinner the men will go downstairs for these briefings:
DCI -- Ten-minute briefing on Soviet economy;
Secretary of Defense will brief on Soviet
military matters;
Secretary Rusk will brief on the world situation.
2. I would urge you to insist that you cover the total
water front on intelligence matters. You are the Director of
Central Intelligence and are responsible for the final analysis
on all three of the foregoing subjects. If you allow the precedent
to be established that McNamara will brief on foreign military
matters and Rusk on foreign "political matters, " you run the
risk of having the Agency eventually relegated to economic
intelligence only.
3. It is entirely appropriate for McNamara to brief
on U. S. military matters and also entirely appropriate for
Secretary Rusk to brief.on U_5. political matters and political
positions around the world but if there is to be an intelligence
briefing, regardless of subject, I feel that you, and you alone,
should do it.
Marshall Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
Distribution:
Original - DCI
1 - ExDir
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 FORM NO.
2-61
L A ~~J ~bp(IIp~Cf#~i+~I~III 1UU1
UNCLASSIFIED CIMIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE INITIALS
I
DCI d X
Q c/
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
IS E3i IT
EYES ONLY'
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
DDCI
]
L
rl F
r "1111 1 KR17/ R I~ nihnni
A AM2
jj
237
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13 January 1964
1. On 6 January Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI called
me regarding my statement at the USIB meeting on 3 January
to the effect that the intelligence community does not have a
smooth way of handling a defector. Mr. Sullivan stated that
the way the community goes about handling things of this nature
is "pretty sloppy, " and suggested that I get something into
motion that would result in setting up the proper mechanics.
2. I told Mr. Sullivan that we are trying to do this, but
exactly what the procedure will be, I did not know. I said that
it should probably remain in USIB since so many people are
involved, but that some agency should have primary respon-
sibility -- probably the FBI. I stated that this whole problem
should be given to the USIB Defector Committee to see if they
can come up with a better system. Mr. Sullivan referred to
the recent case of the Russian student and said that it was
sloppily handled for the simple reason that the mechanics have
not been worked out.
3. In closing, I stated that I thought CIA and the FBI have
the primary concern for such matters; that naturally INS and
the Department of State must get into them, but if it's an intel-
ligence problem, the Agency and the Bureau have the primary
concern. Mr. Sullivan and I agreed to keep in touch on this
problem.
MSC:blp
Distribution:
griginal - DDCI
1 - DD/P
1 -ER
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
$ ;;CI D &ROOi40?O Yd0 43=4
oYedfF~F2~I ases/q,7t Man
,r
?`~p
 VOU L S ~1~ 3 D0100
? UNCLASSIFIED C IDENTIAL SECRET
j I
_
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Deputy Director (Plans)
2
Mr. Knoche
3
STAT
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Dick:
The attached relates to the matter of the
Russian student at Harvard. DDCI
requests your advice as to what, if any,
follow-up to this is advisable.
STA
H. Knoche
1to2:
The problem of refining procedures for handling
defectozs in the United States has already been
raised by Mr. Mason at a meeting of the Inter-
-
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER OVE-7
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHON
DATE
EA/DDCI 7D6011
1/14/64
ed or bh%b'>
FORM NO.
2-61
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V a ~i, DT,.
(-Ot77
3 January 1964
MEM ORANDUM. FOR Tl-14 RECORD
1. On 6. January Mr. ` illisew Sullivan of the FBI called
regarding my statement at the USIB meeting on 3 January
to the effect that the intelligence community does not have a
smooth way of handling a defector. Mr. Sullivan stated that
the way the community goes about handling things of this nature
is "pretty sloppy, " and suggested that I get something into
motion that would result in setting up the proper mechanics.
2. 1 told Mr. Sullivan that we are trying to do this, but
exactly what the procedure will be, I did not know. I said that
it should probably remain in USIB since so many people are
involved, but that some agency should have primary respon-
sibility -- probably the FBI. I stated that this whole problem
should be given to the USIB Defector Committee to see if they
can come up with a better system. Ivir. Sullivan referred to
the recent case of the Russian student and said that it was
sloppily handled for the simple reason that the mechanics have
not been worked out.
3. In closing, I stated that I thought CIA and the FBI have
the primary concern for such matters; that naturally INS and
the Department of State must got into them, but if it's an intel-
ligence problem, the Agency and the Bureau have the primary
concern. Mr. Sullivan and I agreed to keep in touch on this
problem.
/s/ MSC
Marshall 3. Carter
Lieutenant General, ';3A
Deputy Director
Distribution:
Original .. DDCI
1 - DD/P
1-ER
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I January 1964
Z ORAND"i ''ORi cutive iArector
1. The attached n-Aei orandum for the Deputy Director
for Plans from the Chief, Technical Services Division, was
passed on by me by xr,y coar,ment on the routing and record
sheet.
2. It now appears that I n Asinterprated the intent of
paragraph 4 of the basic menr orandum.either that or para
graph 4 is being misinterpreted by #SD.
3. The Scientific civisory Board to the Director of
Central intelligence, as headed by Dr. Augustus .Kinzel, has
been and will continue to be made privy and witting of all
technical and scientific activities, both research and develop-
ment, conducted in any and all eto poneents of the Agency. This
does not in any way imply that that Board has direct operational
responsibility near need necessarily to know of specific opera-
especially in the Clandestine Services.
4. The scientific panels established by the Scientific
Advisory Board are designed specifically to provide the best
scientific capabilities in the peculiar fields for which the panel
is established and, equally as important, to provide the security
con partznentation required to litrmit the panel's "priviness and
wittingness" to that particular lisnited field for which the panel
was established. This, then, m earls that the panel will be
informed in specific detail of scientific and technical require-
ments, development a.,d research. in its own limited field but
will not, repeat not, have access to other fields purely because
:it is a panel of the main board. Likewise, as with the Scientific
Advisory Board. I see no need for involving the panels in the
details of specific operations.
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not related to covert instruxnentatie a, such as OXCAART.
CORONA, human behavior, hype ,am, uocun!Lentation, use
drugs, etc.
5. Accordingly, to take a specific case it, point, the
Covert Instrumentation Panel of the scientific Advisory Board
will be briefed on the totality of those '3: SD and other Agency.
programs involved in or having a airect bearing on covert
instrut ntation. They should not be briefed on any program*
6. It was in the foregoing light that t approved the paper
under the impression that the first sentence of paragraph 4
transferred to DD/S&T the responsibility for any and all panels
(such as the deFioreez Board) which had previously been sponsored
by `rsD. I also assumed that the last sentence addressed itself
in the main to avoiding the totality briefing of a panel assembled
for a specific, limited problem. While I see no objection to TSI,)
or any other component of the Agency utilizing any of our numerous
consultants as individuals on specs c problem a, such utilization
will not relieve the component of We responsibility for keeping
specific panels fully informed of activities in their specific field.
7. If there is any problem in the foregoing that is not
explicitly clear, please take it up with me next week. I have
already spoken along these general lines to Colo el Diller of
LUJ/S&T but have not had the opportunity to talk to
or Mr. Heelnn s.
MSC:blp
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 -DCI
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