WHITE HOUSE MEETING ON LAOS, 8 JUNE 1964, 3:15 PM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300110001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

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TS# 174768
8 June 1984
EMORANDUM R THE RECORD
SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Laos,
8 June 11)84, 3:15 pm
Present:
The President (after the first hour)
Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler,
Mr. McNaughton, Department of Defense
Governor Harriman, Mr. U. A. Johnson,
4r. T. Bundy, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. ',fanning, State
Mr. Forrestal, White Rouse
General Carter, Mr. Colby, Mr. Cooper
1. Secretary McNamara indicated that the purpose of
the meeting was to consider Ambassador Unger's telegram
(attached) and to reconsider the action that was contemplated
for tonight.
2. Governor Harriman pointed out that he had just
reached Secretary Rusk by phone and that the Secretary, con-
sidering all the pros and cons, felt that, on balance, the
action should proceed. Harriman acknowledged that the
Secretary felt somewhat less sanguine about the action than
he, Johnson, and Bundy did, although they too felt that there
were many risks involved. The big question in Rusk's mind
appeared to be whether we would lose Souvanna. Secretary Rus1.
insisted the President see Unger's telegram before making
his decision.
. Secretary McNamara and Bundy pointed out that Unger's
views which were so strongly opposed to the action, were made
on the basis of an incomplete briefing and that Unger in fact
did not realize when he prepared the telegram that it was a
"one shot operation." Although Wier has been forwarded a
more complete description of the operation, he has not yet
had an opportunity to respond. It was pointed out also. that
Unger did not realize that no Napalm would be used.
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n went on to say that we must signal our
intent to Hanoi or the Polish conversations, the Seaborn
elks in Mewl or our own threats will be meaningless.
in response to a question as to the enact on Souvanna
Pboun& (a question which the President was to rats* very
emphatically alebeequeatlY)1 Merriman fiat that on balance
that it mould not.
In response to a suggestion made by lleigor that the
Laotian 7-2S's undertake the task of knocking out the AA
installations, McNamara said that it was absolutely in-
possible for Laotian pilots and 11.2's to do the Job.
0. laresponse to a question from General Carter about
what would happen if we lost ono or more planes on this
operation, Secretary McNamara said that we would "up the
military pressure." McNamara went on to say that if we
-nocted out the site but lost the plane, we would regard
it as a successful operation, or if we did not knock out
the site but did not lose a plane, we would settle for that.
4cNamare and the others felt that there was no point in
delaying the operation for 24 hours or more, "we won't
,;.now any more then than we know now.
7. General Carter pointed out that the action con-
templated noosed to be telescoping the scenario for both
Laos and South Vietnam and wondered whether this particular
action was worth changing our whole approach to both Laos
and South Vietnam. General Carter indicated he felt the
action should be stood down. Mr. McNamara and Governor
Harriman pointed out here that the Director had indicated
his approval for the operation.
b. Bundy and others said that the scenarios are
likely not to be affected; the pressures could be hold at
hay. In any case, it was felt that the scenarios for
both Laos and South Vietnam should allow for reactions to
military attacks and that we should respond with our own
military pressures. Forrestal &slum( 'hat would happen if
we stopped our low-lovol flights (as apparently is eontesp.
lated if this operation in "successful.). McNamara indicated
that although the low-level flights provide valuable coverage,
e could probably get alosgarabout them for as long as a month.
1. At this point the President entered the room.
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Mr. Harrimen auramarized the fact that we had received a message from
Ambeetsador Unger suggesting a suspension of escorts but that both State and
le0D recommend thet wo go ahead with the program for today. He commented
that there are risks in the sttuation but It is mar important to get the signal
to Hanoi of our &termination than the difficulties we might have in Vientiane.
He said that Secretary Rusk agreed with this recommendation althow,A be also
admitted that it was a close question. The President asked for a fun reading
of Ambassadoe UnEer's telegram commenting that it raised pave doubts in
his mind as to the course of action we are undertaking. Mr. McNamara inter-
posed that Mr. Unger did not realize that we were talking of a one -ohot operation
against the mei -aircraft battery and that it fits into our overall ecenario of
military steps to take vrith regard to Laos and South Vietnam. The President
indicated a desire for Ambassador Unger's reaction to the entire program.
Mr. Forrestal than read Vientiane Embassy telegram 1539. The
President asked whethex it Was or was not true that we had agreed with Souvanna
Mourne not to mention U.S. involvement in escort and actual shooting. k
developed in the conversation that Ambasaacior Unger may have had some kind
of understanding on this with Seterentia bat that this had not been approved by
Washington and that it was impractical: further that if no plane had been lost
we would not have admitted U.S. participation but that when one was shot
down the Department was compelled to go further. With respect to AriAbassador
Ungerts Emixtssy telegram 1562, Mr. Meni-Mara commented that we have
reduced our photo flights from ten to one per day, he also commented that the
action against the anti-aircraft battery is a coseshot proposition. The President
asked whether it would be feasible for the RLAF to take out this anti-aircraft.
Der. Meislanwa said that it was not feasible.
ii . The Preshiczat asked whether this action would not be a violation of
the Geneva Accords and launch UB on a new course. Mr. Harriman replied that
the Communists have not abided by the Accords since the start and that we
are merely trying to collect the information the ICC has been unable to obtain.
lie said that this information is Important as it can provide us warning of
possible Communist moves to the Mekong. He said that SOITVallaa Pa was
consulted on the photo overflights and fully accepted them and has been informed
of the beet that they are being escorted, without particular reaction from him.
Another reason for carrying out the action is that it is a edged to the North
Vietnamese .1tewing the limits of U.S. acceptance of their actions; unless this
is done the U.S. becomes non-credible in their view.
12. The President asked whether the gain we elq)ecteel in this attack w
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be. worth tAie Lt.S. violation. of the Goneva Accords. He also %motioned
vbethort Rutin bead to Somme, &MIMI'S (11411401ag. Time was some 1519-
Clin01011 Os to Whottior or tat it was an actual violation of the Accords.
tnarv iviciatzlars saytog thru Ivry sped orauttoat wad he nntdo that it
was not a real violation because of the previous Viat Minh violations..
? Mel4=ara stated that he disocgood with Antateatidor Meow 'a Cabler
silicle,s, the foilewhz W fie said the ICC had *died-and that the Rota Leo
4 nom! Awbu* the nen-Comutordst elements. He void thst Souvlama Lltaatea
lad ,svireved the rtei;uSna1c4allee arid 1atti7 of MS WAS OSCOZ3d altd that t
would possibly resat in their returning itity Are they might receive. smut!
that there vats ts) violation of the Accords or it loco Mare was a hitt difference
Women our and the Communist viobalons. He pobted me that the British had
been inforzaW of the escort and have riot objected.
:3. The Prostkei commented that in pe of all of this, in t eyeo
of the werki we wottki be violothig the Arxords !fecietamenttd thin
trettaed Mn mud wivether t did not trotible the othors. He Weg -
coned that we wade' lose our position vin-s-vlis the iworldand Yee LI'
also lose Somme Marra, Ho asiod what is the overall prognm: rater
ws take out the battery. then what do we tkt. Governor It trrimaa said ant
we would then eusixeld the reatinuaistanee but wee34 take the other n.ilitar,-
steps In soonstrio. The Preekket asked whether the attack would !low Ott
roectim. Governor Harriman Said that there was a chance that it
wade int that if the attack were not made thaw would be no progetz ate
mooting smway . Mr. McNamara than commentod that he was nit enterned
ahem provese at the mooting, voldch is not really expeaod, int how to movent
ftilethttr 44Warletaiiiilt
of the stuation in Lam Ha than commeatal that I don't
lutew What to do to stroagiten the situation there, hat he did balm Coat if cur
str4gdk ttert: not SiKtWit* letiartlitte deterioration would take place.
Iltsilreektess asked what would he done if the maw dataild knock
down smog ot toe planes attack:W. kir . 4lefkonara said that other rtkilintry
MOVOI ISICOng
the IWO Of OW Sersaart0 WOW be tab*. Governor Mrilman fat
that v,ge would he ritiebtig leen even should the Minh suotting mon out to Iv
a &lime than wo would by the likelihood ot a ilithot Lao Weems, "fltv Ikesident
asked Whether this action wookt bo "%Mei the loss of Scum= Mamma.
Govan= Harriaran adtsitted that? t would not, bat he Said that he die act think
that VAS, Vmuld Wpm.,lrMoMmara coymerted that Ambassador Unger
MO TY* trWaVt Mat We War talking Jitty abOtg a ow-atta ivaretton; 11141 Prastalst
ankce wthor &Wier actioati awl% likely develop in any /use..
e"' 7
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Mr. Formatal? requosted waitt
onty -fear home to get Arid*
larriraan Enid that there would
would weaken our naptiatim posture
T.Tt.,?A of the Canadian delegation or tile ICC teprocosdkagto
erint In the vest few days and that if we back off from a
aliculd not g,tve this tough statement.
latra
nutuvittAl
The I sident then weet out of the room for a mo
iMrt,r8;!I8d his come= a the problem of our acting weakly and
H e cited the President's "dangerous gime apeech, the instructions te tly;..?-
ans, and Georctury Rusk's comments in Now Delhi and japan.. Tit said
ne VMS prepitred t heast Asitt ar to act but that in this case we
conid not flu 4114%W with strong Matorminte and then have no plans to act.
" ornor liarrirram agreed with tide saying that he did um see what else wtt
CQUkI .b.
tea.= this Viola
ton lvt Tid
vme concerned
we had been
what
on the
ik it
Woos.
Namara
leered
elm!
t veil=
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' 4
. k being doer that the --dad= were abets to launchtn t1
o the contrary? the Breasident determined that they *mold gah-Ae
Bo cernmested that he still had seine doubts ht dot he
preset plan.
Attoobinenv:
z.L.IBTEL-1559 (Veen)
EMBTEL-1562 (Vetn)
kithara E. Gott
Chief, Far Etta Division
1V 7 ,6
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SECRET
Agenda for meeting June 5, 1964, at 6:00 P. M.
1. Next Steps in South Vietnam (TAB 1)
Z. Next steps in relation to Laos (TAB 2)
3. Outline information program (TAB 3)
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TOP SECRET
June 5, 19 64
MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION ON FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 6 PM
. LAOS
The enemy has two choices in Laos, each with a number of shadings.
First, he can at any time initiate substantial military action on the
ground aiming toward the Mekong Valley.
Second, he can try to keep what he has for the present and leave any
military initiative to us. This is our major problem.
I. Action if theenemy moves strongly toward the Mekong.
While we rate its likelihood very low (less than one in ten) we must
obviously be prepared for this first case -- substantial enemy pressure
toward the Mekong. In this case we believe that it would be necessary to
be prepared to move U. S. and other forces at once and to
be prepared, to occupy selected Laotian cities on the
left bank of the Mekong.
This of course would imply a still sharper de
facto partition of Laos, but since it would by definition be a response to
clear-cut Communist military aggression, we believe it would be inter-
nationally and nationally acceptable -- and indeed almost inevitable.
'-com- Our. recommendat ion is that contingency planning against this possibility 25X1
, ndation should be undertaken at once and we bel ieve that military NSC
1 discussions of this contingency will have a useful diplomatic effect in
- Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam.
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II. Politico-Military Scenario if there is no further major Communist
movement in Laos.
The second enemy choice poses us a more complicated problem. In
essence our objectives are three:
(1) not to let the situation develop so rapidly that we are faced
with a choice of humiliation or major military action before we are
ready to take decisions in the context of SEA and especially SVN.
(2) not to lose whatever prospect there is of maintaining a
Souvanna government and at least a nominal maintenance of the
political status quo in Laos.
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(3) not to permit a diplomatic "victory" for neutralism and
Communism which would reflect heavily against our position and
that of our friends in SVN and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
Our belief is that the following politico-military scenario is the best
available for these purposes. By an-)inimurn of force, and an absence
of direct hostile action unless they shoot first, it aims to show
(1) Our determination
(2) Our readiness for peace
(3) More specifically, our continued dedication to the Geneva
Accords and especially to the Souvanna government.
1. The Article IV consultations. These are proceeding in Vientiane
now and we should do our best to string them out and to wring out of
them a sharp picture of Pathet Lao aggression in the Plain of Jars.
The Article IV consultations are limited to our friends and include
neither French nor Communist representation. They have their value
and it should not be we who bring them to an end. But already pressure
is very high for the next step which is likely to be the Polish Proposal.
Rec.a. We recommend continuation of the consultations in Vientiane, exploitation
of the evidence they produce, and readiness to move to the Polish proposals
at the latest workable time.
At this stage our military pressure consists of fairly regular recon-
naissance flights over the Plain of Jars and over Southern Laos,
together with high-level U-2 reconnaissance over North Vietnam.
Rec. 3 We recommend that these programs continue.
2. The Polish Meeting. We are in favor of the Polish proposal for discus-
sion among the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen, the ICC Members
(Canada, India and Poland), and representatives of the three parties in
Laos.
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It remains our position that the pre-conclition.s for any Geneva conference
are as stated by Souvanna cease-fire and withdrawal to previous
positions, acceptance of Souvanna's position and powers, re-establishment
of the Souvanna government of National Unity, and effective functioning
of the International Control Commission. We must Hold this stand strongly,
less for the sake of our own prestige than for the protection of Souvanna's
position vis-a-vis his Right Wing, and the position of the Khan.h Govern-
ment in South Vietnam. We do not suppose that these conditions will be
accepted in toto, but we do not at all exclude the possibility of real progress
toward them if we follow the program set out below.
In one form or another the Polish discussions are likely to occur within
the next week or two. Under proper conditions these meetings can be
useful in gaining time. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that these discus-
sion's will produce any substantial result, and when they reach an impasse,
they will be stronger calls than ever for a new Geneva conference.
We therefore believe it important that the Polish meetings be accompanied
by additional military signals on our side to underline our determination
to insist on a certain degree of _Communist pull-back before a Geneva
meeting is held.
The best available military indicator for this purpose is the extension
of present U. S. low-level reconnaissance over Laos into North Vietnam
along supply lines feeding the Plain of Jars and the Laotian corridor
toward South Vietnam.
Rec. 4 We recommend the initiation of such low-level reconnaissance at about
the time of a Polish meeting.
Rec. 5 We recommend further that if such planes are downed either over Laos
or North Vietnam, fighter escort should be provided with instructions to
return ground fire and attack anti-aircraft installations.
3. Impasse in the Polish meetings. The actions recommended to this
point are those which would occur before an impasse in the Polish
discussions. When such an impasse has been reached, we expect to
recommend selections from the following additional actions to strengthen
our general position. No specific decisions are recommended at present,
but such actions might include the following:
(1) The expansion of T-28 operations in Laos, including the
use of third country pilots, but not Americans.
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(2) The introduction of harassing action by South Vietnamese
forces into the Laotian Corridor (with U. S. advisors).
(3) The authorization of South Vietnamese air strikes against
North Vietnamese activities in the Laotian corridor.
(4) A number of movements of U. S. forces from our West Coast
toward the West Pacific in ways that will increase our readiness
posture and give a general warning signal. These numbers might
be selected from among the following:
a. 1 Army. Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)
b. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days) ?
c. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South
China Sea (2 weeks)
d. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac
(2 to 10 days)
e. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS
to Okinawa (40 days)
f. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii
(43 days)
4. PolitiCal steps after a Polish impasse.
Our present belief is that after an impasse is reached in the Polish
discussions, the next step politically should probably be discussion in
the UN. Such discussion need not necessarily be limited to Laos, and
at this stage we might well wish a general discussion of the threats to
peace in Southeast Asia in the UN forum.
We believe it important to have in reserve additional military deploy-
ments, warning of which might properly be given in the UN debate. It
is possible that on further discussion some of the actions listed above
might be withheld for this purpose, but our preliminary thinking has been
that the most valuable item in this context would be the deployment of
U. S. ground forces, of about 5,000 men to Thailand.
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It is our current belief that this general politico-military scenario could
be expected to last about a month to six weeks, and that at the end of
that time further action should be closely related to our wider planning
-- for South Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole.
III. The Special Problem of the Laotian Right ?
One continuing danger, in all our Laotian efforts, is the Right Wing.
Both the relatively skillful Phoumi and the quite unpredictable Siho
are capable of acting to overthrow Souvanna and take power at Vientiane
at any time. De facto, they Have much power there now; Any Right
Wing takeover would be most destructive to our whole position.
Rec. 6 We recommend that Ambassador Unger continue to use all appropriate
diplomatic pressures to prevent any such takeover, including the specific
warning that the U. S. would not support those executing such a coup.
At the same time, we must avoid as far as possible action which might
trigger such a Right Wing reaction. This is one important reason for
keeping the finger of accusation pointed at the Communists and avoiding
a Geneva conference which tacitly accepts the status quo in the Plain of
Jars.
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I. Strengthen the situation within SVN by:
A. Expanding the U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the 8 Critical Provinces.
1, Move in additional Vietnamese troops.
2. Assign control over all troops in each of the provinces to the
province chiefs.
3. Develop detailed hamlet by hamlet "oil spot" and "clear and hold"
operational plans for each of the approximately 40 districts.
4. Introduce a system of population control (curfews; identification
? papers; intelligence nctwork; etc.)
5. Increase the provincial police force.
6. Expand the information program (introduce approximately 40,000
radios; install transmitters at provincial capitals; provide
taped programs; etc.).
? 7. Develop a special economic aid program for each province
(distribution of medicines; school construction materials; etc.).
8. Add additional U.S. personnel (initially from within SVN):
a. 320 military provincial and district advisers.
b. 40 USOM provincial and district advisers.
c. 74 battalion advisers (2 for each of 37 bns.)
434
9. Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM
shortages where necessary (110 to 180 men).
10. Establish joint US-GVN teams to monitor the program at both the
national and provincial levels.
Intensifying the information program withir. the country.
1. Distribute between 100,000 and 200,000 radio receivers.
2. Increase the quantity and quality of in-country radio programs
including "fireside" chats, etc.
C. Strengthen the administration of the Country Team.
D. Actions not taken:
1. Lodge opposed:
a. A shift from a government of politicians to a government of
technicians.
b. A shift in the U.S. role from one of "advice" to one of "direction".
c. Removal of dependents unless accompanied by military moves.
."Interlacing" of U.S. personnel within the national and provincial
governments.
II. Near-term Forecast.
A. The actions referred to
next 3 to 6 months.
? B. At best, during that period, the situation will jog along about as it is
? (assuming Khanh is not assassinated) -- it may continue to deteriorate
slowly.
above will have
little
or no
effect within
the
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C. Because visible improvement is unlikely, we can expecm?incnras.ing
criticism of U.S. policy and U.S. operations by the public and by
our allies.
III. U. S. Information Program.
To offset the expected criticism and to develop the "peace offense" theme
(with members of Congress; the press; the public; foreign diplomats; etc.)
IV. Congressional Resolution.
About mid-July consider requesting a Congressional Resolution supporting
U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.
V. Strike against North Vietnam.
A. Continue to prepare political and military plans for such operations,
recognizing that all efforts to achieve our objective by peaceful
means must be exhausted before military action is undertaken. It is
unlikely that a strike against the north would be desirable at any
? time within the next 3 to 6 months, although this estimate may be
affected by events in Laos.
B. Carry on a dialogue with the DRV through the Canadians.
Initiate joint military planning with the Thais.
V;,, Military pressures short of combat operations.
A. Periodically review a list of military moves designed to demonstrate
the U.S. intention to prevent further communist advances in Southeast
Asia and determine whether any of such moves are timely (see list
?attached.)
( see attached list)
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CONFIDENTIAL
Illustrative Military Moves Designed to Demonstrate the U.S. Intention
to Prevent Further Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam
1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos.
2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month).
3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors) -
4 approx. 6/15; 16 by 8/15.
4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia.
5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding
the Laotian corridor.
6. Re-introduce a MAG into Laos (shift from Thailand).
7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos - (15 teams in 20 days).
8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without
U.S. advisors) - 60 days.
9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counter-
insurgency program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days).
10. Expand T-28 operations in Laos, then use of U.S. military pilots.
11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort.
12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor.
13. U.S. Force movements:
a. 1 or 2 B-57 squadrons into SVN - 24 hours.
b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN - 24 hours.
c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand - 24 hours.
d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days)
e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air "Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into
SVN on exercise or assignment (8 days).
f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)
g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).
h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China
Sea (2 weeks).
i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days).
j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22, 900 men) CONUS to Okinawa
(40 days).
k. 1 Infantry Division (11, 500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days).
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SECRET
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June 5, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION ON FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 6 PM
OUTLINE INFORMATION PROGRAM
Part One - Information-psychological program in South Vietnam
a
The Honolulu meeting recommends...major prograrn5.mounted in Saigon
? A. To improve morale and zeal in South Vietnam
B. To carry the story to North Vietnam
C. To better inform Americans and our allies.
This program rests on two basic propositions:
1. That there is no substitute for some real victories, and that
the current bad situation is the main source of bad reports.
? Z. Even so, a much more effective program can be built if everyone
at all levels puts his mind on it.
A. The following steps are recommended in South Vietnam:
1. Heavy support to building an image of leadership in the Khanh
Government, to include more talks by Khanh, wider distribution of radio
receivers, and inclusion of other government leaders.
2. Add U.S. advisers for information and propaganda with every
unit in the field to watch alertly for Viet Cong atrocities and mistakes and
bravery by government soldiers, so as to report and exploit both kinds
of action.
3. Explore possibilities of rewards for heroic South Vietnamese
soldiers.
4. Prepare for a start in land reform in the delta. (Hardly an
information matter but obviously important.)
5. Expand CIA propaganda teams in the villages.
6. Explore additional role for U. S. youth in South Vietnam.
7. Add other more sophisticated propaganda steps.
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B. Propaganda directed to the North
6/5/64
It is recommended that this element of the program should be
built mainly on the efforts listed above for South Vietnam plus advice
and guidance for South Vietnamese programming to the North.
C. Information to Americans and their allies
This is the most difficult but perhaps the most important problem.
The following actions are recommended:
1. Drastic action to improve credibility of U. S. spokesmen in
South Vietnam. U. S. Government, especially military, are no longer
believed cause of past misinformation, and a new information directive
and new personnel are needed.
2. A single individual should have cross-the-board authority
under the Ambassador. It is now agreed that Barry Zorthian of USIA
is the right man for this job.
3. Transportation for newsmen should be improved.
4. The quality of military public information officers should
be drastically improved.
5. The military should launch a more vigorous internal education
program for soldiers who often now "sound off" to the press in such a way
that press reports then make the soldiers' task more difficult.
6. Finally, it is the committee's general recommendation that
every effort be made by the Ambassador and all hands to press the GVN
to a greater awareness of information and propaganda problems.
Part Two - Information and Propaganda in Washington
1. It is recommended that all information and propaganda work
relating to Southeast Asia be coordinated under a single officer holding
appointment as consultant to the NSC. Mr. Robert Manning is recom-
mended for this appointment. There is a certain risk in having any
officer with this responsibility but the need for coordination outweighs
the danger.
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2. A detailed program should be developed under Mr. Manning's
own guidance, but the following sketch indicates the range of his work.
To:
He must coordinate information:
The Congress
Thc.t diplomatic world
Publishers and editors
Reporters
TV and all other opinion. leaders
From: The President and Cabinet
The U.S. military and political leaders in the Pacific
Soldiers and civilians with service in Vietnam
Vietnamese spokesmen
Independent observers who see the real situation
About: The situation and the issue in SVN
The overall struggle for SEA
The policy of the US -- peace, determination and effectiveness
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