MEETING WITH DR. BROCKWAY MCMILLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300070029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 23, 1963
• Content Type: MFR

25X1
Approved For Release 2003
.,; GtA-RD080B01676R981300070029-2
23 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Brockway McMillan
1. At Dr. McMiilan's request I met with him in his office
at 3:30 this afternoon, 23 July, to discuss TAGBOARD.
2. The meeting opened with an informal discussion of our
early retirement program, with which I am presently involved on
the Hill, and some discussion of the Clandestine Services purely
to break the ice and indicate that the Agency also doss things
other than NRQ activities.
3. Dr. McMillan stated that he was not prepared to draw
back from his TAOBOf-RD memorandum, unless so directed by
Mr. McNamara, presumably generated by a protest from Mr.
McCone. He stated that he wished to assign a project officer to
the Agency to push forward on the program and that at the end of
three months which would be a transition period, the entire pro,*
gram would be switched over to Leo Qeary's shop
ILLEGIB
25X1
for management. I replied that we were entirely agreeable to
having the Air Force supply a Project Director, that this had been
suggested by Dr. Charyk previously, and that we had agreed with
alacrity and enthusiasm but that nothing had come of it. I did not,
however, feel that I could agree to determining now that a tran.
sition should take place in three months. I felt very strongly that
in view of our need for full-scale and primary emphasis on
OXCART and the difficulties that we still had to overcome in that
program. I could not accept any move now ich might degrade
that program, particularly such as introducing a now technical
management agency at this stage of the game. Further, I felt that
if and when OXCART or any of its corollary vehicles were surfaced
or uncovered, the only remaining true capability that could be kept
covert would be TAOBOARD. Accordingly, it must remain covert
Approved For Release 2803/07/01 : CIA-RDP80BOl67PRO0130007~
25X1
c 25X1
 25X1
Approved For Relees
00070029-2
and therefore should remain under Program B. I therefore pro-
posed that the project officer come over and dig in right away
and that we would defer any decision on transition until about six
months from now when we should have a much better idea of mere
OXCART stood and we might even have some feel for the policy
decisions that might be required in this connection. In other words,
I felt that we were talking about whether the glass was half full or
half empty and I suggested that he consider it along my lines of
making the decision at a later date. He neither acquiesced nor
objected but did say he would gat with Geary as soon as teary
returned from leave to decide who should come over as the project
of
Cor- a matter now stands, TAOBOARD is being budgeted
by and I propose to hold to this line with the technical
management remaining in (under In CIA).
4. On other subjects, we discussed as follows:
2?x1
a. I recommended both very strongly 25X1
for promotion and stated the - n ea e to write to General
Schriever rticularly ono (and I think to General 25X1
McKee onpointing out their total objectivity, their
complete dedication, their lack of parochialism, and their
high competence and recommending that they both be con-
sidered for promotion to Brigadier General. Dr. McMillan
agreed with me completely.
b. I told Dr. McMillan that we still had remaining in the
Agency considerable competence in the satellite area and that
I would like to see It utilized more in the overall NRO pro-
gram. I proposed that more CIA people be assigned to the
NRO staff and that CLk people be proliferated into the various
other programs. I suggested that Greer could use a CIA man
as a deputy. I pointed out that over 50% of our people were
from the Air Force throughout our programs and that this was
a very healthy atmosphere. I pointed out that he did not have
in the NRO staff or in Oreeer's staff people who were directly
oriented to the needs of the intelligence community and that I
felt by the input of CIA officers who are already thoroughly
25X1
Approved For Release 20P3/07/01 : CIA-RDP80B01616R001300070029-2
 25X1
Approved For Release 2003/07/01. yll~-ROPSOBQ 300070029-2
indoctrinated in intelligence r.quirernente, he would have a
much better, all-around organization to meet intelligence
requirements. He stated he was not too thoroughly familiar
with the NRO staff but that my proposal had appeal and that
he would look into it.
C. I than proposed that he call in all of his Program
Directors and their deputies, perhaps about twenty people
altogether, and have a one- or two-day symposium on just
why they were in business, Just why there was an NRO, just
what their responsibilities were, particularly slanted toward
their primary function of intelligence collection. I reconi
meeneed that Mr. McCone address this group and that it might
also be helpful to have Dr. Land and General Doolittle present.
My purpose in this was to make abundantly certain that the
people running out programs know that their sole purpose is
to develop intelligence and not just to be shooting another
rocket in the air. He thought this was an excellent idea and
said he would follow up on it,. probably in September, after
people had returned from vacation, etc. I immediately vvlun-
teereed to be a Program Director so I could get a vacation too.
4. 1 told him that my grapevine indicated that General
Greer had decided to take over contracting of all of his projects. 25X1
This was as of today, a rumor which I had not verified nor bad
my people. I brought it up not as an issue but to point out that
g e se capabilities were not the best interests of
NRC and certainly not in the best national interests of an exotic
intelligence collection program. I got the Impression be was in
complete agreement although he did not comment.
S. The meeting ended in good order and, based on this memo,
I am writing a letter to Dr. McMillan to try to pin down some of the
foregoing points.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant Oene*al, USA
MSC:blp `e Deputy Director
odved' Rele"3'10i/1(UA-RD 013676ROG43010.Or1Os22ctor
Copy 4 - DD/R Copy 5 - AD/SI
 "O~ VZ jo~ 40~
_ Approved For l ease 2003~/07/Q1 : IA F2DP8QB01676 01300070029-2
(C LAS51 FICATION)
Handle Via Indicated Controls
25X~
...................
0
i
i
WARNING /
This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean- /
ing of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The low prohibits its transmis-
sion O
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern-
to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc- ,
ment
trinoted and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be /
maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.
This document contains information referring to Projects:
QXQe ART. ..TA.G.BQA.Rl7 .............
Approved