NRO EX COM MEETING, 1100 HOURS, 5 JANUARY, IN SECRETARY VANCE'S OFFICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060055-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: January 5, 1965
• Content Type: MFR

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1 UP Stunt
5 January 1965
SUBJECT: NRO Ex Corn Meeting, 1100 hours, 5 January, in
Secretary Vance's office
PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, General Carter, Dr.
Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.
1. Mr. Vance opened the discussion thanking Mr. McCone for
his views o equipment in the SAG aircraft overflying
Cuba. He stated his understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
presently engaged in a study of the problem and thought they would be
coming up next week with their recommendations. It was his impression
that the Joint Chiefs would act favorably on Mr. McCone's proposals.
Fubini stated that all SAC U-2 aircraft would be configured for this
I I Mr. McCone stated that if there
was any problem in immediate avai a ilities he felt CIA could help with
their aircraft, and General Carter stated that this was true and that we
were in a good position for such hel
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3. There then ensued a long, involved discussion of the establish-
ment of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. Fubini
said that he thought the COMOR paper was good but not totally responsive,
that what we really needed was a "table of recognition" which would
indicate the targets that we needed to cover, the degree of resolution
required for them and some indications of our capabilities to acquire
this intelligence. He said he wanted a study showing the probability
of detecting targets of known signatures by various acquisition means,
the probability of identifying targets when we do not know the signature,
and the number of possible targets in each class. Mr. McCone pointed
out that he had raised this precise problem at the U.SIB and this was
why the COMOR paper had not been approved. He pointed out that the
COMOR paper had been referred to NRO for an analysis of capabilities
to collect, number of missions, resolutions acquired, etc. Mr. McCone
said he had no intention of approving requirements without knowing what
their cost would be in terms of research and development and also the
reconnaissance effort required. Dr. Fubini stated he had raised this
matter with General Carroll after reading the COMOR paper, and Mr.
McCone said General Carroll had planned to discuss this subject with
Mr. McCone at an early opportunity. It appears that the instructions to
COMOR in connection with their paper as well as the instructions to NRO
to report on the COMOR paper are adequate for the time being.
4. Mr. McCone pointed out that this led him into a real problem on
the FY 66 budget since he had no knowledge of the NRO submissions or
requirements, nor had they been presented to him as should have been
done in accordance with the National Reconnaissance Plan. He stated
that it was perfectly apparent that the things the President had indicated
in his speech last night that were to be done could be done only with hard
cash and that in the light of our budget economies this hard cash could
come only from the Department of Defense budget. This in turn could
come only from the most precise and careful program planning, and the
most arduous, day-by-day management of programs. This led Mr. McCone
to conjecture whether or not we were going down the right road with a
high resolution, narrow swatch width as epitomized by
in the light of these fundamental budget inhibitions. He thought perhaps
we might be able to save from the NRP by
the most intensive analysis of intelligence requirements matched against
intelligence capabilities. He pointed out some of the assets available
in the project and suggested that we get organized to take
a close look at t is and all other high-cost programs. As to the OXCART
and the RS-71, since they both appeared to have the same missions, Mr.
McCone suggested that perhap.d the
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Vance stated that while Mr. McCone's duplication concern was certainly
valid that neither he nor McNamara had decided on the need for a follow-
on bomber and that if they were to make this decision affirmatively, there
were several alternatives more a ~ealin than modifying the RS-71.
Specifically, he said, that for of development work they could
"stretch out" the TFX to provide a better aircraft for this purpose. Mr.
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ACTION: DD/S&T to get in touch with Dr. Fubini at once and give
him the full F -1 treatment.
5. As to TAGBOARD, Fubini and Vance both stated that they were
highly prejudiced for it because it did not require a pilot and they cited
the recent case of the drone shot down by the ChiComs in which practically
no lights at all were turned on around town or internationally. They said
that had a pilot been lost the shoot-down would really have been a major
international event. Nevertheless, since this involves considerable amounts
of money, and since procurement for new BLUE SPRINGS type drones is
necessary, it was agreed that Dr. Herb York would be contacted by Fubini
and asked to take a look at the drone systems.
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6. Mr. McCone then suggested that a new panel of consultants be
formed consisting of such people as Purcell, Land, Donovan, perhaps
Baker and others, to look at the entire National Reconnaissance Plan
and come up with recommendations for a new plan in the light of various
limiting requirements and assets and particularly dollars. Mr. McCone
stated that the responsibility belongs to McNamara and Vance and himself
and to no one else, but that they needed the advice and guidance of outside
consultants, as well as all the in-house capabilities we might have available.
Mr. Vance pointed out that COMOR has work to do, NRO has work to do,
and McMillan's Steering Group has work to do. Dr. McMillan stated that
his Steering Group was really an in-house capability if you included 25X1
as being in-house assets. Mr. McCone at
this juncture stated that was most promising and that within
several weeks the feasibility s u y would be ready for presentation. He
stated that the firms involved were beginning to feel the pinch of keeping
personnel on in the hopes of continuing the development whereas at the
moment they had no work for these people to do. Dr. Fubini said this was
not a new situation in Government and that what the Department of Defense
did was to arrange for incremental financing to hold the top layer of person-
nel and keep them on the payroll during these interim periods when decisions
had to be made. Mr. Mc Cone stated that we should make the decision on
rior to 1 February and that some of us should probably go up
to to see the mock-up in addition to having the people come down 25X1
here and with CIA put on a feasibility presentation. Dr. Fubini pointed out
that he hoped this could be done prior to 24 January since he had a trip
planned to NATO after that.
7. Overall analysis of this meeting is that Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone
are going to take a very hard, intensive, and critical look at intelligence
requirements, as well as developmental projects to meet these requirements,
and that insofar as the National Reconnaissance Plan is concerned and
specifically the commitment of funds without Vance -Mc Cone approval, my
judgment is that the honeymoon is over. I foresee the possibility of cutting
off entirely, pushing ahead with I bor something closely
resemblin it combining the OXCART-RS-71 assets, phasin out CORONA
cutting out Ibin favor of
I I
8. There was no discussion of ARGON, CORONA,
West Coast organization, or NRO agreement.
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probably going ahead with TAGBOARD at its present level,
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Vance stated that while Mr. McCone's duplication concern was certainly
valid that neither he nor, McNamara had decided on the need for a follow-
on bomber and that if they were to make this decision affirmatively, there
were several alternatives'more appealing than modifying the RS-71.
Specifically, he said, that for f development work they could
"stretch out" the TFX to provide a better aircraft for this purpose. Mr.
ACTION: DD/S&T to get in touch with Dr. Fubixxi at once and give
him the full 0 treatment.
5. As to TAGBOARD, Fubini and Vance both stater that they were
highly prejudiced for it because it did not require a pilot and they cited
the. recent case of the drone shot down by the ChiComs in'`which practically
no lights at all were turned on around town or internationally. They said
that had a pilot been lost the shoot-down would really have been a major
international event. Nevertheless, since this involves considerable amounts
of money, and since procurement for new Blue Springs type drones is
necessary, it was agreed that Dr. Herb York would be contacted by Fubini
and asked to take a look at the drone systems.
Approved For Release 2003/10/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060055-4
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 Approved For elease 2003/10/02 : CIA-RDP80BO167W001300060055-4
3. There then ensued a long, involved discussion of the establish-
ment of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. Fubini
said that he thought the COMOR paper was good but not totally responsive,
that what we really needed was a "table of recognition" which would
indicate the targets that we needed to cover, the degree of resolution
required for them and some indications of our capabilities to acquire
this intelligence. He said he wanted a study showing the probability
of detecting targets of known signatures by various acquisition means,
the probability of identifying targets when we do not know the signature,
and the number of possible targets in each class. Mr. McCone pointed
out that he had raised this precise problem at the USIB and this was
why the COMOR paper had not been approved. He pointed out that the
COMOR paper had been referred to NRO for an analysis of capabilities
to collect, number of missions, 'resolutions acquired, etc. Mr. McCone
said he had no intention of approving requirements without .a lcno what
'ock ahd, lepMa4 o, 4 4" their cost would be in terms ofFec.onna1ssance effort required. Dr.
Fubini stated he had raised this matter with General Carroll after reading
the COMOR paper, and Mr. McCone said General Carroll had planned
to discuss this subject with Mr. McG;one at an early opportunity. It
appears that the instructions to COMOR in connection with their paper
as well as the instructions to NRO to report on the COMOR paper are
adequate for the time being.
4. Mr. McCone pointed out that this, led him into a real problem
on the FY 66 budget since he had no knowledge of the NRO submissions
or requirements, nor had they been presented to him as should have been
done in accordance with the National Reconnaissance Plan. He stated
that it was perfectly apparent that the things?,athe President had indicated
in his speech last night that were to be done could be done only with hard
cash and that in the light of our budget economies this hard cash could
come only from the Department of Defense budget. This in turn could
come only from the most precise and careful program planning, and the
most arduous, day-by-day management of progra'1ns. This led Mr.
McCone to conjecture whether or not we were going down the right road
with a high resolution, narrow swatch width as epitomized by 25X1
in the light of these fundamental budget inhibitions. He thought
perhaps we might be able to save a from the
NRP by the most intensive analysis o l intelligence requirements matched
against intelligence capabilities. He pointed out some of the assets avail-
able in the project and suggested that we get organized to take
a close look at this and all other high-cost programs. As to the OXCART
and the RS-71, since they both appeared to have the same missions, Mr.
McCone suggested that perhaps the
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6. Mr. McCone then suggested that a new panel of consultants be
formed consisting~of such people as Purcell, Land, Donovan, perhaps
Baker and others, to look at the entire National Reconnaissance Plan
and come up with recommendations for a new plan in the light of various
limiting requirements and assets and particularly dollars. Mr. McCone
stated that the responsibility belongs to McNamara and Vance and himself
and to no one else, but that they needed the advice and guidance of outside
consultants, as well as all the in-house capabilities we might have available.
Mr. Vance pointed out that- COMOR has work to do, NRO has work to do,
and McMillan's Steering Group has work to do. Dr. McMillan stated that
his Steering Group was really an in-house capability if you included 0 25X1
being in-house assets. Mr. McCone at
this juncture stated that I Iwas most promising and that within
several weeks the feasibility study would be ready for presentation. He
stated that the firms involved were beginning to feel the pinch of keeping
personnel on in the hopes of continuing the development whereas at the
moment they had no work for these 'eople to do. , Dr. Fubini said this was
not a new situation in Government anti that what th e ar ent o Defense
did was to arrange for incremental financing to s'.e *~P )A-?fer a ~7ers?a-cs~
and keep them on the payroll during these interim periods when decisions
had to be made. Mr. McCone stated that we should make the decision on
rior to 1 February and that some of us probably go up
tol o see the mock-up in addition to }raving thpeople come 25X1
down here and with CIA put on a feasibility presentation. Dr. Fubini
pointed out that he hoped this could be done prior to 24 January since he had
a trip planned to NATO after that.
7. Overall analysis of this meeting is that'.Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone
are going to take a very hard, intensive, and critical look at intelligence
requirements, as.well as developmental projects", to meet these requirements,
and that insofar as the National Reconnaissance Plan is concerned and
specifically the commitment of funds without Vance-McCone approval, my
judgment is that the honeymoon is over. I foresee the possibility of cutting
off I lentirely, pushing ahead with or something closely
25X1
resembling it, combining the OXCART-RS-71 assets,- phasing out CORONA
I cutting out 0 in favor of 25X1
I _J probably going ahead with TAGBOARD at its present level,
etc., etc., etc.
8. There was no discussion of ARGONNE, CORONA,
West Coast organization, or NRO agreement.
25X1
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