LETTER TO THE HONORABLE MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM MARSHALL S. CARTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 12, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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Approved For Re
NSA review(s) completed.
The Honorable McGoorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for l atio al Security Affairs
The Whit. House
Washington, D. G.
12 February 1965
Dear Mr. Bly:
I would like to call your attention to the attached CIA
memorandum which describes Chinese Communist military
cuz-
developments -- going back to 1963 -- related to the
rent crisis in Vietism.
All of these developments have been under careful
study for some time and the memo was in process of prep-
aration bare prior to the recent intensification of Viet Cong
operations in South Vietnam.
Faithfully yours,
/s/
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
Attachment:
OCI Special Report dated 12 Feb 65, Subject: Chinese
Communists Brace for Possible Spread of Indochina War
(OCI
Identical letters sent to: The Honorable Llewellyn E. Thompson,
The Honorable George W. Ball, The Honorable William Bundy,
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Honorable Cyrus R.
Vance, The Honorable John T. McNaughton, General Earle
G. Wheeler
Distribution:
OjgiFia1 -. Addressee
- DDCI w/att
1 -. ER via ExDir w/att
Approved f flu"* (}05/04/22
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12 February 1965
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Copy No. 4,4 Y
SPECIAL REPORT
CHINESE COMMUNISTS BRACE FOR POSSIBLE SPREAD OF INDOCHINA WAR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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12 February 1965
The steady build-up of Chinese Communist mili-
tary strength in South China since mid-1964 strongly
suggests that Peiping is preparing against the pos-
sibility that an expansion of the Indochina. war may
lead to direct Chinese involvement. Taken as a.
whole, Peiping's efforts to improve its capabili-
ties appear defensive. There are no indications
that the Chinese leaders intend to initiate new
military action in Southeast Asia, at this time, but
it seems clear from their actions that they are de-
termined to continue their encouragement and sup-
port for Communist insurgency. The Chinese prepa.ra.-
tions probably reflect concern that continued suc-
cesses in South Vietnam will increase the danger of
repeated and heavy US blows against North Vietnam
(the DRV) or Communist China. This appears to be
the sense of Foreign Minister Chen Yi's recent re-
marks ha.t the war was go-
ing well or a communists but there was a. possi-
bility of US "fireworks" before final victory.
Peiping certainly hopes to avoid a direct
confrontation with US forces, and the steps it has
taken are probably calculated in part to back up
threatening propaganda aimed at deterring the US
from actions which would bring it face to face with
Communist China. The Chinese are probably committed
to respond in some fashion if there is an all-out
US attack on the DRV, however, and would be unwill-
ing to "stand idly by" in such a situation. Pei-
ping's official statement of 9 February reaffirmed
earlier promises to assist North Vietnam and as-
serted that the Chinese were "well prepared in this
respect."
Planning for joint action designed to counter
possible US moves probably began in earnest l
in late June and early July 1964. Evidence of Chi-
nese military preparations began to increase from
that time on and the pace picked up after the Ton-
kin Gulf crisis in August 1964. Chinese actions
include
mprovemen of air defenses
and naval forces in South China., what may be a sub-
stantial enlargement of the armed forces, a militia
build-up, and civil defense preparations.
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Early Military Planning
Joint planning for closer
Chinese cooperation in defense
of the DRV apparently began well
over a year ago, probably as
part of a long-range strategy
involving a gradual build-up of
Peiping's strength in South China,
to be ready for hostilities
should the need arise.
AUG Tonkin Gulf crisis; first
1964 regiment of MI Gs trans erre to North Vietnam; let tighter
base activated at Nannin new radar and air defense support
personnel moved to Sino-Vietnamese border
SEP Summer military conscription drive in full swin ;
1964 new naval
a -01-Mu on nor Shore at on in u.
OCT Second extraordinary military review held in 1964, also pre-
1964 sided over by Mao Tse-tung; this was concerned with the
militia buildup; construction began on Ningming airfield;
Peitun airfield being improved.
DEC Second major conscription drive of 1964 under way; second
1964 regiment of MI Gs transferred to North Vietnam; continuing
JAN Terms of service for military personnel extended by one year;
1965 indications that the Chinese may be assuming responsibility
for air defense of North Vietnam.
No unu-
suaactivity was noted
in South China during or immedi-
ately after this period.
Planning for measures to
cope with possible US military
moves took on a sudden urgency
in the spring of 1964. Begin-
ning in early May the US had
made it clear to the Communist
leaders in Peiping and Hanoi
that the deteriorating situation
in Laos and South Vietnam was
a matter of vital and growing
concern in Washington. The core
of the US message was a, warning
that the Indochina. war might be
enlarged if the Communists did
not ease their heavy pressure
in Southeast Asia..
US threats of possible ac-
tion against the DRV apparently
aroused sharp concern in the
Communist camp, and triggered
a. special con-
views on 16 and 17 June presided
erence o the Chinese central
committee held in conjunction
with extraordinary military re-
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over by Mao Tse-tung himself
and attended by large numbers
of top military and party offi-
cials.
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Alarmed by US talk of carrying
the war north, Hanoi may have de-
manded new assurances of Chinese
military assistance in the event
of an attack--backed up by defi-
nite plans for action in such an
eventuality. The Vietnamese
probably also asked for a more
forthright public statement of
Peiping's intentions--aimed at
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deterring the US from enlarging
the conflict. This was forth-
coming on 7 July in a. formal
statement by Chinese Foreign
Minister Chen Yi putting the US
on notice that any attack on
North Vietnam carried grave risk
of countermoves by Communist
China.
Evidence of Peiping's de-
termination to help defend the
DRV, and indications of the ex-
tent to which Chinese moves in
support of Hanoi had been pre-
pared in advance began to ap-
pear following the Tonkin Gulf
crisis in August. Official state-
ments from Washington made it
clear that this was a one-time
reaction to a specific provoca-
tion, not the first phase of a
major escalation. The incident
demonstrated, however, that un-
der some circumstances the US
was willing to intervene directly
by mounting limited attacks
against the DRV.
The Air and Naval Build-up
Peiping's response to the
employment of US air power
against targets in the DRV was
a, blast of belligerent propaganda
and a, series of moves to strength-
en air defenses in North Vietnam
and South China. The speed of
the reaction suggests that well-
prepared contingency plans were
being put into effect. The Chi-
nese moved a, regiment of jet
fighters into North Vietnam's
Phuc Yen Airfield in August and
a. second regiment in December.
Fighter strength in South China,
has been more than doubled.
jet fighters have been
move in o the area since August,
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raising the total deployed there
This build-up has in- 25X1
c u e some MIG-19 (Farmer) and
a few MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fight-
ers. Their transfer was a.ccom-
pa.nied by a substantial increase
in radar installations and anti-
aircraft artillery.
Since October, an airfield
suitable for use by tactical jet
fighters has been under construc-
tion at Ningming, ten miles
north of the Vietnamese border.
This probably will be service-
able by this spring. I
small airfield near the Laos
border at Ssuma.o. There are in-
dications that the 4,700-foot
unpaved runway at this field is
being improved. Another airfield,
near the Burma border at Peitun,
which can already accommodate
jet fighters, is also being im-
proved.
There are increasing indi-
cations that the Chinese may in-
tend to use their growing air
strength in the area. to defend
North Vietnam, as well as South
China..
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for North Vietnam under some
circumstances.
Peiping's South China Fleet
has increased its capability in
the Tonkin Gulf since Au ust.
an a,
small naval facility was estab-
lished in the Peiha.i area on the
north shore of the Tonkin Gulf.
Although the South Sea Fleet has
no major naval vessels, it has
numerous patrol. craft and motor
torpedo boats which could con-
stitute a. limited threat to US
naval operations in the Tonkin
Gulf.
years of 1959-60, recruiting
shifted largely to an urban base
in 1961. While no solid figures
on the summer recruitment tar-
get for 1964 have been made
known,
ould indicate a. total
nations. goal of about 700,000,
which would be in line with
normal annual quotas.
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In December 1964,1
Ia. secon 25X1-
Expansion of the Army
There are some indications
that the Chinese Communists
have decided to expand their al-
ready large armed forces. Two
large-scale conscription drives
and a. recent extension of mili-
tary tours of duty may have had
the net effect of expanding these
forces from about 2.5 million
to more than 3 million.
The first conscription
drive took place from July to
October
This appeared at the
time to be merely a repetition
of the annual summer conscrip-
tions of the previous three
years. From 1955 to 1959, the
army had recruited and demobi-
lized during the winter to coin-
cide with the farming cycle, as
most inductees were from rural
areas. Because peasant recruits
had fewer skills and had become
less reliable during the disaster
nationwide conscription drive
was under way. Many of the re-
cruits were being drawn from
areas that presumably had already
supplied their annual quota in
the summer. This is the first
time that a. major winter drive
ha.s been noted since 1959 and
the first time that two heavy
drives are known to have taken
place in one calendar year. Al-
though figures for either con-
scription or demobilization are
lacking, the total number of re-
cruits over the past year would
seem to have been greater than
the normal annual quota..
On 19 January, Peiping de-
creed a, one-year extension of
the terms of service for the
army, air force, and navy to
four, five, and six years, re-
spectively. This order presum-
ably halts the demobilization
which has been going on concur-
rently with the second conscrip-
tion drive. The net effect of
retaining most of those who
would normally be demobilized
at this time and the two sub-
scription drives last year would
be to increase the size of the
armed forces by a. substantial
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CHINESE PEOPLE'S MILITIA PASSING IN REVIEW;
awnnF~utxauts4twntri a x:tatawxa~ ? ~Hau~~~ w~ssks~ ~.~am
number. Another effect of the
mandatory extension of tours,
of special importance to height-
People's Militia has been taking
place under the full glare of
propaganda. From a. claimed
peak of 230 million during the
Great Leap Forward, the militia.
collapsed and was all but dis-
banded in 1960, and militia ac-
tivity remained limited even
through early 1964. With the
general hardening of the regime's
policies in June, however, re-
cruiting and training of mili-
tiamen was suddenly stepped up.
By now, according to tenuous
indications, the militia may
have regained a. strength on the
order of 20-30 million. Current
training covers most basic mili-
ta.ry skills, including the use
of live ammunition on a large
scale for the first time in four
years.
Peiping intends to use the
militia partly as a new tool for
controlling domestic dissidence,
particularly in conjunction with
the intensifying "socialist ed-
ened military preparedness, is uca.tion" campaign. Nevertheless,
that the army will be able to Peiping has also played up the
retain its best-tra.ined troops militia's potential as a. defen-
for an additional year. At the sive reserve which can release
same time, the proportion of
raw recruits in the service at
any one time will be reduced.
In fact, the proportion should
be significantly lower this year,
because the militia, from which
the army draws most recruits,
has greatly stepped up its pre-
induction basic infantry train
ing.
Militia. Build-up
At the same time that the
regular military forces appar-
ently have been quietly expanded,
a major build-up of the civilian
regular troops for duty else-
where. Despite the regime's
hopes, however, it is question-
able whether a. trustworthy mili-
tia force can be organized on a
large scale.
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For the first time in sev-
eral years, indications of civil
defense preparations in South
China have begun to appear. On
Hainan Island, 25X1
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air raid trenches were being dug
and air raid drills conducted.
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to maintain a dominant position
despite the additional air sup-
port provided for the armies
of Souva.nna. Phouma.
Thel optimism
There is evidence that o-c
government units on the South
China border with Laos and Viet-
nam have been preparing contin-
gency war evacuation plans.
Taken as a whole, the Chi-
nese Communists' effort to
strengthen their armed forces
in general, and particularly to
improve their air and naval ca-
pability in the region near the
Sino-Vietnamese border, appears
defensive. Peiping seems to be
preparing to ward off blows
which it fears may fall, rather
than getting ready to launch a
massive offensive thrust de-
signed to finish off the war
quickly. At the same time, Pei-
ping hopes that its actions
backing up its bellicose propa-
ganda will serve to deter the
US from any escalation of the
war.
The Chinese appear confi-
dent that the months ahead will
bring new successes in the strug-
gle by the Viet Cong to wrest
control over the countryside
in South Vietnam from the govern-
ment in Saigon and eventually
to establish a neutralist regime
which would insist on a US with-
drawal from the area. Peiping
is probably equally well pleased
by the situation in Laos, where
Communist forces have been able
about developments in Southeast
Asia shown by Chinese Foreign
Minister Chen Yi
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psychological warfare, but it
probably reflects the general
lines of Peiping's estimate
concerning the trend of events.
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As ior LAOS, Hmeiiea11
sup would be withdrawn
after the game was played out
in South Vietnam and the Lao-
tians would be forced to reach
agreement among themselves.
Peiping's propaganda. paints
the US situation in Southeast
Asia, as increasingly desperate.
Although some of the Chinese
leaders doubtless realize that
this picture of a swelling tide
of Communist victory is over-
drawn, they are probably to some
extent bemused by their own in-
vention. Chou En-lai's intem-
perate sneers at the feebleness
of "imperialism"
suggest such a. mood of con-
fidence. The Chinese premier
scoffed at defensive military
preparations by the UK against
Indonesia and declared that al-
though the US "paper tiger is
baring it fangs and showing its
claws," the Chinese people regard
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it as "quite miserable and ludi-
crous."
Despite this bold talk,
Peiping's preparations for de-
fense indicate continued respect
for US power directly applied
in the field. The Chinese may
well despise the US "strategi-
cally," heavily discounting the
possibility of an all-out at-
tack against China., but are get-
ting ready to cope with stepped
up "tactical" thrusts against
the DttV. Their emphasis on air
defense and the build-up of
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naval capability indicates the
kind of limited US action they
regard as most likely. The re-
cent moves to increase the over-
all strength of their ground
forces during the next six months
or so are probably insurances
against an all-out US attack
which the Chinese accept as pos-
sible but do not think is very
likel .
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