MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM MSC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300040008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 30, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

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L~ 30 October 1962
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
1. At 6:00 p.m. today in Secretary Ball's office I attended a
NSC REVIEW meeting of the Executive Committee representing Mr. McCone. Present
COMPLETED, were Secretary Rusk, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the Attorney General,
6/26/2003 Secretary Dillon, Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary McNamara, General
Taylor (but for the early part of the meeting only), Secretary Nitze, Don
Wilson of USIA, Harlan Cleveland, Secretary Foster, Secretary Ball,
Secretary Johnson, Secretary Martin, and Ambassador Thompson. The
meeting was called presumably to respond to the nine items that had been
transmitted to me at 4:15 by telephone. However, upon arriving at the
meeting, there was already a draft message to Ambassador Stevenson
for discussion as well as a number of listed points apparently put together
by Paul Nitze and Alexis Johnson.
2. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by trying to point out what
we hope to achieve in the near future. He said that we had had a Cuba
before this and a Cuban problem, and that we would certainly have a
Cuban problem after the present crisis was settled. Our primary objec-
tive must be to get the offensive missiles out of Cuba now, just as quickly
as possible. If we succeed in this, then a number of other things can
happen as we go ahead in the future. It will have an effect on the USSR,
it will have an effect on Castro, and many of these things will be dividends
and we must not try to tie in our dividends now with the major problem of
getting the missiles out of Cuba. He pointed out that the margin of decision
in the Kremlin is very, very thin and if we load too much on them now in
the way of demands, we may break down their initial reaction and there-
fore end up with nothing. Paul Nitze pointed out that while we are doing
this, we must under no circumstances tie our hands to this particular
purpose and must keep maximum freedom of action for future activities.
The Attorney General stressed the importance of how we phrase any talk
of "invasion" and our safeguards against taking such action. He seemed
to not have realized that the President had already made some very firm
commitments on this. In any event, he was most anxious that we not tie
our hands in this regard so that if at some future period an invasion was
necessary for other reasons, we would not have an international commit-
ment preventing us from doing so. It was generally agreed that if we
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stuck to the President's previous press statements as well as his com-
munications with Khrushchev and did not try to expand on these or
explain them, we were on pretty safe ground. I think the actual phrase-
ology, as I recall, was "we would give assurances against an invasion
of Cuba, " or at least this is what Khrushchev asked Kennedy to do. The
Attorney General pointed out again that we must not make that type of
finalized commitment because it would then allow Cuba to move into
Latin America with all forms of subversion, and that in the event we
wanted to put pressure on Cuba, possibly as a result of a Soviet move
in the Berlin area, we might be enjoined from doing so. Secretary Rusk
pointed out that the Rio Pact would protect us and there were a number
of other things that we could do to relieve us of any such commitment.
It was generally agreed, however, in the entire meeting that we would
not attempt to spell out or make any agreement either unilaterally,
bilaterally, or on a quid pro quo basis, as to subversive activities.
Certainly the Soviets and the Cubans would not live up to them and we
did not want to be saddled with something that we would have a moral
obligation to live up to. The Attorney General again pointed out that
it would be fatal for us to have any sort of unilateral "no-invasion"
statement and Mac Bundy agreed that we must stick to the President's
prior statement without further elucidation.
3. Secretary Ball then took over the meeting to indicate that he
had a draft of possible instructions for Ambassador Stevenson and also
a Department of Defense memo. The latter I was not given a copy of,
nor were there any more available, but it seemed to parallel, from what
I could see, the draft of instructions. Ball was anxious to get a draft out
tonight, refine it in the Department, and submit it for the approval of the
Executive Committee tomorrow, 31 October. Then Ball and Gilpatric
could return to New York and work on Stevenson. He felt that we needed
a preamble to the instructions, of some sort of philosophical material to
indicate a statement of U. S. objectives, at least during this initial
period, so Stevenson would have some guidelines within which to operate.
There was a general discussion of what constituted offensive weapons and
it was generally agreed that we again would conform to the Presidential
statements and press releases. I pointed out that it was our feeling that
in the event the Soviets did remove their offensive missiles, they would
concurrently or shortly thereafter also remove their SA-2 missiles since
lop SIECWi*
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these were of the latest type, contain C-band radar equipment, and
taking Mr. McCone's policy or, rather, prognostications in reverse,
if they removed the missiles there would be no need for the air defense
system. Mr. Bundy pointed out that Mr. McCone had been a voice
crying in the wilderness from either the Riviera or the Champs Elysees,
and he presumed that Mr. McConets opinion at that time had now become
doctrine. I stated unequivocally that insofar as the Agency in which I
operated was concerned, there was no question but what it was doctrine.
4. Mr. McNamara seemed absolutely convinced that the Soviets
will move out the missiles and that some of the indicators in today's
photography pointed toward this already being in effect. I did not make
an issue of it except to indicate that we did not feel as complacent about
this as he did. At about this time it became apparent that the feeling was
for some direct, bilateral, highly-secret negotiations with the Soviets.
Secretary Rusk reported that the initial U Thant and Castro conversations
had gone very badly, that Castro was adamant and would not give an inch,
that Castro would allow no inspections on Cuba or over Cuba. Alexis
Johnson pointed out that Gromyko had told Kohler that bilateral bargaining
arrangements between the U. S. and the Soviets were the best way to
handle this proposition and certainly we should not get/it?%eavily involved
with the UN and Castro. Apparently Stevenson had lunch with Kuznetsov
today or yesterday and he, Kuznetsov, seemed greatly disturbed at what
appeared to be Cuban reaction.
5. They went through the cable very, very hastily, pointing out
areas which needed correction and it was quite apparent that a complete
redraft of the instructions to Stevenson was in order. It was the consensus
of the entire Committee that we must now move very rapidly and very
secretly to bilateral discussions with Kuznetsov. Furthermore, that the
Presidenthas a press conference scheduled for Thursday (which might pos-
sibly be delayed to Friday) in which he must be in a position to report
current situation as regards Cuba and the Soviet missiles and we could not
delay much longer in taking actions directly with the Soviets.
6. Secretary Rusk then read a memo prepared by Ed Martin in two
and a half pages which ended up with the conclusion that we should not
attempt to get or to give any assurances of non-subversion; in other words,
the Soviets and the Cubans would not live up to them and we did not want to
be bound by any such moral commitments, but we must avoid this at all
costs. It was also agreed that we must not do or say anything that would
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in any way tie our Cuban action or attempt to relate it to possibilities
in Berlin. It was further agreed that we would not even discuss any
change in status of Guantanamo.
1 ?1 Finally, it was agreed that in response to a query from General
as to what the photography showed today, we would report back
that it had been inconclusive and that as a result thereof we must certainly
start flying again on Thursday. There is still considerable doubt as to
when U Thant will return and what bearing this might have on our recon-
naissance standdown.
8. The meeting ended with the State and Defense people going back
to redraft instructions to Stevenson in the light of the discussion and for
Cleveland to send a message to Rickey along the lines previously indicated.
The new draft will be considered at the Executive Committee meeting
tomorrow morning at 10:00.
9. As an aside, Mr. Bundy indicated that he did not feel we had
made full use of
I Furthermore, e e
initiate a concentrated intelligence operation on those ships of the Soviet
Bloc which have hatches capable of taking the missiles out of Cuba.
10. If the foregoing seems a little bit confused, it is primarily because
the discussion was somewhat confused. I attach as documents which were
passed out at the meeting, the following:
a. A Top Secret attachment listing an approved list of outstanding
issues prepared for the meeting tonight.
b. A draft letter of instructions to the United Nations, Ambassador
Stevenson. This will be drastically revised.
11. In conclusion, I felt somewhat encouraged at the general attitude
of firmness and resolve displayed on the part of the people there that we
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could not make commitments which would prejudice U. S. interests,
either short or long-range and, further, that we must be ready for more
definitive action in the event our current activities bring no fruit.
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MSC
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The attsohed is Ww appeov" list of cutstan4ing
issues prepared foe the ~ Cf the SDC Ixscntivs
Cemdttee at its ^e.tte1S 6za p.a., Oatabsr 30, 1965,
In the State Departsctt.
TUP Si*:c1 T A Let
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TOP SECRET
SENSIfi2 E_ NDLX TO:
FOR YOUR RETENTION
SENSITIVE HANDLUI3G
Top SLUE
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 1. Theory of operation.
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A. Wha is to b ~?cr l' ? r -, tie
,, objective bre,~::.n;, ay._i't.:z?,.
r
.rith T?Ioocotiz z t 1 rcr.,.-:,z.1 of strictly offensive ti-.,espons. )
B. IIov, to deterninc v it::JL- ',,as been removed.
1. To convince L .~ 1.
2. To convince U.S. public and others.
3. Precedents.
II.
Short term verification requirements.
A. S. ipp:ing.
1.
Inbound,
a.
b.
co
LN nor''_
UN sea
.US st r.cz.;
v>allance.
i11ance
position and conditions for charge.
2.
Outbound.
a. Extent TT
ri fictr ion.
b. US s tanc:vy capability.
1. t?
1?c-:,ivi~ies in 1. UN .verification0
a. Specified identified sites.
b. Gener~~i01 76R 300040008-8
17-- .L. Lola r,ei lit verification
A. Duration of UN arr,-.-ronents.
'an
D. Inauguration of Ciic or nuclc~:i free zone ^crranger~e:its (~~, a~'Ll~
resolution).
1. Not to invade.
2. Regarding sul-vorsion - insurrection in Cuba.
3. In multilatc_':.__ `'ra:et..;or.:.
i~cc ~.racal obli.`~ i?.i,.:t,,, of Cul.:a:
1. :Cegarding Lat :. . _.uerica ?
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