EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON 7 NOVEMBER 1962 AT 1700

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300040007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 7, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

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7 November 1962
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
6/26/2003
SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting at the White House on
7 November 1962 at 1700
turned to me and said, "Please have the CIA provide me the pictures of
the most recent photography. " I undertake to do so and would suggest
that if the Executive Committee meeting is not until tomorrow evening,
8 November, we make an appointment to show the President the most
current pictures. There then evolved a fairly complicated discussion of
1. At the meeting were Secretary of State Rusk, Alexis Johnson,
Mr. Ball, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General
Taylor, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Secretary Dillon, the Vice President,
the Assistant to Robert Kennedy (whose name escapes me), myself, and
several other hangers-on. As soon as the President had sat down I
briefed him on The Crisis USSR/Cuba information as of 1500, 7 November
1962. I addressed myself only to the missile summary at the bottom of
the first page and to the other minor items relative to the IL-28's. There
was very little discussion as to the intelligence information and the
President asked Mr. Gilpatric how he had come along with his negotiations
with the Soviets in New York. Mr. Gilpatric indicated that the only
problems still remaining were whether or not the helicopters would be
allowed to hover over Soviet ships that were leaving and just how far the
Soviets would remove the covers from the missiles that were deck loaded.
It was generally agreed, apparently, that we did not have to have complete
checkout of all equipment if our surveillance indicated that the missiles
themselves were being removed. I had already given a fairly compre-
ALL
and at about
hensive briefing on the situation as regards missile remov
this time Mr. McNamara indicated that according to his information, 91%
of all erectors were in port and about 75% of the IRBM rings were in port.
I am afraid that I went out into left field here because I asked him 91% of
what figure and 75% of what figure. His response was that these were the
figures that we knew were in there and when I asked whether or not we
actually knew them, he said these were the figures he had been given.
There then;j'evolved a discussion of the most recent photographs and
apparently the President had not seen the troops actually mounting up the
gangplank. At this point Mr. McNamara suggested that he provide
pictures the following morning for the President to see, and the President
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just what the relationship was between the President and Khrushchev
and it was decided that the exchange of messages over the 6th and
7th of November between Khrushchev and the President were to be kept
very, very quiet and in general most any, if not all, of our responses
for the next several days would be based entirely on whatever reply we
might get from Khrushchev. The President indicated that he would like
to make a press announcement quite soon, although Secretary Rusk said
we needed more assurances and Mr. McNamara felt that we should
announce sometime by Thursday evening that we were making inspections,
particularly as to IL-283s. About this time Mr. Salinger felt that he had
to press for a release of some kind tonight and although the President
argued that tonight was not the night, he- and SecDef and SecState finally
agreed that a press release along the lines that "the Soviets had reported
shipments of missiles leaving Cuba, U and that we would expect some sort
of U. S. /Soviet meeting or contact later on to as sure ourselves of this
fact. After much discussion, a release was finally agreed on and I have
not yet seen this. Mr. McNamara then pointed out that the radar activity
with the FRUIT SET indicated more a factor of training rather than of
any operational activity, and at this point General Taylor pointed out that
the abort instructions applied only as to when the elements were fired on,
that prior to being fired on our units would continue their surveillance.
Mr. Rusk pointed out that we were heading for a real problem. He
anticipated that sometime, perhaps about Saturday, the Soviets would ask
for aS.e-curity Council meeting at which time they would say that they had
complied with all of the agreements between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr.
Kennedy and that so far as they knew, the U. S. had not yet complied with
any of these agreements. Secretary Dillon then pointed out that while
they might get the missiles out of Cuba, what were we doing about the
elimination of Communism -- this was the main problem, not the removal
of missiles. Secretary Rusk then said that U Thant had proposed that
five Latin American Ambassadors who were still operational in Havana
take on the job of inspection. The advantage here was, as far as Mr. Rusk
could see, vms of getting OAS back in the act and that we must at all costs
insist upon complete freedom of travel of these Ambassadors for the
inspection of any and all areas in Cuba, particularly to give us reassurances
for the public against any possible uses of calves, etc. At about this point
Mr. Bundy asked whether we were working for or a ainst a bargain; in
other words, are we trying to convince Khrushchev r the public of our
good will, or vice versa; in other words, just exactlyJare we trying to prove.
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It was generally agreed that no definitive action of any kind be taken until
we had at least heard from Khrushchev as to the reply to the President's
message of 7 November. The President at this point indicated that we
must insist upon the removal of the IL-281s, that we must receive good
assurances of no possible re-entry of missiles or other offensive activities,
and that it seemed to him that we now have some time to await further
actions by the Soviets. It was at this point that I, General Carter, DDCI,
pointed out that no matter what agreements might be made, it was absolutely
mandatory that the United States Government must continue to have proper
and adequate surveillance of exactly what was going on in Cuba. The
President then directed that the State Department was to prepare a draft
statement as to generally:
"1. Where are we as of tomorrow, assuming the missiles have been
taken out.
"2. How must we maintain the initiative, because at the moment it
would seem to be that Khrushchev looks pretty good.
"3. What other steps must we take in order to come along OK, and
certainly we should wait for a Khrushchev reply before we make any public
statement. "
Rusk then interposed the problem as to how far we can press Khrushchev,
not as to the IL-28's publicly because Khrushchev himself has not publicly
committed himself on the IL-281s. About this point Ambassador Thompson'
indicated that we should play this very, very cautiously so that we did not
box ourselves out, particularly as to the IL-28's. A subsequent discussion
as to the FROG's, or short-range surface-to-surface missiles, indicated
that as far as the U. S. Government was concerned, we did not consider
them offensive missiles. There was then considerable discussion as to
exactly what we should tell our UN delegation as to offensive and defensive
missiles. Apparently in prior telegrams we have escaladed or added on to
our definition, and it was generally agreed that insofar as the U. S. Govern-
ment was concerned, offensive missiles constituted the IRBM's, the
MR-BM's, the IL-282s, and anything involving nuclear warheads. Insofar
as this might apply to air-to-surface rockets or to bombs, especially just
plain ordinary hardware bombs, we would remain singularly quiet.
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2. At about this point there was brought up the U Thant suggestion
that the five Latin American Ambassadors who were still represented in
Havana should perhaps provide the necessary inspection facilities for
the United Nations. It was felt that the United Nations Secretary General
should have the overall responsibility for inspecting each and every
country, presumably on the basis of the Brazilian atom-free Latin
American proposal, but that in any event the Secretary General should
have the ultimate responsibility. This appears to be a Brazilian proposal
with which I am not too familiar. At about this time Secretary Rusk
indicated that Mr. Bundy should prepare a memo of our requirements as
to surveillance, ultimate safeguards on the basis of quarantine or blockade,
and as to just where we are headed for the reassurances that we need to
make sure that Cuba is not a threat to the Western Hemisphere. It was
indicated that if the Soviets would not guarantee our right to overfly, then
we must tell them that we are prepared to continue overflights in any event,
and that if we are shot at, we must take proper reprisal action, and we
would hope, since the Soviets have assured us that these are Cuban instru-
ments, that there would be no Soviets around to be hurt under the circum-
stances. At about this time Mr. Bundy pointed out that if we have any
agreement with any five Ambassadors from Latin American countries, he
would expect that they would immediately become spelunkers and not only
watch outgoing ships but also start digging into caves. Mr. McNamara at
this point suggested that if the IL-281s do not go under our previous
ultimatums, that we should embargo their fuel. The President then
pointed out that, or at least asked the question, "What can we do to make
it so tough on Castro, particularly as regard the IL-282s, without getting
Khrushchev upset or out of phase with his own government or without
initiating a more fervent quarantine, what can we do to make it real tough
on Castro?" There were suggestions of having Latin American countries
breaking relations, Latin American countries keeping their ships out of
trade, and it was decided that Defense, CIA, and State would get together
and decide just what courses of action might be appropriate under the
circumstances. The question was then raised as to just what should or
could be done if"cane of our surveillance aircraft where shot down. Mr.
Nitze pointed out that we should lay in a strong public relations program
and at this point the President indicated that such a program might be
included in the press statement that was being drafted for his use
tomorrow.
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General Taylor pointed out that we had a number of problems in
case of a shoot-down of our surveillance aircraft. In other words, was
the action isolated or general? I f it was isolated, then we should retaliate
on an isolated spot. If it was general, then we should retaliate generally.
The point here being that we had to have further good proof as to just what
had happened to one of our aircraft and subsequently either to wipe out the
whole system or just that portion of the system that might have done the
damage. It was then pointed out that we had no - repeat no - long-range
surveillance target system. In other words, while all the discussion so
far had been as to inspecting outgoing ships with missiles and checking
incoming ships with possible missiles, quarantine action, and taking an
occasional reading airborne, just exactly what were our long-range surveillance
requirements? The President then indicated that he would like to have CIA
and the Department of Defense establish a joint study as to just what
we might need to insure that we would not again get ourselves trapped in a
situation in which we had most currently found ourselves.
The problem then came up as to just what our posture might be if
although telling Khrushchev that he had to get the IL-28s out, he did not
do so, what do we do next? Do we go to the mat and make an international
problem out of this, or do we deal with a situation which perhaps has not
yet been met? In other words, do we go in and clean them out? Do we
make this a public statement or a private statement? Just exactly what do
we do in the event that Khrushchev says the IL-28s are not part of the
bargain? This problem was turned over to State Department to come up
with possible courses of action.
Mr. McNamara then pointed out that for tomorrow he recommended
U-2 flights up to a total of five (and I think this is the entire capability)
if the weather is okay and there are no other objections. He also
recommended twelve low-level flights to include approximately eight
against caves to just try to find out what was going on. The President
approved all of these.
There was some discussion, but nothing substantive as to just what
might happen if one of our aircraft were shot down. They apparently were
not prepared to face up to this although I got the distinct impression that
it was to be included in the possible pressstatement or possible public
relations statement that State Department was preparing for the President
for tomorrow evening's consideration. They discussed in only general
detail Mr. Nitze's proposal as to what might be done if an aircraft were
shot down. As you will recall, this included alerting the Soviets and the
Cubans that if anything like this happened again, we would have to probably
sit down and talk about it or do something else reasonably less drastic.
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Neither Mr. Rusk, nor Mr. McNamara, nor General Taylor, nor
myself, nor Mr. Dillon specifically were prepared to accept this. We
all felt, and so expressed ourselves, that the President had made himself
abundantly clear and that if there was any shoot-down or offensive action
against our surveillance aircraft, action must be taken. Although no
definite decision was made, I felt the real consensus that the hard-poking
people at this particular meeting were prepared to go right in and start
either shooting down aircraft, including IL-28s, or cleaning out surface-
to-air missile sites in the event there was any hostile action against any
of our reconnaissance activities. In other words, they did not - repeat
did not - accept the general caveat; that had been proposed by Mr. Nitze
in his memorandum to the NSC Executive Committee, dated 7 November.
I must say that I was considerably encouraged by the general position
taken by the President, Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,
specifically Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Dillon. I was not enchanted with the
positions put forward generally by Mr. Nitze, and I think the rest of the
party present was also not enchanted. I did get the most definite impression
that the United States Government was not backing down from its prior
position that all offensive missiles, to include IL-28s, must be removed
from Cuba. However, there did not appear to be any real facing up to the
problem of the SA-2 or the surface-to-air missile sites remaining in Cuba,
regardless of who might control them, either the Soviets or the Cubans.
I tried to address myself to this problem but was told by the President
that they were aware of it. Unfortunately, it would appear that we are
liable to be faced with the problem of accepting SA-2 missile sites all
around Cuba without any firm decision as to U. S. surveillance capabilities
or public policy, or Governmental policy perhaps, as to continuing this
surveillance. In other words, I have a very real fear that some how we
are liable to be backed into the corner of having the SA-2 sites remain in
Cuba, and we, the U. S. Government, will back down on the need for
continued surveillance. I repeated a number of times to the Executive
Committee that unless we continued proper air surveillance we would be
absolutely blind, dumb, and deaf as to what would be going on in Cuba,
and under no circumstances could we accept a degradation of our surveil-
lance responsibilities. I feel reasonably certain that the policy makers
are aware of the fact that: First, as long as the SA-2 missile sites encircle
Cuba, there is a very real threat to our surveillance and intelligence
capabilities; second, that the SA-2 missile system around Cuba is totally
controlled, operated, and commanded by the Soviet Union; thirdly, that
if the Soviets should say this is not true and these are Cuban missile
systems, then we should make it abundantly clear to them that in the event
any of our aircraft are attacked or otherwise disturbed, then we must quite
obviously take reprisal action and we would be happy that there would be
no Soviet troops or personnel involved; and, finally, that the general
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Governmental position was that so long as there was inadequate
inspection on site, inadequate inspection of Cuba from the air,
inadequate verification of outgoing ships, and inadequate checking
of ships coming in to Cuba, then the United States could in no way
be complacent, and would certainly be obliged to take whatever
unilateral action might be required to protect its own interest and the
interest of all Latin American countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Contrary to most meetings I have attended recently at this level, I
came away somewhat encouraged, and certainly not discouraged, but
in a position of continuing to carry the flag for adequate intelligence
and adequate policy action. I felt no feeling of hesitancy, no feeling
of backing up, no feeling of caution from the President, or any of
his advisors. There is absolutely no question in my mind but what
we have a very firm stand, a very firm position, and that the United
States Government will proceed forthwith along this line regardless
of what the consequences might be. I was most encouraged.
25X1
Marshall ar er
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
Distribution:
Original - b>DCI
DDCI /
Ex dutive Director
1 - 4P
1f DD/
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