RESULTS OF USIB MEETING THIS MORNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300040004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 21, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rek#ose 2003/0111 Clr~-RDP8,OP01676R0 ,60004000
21 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Results of USIB Meeting This Morning
1. After a lengthy discussion it was decided that in view of the
times of preparation of SNIE 11-19-62 and the supplement to the
joint evaluation of Soviet missile threat in Cuba, it would be undesirable
to attempt to revise the latter to make it conform to the former. The
GMAIC report had already been distributed to its recipients and,
furthermore, was based on information that was three days old. In
addition, the comment in the SNIE was based on a previous GMAIC report
and was for estimative purposes rather than to provide finite technical
detail. It was agreed that if the question arose, these differences would
be pointed out to our principals and that it was not in fact a matter of
great difference. We must continue to look to the GMAIC report as
amended each day to give us the current operational readiness status of
the missile sites, always remembering that these will be subject to the
latest read-out provided by Lundahl and the fact that the analysis is based
on information which is 48-72 hours old.
2. The Board of National Estimates was instructed to produce a
special estimate as to various situations that might occur, and Soviet
reaction thereto, after a strike against the missile bases. It was agreed
that in the absence of planned courses of action, they would have to make
their own assumptions as to such courses.
3. Continued security precautions were urged in order to prevent
large-scale, world-wide alert procedures going into effect. It was
mentioned that such procedures could even trigger a pre-emptive attack.
USIB decided to keep field notification to the barest minimum until after
the President had made his talk. Additionally, the problem of reduction
in the tight security controls was discussed and it was apparent that the
Department of State had lifted these controls to the extent of bringing in
a number of Assistant Secretaries over and above those cleared at the
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White House. General Carroll in particular is hurting on this but
appears to be hewing to the line as closely as possible.
4. We decided that there was a need for a black list of Cuban
Communist leaders so that in the event we do invade the island, we
will be able to put the finger on those people who must be rounded up
the soonest. I will have DD/P and DD/I get on this.
5. We directed GMAIC and JAEIC to prepare a sanitized version
of their current report plus supplements. This will be considered at
2:00 this afternoon by USIB. It is essential that we protect our
I I COMINI2, and KEYHOLE sources -- it was agreed that
u s l give a most meaningful presentation at the Top Secret
level and perhaps even less, which would be suitable for briefings of
the Latin American Ambassadors, the quadripartite Ambassadors, the
NATO Council, and others. We will also sanitize this to ensure that
the thrust is against Cuba and Castro rather than the Soviet Union.
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300040004-2