MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM [GENERAL CARTER]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300040003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 17, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

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17 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED, 1. On Monday evening, 15 October late, I was informed that
6/26/2003 the latest readout from Cuban U-2 photography indicated initial
deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. I immediately
authorized the dissemination of this information on a very limited
need-to-know basis to USIB members and their immediate com-
manders. On Tuesday morning at 11:45 I attended an NSC Meeting
at the White House which included the President, Secretary Rusk,
Secretary Ball, Secretary Martin, Secretary McNamara, Secretary
Gilpatric, General Taylor, the Vice President, Secretary Dillon,
the Attorney General, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and myself. I made
a preliminary briefing to the group as to what we thought we saw
25X1 and Mr. Lundahl and 11 1 expanded thereon. At the end
of the intelligence portion of the briefing, the group went into
25X1 NSC general discussion.
2. Secretary Rusk was greatly disturbed about this new
development but pointed out that Mr. McCone had predicted such a
possibility back in mid-August. He said that he had been thinking
about courses of action and that he had a number of comments to
make, along the following lines:
a. A quick-strike surprise attack by air to wipe out these
bases;
b. Consideration to expand this into a total invasion to
take over the island;
c. We must not operate in a vacuum but must of course
pre-inform our allies, at least in part;
d. We should consider making an announcement very shortly
and to determine whether or not to call up the Reserves;
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e. Perhaps we should get in touch with Castro through a
third party and tell him it was now or never and that he was
selling Cuba down the river by getting involved with Soviet
missile bases;
f. We should try to create maximum confusion and not
worry too much about the noise level. Here he was referring
to infiltration and sabotage efforts;
g. We should review our policy on a provisional govern-
ment and try to get all the various factions working together.
In any event, we must keep Cuba isolated from the Free World
although in doing so we must not isolate ourselves.
3. In the final analysis Mr. Rusk felt that we had to either make
a quick surprise attack and knock out these bases or to lay on a heavy
propaganda barrage in all areas which might cause a withdrawal.
Rusk stated that we could not in our thinking separate Berlin and other
trouble areas in the world. He seemed deeply troubled and did not
seem firm in any of his proposals but appeared to have been boxing
the compass as to courses of action.
4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that if we are going to take overt
military action, it must at all costs be done on a 100% basis and before
any of the missiles become operational. General Taylor pointed out
that the element of surprise would be essential but since this would
then be a one-shot operation, we should establish an immediate blockade
and then look toward invasion although this latter prospect did not
enthuse him. He stated that the decision to invade would be the hardest
one to make because of the long-time involvements and the lack of any
substitute for the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the
Soviet decision must have been made early in the summer and that
these missiles probably arrived in Cuba at about the time the President
Was making his policy statements. Bundy thought there was a real
possibility that Khrushchev may be confused or misled as to the temper
of the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba.
5. The President pointed out that the missiles certainly had to
be removed one way or another, and stated that he would meet again at
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six o'clock that evening with his advisers. In the meantime there was
much information to be gathered and much analysis to be done as to
pros and cons of all the various courses of action. He authorized as
many U-2 flights as needed to get full, complete, 100% coverage of
the island. He asked for a report on the latest analysis of just what
the thinking toward Cuba is in Latin American countries as well as
NATO as to any action the U. S. might take; some unanswered ques-
tions on whether or not to surface the fact that we were making sur-
veillance flights and whether or not to surface this new information;
also whether to precede any military action by some form of political
pressure action; what would be the effect of military strikes, how
long would it take to organize, how many sorties would be required,
etc.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter
Here's as much as you dictated on your
Memorandum for the Record.
Barbara (17 Oct)
DATE)
FORM NO. 'rtl REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 Asir 54 V
I,... .....
WH
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