MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001200080046-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: February 5, 1958
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP80BO1676R00120SIB tv "
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. Co
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Dulles, Chairman, Intelligence Advisory
Committee
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming Jr., Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, Director of Naval.
Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Major General Millard Lewis, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, United States Air Force
Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation
The attached memorandum of conversation which -reflects on the
current developments in Indonesia is forwarded for your information..
Army review(s)
completed.
Rcgraded Unclassified
when Sep Lfffq%rTlQlAse f2 4: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001200080046-3
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TAB "A"
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH INDONESIAN ARMY OFFICERS
28 JANUARY 1958
Participants: Lieutenant Colonel. D0 I. Pandjaitan, Assistant Military
Attache, Bonn, Germany
Lieutenant Colonel M. Panggabean, recent graduate of
Allied, Officers Course, The Infantry School,
Ft Benning, Georgia
Mr. E. D. Sorenson, Indonesia-Malaya Specialist, ACSI
1. Pandjaitan and Panggabean are brothers-in-law and both are
Christian Sumatrans from Tapanuli. Although both officers are out-
spokenly anti-Communist, they are strongly opposed to the political
dominance of;the Javanese and are scornful of the "blind and stupid"
Javanese response to President Sukarno. Despite their lack of respect
for Sukarno, both officers insisted that a realistic consideration
of the voting potential on Java and Sukarno's position as the recognized
leader of Indonesia's revolution precludes the formation of any Govern
ment for a united Indonesia without Sukarno. Sukarno must be "used"
until the "right time" arrives. Both officers blame Indonesia's troubles
on improper coordination and planning. This criticism applies both to
the Central Government and to the efforts of the opposition, in which
group they placed themselves.
2. Pandjaitan claims that a majority of the "younger officers"
in.the Indonesian Army has lost faith in the extremist views respectively
represented by Army Chief of Staff Nasution and "dissident" Colonel
Simbolon. These younger officers regard Colonel Kawilarang, currently
Army Attache in Washington, as their "spiritual leader" for reuniting
the Indonesian Army. Pandjaitan's "mission" to Washington was for the
express purpose of delivering a request by the younger officers for
Kawilarang to return to Indonesia and use his influence to prevent
the fragmentation of the Republic.
3. Pandjaitan also stated that the "younger officer group" was
disturbed and becoming disillusioned about U.S. policy toward Indonesia.
They did not understand why the U.S., which had helped Indonesia obtain
her independence, was "deserting" her now. The Army does not regard the
Neta Guinea question as a paramount issue in itself, but that as long
as it remains an obsession of Sukarno it will be a critical factor in
Indonesian affairs. These officers have waited in vain for the United
States to take the lead in "neutralizing" the New Guinea problem and
thus removing it as an "emotional" issue for Sukarno to exploit.
Pandjaitan asserts that before his visits to the United States, the
USSR and China in 1956, Sukarno was beginning to overcome'his suspicions
of the United States (as a "capitalist" nation). However, the contrast
between the U.S. position on New Guinea and that of the Soviet and
Chinese again swung Sukarno away from the West. These officers ask
"what must we do to get U.S. support?"
Unable to determine
regrading date
CR.ET
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SECRET
Memorandum of Conversation with Indonesian Army Officers
4. Pandjaitan also averred that both the Chief of Army
Intelligence and General Nasution had assured the U.S. Army'Attache
in Djakarta that the Army was removing suspected Communists from in-
fluential positions as rapidly as they were discovered. Somewhat ex-
citedly, then, Colonel Pandjaitan stated, "If the U.S. knows of any
Communists, let them tell us, and we will have them removed. If the
U.S. says that General Gatot Subroto is more acceptable than Nasution,
and will give us arms, we can make that come about in three months
time. We will do anything except shoot Sukarno or attack the Communists
without proof of illegal actions on their part. In our country now we
cannot arrest Communists just because they are Communists; we will
remove them-=so (gesture as stabbing with a knife)--if they step out of
line, but, they are careful."
5o Pandjaitan asserted that he had seen Colonel Jani (the head
of the Indonesian military purchasing mission currently in Eastern
Europe) in Belgrade and that Jani stated that he had the authority
to break off all negotiations with the satellites and go to Washington
if.the United States agreed to furnish Indonesia with reimbursable
Military aid. Moreover, even if U.S. aid were not forthcoming, Jani
hoped to be able to keep Bloc purchases for the Army to a bare minimums
6. Concerning reports that separate states will be declared in
Sumatra and/or Celebes, both Pandjaitan and Panggabean asserted that
the several councils do not have sufficient strength to carry out their
threats. Panggabean stated that these groups were weak from the outset,
but that they had succeeded because the Central Government under
Ali Sastroamidjojo, was even weaker. Moreover, Panggabean asserted
that much of the support initially developed because of the injustices
and inequalities in the relations between Java and the outer islands,
was currently dissipating because of the dangers of disunity in the
Republic.
7. Both officers left Washington last week. Panggabean will
accompany Pandjaitan to Bonn for a short visit before returning to
Indonesia. He has not been told his next assignment.
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 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP80B01676R001200080046-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles
This is for your information.
Copies of this report have been sent
to General Cabell, DD/P and DD/I.
6 Feb 58
(DATE)
FORM I AUGH 54 Ivl WHICH RELACES
BEM US10*101
ED.
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