LETTER TO ALLEN W. DULLES FROM JAMES S. LAY, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001100060023-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 1, 1960
• Content Type: LETTER

Y j~a~ C~ .~_ Ego
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1960
Dear Mr.Director:
The enclosed Organizational History of the National
Security Council has been prepared for the Senate Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery, in response to a request by
its Staff Director.
Although I understand that this history will be printed
under the auspices of the Senate Subcommittee, I thought that
you might be interested in having an advance copy.
Sincerely yours,
Executive Secretary
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Hon. Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
June 30, 1960
Dear Mr. Mansfield:
I am transmitting herewith the Organizational History of the National
Security Council which you requd o for recordchinery.of the
hearings of the Senate Subcommittee
Robert H. Johnson, Director of the planning Board Secretariat of the
ed in writing this history. It is based
NBC Staff, and I have collaborat
tance of
upon official sources, the valued assis many of our associates
in the NBC organization, articles by officials who have been associated
with the Council, and our own recollections of events.
We have tried to make this history an authoritative and objective
eg s each
re
analysis of the organization and procedures ofri he Corn ilh l u in
of the three principal phases of its developm
is an essentially factual description of the general organizational
problems and guiding concepts, the structure of the Council and its sub-
ordinate bodies, and the procedures employed, with some indication in
and of the for each in
each case of the type of activieiof the Council9eaorganizat1 na3.sdevelop-
the largely evolutionary proces
ment.
of the Council's deve
i
ng
Behind this administrative account
the substance of the national security policy problems
lies, of course, :^ ed offi-
and issues dealt with in the NBC organization b y many disti-gufisish the
cials over the years. These substantive problems and issues,
individuals participating in their consideration, more than anything
~ures*
else have governed the nature first footnote,Pandrconsistent with the agreed
However, as indicated in history does not include the
for the Subcommittees study, this
guidelines
substance of any papers or discussions within the NSC organization. As
also indicated, there is no individual appraisal of officials associated
with the Council.
It is our earnest hope and desire that this history will prove of
value to the work of the Subcommittee and, in fact, to all serious
students of Government.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Ececutive Secretary
Mr. J. Kenneth Mansfield, Staff Director
Senate Subeogmnittee on National Policy Machinery
Washington 25, D. C.
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AV-ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Table of Contents
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION---------------------------------------------
Eau
1
II. THE INITIAL PHASE 5
(SEPTEMBER 1947 - JUNE 1950)-----------------------------------
Introduction------------------------------------------------ 5
The Organization of the Council----------------------------- 6
The Organization of the Staff------------------------------- 10
Staff and Council Procedures-------------------------------- 12
The State-Army-Navy-Air Force
Coordinating Committee------------------------------------ 17
III. THE SECOND PHASE
(JUNE 1950 - JANUARY 1953) ------------------------------------- 18
Introduction------------------------------------------------ 18
Reorganization of the
Council and the Staff------------------------------------- 19
Subsequent Changes in the Council and Staff Organization---- 23
Senior Staff and Council Procedures------------------------ 23
The Psychological Strategy Board--------------------------
IV. THE THIRD PHASE
8
(JANUARY 1953 TO THE PRESENT)---------------------------------- 228
Introduction------------------------------------------------
Reorganization of the
Council and the Staff------------------------------------- 30
Subsequent Changes in the Organization of the
Council and the Planning Board---------------------------- 35
Planning Board and Council Procedures----------------------- 39
The Operations Coordinating Board--------------------------- 46
Origin of the OCB--------------------------------------- 46
Organization of the OCB-------------------------------- 49
The 0CB Staff------------------------------------------ 51
Placement of the 0CB within the NSC Structure---------- 52
The Work of the OCB------------------------------------ 54
Changes in the NSC Staff Since July 1, 1957----------------- 59
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June 30, 1960
AN ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL*
By James S. Lay, Jr. and Robert H. Johnson
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In a little less than thirteen years the National Security
Council has been transformed from a brief statement of purposes in the
National Security Act of 19+7 into a well-established part of the
governmental machinery. Two Presidents have endorsed, supported and
fully utilized it. The organization and procedures of the Council have
been adjusted to meet the individual needs and desires of each of the
Presidents who have presided over it as well, as the requirements of a
changing world situation. However, the Council mechanism has also
evolved continuously; each stage in its development has been built upon
the stage before.
Even in advance of World War II there were individuals who saw
the need for improved means of correlating our foreign policy with our
military and economic capabilities. However, it was the deficiencies
exposed by the pre-Pearl Harbor period of diplomatic and military maneuver,
the handling of wartime problems involving relationships between foreign,
military and domestic policies, and the development of policies for the
postwar period that demonstrated to many individuals, in and out of govern-
ment, the need for better machinery for relating our foreign and our mili-
tary policies. During the wartime period General George C. !vrshall is
understood to have been an early advocate of improved top-level coordin-
ating machinery.
* This history deals only with the unclassified organization and pro-
cedures of the National Security Council. It does not include the
substance of papers or discussions on national security matters within
the NSC organization because they are of a confidential nature invol-
ving matters-of Presidential privilege and because most of them must
a propriate for this history to contain any individual appraisal of the
many distinguished officials who have been associated with the NSC
organization. However, it should be recognized that the organization
and procedures described herein were largely governed by the require-
ments of the subject matter and of the individuals involved in the
work of the Council during the various stages of its history. In fact,
the purpose of the organization and procedures on which this history
concentrates is to serve the officials of the Council in dealing with
the substantive problems and issues affecting the security of the United
States now and in the foreseeable future.
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The genesis of the National Security Council has, however, many
sources. One such source was U.S. wartime participation with the
British in combined committees, and more particularly, our experience
with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In these committees the U.S. par-
ticipants became familiar with British development and use of commit-
tees and committee secretariats. In the course of their collaboration
with the British, U.S. officials also became familiar with the British
Committee of Imperial Defense which had been established in 190+ as a
means of assuring high-level coordination of national security matters.
U.S. officials recognized that any similar U.S. organizations
would have to be adapted to the requirements of the U.S. Presidential
system which are, of course, in important respects different from those
of the British Parliamentary system. The experience of the United
States with the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was applied during
the war to the development of the organizational structure of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to the development of the staff and
sub-committee structure of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC), established late in 1944 to provide a more regular channel of
communication between the State Department and the U.S. military on
politico-military matters.*
The "Committee of Three" which was established during World War II
and subsequently abolished was, in a sense, one of the predecessors of
the National Security Council. This committee was composed of the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy and was designed to facilitate con-
sultation among these Presidential advisers on politico-military matters.
In the immediate post-war period numerous individuals and groups
studied the problem and advocated some kind of high-level coordinating
mechanism. One of the more comprehensive of these studies, and the
first one to suggest the name "National Security Council", was the
report prepared by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt for Secretary of the Navy
Forrestal in September 1945 as a result of the controversy over unifi-
cation of the armed services.**
So many different individuals and organizations contributed to the
development of the concept and the specific legislative proposals re-
lating to the National Security Council that analysis of this phase of
the Council's history could readily provide the basis for a separate
study. It is necessary in this short history of the Council, therefore,
to concentrate essentially upon developments which began with the
* SWNCC was reconstituted as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee (SANACC) following the end of the war. For discussion of
the relationship of SANACC to the NSC see infra, p. 17.
Unification of War and Navy Departments and Post-war Organization
for National Security, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of
Navy. (Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 79th
Congress, First session), pp- 7-8, 55.
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enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. Even for the period
covered, this history does not pretend to be completely comprehensive,
but it does attempt to cover all major developments.
The National Security Act, passed by a Republican Congress and
approved by a Democratic President, is best known as the legislation
that provided for "unification" of the armed services. However, it
was the intent of Congress in passing the act "to provide a comprehensive
program for the future security of the United States"* and Title I of
the Act provides coordinating mechanisms in three other areas of national
security activity -- L. q., the areas of national security policy; of
intelligence; and of military, industrial and civilian mobilization.
The National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) were created to
coordinate the various activities of the existing Executive departments
and agencies in these three fields.**
The Act provided that the function of the Council should be to
"advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as
to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of
the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the
national security." It further stated that, subject to the direction
of the President, the Council should:
"a. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments,
and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and
potential military power, in the interest of national security,
for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in
connection therewith; and
"b. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to
the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with
the national security, and . . . make recommendations to the
President in connection therewith."
The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the same Act, was placed
under the Council.***
*
***
National Security Act of _f9__47, Section 2.
The Eberstadt report had also proposed creation of a CIA and an NSRB.
Section 102(a). The relationship is spelled out in Section 102(d). A
predecessor organization, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), had
been established on January 22, 1946 by Presidential Directive. CIG
was, in September 1947, therefore a functioning organization and pro-
vided the organizational base upon which CIA was built.The Presidential
Directive of 1946 also created the National Intelligence Authority(NIA)
(composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a personal
representative of the President) to seek to ensure that the foreign
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government were "planned,developed
and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of
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The Act specified that the Council should be composed of the
President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force,
and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, but authorized
the President to designate the Secretaries of executive departments,
the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the Chairman of the Research
and Development Board as Council members. The Act further stated that
the President should preside over Council meetings, but provided that,
in his absence, he might designate a member of the Council to preside
in his place. Finally, the Act provided for the establishment of a
career staff headed by a civilian Executive Secretary appointed by
the President.
It is possible to identify three distinct phases in the Council's
evolution: (a) an initial phase (September 1947-June 1950) during
which the Council was organized and established itself as a useful part
of the governmental machinery; (b) a second phase (June 1950-January
1953) during which the Council was reorganized in the light of opera-
tional experience and to meet the greatly increased demands placed
upon it by the Korean War; and (c) a third phase (January 1953 to date)
during which the Council mechanism was further strengthened and ad-
justed to the requirements of a new President.
the intelligence mission related to the national security". The
Director of Central Intelligence, who headed CIG, performed his re-
sponsibilities "under the direction and control" of the NIA (11
Federal Register 1337-39, February 5, 1946). NIA was, in turn,closely
associated with the so-called "Committee of Three" which had the same
membership as NIA (except that it did not include a President's repre-
sentative) but a broader role. Mr. Sidney Souers, who was named as the
first Director of Central Intelligence, was subsequently the first NSC
Executive Secretary.
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II. THE INITIAL-PHASE (SEPTEMBER 1 49 7-JUNE 1950)
Introduction
Those who participated in the initial organization and work of the Coun-
cil were motivated by certain key principles. Central to everything else was
their recognition cth and emphasis upon the Council's role as a policy advisory
body to the PreSjdeit..,.
At the,ti 'the Council was organized there were some within the Executive
Branch who,raygFIed'.a somewhat different emphasis. They did not deny that the
Council was,undathentally an advisory body to the President. But they believed
that when,'z_,the absence of the President, there was consensus within the Coun-
cil on a particular matter; when the departments or agencies represented on the
CounaLl were able to carry out the decision reached; and when that decision was
within t e:..scope of previously approved Presidential policies, it would not be
necessary to:;take the matter to the President for decision.
wds>cecided, however, that the Council's role should be limited strict-
ly to advising the President. The advisory character of the Council was the
principal theme of a statement of the "Concept" of the Council approved by the
President in July 1948.* The only qualification placed upon this proposition
was the recognition that, under the statute, the Council members had certain
corporate responsibilities for issuing general directives concerning the organ-
ization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several
government departments and agencies as relate to the national security. Even
this is not truly an exception, for the President retains the ultimate power of
decision within the Executive Branch.
Corollary to this emphasis upon the advisory character of the Council was
the acceptance of the principle that divergencies of view as to national secu-
rity policy should not be suppressed, but should be clearly reflected at each
stage in the development of a policy. This principle has been applied to the
Council's work throughout its history and regularly resulted in presentation
to the President of what have come to be known as "split" policy recommenda-
tions.
Within the broad and basic concept as to the advisory character of the
Council, the officials responsible for organizing the Council's work faced
certain immediate practical decisions as to what kinds of problems should be
tackled first. The Council's functions, as stated in the statute, were very
broad indeed. It was believed, however, that the Council could most quickly
establish itself as an organization of recognized usefulness to the President
and to the departments and agencies if, initially, instead of concentrating on
some of the broader, longer-range national security problems, it were to make
The immediate occasion for the preparation of the "Concept" was an appear-
ance by the Executive Secretary before a Hoover Commission Task Force.
However, it was based upon and codified similar statements that had been
made upon earlier occasions.
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itself available to the Council agencies for the development of policies to
deal with problems which were of immediate, current concern to those agencies
and which required Presidential decision. Finally, it was recognized that the
Council was likely, under the circumstances existing at that time, to be con-
cerned in very considerable measure with problems involving foreign affairs
and that, accordingly, the State Department would play a major role within
the organization.*
The Organization of the Council
The National Security Act of 191+7 was approved by the President on
July 26, 191+7. Mr. Sidney Souers, the Executive Secretary Designate, began
assembling a small permanent Council Staff in August.** The Council held its
first meeting on the effective date of the Act, Friday, September 26, 191+7.
Mr. Souers was sworn in as Executive Secretary just prior to the meeting, to-
gether with the heads of two other new agencies established by the Pct, the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, National Security Resources
Board.
Certain basic organizational decisions were made at the first meeting of
the Council. It was decided that the permanent membership should be restricted
to those officials specified by the Pct and that attendance of other officials
would be only with the approval of the presiding officer. The heads of other
agencies were regu]a rly invited for items of interest to them.*** It was
agreed that the Director of Central Intelligence should attend all Council
meetings as an adviser and observer. It was decided that no set schedule of
meetings should be established, but that meetings should be arranged as re-
quired. The Council at this inaugural meeting also approved recommendations
of the Executive Secretary, developed in consultation with the participating
agencies, with respect to the functions and composition of the NSC Staff and
with respect to the initial study assignment to the Staff. It was agreed that
CIA. should initially furnish necessary administrative services to the NSC
(e. g?, fiscal, personnel and supply services).
On this last point see Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation and National
Security". The American Political Science Review Vol. XLIII, No.
(June 1949) p. 53 6.
On the day the Council held its first meeting the Council had, in addition
to the Executive Secretary, three employees, all detailed by participating
agencies. One of these was the present Executive Secretary, Mr. James S.
Lay, Jr..
It would not be useful to list for the period 1946-50, or for subsequent
periods covered in this history, all of the other officials who partici-
pated in Council meetings on an ad hoc basis. However, it may be of in-
terest to note that the following participated on this basis during the
period September 1947 to December 191+8: The Secretaries of Treasury,
Commerce and Labor; the Attorney General; the Economic Cooperation Ad-
ministrator and the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.
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Although President Truman presided at the first Council meeting and occa-
sional meetings thereafter, he did not regularly attend such meetings until the
beginning of the Korean War.* The President's decision not to attend Council
meetings was based upon his concern that the discussion might be terminated
prematurely by too early an expression of his own views** and upon his view
that in this way he could best preserve his full freedom of action with respect
to the policy recommendations of the Lounoil, including any dissents thereto.
There were thc1QG who argued that, in view of the statement in the statute
that "The SP--vary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the Presi-
aa:zt, w all matters relating to the national security",he should preside in the
President's absence.*** However, the President decided that the Secretary of
State, as the second ranking member of the Council as then constituted, would
preside. This decision was also consistent with the concept that, under the
circumstances then existing, the State Department would play a major role in
the organization.
The Council's recommendations were brought to the President for his con-
sideration following the meeting, ordinarily by the Executive Secretary who
served, in effect, as an Administrative Assistant to the President for national
security matters. The President was kept regularly informed of the status of
Council business through regular briefings by the Executive Secretary. The
Executive Secretary saw the President daily to brief him on the latest foreign
intelligence as well as on Council matters.**** Even though the President did
not regularly preside, Council meetings were, from the beginning, held in the
Cabinet Room of The White House.
During this period certain changes occurred in the initial arrangements
regarding meetings and Council participation. In May 1948 the Council agreed
that meetings should be regularly scheduled twice a month. However, a meeting
might be cancelled if there was no business to transact and special meetings
might be scheduled as required. These rules prevailed until the beginning of
the Korean War. Two significant changes in membership occurred in the period.
In January 1949 the President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury at-
tend all Council meetings. On August 19, 1949, the President approved amend-
ments to the National Security Act which created the Department of Defense as
* President Truman presided at twelve of the 57 Council meetings which were
held during the period from September 26, 1947 through June 23, 1950.
** Souers, op, cit p. 541.
*** National Security Act of 1947, Section 202 (a). In 1949 this section was
amended to provide that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal
assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of
Defense".
**'* With the retirement of Admiral William H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the
President, on March 26, 1949, the Executive Secretary assumed full re-
sponsibility for briefing the President daily on politico-military af-
fairs, a task he had previously performed in cooperation with Admiral
Leahy.
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an Executive Department and greatly strengthened the position of the Secretary
of Defense giving him clear primacy over the Service Secretaries.* These amend-
ments also eliminated the Service Secretaries from the Council membership and
added the Vice President. The same amendments made the Joint Chiefs of Staff
military advisers to the Council. The Chairman, JCS, thereafter attended all
Council meetings. By Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective August 20,
1949) the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President, thus
formalizing a de facto situation.**
A Council staff and committee structure to deal with U. S. internal se-
curity problems was developed as a result of Council action initiated in April
1948. At that time the Council employed Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, former Chief of
the Internal Security Division of the FBI, as a consultant. Mr. Coyne, who
was recommended to the Council by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI,
under'ook at the Council's request a survey of the problem of internal security.
His report, submitted to the Council in August, concluded that a more thorough-
ly coordinated and integrated effort was required in this field. To this end,
he proposed creation of a Special Assistant on Internal Security to the Na-
tional Security Council who would be charged with responsibility for making an
assessment and appraisal of the over-all internal security program on a con-
tinuing basis and who would arrange through interested agencies for studies of
parti.ular internal security problems with a view to developing agreed solu-
tion5 to such problems. In carrying out this function this individual was to
work !.-Iose1v, on c. consultative, advisory and mutually cooperative basis with
the r^presc:.btati-~n of the interested Executive departments and agencies. The
Council adapted t' conclusions of this report, but deferred action on the rec-
ommendation with respect to a Special Assistant.
After further consideration of the problem the NSC in March 1949 approved
a directive establishing the already existent Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference (IIC) as a committee of the NBC and creating a new Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security (ICIS).KKK Specific charters for the two
Public'-Law 216, 81st Congress.
The Council offices were from the beginning located in the Executive Of-
fice Building. There were those who, at the time the Council was getting
organized, favored locating Council offices in the Pentagon. In fact,
office space was provided for the Executive Secretary in the Pentagon,
but never occupied. The decision to locate the Council offices in the
Executive Office Building reflected a conscious recognition of the Coun-
cil's role as a staff arm to the President.
VKH At the time it was established as a committee of the NSC, the IIC was made
up of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Jus-
tice; the Director of the Intelligence Division of the Army; the Director
of Naval Intelligence; and the Director, Office of Special Investigations,
U. S. Air Force. The membership today is the same except that the title
of the Army representative is now "Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Depart-
ment of the Army" and, of the Air Force representative, "Director of Spec-
ial Investigations, the Inspector General, Headquarters U. S. Air Force".
The ICIS was, and continues to be, composed of representatives of the
Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and the National Military Estab-
lishment (now, the Department of Defense).
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committees were approved subsequently by the Council. The IIC was already
responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espion-
age, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence
matters affecting internal security. The ICIS was made responsible for co-
ordination of all other internal security matters.
The directive of March 1949 also created an NSC Representative on In-
ternal Security who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, was re-
sponsible for (a) assisting and advising the NSC in coordinating the activi-
ties of the IIC and the ICIS; (b) assistin and advising the IIC and the ICIS
in carrying out their responsibilities; (c) submitting to the IIC and the ICIS
questions which, in his opinion, required their consideration; (d) participat-
ing, as the representative of the NSC, as an observer and adviser in all meet-
ings of the IIC and the ICIS; (e) submitting for NSC consideration any problems
which could not be resolved by the IIC and the ICIS, outlining divergent solu-
tions proposed and making his own recommendation; and (f) reporting to the NSC
at least quarterly on progress being made in the provision of adequate internal
security. It was specified, however, that he should have no power of instruc-
tion, direction or supervision over the IIC or the ICIS. Mr. Coyne was desig-
nated as the NSC Representative on Internal Security.
When, acting within its Presidentially-approved charter, either of the
committees reached an agreement on a particular course of action, that agree-
ment could be referred to the appropriate agency for implementation without
prior reference of the matter to the NSC. The NSC Representative on Internal
Security sought to ensure that matters that did appear to require Council ac-
tion were brought to the Council's attention. The Council was kept regularly
informed of the committees' activities through reports on those activities.
Beginning with this initial period and thereafter throughout its history,
the Council has from time to time established other standing committees or sub-
committees. Such standing committees occasionally include members from non-
Council agencies. However, they have characteristically been created to deal
with some particularly sensitive subject or with a subject of direct interest
to only a few of the agencies that participate in the Council's work.*
It may be useful here to compare the recommendations of the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the "Hoover Commis-
sion") regarding the NSC with the organizational changes described above.
The Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended inter alias (a) that the Presi-
dent be given authority to determine the membership of the Council; (b) that
better working level relationships be established between the JCS organiza-
tion and the NSC and other agencies; (c) that internal security planning be
improved; (d) that CIA be improved and strengthened; and (e) that the Coun-
cil be placed formally within the President's Office. The 1949 statutory
changes helped ease some of the immediate problems with respect to member-
ship by limiting the military establishment to a single Council representa-
tive. The statutory change with respect to the JCS relationship to the
Council eased, but did not completely solve, the problem referred to in
(b); further organizational chap es effected in 1950 did, however, largely
solve this problem (infra, p. 22. The surveys of internal security and
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The Organization of the Staff
A major consideration in the initial organization of the Council's staff
was stated as follows by the first Executive Secretary of the Council:
"In organizing the staff, an effort has been made to steer a middle
course between two undesirable extremes. If the personnel were entirely
composed of permanent Council employees, there would be a tendency to
reach 'ivory tower' conclusions out of step with operational develop-
ments. On the other hand, if the personnel were solely officers de-
tailed from the participating departments, unavoidable turnover might
cause a loss of continuity. The staff, therefore, is a mixture of
these two types."*
That part of the staff organization drawn from the agencies that partici-
pate in the Council's work has, throughout the Council's history, performed
two basic functions. On the one hand, the individuals who comprise this part
of the staff have been individually responsible for bringing the resources of
their respective departments and agencies to bear upon the Council's work.
On the other hand, these individuals have, as a group, prepared the papers
considered by the Council. The permanent career staff of the Council has pro-
vided certain central services and has been a source of independent analysis
of the subjects before the Council and its subordinate interdepartmental staff
groups.
The Council Staff, as initially organized, had three principal components:
(a) the Office of the Executive Secretary; (b) a Secretariat which performed
such usual secretariat duties as circulating papers, preparing agenda and re-
cording Council actions; and (c) a unit called "The Staff" which developed
studies and policy recommendations for Council consideration. The office of
the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat were composed entirely of perma-
nent Council employees. "The Staff", on the other hand, initially consisted
wholly of officials detailed on a full-time basis by the departments and agen-
cies represented on the Council, though it was assisted by permanent staff
members. Because, as earlier noted, it was anticipated that the majority of
problems dealt with by the Council under then-existing conditions would relate
primarily to foreign affairs, the State Department was asked to provide an
official to head this Staff. This official was called the "Coordinator of
the Staff". In December, 1947, a permanent Council employee was added to
"The Staff". Obtained by permanent transfer from State, he was designated
"Assistant to the Coordinator". Immediately following the first Council
meeting, full-time members of "The Staff" were designated by State, Army,
intelligence activities (on the latter see infra, pp. 12-13)., which had al-
ready been undertaken by the Council, together with the Council actions
flowing therefrom, covered the matters mentioned in (c) and (d). Place-
ment of the NSC in the Executive Office of the President dealt with the
recommendation referred to in (e).
* Souers, OP cit, p. 537.
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Navy, Air Force and CIA. The State Staff Member was not initially the same
individual as the "Coordinator". The Secretary of Defense, who was not at
this time represented on "The Staff", designated a Special Assistant to main-
tain liaison with the Executive Secretary. Because it was itself in process
of organization during this period, the NSRB did not designate a Staff member
until February 1948. Non-members of the Council were represented at meetings
of "The Staff" on an ad hoc basis when subjects of concern to them were being
considered. Members of "rT-he Staff" were generally of the rank of lieutenant
colonel or colonel (Navy: commander or captain) or equivalent Civil Service
rank; the Coordinator was a senior Foreign Service Officer.
It might be noted here that the changes that have occurred during the
life of the Council in the terminology applied to the different parts of the
Council staff organization have been a source of some confusion to those out-
side the organization. Thus initially, as indicated, the term "The Staff"
was applied to the principal interdepartmental component of "The NSC Staff".*
Following the 1950 reorganization the interdepartmental components, the
"Senior NSC Staff" and the "Staff Assistants", were formally still considered
a part, along with the permanent career staff, of "The NSC Staff". However,
in practice it became customary to apply the latter term to the permanent
career staff only. This practice was formalized at the time of the 1953
reorganization.
In November 1947 a fourth component was added to the Council staff struc-
ture. As a result of a meeting of the Four Secretaries (Defense, Army, Navy
and Air Force) attended by Mr. Souers, the chiefs of the plans and operations
divisions in the three military services were designated "Consultants" to the
Executive Secretary. The Secretary of State similarly agreed to designate the
Chief of the Policy Planning Staff as the State Consultant to Mr. Souers. A
Consultant was named by NSRB in June 1948, and the Director of Central Intel-
ligence performed this function for CIA. In addition, the Secretary of De-
fense designated the Director of the Joint Staff to advise the Executive Sec-
retary. Although a number of important changes have been made in the Council
staff organization since 1947, the basic pattern of a two-level interagency
staff organization, established in 191+7, has persisted down to the present day.
Only relatively minor changes occurred in this staff organization during
the period under review. In April 1949, after Mr. Louis Johnson became Secre-
tary of Defense, he named a Member for "The Staff" and formally designated the
Director of the Joint Staff as his NSC Consultant. The position of State Mem-
ber of "The Staff" and the position of the Coordinator of "The Staff" were
combined in July 1949. After the National Security Act was amended in August
1949, the three members of "The Staff" from the military services were redes-
ignated "Advisers" and the representative of the Secretary of Defense became
the sole member from the Defense Department. The Service Advisers continued,
however, to participate fully in the work of "The Staff".
Hereafter when reference is made to this interdepartmental staff component
of the 1947-50 period, it will be identified as "The Staff" in quotation
marks.
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Staff and Council Procedures
Something of the character of the problems with which the Council was con-
cerned during this period, as well as during subsequent periods, may be sug-
gested by a brief description of the four principal categories of policy papers
considered by the Council. First and most important are the basic over-all
policy papers which cover a wide range of national security problems and con-
tain related political, economic and military strategy. Second are the papers
covering individual foreign countries or larger geographical regions. A third
category might be called "functional" policies. These cover such national se-
curity policy matters as mobilization, atomic energy, Free World-Sino-Soviet
Bloc trade, and regulation and control of armaments. Organizational policies
constitute the final category. These include, among others, policies relating
to the Council's own organization, internal security organization and the gen-
eral policy directives relating to the organization and coordination of foreign
intelligence activities which are issued by the Council pursuant to the National
Security Act.
The Council at its first meeting, on the recommendation of the Executive
Secretary, made the assessment of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks in
relation to actual and potential U. S, power a continuing, long-range study
assignment of the NSC Staff. However, in accordance with the basic approach
described earlier, it was decided very early that this assignment should be
tackled initially through studies of certain critical areas of the world. It
was agreed that these studies should subsequently be incorporated in an over-
all appraisal of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks.
During much of the period 1947-50, therefore, the great majority of the
policies considered by the Council were policies dealing with particular for-
eign countries or larger geographical regions which presented problems of
critical significance at the time. Initially papers of this kind were focused
on single (though major) problems and in some cases provided quite detailed
policy guidance for dealing with those problems. Papers dealing with a single
foreign country did not attempt to deal with all aspects of U. S. relations
with the country, but only with certain key aspects. However, as the months
and years passed the Council and its staff progressively tackled broader,
longer-range problems and broadened the scope and coverage of country and
regional policy papers. The first paper of a broad over-all character dealing
with the basic national security problems facing the United States was adopted
by the Council in November 1948.
In this initial phase of the Council's existence relatively few policies
of the "functional" variety were acted upon by the Council. However, because
the Council was establishing many of its basic organizational arrangements dur-
ing this period and was also making recommendations for organizational change
in areas of governmental activity related to the Council's work, organizational
policies constituted an important proportion of the Council's business. For
example, the Council began in December 1947 to discharge its responsibilities
under the National Security Act for issuing general policy directives concern-
ing the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities
of the several departments and agencies as relate to the national security.
In January 1948 the Council initiated a general survey of foreign intelligence
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activities. This survey was made by a group of consultants from outside the
government and marks the first such use of outside consultants by the Council.*
The recommendations made by this survey group were subsequently considered in
the Council.
Some reorientation was given to the work of the Council and "The Staff"
when, on May 4, 1949, not long after the beginning of President Truman's sec-
ond Administration, the Executive Secretary met with the Under Secretary of
State, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff and other State Department of-
ficials to discuss the work of the Staff, and, in particular, the type of re-
ports that the Staff had been preparing. On the basis of the conclusions
reached in that discussion, the Executive Secretary on May 26 issued instruc-
tions to the Coordinator of "The Staff" requesting "The Staff" (a) to conduct
a periodical review of all current national security policies in order to de-
termine what revisions were necessary; and (b) to undertake a program of stud-
ies on major policy problems which would appraise the national security aspects
of those problems and analyze alternative courses of action open to the United
States, without, however, making policy recommendations. These instructions
thus initiated two new types of staff activity--a general review of existing
policies, and the preparation of papers which discussed policy alternatives
without recommending a particular policy.** Both types of activity have been
a recurrent feature of Council business in the period since 1949.
From the beginning, proposals for Council projects could and did originate
in a variety of different ways. In the first year of the Council's operation,
for example, State was the most important single source of the Council's agenda
subjects but the Secretary of Defense, the Army and the Air Force together orig-
inated nearly as many Council projects. In fact, a striking feature of the
Council's early activities was the leading role which the late Mr. Forrestal
played in initiating Council projects during the period that he was Secretary
of Defense. The NSC Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Commit-
tee,*** CIA and Commerce were other sources of projects during the first year.
Members of "The Staff", though assigned to the Council on a full-time
basis and physically located together in the NSC offices, also maintained
offices in, and regular contact with, their respective agencies. Meetings of
"The Staff" were conducted on an informal basis with the Coordinator serving
as chairman. The first step in the preparation of a paper was a meeting of
"The Staff" to discuss the policy problem and to define the scope of the par-
ticular report. Although the principal participants in these Staff discussions
were the members detailed by the agencies, certain members of the permanent
career staff also participated. While the latter did not make policy recommen-
dations, they did raise questions, suggest additional issues, and often prepared
redrafts of papers on the basis of the Staff discussions.
* One of the members of this survey group was Mr. Allen W. Dulles, the
present Director of Central Intelligence.
** The review of policies was undertaken immediately; the first Staff report
analyzing policy alternatives was discussed in the Council in August 1949.
*** On the relationships between the Council and SANACC see infra, p. 17.
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Each Staff member obtained the staff-level views of his respective depart-
ment or agency with respect to the matter under review. These views were some-
times submitted in writing. After one or more Staff discussions, in the course
of which the agencies represented on "The Staff" further clarified their views
on the subject, one member of "The Staff" was ordinarily requested to prepare
a draft report. In the usual case, the first draft of the report was prepared
by the State Department member. As a variant of this procedure, utilized par-
ticularly in the early days of the Council, the members of "The Staff" were
requested to prepare individual agency contributions which were subsequently
integrated into a single report.
The usual policy paper prepared by "The Staff" during this period consis-
ted of three basic elements: (a) a very brief and quite general statement of
the problem to which the paper was addressed; (b) an analysis of the problem;
and (c) conclusions. The analysis normally included such elements as a state-
ment of U. S. objectives, a statement of existing policies and commitments, an
estimate of the situation and possible future developments, and an analysis of
the alternative courses of action open to the United States. The "Conclusions"
were the only section of the paper normally acted upon by the Council. The
paper as a whole was ordinarily very brief.
After several meetings of "The Staff" on a policy draft, it was sent to
the Consultants for concurrences. The Consultants were not requested to con-
cur in a paper in all of its particulars, but only to indicate their views as
to whether the paper was in such condition as to be suitable for Council con-
sideration. Although ordinarily these concurrences were obtained without a
meeting of the Consultants, meetings were occasionally called by the Executive
Secretary, particularly when there was a difference of view among the Consul-
tants. Following such clearance, the paper, including any continuing diver-
gences of view, was submitted to the Council for its consideration.* The
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were obtained by the Secretary of Defense
on any papers having military implications and were circulated to the Council
prior to its consideration of the paper.
Ordinarily the policy proposals acted upon by the Council were prepared
by "The Staff". In these cases where a Council member submitted a policy pro-
posal directly to the Council for consideration, it was usually referred, some-
times after preliminary Council discussion, to "The Staff" for preparation of
a report and recommendations. Nonetheless, there were a number of instances
in which the Council acted directly upon a report submitted by one of its mem-
bers (generally the Secretary of State). Upon occasion the Secretary of State
submitted reports for the information, rather than for the consideration, of
the Council. Such reports, stating the current U. S. foreign policy position
on some subject, were often discussed in Council meetings and were occasionally
concurred in by the Council and the President.**
* The first policy paper prepared by "The Staff" was submitted to the Council
in mid-October, 1947, and considered and adopted in November. Since this
paper was prepared before there were Consultants, it went directly to the
Council.
** Souers, 22 cit, p. 539.
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One of the features of the latter part of the period under review was the
increasing use by the Council of ad hoc committees to prepare reports for its
consideration. Such committees were generally, at least in original member-
ship, composed of higher-level agency representatives than was "The Staff".
They often included representatives of agencies which were not regularly repre-
sented on "The Staff". Ad hoc committees were assigned responsibility for rec-
ommending policies on some of the more critical problems during the latter part
of this period.
The Council agenda from the start included a variety of different types of
report. Some were submitted for consideration as the basis for policy recommen-
dations to the President. Others were submitted solely for Council information
though, when scheduled on a Council agenda, they might provoke a Council discus-
sion. Some reports were specifically designed to serve as the basis for Council
discussion. Some Council papers were submitted by Council members, some by "The
Staff", some by non-members of the Council, and others by special committees or
by consultants. In some instances these were regular periodic reports, in other
cases they were prepared in response to specific request or because of some de-
velopment or anticipated development. The agenda also included both oral and
written reports.
Certain regular reports were a standing feature of the Council agendas.
Thus in the first year of the Council's existence a written current intelli-
gence report was regularly placed on the agenda for the Council's information.
Subsequently this report was submitted and scheduled monthly. In 1950 it was
dropped altogether as an agenda item. Instead, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence would from time to time in the course of Council discussion call the
Council's attention to intelligence information which had a bearing on the
policy papers under consideration or which was otherwise of interest to the
Council. Beginning in May 1948 a report prepared by the NSC Secretariat on
the current status of work on Council and Staff projects also became a regular
agenda item.
In the Council meeting, the Executive Secretary introduced each subject on
the agenda, but generally did not attempt to summarize the contents of the re-
ports before the Council on the assumption that each particippat had done his
"homework" in advance. The presiding officer was sometimes the first to comment
upon a policy paper; on other occasions he called first upon the other Council
members for comment. A general discussion of the policy paper followed.
A decision was made at the beginning of the Council's existence not to
prepare written minutes which would reflect the Council discussion. It was
believed that to do so would have an undesirable inhibiting effect upon the
discussion. Therefore, throughout the Council's history, the only permanent
official record that has been made is a record of the Council's action on the
various subjects it has considered. During the period 1947-53, this record was
prepared by the Executive Secretary on the basis of his understanding of the
Council's actions, but was not normally circulated to the Council members for
clearance in advance of its submission to the President. Council members could,
of course, raise questions as to the Executive Secretary's interpretation of
what had occurred in the meeting, following circulation of the approved record.
Such action was seldom taken, however.
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It should be noted that occasionally, when it did not appear necessary to
have a formal Council discussion of a report, the Council acted upon it by memo-
randum approval. This practice, originating in the earliest months of the Coun-
cil's activity, continues to the present though it is used infrequently.
A day or two after the Council meeting the Executive Secretary submitted
to the President the record of the Council's actions and the policy papers as
amended and adopted by the Council, including any remaining differences of
view. He also submitted any Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the paper. The
President acted upon the Council.'s recommendations, deciding any remaining
differences of view. The President approved only the "Conclusions" of the
policy paper; these became the national security policy on the subject.
Following the President's action upon them, the record of the Council's
actions and the approved policy papers were circulated to all Council partici-
pants. From the beginning, when the President approved policy recommendations
submitted to him by the Council, he directed that they be implemented "by all
appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under
the coordination" of the department or agency head who had the primary respon-
sibility for implementation of the policy involved. In most cases this was the
Secretary of State. The head of a department or agency which had been assigned
responsibility by the President for implementation of a Council action or for
the coordination of implementation of a policy paper was informed of his re-
sponsibility by individual memorandum from the Executive Secretary. It was
the responsibility of the coordinating agency to notify all other departments
and agencies of the actions for which each was responsible in implementation
of the paper, and to ensure that such actions were taken in a coordinated man-
ner. The coordinating agency was also responsible for ensuring appropriate
dissemination of the policy, or extracts from it, to agencies of the govern-
ment which were not members of the NSC.
The Council in 1948 established an ad hoc committee to re-examine proced-
ures for the implementation of national security policies. That committee rec-
ommended, and the Council in October 1948 approved, continuation of existing
procedures with the additional provision that the "coordinating agency" would
submit progress reports at appropriate intervals which summarized the implemen-
tation of the policy. These reports were circulated to the Council for its in-
formation and scheduled on the agenda of a Council meeting. Thus an opportun-
ity was provided for discussion at the Council level of the implementation of
approved policies. Progress reports were quite brief (generally no more than
one or two single-spaced pages). They sometimes reported on implementation on
a paragraph-by-paragraph basis but initially there was no standard format. In
the early period they were sometimes submitted as frequently as every month or
two, though four to six months was the more usual time period.
Subsequently the instructions relating to the implementation of national
security policies were amended to provide further that, if the coordinating
agency and another participating agency differed as to interpretation of the
policy or as to methods of implementation and were unable to resolve their
differences, the divergent views would be submitted in writing through the
Executive Secretary to the President for his decision.
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The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
In late 1944, as noted earlier, there had been established, by agreement
between the Secretaries concerned, a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC). When the Air Force was established as a separate department by the
National Security Act of 1947 it was added to the membership of the committee
and the committee was re-christened the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee (SANACC). Although SANACC dealt with a broad range of problems,
those relating to occupied areas constituted its most important single field
of activity.
Soon after the Council was organized SANACC began to submit policy papers
to it for its consideration. These were generally referred to the Staff for
revision following preliminary Council consideration. Occasionally the Coun-
cil in turn requested SANACC to prepare a report for it. The Executive Secre-
tary of the Council maintained regular contact with the secretariat of SANACC
and received SANACC papers. In this way, duplication of effort was avoided.
However, it was evident that SANACC's functions closely paralleled, if they
did not indeed in many respects duplicate, the functions of the NSC Staff.*
An important difference (and one of the reasons that SANACC was temporarily
continued) was the fact that, unlike the Council or its staff, it could,
through action by its members, initiate implementation of its decisions,
provided, of course, that the subject was within its terms of reference and
that Presidential consideration was not required.**
An ad hoc committee of the Council was established in March 1948 to study
the relationship between SANACC and the Council. That committee proposed in-
terim terms of reference for SANACC which the Council approved in August 1948.
Those terms of reference provided that SANACC's principal functions would be
(a) to advise and assist the NSC, preparing reports and studies requested by
it; and (b) to coordinate matters referred to SANACC by any of its members or
by the NSC. Thus SANACC was, in effect, recognized as being a part of the
Council's staffing mechanism while at the same time it continued to perform
coordinating functions on matters which did not come before the Council.
In accordance with the interim terms of reference, the Council made a
further review of SANACC six months after approval of the terms of reference.
That review resulted in action by the Council to dissolve SANACC as of June 30,
1949.
* The Eberstadt report had recommended that the NSC take over the functions
of SWNCC (op cit p. 7; see pp. 53-54 of that report for a brief descrip-
tion of SWNCC organization and activities).
In this respect SANACC was somewhat similar in character to the internal
security committees of the Council established in 1949 and to the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board established in 1953.
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III. THE SECOND PHASE (June 1950-January 1953)
Introduction
Though by the time of the Korean War the Council was a well-established,
functioning organization, certain problems relating to the initial organ-
izational arrangements began to become apparent. Attendance at the Council
meetings, originally confined to the Council members themselves, gradually
broadened to include the Consultants and other departmental advisers. This
tended at times to have an inhibiting effect upon discussion and to result
in undue reliance by Council members upon departmental advisers during the
Council discussion. The absence of the President from the Council table,
though it had been thought desirable for certain reasons noted earlier,
tended to produce a less sharply focused discussion than if the President
had been present, and action on important points at issue was sometimes
deferred or was taken later outside the Council. Though the Council discus-
sion was subsequently summarized for the President by the Executive Secretary,
the President's absence from the meeting deprived him of the opportunity
of hearing the Council members' direct expression of their on views, and
of the opportunity to ask questions and to engage personally in the inter-
change of views around the Council table. Council members, lacking an
opportunity to present their respective positions directly to the President
in Council meetings, sometimes took occasion to do so individually following
the meeting.
Moreover, detailed members of "The Staff", working as a group in the
NSC staff offices, tended increasingly to be looked upon as "foreigners"
by their respective agencies. On the other hand, the Consultants, all of
whom had heavy departmental responsibilities, tended over time to give less
and less attention to NSC matters. These tendencies toward the isolation
of "The Staffs' members from their agencies and toward the increased absorp-
tion of the Consultants in agency work produced two additional results:
(a) the tendency of Council members to submit policy recommendations
directly to the Council, by-passing "The Staff"; and (b) the tendency of
the Council to refer many problems to Id Council committees.
Experience had shown that direct referral of departmental papers to
the Council, without joint staff work, led generally to delay; In the
absence of such staff work which exposed pertinent facts, viewpoints and
alternative policies and which clearly defined the issues in advance of the
Council meeting, the Council generally found it necessary to refer such
papers to "The Staff" or to an Ad LU committee for interdepartmental
staffing prior to final Council action.
Ad "oe committees were sometimes a useful and occasionally a notably
successful device, but regular referral of problems to such committees often
also delayed work unduly. Such delays were the results of such factors
as (a) the heavy departmental responsibilities of many of the members of such
committees; (b) the difficulties such committees have in arranging meetings
and meeting deadlines (contrasted with staff groups that have regular, fixed
meeting times and work programs); (c) the unfamiliarity of many of the members
of such groups with Council requirements as to substance, format and
procedure; and (d) finally, and most important, the frequent inability
of such committees to relate their
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work on a particular policy problem to other pertinent approved national
security policies. Ad hoc committee members also tended to approach problems
primarily as representates of their respective agencies.
Another problem was the lack of a Joint Chiefs of Staff representative
on "The Staff". This lack made it very difficult to anticipate and take
into account probable JCS views on a subject under discussion in advance
of receipt of their formal written views. Such views, which were submitted
only after staff work had been completed and the paper circulated to the
Council for consideration, frequently required referral of the paper back
to "The Staff" for reconsideration.
A final problem related to the chairmanship of the Council's major
interdepartmental staff groups. As noted earlier, the State Department
was from the beginning assigned a major role in the Council because of
State's leading role in foreign affairs and because of the expectation that
the Council's major concerns would be in the foreign affairs field. As an
application of this principle, a State representative had been made Coor-
dinator (chairman) of "The Staff". As the Council developed, the matters
which were of concern to it gradually broadened to include many problems
which did not relate solely or even primarily to foreign affairs, though
manky of these problems had important foreign affairs aspects, e. g.,
military, defense mobilization, internal security and atomic energy problems.
This gradual development was accelerated by the beginning of hostilities
in Korea, which increased the importance and urgency of military and defense
mobilization problems and the role of the military and defense mobilization
representatives in the Council organization. In other words, while the
majority of the policy papers with which the Council continued to be
concerned were papers dealing with foreign affairs and while the State
Department continued to play the major role in the development of these
policy papers, the number of subjects involving direct, major responsibil-
ities of other departments and agencies increased and with it, their role.
In these changed circumstances the dual role of the State Coordinator of
"The Staff", as an impartial chairman and as advocate of a State Depart-
ment position, became increasingly difficult. Over time the feeling grew
that other departments and agencies would cooperate more effectively in
the-work of the Council in matters directly affecting their own responsi-
bilities if the major interdepartmental staff groups were chaired by some-
one without departmental ties. Finally, and of great importance, was the
recognition that the work of the interdepartmental staff group which
prepared reports for the NSC could be fully effective in serving the Council
only if the chairman of the group was personally cognizant, through regular
contact with the President, of his desires and requirements regarding the
work of the Council.
Reorganization of the Council and the Staff
All of these problems had been under consideration for some time by
the Executive Secretary and others associated with the organization. They
were provided with an opportunity to do something about them in connection
with a general review of basic U. S. security policies in the winter and
spring of 1950 which produced, as an early by-product, a general recommen-
dation for a revised and strengthened staff organization. In response to
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this recommendation, the Executive Secretary* on April 17, 1950, submitted
his proposals for the reconstitution and strengthening of the NSC Staff.
He proposed the creation of a senior staff group composed of one repre-
sentative designated by each Council member, with a military adviser
de ignated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an intelligence adviser desig-
nated by-tho Dirootor or Central Intelligence. In addition, other agency
heads invited by the President to participate in Council work might, when
appropriate, designate an ad hoc representative on this staff. The members
of this senior staff group -re-To be individuals who could fully and
accurately reflect the views of their principals and were to have such
departmental status and freedom from other duties as to permit them to
devote a large part of their time to Council work. The existing Staff
members were to become assistants to the senior staff group so as to take
full advantage of their experience and background and to ease the transition
to the new organization.
One objection that was soon raised to these proposals related to the
matter of JCS representation. It was argued that it was impossible for an
individual "adviser" to represent a corporate body like the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in such a staff organization.
In May 1950 the whole problem was referred by the Council to a special
NSC committee, consisting of representatives of State, Defense, and NSRB,
for the preparation, in collaboration with the Executive Secretary, of
appropriate recommendations. However, the Korean hostilities began before
the committee was ready to submit its report. Immediately following the
beginning of the Korean War, President Truman began presiding regularly at
all Council meetings except for occasional instances when he was unable to
attend.:: In those instances the Secretary of State presided. At about
this same time the President directed that the Council meet regularly every
Thursday and that all important recommendations relating to national
security policy be coordinated through the Council and its staff.
On July 19, 1950,the President issued a directive with respect to the
reorganization and strengthening of the Council and its staff. Once more
he emphasized that all major national security policies should be recommended
to him through the Council. He directed that Council attendaince be restricted
to the statutory members of the Council plus the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. W. Averell
Harriman (Special Assistant to the President), Mr. Souers, and the Executive
Secretary. He further directed that participation of other officials be
only with his specific approval. He requested the Secretaries of State
Mr. Souers resigned as Executive Secretary effective January 15, 1950,
and was succeeded by Mr. Lay. Mr. Souers was appointed a Special
Consultant to the President and continued to attend all Council meetings
until January 1953.
President Truman presided at 62 (or 87%) of the 71 Council meetings
held from June 28, 1950, through January 9, 1953.
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and Defense, the Chairman, NSRB, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence each to nominate
a member for a senior staff group. The President himself designated the
members of the senior staff group on the basis of these nominations.
Finally, he named the Executive Secretary, NSC, chairman of the senior
staff group.
Members of the senior staff group, or the "Senior NSC Staff" as it
was soon called, were quickly nominated and, at the Senior Staff meeting
on August 11, 1950, they in turn designated their assistants. Shortly
thereafter Mr. Harriman also nominated a representative for the Senior
Staff. Mr. Marion W. Boggs, a member of the career NSC Staff and former
Assistant to the Coordinator of the Staff, was named Coordinator (i. e.,
chairman) of the Staff Assistants. He also served as the executive
secretary of the Senior Staff. The functions of these two interdepartmental
staff groups continued to be those functions that the Council had assigned
"The Staff" at the first Council meeting in 191.7. On August 10, 1950, the
Council directed that the Senior Staff assume responsibility for projects
formerly assigned to ad hoc committees of the Council.
These changes were directed toward solving the problems noted above.
The relationship between the changes in Council arrangements and the
problems noted earlier is obvious and direct. The relationship between
the changes and the problems at the staff level needs some elaboration,
however. At the senior level the agency representatives on the Senior
Staff were drawn much more fully and actively into the work of the Council
than their predecessors, the Consultants. Whereas the Consultants had
played a largely passive role, the Senior Staff replaced "The Staff" as
the principal staff arm of the Council and absorbed the assignments of
existing ad hoc committees. The members of the Senior Staff were generally
of Assistantcretary level or above and met as a group approximately
twice a week (sometimes more frequently) during the first year. Thus the
Council was provided continuous staff support by a high-level interdepart-
mental staff group.
Meanwhile, the Staff Assistants, unlike the members of "The Staff",
no longer spent almost full time in NSC offices, but instead maintained
offices only in their respective agencies where they could play a more
active role in the development of agency views on papers before the Senior
Staff and the Council. The Staff Assistants as a group, however, continued
to do much of the pick and shovel work of redrafting papers for the Senior
Staff. Thus, while their semi-estrangement from their agencies was ended,
they continued, as a group, to look at national security problems from more
than an agency perspective and to take, as did the Senior Staff and the
Council, a national point of view.
Another change of considerable significance was the arrangement
with respect to the chairmanship of the two major interdepartmental staff
groups. The April proposals of the Executive Secretary had made no
recommendations on this point. The selection by the President of the
Executive Secretary as the Chairman of the Senior Staff provided the
principal staff body with a chairman who, as head of the permanent NSC
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Staff in the Executive office of the president, was an official without
departmental ties. Although he maintained a neutral position as to policy
recommendations, he participated actively in leading the discussion in an
effort to bring out all relevant facts and viewpoints and to explore all
feasible alternative policies. Of greatest significance was the fact that
the Executive Secretary, because of his daily contact with the President,
was in a position to know or to ascertain the Presidentts desires and require-
ments with respect to problems before the Senior Staff and the Council.
Selection of a member of the permanent Council staff as the chairman of the
Staff Assistants was a change of parallel significance.
The 1950 changes also improved considerably the relationship between
the Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the staff level by placing a
JCS representative on both of the new interdepartmental staff groups. y,
the changes provided the Secretary of the Treasury who, as previously noted,
had been a regular Council participant since 1949, with representation at
the staff level.
Subsequent Changes in the Council and Staff Organization
Two major changes in Council membership and staff participation occurred
during the period following the 1950 reorganization. Immediatelyajtethe
beginning of the Korean War, the Office of Defense Mobilization (OD) was
created to coordinate mobilization activities immediately connected with
the war, as contrasted with general long-range mobilization planning,
responsibility for which continued to reside in NSRB. In December 1950 the
President requested that the Director of Defense Mobilization participate
in all Council meetings and in March 1951 the Director nominated a Senior
Staff Member. The Economic Cooperation Administration had participated on
an ad hoc basis in Council activities at both the Council and staff levels
since 1948. However, the foreign assistance organization began participating
in all Council activities in October 1951 when the Mutual Security Act of
1951* amended the National Security Act to make the Director for Mutual
Security (a newly created office) a statutory member of the Council. He,
in turn, nominated a member for the Senior Staff.**
In August 1951 the Bureau of the Budget designated an individual to
serve as its representative in a purely advisory role at meetings of the
Senior Staff and as its channel of communication with the Senior Staff. This
representative did not attend all Senior Staff meetings. The Director,
Bureau of the Budget, did not normally attend Council meetings.
Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, Title V.
Section 501-(e)-(l) (effective October 10, 1951).
**e Since Mr. Harriman, who was designated Director for Mutual Security,
had been attending Council meetings as a Presidential assistant and
since he had a representative on the Senior Staff, the change in the
his Seniormeetings
theattendance
did
of r. HarrimandandSenior
changeaffect
thougug
representative.
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In August 1951 an additional function was assigned to the permanent
career staff of the Council. The President at that time, in connection
with his action on a report relating to the status of current national
security programs, directed the Executive Secretary to create, as a part
of the NSC Staff, a small reporting unit to work with the responsible
departments and agencies to ensure that reports on the status of such
programs were made available promptly to the Council or to the President.
Initially two members of the NSC Staff were assigned to this function.
They concentrated primarily upon the development and improvement, in
cooperation with the agencies concerned, of regular semi-annual (later
annual) status reports to the Council. These reports have regularly
covered the military, mutual security, atomic energy, civil defense,
mobilization, foreign information (now USIA), foreign intelligence, and
U. S. internal security programs.* After the basic job of organizing
this work had been done, the unit required only the part-time services of
one individual. Apart from this addition and the designation of the
Coordinator of Staff Assistants from the membership of the permanent
career staff of the Council, the career staff was not basically changed
as to function or organization during this period. However, members
of the permanent career staff assisted the Executive Secretary in his
roles as Chairman of the Senior Staff and as an assistant to the President
for NSC matters by such means as suggesting questions with respect to
papers before the Senior Staff, redrafting papers to reflect Senior Staff
discussion, and suggesting deficiencies in existing policy coverage.
Senior Staff and Council Procedures
During the last half of 1950 and the first half of 1951 the Senior Staff
and Council were very active, largely on policy matters relating to Korea
and other problems arising out of the generally tense international situation.
Questions relating to the strengthening of major national security programs
occupied a significant proportion of the time of the Senior Staff and the
Council during this period. As has been indicated, the Senior Staff met
approximately twice a week and sometimes met more frequently during the
first few months of its existence. The Council was meeting an average of
three times a month.
The latter part of 1951 and all. of 1952 were characterized by a
resumption of a regular pattern of Council business. The Senior Staff
reviewed existing policies and prepared policies on new subjects in
response to changes in the situation or anticipated developments. It
met on an average of about once a week.** Though a weekly NSC meeting
continued to be scheduled, the scheduled meetings were sometimes cancelled
and the Council met an average of somewhat less than twice a month during
this period.
Recently a report on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
programs has been added.
# In addition, as indicated below, Senior Staff steering committees were
meeting during this period.
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Also during the period 1950-51, as a. result of Congressional passage
of the "Cannon Amendment" on September 27, 1950, and the "Kem Amendment"
which superseded it on June 2, 1951,* the Council was given new statutory
responsibilities of a rather unprecedented character. In essence, the
Cannon Amendment provided that, during any period in which the armed
forces of the United States were engaged in active hostilities carrying
out a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, no
financial or economic assistance (other than military assistance)
could be provided to a foreign country whose trade with Sine-Soviet
Bloc countries was found by the NSC to be contrary to U. S. security
interests. This legislation did not require reports to Congress. The
Kem Amendment spelled out in somewhat more detail what kinds of com-
modities fell under the trade proscription and required the Secretary
of Defense to prepare a specific list of such commodities. It required
certifications by the countries receiving U. S. assistance that they
had not been engaging in such trade, but provided that exceptions could
be made to these requirements upon official determination by the NSC
that such an exception was in the security interests of the United States.
The Council was required to report any such exception, with the reasons
therefore, immediately to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees
of the Senate and House of Representatives, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House. The Council was also required to make a quarterly review of such
determinations and to report the results of its review to these committees.
Finally, the Kem Amendment specified that each of these reports should
contain an analysis of the trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc of the countries
covered by the reports.
A Special Council Committee on East-West Trade undertook the
required Staff work.** The Council made an initial over-all determina-
tion under the Cannon Amendment in December 1950 but directed its
Special Committee to make a continuing review and recommendations as
required. The Council approved its second (and last) determination
under the Cannon amendment in February 1951 and directed the Special
Committee to continue its review. Twenty determinations affecting
thirty-six countries were prepared by the Special Committee under the
Kern Amendment and submitted through the Senior Staff to the Council
which approved them, transmitted them to the specified Congressional
committees and released them publicly.*** The Committee also prepared,
and the Council approved, a final report and review of its determinations.
The legislative requirement for such Council determinations was eliminated
when the Kem Amendment was superseded by the Mutual Defense Assistance
Section 1304, Public Law 843, 81st Congress, September 27, 1950, and
Section 1302, Public Law 45, 82nd Congress, June 2, 1951.
## Membership of this committee consisted of representatives of State,
Treasury, Defense, Commerce, NSRB, ODM, ECA, JCS, CIA, Export-Import
Bank, and Mr. Harriman's office.
### A number of additional countries provided the required certifications
thus obviating the need for Council determinations to cover them.
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Control Act (the "Battle Act") on October 26, 1951.* Following the 1950
reorganization the State Department continued to be the source of first
drafts of foreign country and regional policy papers which continued to
constitute a major share of the Council's business. As in the past, other
departments were the source of a first draft where the subject fell
primarily within their area of responsibility and sometimes drafts were
prepared in the Staff Assistants or in the Senior Staff on the basis of
contributions from several agencies. After a preliminary discussion in
the Senior Staff, a draft policy paper was ordinarily referred to the
Staff Assistants for redrafting in the light of the discussion. The
Staff Assistants' redraft was circulated to the Senior Staff for further
consideration. This process was sometimes repeated one or more times
before the paper was submitted to the Council. When the nature of a
problem and the timing of action so dictated, the Senior Staff's work on
a paper could, of course, be considerably speeded up. During the discus-
sion of a draft policy paper in the Senior Staff, any Senior Staff member
could suggest new ideas or alternative policies. The many ideas and
policy alternatives generated by this process of interchange in the Senior
Staff frequently provided the basis either for agreed or for "split"
policy recommendations to the Council.
Toward the end of this period an increasing amount of the preliminary
preparation of papers was done in steering committees of restricted member-
ship from the Senior Staff and Board Assistants prior to consideration by
the full membership of these groups. A principal objective of this arrange-
ment was to permit greater frankness of interchange on sensitive subjects
among the representatives of those agencies which had the most direct
concern with the particular subject matter.
In September 1950, shortly after the Council reorganization, the
Senior Staff agreed to a new format for Council policy papers. What had
formerly appeared at the end of the paper as "Conclusions" was now placed
at the front of the paper as a draft "Statement of Policy". This State-
ment of Policy contained the Council's policy advice to the President and
was the only part of the paper that the Council adopted and the President
subsequently approved. The Statement of Policy was follown.d, by an "NSC
Staff Study" which normally included four major sections: (a) a state-
ment of the problem; (b) an analysis, which usually included such
elements as a statement of approved policies and othor relevant facts
bearing on the problem, an assessment and appraisal of U. S. objectives,
commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U. S. military
power, an estimate of the situation and probable future developments,
and other more particular factors bearing on the problem; (c) an enumera-
tion and analysis of alternative courses of action; and (d) conclusions.
During this period the format of the Statement of Policy went through
a further evolution. By the end of the period it typically included
three elements: (a) general considerations which consisted essentially
of a summary statement of the elements contained in the analysis section
* Public Law 213, 82nd Congress.
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of the staff study; (b) a statement of U. S. objectives; and (c) courses
of action.
With staff work completed, the paper was circulated to the Council
in advance of the Council meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordinarily
submitted their views on the paper in advance of the meeting and these
too were usually circulated. Each Senior Staff member was responsible
for briefing his principal in advance of the meeting on the subjects
before the Council; the Executive Secretary similarly briefed the President.
The Council's agenda, which was determined by the President in consulta-
tion with the Executive Secretary, continued to include a variety of
different kinds of reports and presentations. In the Council meeting the
Executive Secretary, as Chairman of the Senior Staff, presented the Senior
Staff's papers. Other procedures remained basically unchanged. Though
the President now presided at Council meetings, he continued to reserve
his own decision on Council policy recommendations until after the Council
meeting when those recommendations were presented to him by the Executive
Secretary for approval together with the record of the Council's actions.
When the President approved a policy recommended to him by the Council,
he continued to designate the department or agency which had primary
responsibility for action to coordinate its implementation. During this
period he sometimes designated two agencies, (e. g., State and Defense) as
joint coordinators. The coordinating agency continued to submit progress
reports; in the case of policies under joint coordination these were joint
reports. Toward the end of the 1950-52 period, progress reports were
often submitted less frequently than every six months.
The format for progress reports, as it had developed b this time
in the Council's history, contained two basic elements: (a a summary
of important U. S. actions to implement the policy, and important
developments which had favorably or unfavorably affected the policy or
its implementation; and (b) a brief assessment of the effectiveness,
adequacy and timeliness of the policy and its implementation. Progress
reports did not propose specific changes in policy, but indicated the
respects, if any, in which the policy was inadequate and neF3ed review.
If the Council recommended, on the basis of the information in a progress
report, that a policy be reviewed and if the President approved that recom-
mendation, the review itself was undertaken by the Senior Staff.
The Psychological Strategy Board
The Council had, virtually since its inception, re ularly considered
problems relating to the organization of psychological including foreign
information) activities. As a result of one such discussion in January 1951
the President requested Mr. Souers, his Special Consultant, and the Bureau
of the Budget to make a further study and recommendations. Based upon
this study the President in the Spring of 1951 issued a directive
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establishing the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB ).* With a basic
membership of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and with a fulltime
Director and staff, the PSB was responsible for the "formulation and
promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible
for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological
objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and
evaluation of the national psychological effort". Although the PSB
was established outside the NSC structure, the Board was directed to
report to the Council on its activities and on its evaluation of the
national psychological operations including implementation of approved
objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies con-
cerned". The Director of the PSB was invited to attend Council meetings
as an Observer and was represented by an Adviser on the Senior Staff.**
# White House Press Release, June 20, 1951.
## Mr. Gordon Gray was one of the Directors of PSB who attended Council
meetings as an Observer and Mr. Robert Cutler was one of those who
served as PSB Adviser to the Senior Staff. Both of these individuals
were later to serve as Special Assistants to the President for
National Security Affairs.
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IV. THE THIRD PHASE (JANUARY 1953 TO THE PRESENT)
Introduction
The third phase of the Council's existence began with a thorough
reappraisal of the Council's organization, as it had developed to 1953,
and of the then current national security policies. By direction of
President Truman, current national security policies were made available
shortly after the 1952 election to President-elect Eisenhower, together
with brief progress reports on each and related intelligence material.
In late December 1952 the President-elect advised the Executive Secretary
that Mr. Robert Cutler would be his Administrative Assistant with
special responsibilities for the NSC. Mr. Cutler visited Washington soon
after, and, on January 21, 1953, was sworn in as Administrative Assistant
to the President. Mr. Cutler immediately embarked upon a thorough,
wide-ranging study of the Council organization. At the same time he
began to attend and to take an active part in Senior Staff meetings.
The President on January 21 asked each statutory Council member
(excepting the President and Vice President), the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Director of Central Intelligence to designate, on a temporary
basis pending permanent arrangements, an acting me:lL3r of the senior
Staff. This temporary Senior Staff continued in existence until the
President approved Mr. Cutler's proposals for Council reorganization in
March. Attendance at the first Council meeting of the new Administration
on January 29, 1953, was restricted to the statutory members and advisers.
However, the Secretary of the Treasury was invited by the President on
February 2 to attend all Council meetings and to designate an acting
member of the Senior Staff.*
The reappraisal of the Council by the new Administration was de-
signed to strengthen and improve it and to adapt it to the needs and
desires of President Eisenhower. This reappraisal was based upon cer-
tain fundamental concepts with respect to the nature of the Council and
how it should operate. These concepts contained a number of important
elements of innovation; other elements were derived from the National
Security Act itself or were built upon prior experience in tree develop-
ment and operation of the Council. Together these concepts form a
coherent body of thinking on the subject, the understanding of ,,which is
important to an appreciation of the changes subsequently made in the
Council organization. They are stated here as eight key consideration:'`
# The activities of the Senior Staff and Council during these
first two months are discussed below.
Most of these considerations can be readily derived from an
article by Mr. Cutler in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, pp. 441-458.
(April 1956) or from his March 1953 report to the President.
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1. The importance of the Presidential advisory character
of the Council, and, deriving therefrom, the importance of
ajusting the Council's operation to the needs of the new President.
2. The importance of achieving a proper balance in
Council attendance between the consideration on the one hand
of obtaining the advice of all who have some responsibility
for the subject matter under consideration, and, on the other,
of restricting attendance to that level which would permit
intimate, frank and fruitful discussion.
3. The importance of a highly active, vigorous organi-
zation; an organization characterized by regular and frequent
meetings, full agenda, vigorous discussion and strong leader-
ship at all levels.
L. The importance of the most thorough sort of discussion
in inter-departmental staff groups below the Council as a means
of ensuring preparation of "precisely worded, carefully studied,
and well presented"* papers which avoided ex parte presentation
on the one hand, and the suppression of real differences of view
on the other.
5. The importance of viewing the Council and its subor-
dinate groups as bodies made up of individuals advising the
President in their own right and not simply as the representatives
of their agencies.
6. The importance of relying fundamentally upon the re-
sponsible officials represented on the Council and upon their
staffs for ideas, for analysis and for the preparation of policy
advice, thus avoiding an "ivory tower" approach or the inter-
position of individuals without departmental responsibilities
between the President and his responsible Cabinet officials, At
the same time, the importance of (a) bringing fresh points of
view to bear upon the Council's work through increased use of
outside consultants; and (b) strengthening the capabilities of
the permanent Council staff for independent analysis and review
of national security problems and policy papers.
7. The importance of taking into account the financial
implications of proposed policies; their effect upon the fiscal
and budgetary situation and upon the domestic economy.
8. The importance of ensuring that approved national secur-
ity policies are implemented in an integrated, coordinated fashion
and in such a way as to make a full contribution to the particular
climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the
world.
* Ibid., P. 44 7
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Reorganization of the Council and the Staff
In the course of Mr. Cutler's study of the Council organization
he consulted regularly with the President and solicited views from a
number of people both inside and outside the government who had knowl-
edge of and, in many cases, direct experience with the Council mechanism.
Included in these consultations were former Council and Senior Staff
Members and the former and present Executive Secretary. In addition to
obtaining the individual views of such knowledgeable persons orally or
in writing (or both), !Jr. Cutler met with small groups of them in all-
day sessions. Mr. Cutler also consulted with and obtained the assis-
tance of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and his staff and the
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization.
On March 16, 1953, he submitted his report to the President who
approved it the following day. The report recommended many changes,
but because it also incorporated all of the basic instructions govern-
ing the organization and operation of the Council and its subordinate
bodies, it confirmed a number of already existing arrangements as well.
After reaffirming the Presidential-advisory character of the Council,
the report found that no changes were required in the existing statutory
statement of the functions of the Council.
On the subject of attendance at Council meetings the report stated
that, as a general rule no more than eight persons should have the right
to participate as Council members. The report distinguished the several
types of attendance at Council meetings, establishing five different
categories of attendance: (a) statutory members, (b) participant
members, (c) advisors (statutory and other), (d) observers, and
(e) staff. Within the category of "participant members" a further
distinction was made between those individuals who were invited on a
"standing-request" basis to attend all Council meetings until the
President otherwise decided and those who were invited to attend a
meeting or a part of a meeting on an "ad hoc" basis. The categories
generally formalized prior practice and were of value in providing a
framework within which individual decisions on attendance could be
made on a flexible basis in the light of the requirements of a partic-
ular Council agenda.
The report confirmed existing arrangements as to actual Council atten-
dance with two exceptions: (a) it providea that the statutory membership
of the Chairman, NSRB, should be transferred to the Director, Office
of Defense Mobilization,* and (b) the Special Assistant to the President
Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 (effective June 12, 1953) abolished
NSRB and transferred all of the functions of the Chairman, NSRB.
(except those that it abolished altogether) to the Director, ODM.
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for Cold War Planning became an Adviser to the Council while the Director,
Psychological Strategy Board, was eliminated as an Observer. Thus,
the Council membership was limited to a regular group of seven partic-
ipants (the statutory members* and the Secretary of the Treasury). The
two statutory advisers plus the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning
also attended regularly. The absorption of NSRB by ODMR had reduced the
number of Council participants by one.
An important innovation was the provision that, if the President
was unable to attend a Council meeting, the Vice President would preside
in his stead.3 Only in the absence of both the President and the
Vice President would the Secretary of State preside. The report
specified that a regular weekly meeting time should be established and
ordinarily maintained.
The report explicitly rejected participation in the Council by
individuals who had no departmental responsibilities. However, it pro-
vided for the appointment on an ad hoc basis of Consultants from out-
side the goverrv^ent who would, either individually or in groups, serve
as informal advisers to the Council. Two examples were cited of the
potential use of such consultants: (a) to consider some specific new pro-
posals or long-range project and report to the Council (in such a case
its report would be reviewed by the agencies concerned); and (b) to
review for the Council a proposal developed by the Planning Board.
The Senior Staff was renamed the "Planning Board", but retained
the same functions. With the exception of the elimination of NSRB, the
agency representation on the Planning Board remained unchanged though
the representatives of the JCS and CIA were re-designated "Advisers"
rather than "Members"."* However, as Advisers they retained their right
The President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Director for Mutual Security and the Director, ODM.
3t President Eisenhower has presided at 306 (or 90%) of the 338
Council meetings held from January 29, 1953, through June 30, 1960.
*3-* Members of the Planning Board at this time were, in addition to
the Special Assistant, representatives of State, Treasury, Defense,
Mutual Security and ODM. JCS, CIA and PSB were represented by
Advisers. 1Vhen PSB was later abolished and the Operations
Coordinating Board established, a member of the OCB Staff (usually
the Executive Officer or his Deputy) was a Planning Board Adviser.
As noted below, this arrangement was further amended in 1957.
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to have their dissents, if any, included in Planning Board reports to
the Council. As in the past, other agencies might be invited by the
Chairman to attend Planning Board meetings for items of interest to
them. The chairmanship of the Planning Board was assigned to the newly
established Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs* instead of the Executive Secretary. This assignment was
consistent with the important principle, mentioned earlier, that the
Chairman of the Councils principal policy-formulating staff body should
be a person without departmental ties who through a direct and close staff
relationship with the President was fully cognizant of the desires and
the requirements of the President.
Mr.. Cutler-s report renamed the "Staff Assistants" the "Board
Assistants". They continued, however, to have the same functions and
to be chaired by a Coordinator from the NSC Staff."
Though, apart from the change in chairmanship, the membership and
functions of the Planning Board were not essentially changed by the
report, the report did contain some important specifications with respect
to appointment of individual Planning Board Members and Advisers. It
continued the provision for nomination by the agency head and appointment
by the President (after approval by the Special Assistant)."" It stated
that each Member or Adviser should have direct access to and the per-
sonal confidence of his agency head. (Generally speaking, Planning Board
members are Assistant Secretaries, or equivalent, within their depart-
ments or agencies.) N1?ost importantly, the report specified that each
Member or Adviser should:
"...have as his principal responsibility, which over-
rides all other duties and with which no other duty can inter-
fere, his work with the Board, including preparation for and
attendance at meetings; yet at the same time continue
to be sufficiently in the stream of activity of his depart-
ment or agency so as to be capable of representing its views."
This requirement was addressed to a problem that had appeared toward the
end of the 1950-53 period. Senior Staff Members, though of high caliber
and adequate rank, frequently became so absorbed in departmental respon-
sibilities that they found it difficult to devote sufficient time and
attention to NSC work. They tended to delegate real responsibility for
Senior St aff work to alternates or to the head of the office within their
The functions of the Special Assistant are described in greater
detail just below.
3* The Advisers from the three military services ceased attending
Board Assistants meetings after April 1953. They continue, how-
ever, to provide support to Defense and JCS Planning Board rep-
resentatives by assisting in the development of service views on
the papers before the Planning Board and the Council.
Each Planning Board Member and Adviser receives a personal
letter of appointment from the President.
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agencies who was responsible for the particular subject matter being
considered.
The report emphasized the importance of ensuring that the Board
was constantly aware of the matters in which the Council was interested,
though ideas for projects might germinate at any level in the organization.
Finally, it stated that if conflicts of view could not be fairly re-
solved, they should never be suppressed or compromised, but should be
reported to the Council.
The report simply listed the other existing standing committees
of the Council and proposed no changes in them at that time.
One of the most important changes introduced by the report was
the creation of the position of Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The Special Assistant was named the principal
executive officer of the Council and Chairman of the NSC Planning Board.
This change represented the designation by the President of a member of
the White House Staff as his principal staff officer for national
security affairs. The xcecutive Secretary, who had previously per-
formed this general role, was reappointed head of the career staff of
the Council and was designated to act for the Special Assistant in his
absence and to advise and aid him in the performance of his duties.
The Special Assistant was made responsible for determination,
subject to the President's desires, of the Council agenda, for brief-
ing the President in advance of Council meetings,* and for presenting
matters for discussion at the Council meetings. As Chairman of the
Planning Board he was responsible for scheduling Planning Board work
and for the manner of presentation and quality of such work. He was to
appoint (subject where necessary to the President's approval) such ad hoc
comittees, such consultants from outside the Government and such mixed
governmental-non-governmental committees as might be required. He super-
vised the work of the NSC Staff through the Executive Secretary.
Finally, the Special Assistant was charged with bringing to the
attention of the President, with recommendations for appropriate action,
It might be noted here that, with the beginning of the new
Administration in 1953, responsibility for daily briefing of
the President on current foreign politico-military develop-
ments was transferred from the Executive Secretary to the
White House Staff Secretary. The Executive Secretary did con-
tinue to participate in the Special Assistant's briefing of the
President before Council meetings.
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lack of progress by an agency in carrying out any policy assigned to it;
provided it was not possible to expedite performance at the Planning
Board level. The report emphasized, however, that responsibility for
implementation rested with the agency head concerned and that the role
of the Special Assistant was, on behalf of the President, to inspect,
not to evaluate or to direct. Mr. Cutler was named the President's
first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.*
The NSC Staff, headed by the Executive Secretary, was to continue
to provide the secretariat for the Council and the Planning Board, to
act as the official channel of communications for the Council and to pro-
vide, with CIA support, administrative services for the Council. The
report confirmed the new arrangement under which the NSC Staff was respon-
sible for briefing the Vice President on the matters before the Council.
In addition, as a final important change, the report provided for
the strengthening of the NSC Staff by the establishment within it of
a small "Special Staff" under the supervision of the Deputy Executive
Secretary with, among others, the following duties: (a) independent
analysis and review of each Planning Board report before its submission
to the Council; (b) continuous examination of the totality of national
security policies with a view to determining if gaps existed which should
be filled and if important issues or anticipated developments were
sufficiently explored; (c) continuing integrated evaluation of the cap-
abilities of the free world versus the capabilities of the Soviet and Sat-
ellites, and estimates of the situation, in order to bring such evalu-
ations and estimates before the Council; (d) providing a chairman or mem-
ber of, or observer with, ad hoc non-governmental or mixed governmental-
non-governmental committees, and assistance, in recruiting such committees;
and (e) keeping currently informed on the status of all national security
programs and seeing that reports and pertinent information thereon were
currently available (thus incorporating the functions of the Reporting
Unit). The Special Staff, when it was established, was made up of two
members of the existing professional staff of the Council (plus the Deputy
Executive Secretary) and three additional staff officers. It continues
to have, in addition to the Deputy Executive Secretary, five professioral
members today.
The report re-affirmed and emphasized the distinction between the
Council, the Planning Board and the Special Assistant on the one hand and
the NSC Staff on the other. The former group, it was recognized, was a
part of and would change with changes in the Administration; the latter
group, the report stated, should not be subject to change with political
change.
Mr. Cutler served from March 1953 to March 1955 and again
from January 1957 to July 1958. Others who have held this
position have been "Rr. Dillon Anderson (April 1955-August 1956);
Mr. William H. Jackson (Acting) (September 1956-December 1956);
and Mr. Gordon Gray (July 1958 to the present).
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Subsequent Changes in the Organization of the Council and the
Panning Board
The basic organization of the Council established by the
March 17, 1953, report has been altered in only one fundamental respect
since that time. That alteration occurred late in the same year when,
on September 3, the President issued an Executive Order creating the
Operations Coordinating Board (0CB). Because the development of the
OCB is itself a large subject, it has been treated separately below,
along with changes in the NSC Staff that relate to the integration of
the OCB within the NSC structure in 1957.
Several changes in Council participation, and related changes in
Planning Board participation, occurred during the period. Attention
will be concentrated here upon the changes that have occurred in the
group of officials who have been entitled to participate fully in the
work of the Council either as statutory members or as "participant
members".
Beginning in early February 1953 the Director, Bureau of the Budget,
began to attend Council meetings. Although he attended almost all meet-
ings, he was, until July 1953, invited on an ad hoc basis for particular
agenda items. During this period a representative of Budget also parti-
cipated in the work of the Planning Board on an ad hoc basis.* In early
July 1953 the Director became a standing-request participant member of
the Council and was represented thereafter on the Planning Board by a
full member.
As already noted, the Council membership of the National Security
Resources Board (NSRB) was transferred in 1953 to the Office of Defense
Mobilization (ODM). On July 1, 1958, the Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization was established, absorbing the functions of ODD-M and the
Federal Civil Defense Administration and assuming ODMts Council and
Planning Board memberships.** When the Foreign Operations Administration
(FOA) succeeded the MGutual Security Agency on August 6, 1953, the
membership on the NSC of the Director for Mutual Security ~?ras transferred
to the new Director of FOA.'rJhen FOA was subsequently abolished on
June 30, 1955, and its functions were transferred to the new Inter-
national Cooperation, Administration (ICA) within the State Department,
The Director designated al. individual who was available for
such case-by-case participation as was determined necessary.
This Budget representative was assisted by an individual who
served as the normal point of contact and liaison with the
NSC Staff. Budget during -t~liis period received the agenda
and reports of the NSC and the Planning Board.
Reorganization Plan 1 of 1958
*3 Reorganization Plan 7 of 1953
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the membership of the Director, FOA, on the Council was abolished.*
However, the Director of ICA was authorized by the President to attend
Council meetings as an adviser to the Secretary of State. Subsequently,
when responsibility for over-all coordination of the Mutual Security
Program was assigned to the Under Secretary of State, he was invited to
attend Council meetings as an observer, in lieu of the Director, ICA.''
The Mutual Security program function was represented on the Planning
Board by a member until FOA was abolished. At that time an ICA Observer
was designated to provide staff support for the State Member of the Board,
attending Board meetings when items of interest to ICA were under consideration
These arrangements continue to the present.
A further sub-category was added to the list of categories of
Council participation during this period in order to provide a further
degree of flexibility. A distinction was made between "Regular Partici-
pant" members who attenddd all Council meetings until the President other-
wise determined (i, e., the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director,
Bur6au of the Budget and "Special-Request Members" who had a standing
Presidential invitation to attend Council meetings, but only for meet-
ings or parts of meetings which were concerned with matters relating
to their official responsibilities. The practice of making such a dis-
tinction developed gradually in the period 1955-57. This practice was
formalized by Mgr. Cutler when he returned as Special Assistant in early
1957 and issued, on July 1, 1957, a Presidentially-approved revision of
his statement of March 17, 1953, on the structure and functions of the
Council. These Special-Request members are represented by observers on
the Planning Board who have a similar standing invitation to attend
Planning Board meetings for items of interest to their agencies. They
receive Council and Planning Board agendas and other necessary Council
and Planning Board documents. Currently Special-Request members of the
Council are the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA).'* In the past the officials in this
3# His membership on the NSC was abolished by Executive
Order 10610, Section 303 (a) and (b). FOA itself was
abolished by the Mutual Security Act of 1954. (Public
Law 665. 83rd Congress)
The Director;. ICA, does, however, attend Council meetings
from time to time on an ad hoc basis.
The Attorney General began attending Council meetings regularly
during the President's first illress in the fall of 1955.
Following the President's recovery he was given the status
described above. The Chairman, AEC, began attending meetings
on the above basis in January 1956. Earlier he had attended as
an observer in his capacity as Special Assistant to the President
for Atomic Energy Matters and continued to do so from time to time
after January 1956 when he was not participating as the
Chairman, AEC. The Administrator of NASA was given this status
on August 19, 1958, just after approval of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act which established NASA.
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category have included the Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmanent,* and, before FCDA and ODOR were combined, the Federal
Civil Defense Administrator.
Various officials have, from time to time, been invited to attend
Council meetings for items of interest to them as "Observers". Though
no attempt will be made to recount all of the changes in this group,
its composition may be illustrated by the following list of officials
who are presently in this category: The Assistant to the President and
The Deputy Assistant, the Director, U.S. Information Agency (USIA),*
the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy
and for Science and Technology, and the White House Staff Secretary
and his assistant. The Special Assistants to the President for National
Security Affairs and Security Operations Coordination, together with. the
Executive Secretary and his Deputy, regularly attend Council meetings
as the Council staff. Ordinarily the Council participants, apart from
the Secretaries of State and Defense, do not bring supporting staff
personnel to the meeting except as may be necessary when they make
special presentations to the Council. USIA and the Office of the Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, as well as
Justice, AEC and NASA, are represented at the Planning Board level
by Observers.
It should be noted that actual attendance at Council meetings
varies according to the type of report being considered and the character
of the meeting. Thus, when the Council hears a presentation of some
special study or report, a number of additional officials may be invited
to attend and the purpose of the meeting may be largely expository. At
the other end of the spectrum is an occasional Council meeting on a
sensitive subject to which only the statutory members of the Council,
the statutory advisers and essential Council and Tfhite House staff
are invited. Attendance at the usual Council meetings, when the agenda
is a normal one of Planning Board and other reports, falls somewhere be-
tween these two unusual cases. The regular Council attendants who sit
at the Council table are the five statutory members (the President,
Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, OCDM),
the two statutory advisers (the Chairman, JCS, and the Director of Central
Intelligent), the Director, USIA, the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Executive Secretary and the Deputy
Executive Secretary.
In February 1953 the Council had agreed that the existing internal
security organization of the Council should be continued. However, in
# The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmanent was
represented on the Planning Board by a Member.
The Director, USIA is the only Observer who sits at the
Council table.
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April 1954, the President requested the Attorney General, in cooperation
with the interested departments and agencies, to make a study of the
internal security organization of the government and to make recommen-
dations to the Council on the subject. On September 10, 1954, the Presi-
dent approved recommendations by the Attorney General, as amended and
adopted by the Council. In general these recommendations continued the
existing internal security organization of the Council, including its
two internal security committees (the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security (ICIS)) and its Representative on Internal Security. The
major new provisions were as follows: (a) the Chairmen of the two
committees were hereafter to be designated by the President from the
membership of the committees after consultation with the Attorney
General; (b) the Attorney General was to continue to take a leading
role in NSC consideration of internal security matters and the Justice
Observer was to take a similar role in the Planning Board (receiving all
necessary Planning Board papers); (c) representatives of the IIC and
ICIS were to attend meetings of the Planning Board or other committees
of the NSC to participate in matters relating to the responsibilities
of the two committees; and (d) the joint report on the internal security
program, which IIC and ICIS were already submitting as a part of the
semi-annual (later annual) status reports on national security programs,
was to be considered a substitute for separate reports to the Council
by the NSC Representative on Internal Security; subject, however, to the
understanding that the latter might submit comments on the joint IIC-
ICIS report.*
# The NSC Representative on Internal Security has since 1949
attended meetings of the Council whenever matters relating
to internal security are scheduled for consideration.
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Planning Board and Council Procedures
On October 13, 1953 the Council noted a statement by the President that
his conception of the NSC was that of:
"a corporate body composed of individuals advising the President in their
own right, rather than as representatives of their respective departments
and agencies. Their function should be to seek, with their background of
experience, the most statesmanlike solution to the problems of national
security, rather than to reach solutions which represent merely a
compromise of departmental positions. The same concept is equally
applicable to advisory and subordinate groups, such as the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the NSC Planning Board."*
This concept continues to govern the work of the Council and its subordinate
bodies.
On January 21, 1953, at the time that Council members were asked to
designate acting members for a Senior Staff, they were also informed that the
initial assignment of the new Senior Staff members would be to develop, after
consultation with their respective principals, an agenda of policy questions
listed in approximate order of priority, based upon: (a) a preliminary review
of current policies; (b) examination of currently active Council projects; and
(c) initiation of new policies or projects.
The period 1953-54+ was marked by very great activity. The Planning Board
(before March 17, 1953, the Senior Staff) met regularly three times a week.
During particularly busy periods it met even more frequently. Meetings were
from three to five hours long and the agenda regularly included from three to
five items. The Council met an average of once a week and its agendas, too,
were very full.
During 1953 much of the Council and Planning Board's time was devoted to.
(a) certain urgent and critical international problems; (b) certain problems
relating to the scope and character of major national security programs; and
(c) a thorough examination of alternative over-all strategies and policies.
At the same time a general review of existing national security policies was
undertaken. In 1954 an increasing amount of the Council and Planning Board's
time was devoted to this review and by the end of that year it had been
largely completed. Interspersed with these activities was the development of
policies on a number of new subjects.
With the end of hostilities in Korea and Indochina in 1953 and 1954 and
with the completion of the initial review of national security policies in
When the President approved a revised statement of the structure and
functions of the NSC on July 1, 1957, the OCB was added to the list of ad-
visory and subordinate groups, and the statement was clarified by addition
at the end of the phrase "although the members of the latter two boards
/1. e., the Planning Board and the OCBJ are responsible also for stating
the views of their respective departments and agencies."
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early 1955, the Council and Planning Board entered a period characterized by a
somewhat reduced pace of activity and by reversion to a regular pattern of
business. Beginning in mid--1955 and continuing to the present time, two Plan-
ning Board meetings per week became the rule, though additional meetings were
sometimes scheduled. The Council has also met somewhat less frequently than
in the first two years, the number of meetings ranging from 36 to 13 per year.
Much of the Council's and Planning Board's time in the years 1955-56 was de-
voted to regular activities involved in developing new policies or reviewing
existing policies in the light of current and anticipated developments. Per-
haps the most significant individual projects during these two years were
comprehensive studies which were done for the Council by outside groups or
government committees of certain important national security programs. Thus
certain military programs were studied in the light of technological develop-
ments. Similarly, a study was made of certain aspects of the foreign
assistance programs. Both of these studies initiated long cycles of Planning
Board and Council activity during which new policy guidance affecting
important programs was developed.
A new aspect of the value of the National Security Council was demon-
strated in the fall of 1955 at the time of the President's first major illness.
By that time, as noted, the Council had built up a reservoir of Presidentially
approved national security policies. These permitted the heads of the various
government departments to carry on "with full knowledge of the continued
validity of the broad concepts established by the President in the cumulative
experience of the NSC."* The Vice President presided over the Council during
this period and the Council provided a useful forum for discussion of national
security problems. Shortly after the middle of October 1955 the President be-
gan to be kept informed of the Council's actions and began acting upon them.
The Council performed in a similar fashion, though for a shorter period,
following the President's second illness in June 1956.
The second Administration of President Eisenhower began in the Council
with a reevaluation of various major elements of basic security policy on the
basis of a series of discussion papers, each of which examined one of the
major aspects of the over-.all U. S. security policy. On the basis of the new
basic policy, certain other security policies were also re-examined. Further
studies were also made of certain national security programs. New policies
were prepared against the background of a world situation characterized by
such outstanding features as the developing capabilities cf the United States
and the USSR in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles; the actual
or anticipated emergence of a large number of newly independent countries; and
the beginning of the exploration of outer space. The Counci'.. also reviewed
its general directives relating to the organization and coordination of the
foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies.
In the latter part of the period there has been a resumption once more of
the regular process of policy re-examination and revision, but there has also
been an increased effort to use the Council for discussion of major policy
issues facing the United States now and in the future, without necessarily
:W-Dillon Anderson, "The President and National Security", The Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 197, p. 442, (January 1956).
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seeking immediate policy decisions on those issues. To this end increased use
has been made of consultants and of discussion papers which consider the pros
and cons of policy alternatives without themselves recommending a policy.
There has also been an emphasis upon the preparation of long-range studies of
major problems the United States is likely to face over the next five to ten
years as background which will be of assistance in the development of future
policies.
The procedures of the Planning Board during the entire period from 1953
to the present date have not varied significantly in basic outline although,
of course, they have been adjusted when necessary to meet the requirements of
a particular policy problem or the character of a particular type of report.
The procedures are also in many fundamental respects comparable to those which
earlier characterized the activities of the Senior Staff. Before the first
draft of a new policy paper is prepared, the subject is sometimes discussed on
the basis of the existing policy, an intelligence estimate, a military
appreciation or similar material. An intelligence estimate may be requested
if a current one is not available. The CIA representatives maintain close
contact with the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and with the NSC Staff in order to ensure, so far as possible, that
intelligence estimates are available at the time required.
First drafts of foreign country and regional papers continue to be pre-
pared in the State Department, just as first drafts of other types of papers
are ordinarily prepared by the agency of primary interest, or, in some in-
stances, by a Planning Board Committee. As in the past, papers are upon
occasion prepared directly by the Planning Board or the Board Assistants,
sometimes on the basis of a first draft prepared by the NSC Staff to reflect a
Planning Board discussion.
The format of Council papers went through a further evolution during this
period. Initially the statement of policy of a typical country or regional
policy paper continued to consist of three basic elements: general consider-
ations, objectives, and courses of action. In 1955 and 1956 there was some
experimentation with the addition of a new section of "policy conclusions"
which, in general character, fell somewhere between general considerations and
courses of action. Essentially the "policy conclusions" constituted a state-
ment of the main policy guidelines. Beginning in 1957 such policy conclusions
began to be eliminated; the courses of action were renamed "major policy
guidance" and were changed somewhat by the inclusion in them of material that
had previously been contained in the "policy conclusions" section. This
change was in line with the affirmation by the President at about this time of
the principle that, except as directed by him, matters to be considered by the
Council should insofar as possible deal with the making or alteration of broad
policies - either policies for the future or policies required by currently
developing events.
Initially almost all policy papers were accompanied by a staff study. In
fact, the preparation of such a staff study and its discussion in the Planning
Board was sometimes the first step in the preparation of a new or revised
policy paper. More recently staff studies have not usually been prepared,
except in the case of a wholly new policy subject or in a case where
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developments since the approval of the last policy paper are such as to seem
to require preparation of such a staff study. The general considerations, of
course, cover the same ground, though in somewhat less detail, and they are
regularly supported by the more detailed treatment of a current intelligence
estimate.
The above-described format applies particularly to country and regional
policy papers. As an outline it also covers the principal elements of almost
all other policy papers considered by the Council though the material in some
of these may be somewhat differently organized.
The most important innovation in the format of Council papers during the
period was the addition, in July 1953, of a "Financial Appendix" to policy
papers having financial implications. Such appendices are included in
"functional" as well as country and regional policy papers. Though the form
of Financial Appendices has evolved since 1953, its purpose and its general
content have remained essentially unchanged.* The primary purpose of the
Financial Appendix is to indicate, for the information of the Planning Board
and the Council, the cost implications of the proposed policy. It normally
contains information on past expenditures and order of magnitude estimates of
future programs. It includes statements of assumptions and other information
essential to an understanding of the cost data. The Financial Appendix does
not presume to dispose of policy issues. It is submitted purely for the in-
formation of the Council and the Planning Board. Approval of a policy state-
ment does not indicate approval of the cost estimates in the Financial
Appendix.
A first draft of a policy paper is ordinarily discussed first in the
Planning Board and then referred to the Board Assistants for revision in the
light of the discussion. This process may, if necessary, be repeated several
times. When a problem is particularly urgent the Planning Board has on
occasion met in almost continuous session and has itself done the essential
redrafting.
In the process of Planning Board and Board Assistants discussion the
Planning Board members and their Board Assistants obtain their agencies' views
on each successive draft. The NSC Staff, and more particularly, the Executive
Secretary, his Deputy and members of the Special Staff, support the Special
Assistant in his role as Chairman of the Planning Board. Members of the
Special Staff make an independent analysis and review of each Planning Board
paper at each stage in its development for the benefit of the Special
Assistant and the Executive Secretary. They also participate in the meetings
of the Board Assistants.
Financial Appendices are prepared by the NSC Staff on the basis of
contributions from the agencies responsible for the programs involved and
are reviewed by the Planning Board. For the current directive on the use
of Financial Appendices see "Organizing for National Security", Selected
Materials prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United
States Senate, and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery,
Sh Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 26-28.
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The Special Assistant plays a leading role in the Planning Board meetings
as presiding officer and as a non-voting participant. He expresses his
personal views in the course of the Planning Board discussion of a subject,
but as the principal staff officer of the President for national security
affairs, he is concerned primarily to ensure that the paper is adequate and
that it satisfactorily reflects the views of the members of the Planning Board
representing the various agencies. In particular, he is concerned with
ensuring that, if there are significant differences of view as to policy
recommendations within the Board, they are fully discussed and presented to
the Council as clearly and accurately as possible. In recent experience about
two-thirds of the papers sent to the Council by the Planning Board have con-
tained such "splits". The Special Assistant's own views are not recorded in
the paper when it goes forward to the Council, In the Council meeting, he
makes an impartial presentation of the views of the Planning Board members,
but also, if he wishes, expresses his own personal views to the Council fol-
lowing such presentation.
When a paper has been submitted by the head of an agency for direct cir-
culation to the Council, the Planning Board almost always discusses it in ad-
vance of its consideration in the Council and sometimes prepares written com-
ments upon it for consideration by the Council. Similarly, oral presentations
for the Council are often made first to the Planning Board. Reports by out-
side study groups, by consultants or by special Council committees are also
regularly discussed in the Planning Board prior to their consideration by the
Council and may be referred back to the Planning Board for the preparation of
recommendations following preliminary Council consideration. These procedures
help ensure that Council members will be well briefed on Council agenda sub-
jects prior to Council meetings. Nonetheless the Council does, when the
occasion warrants it, consider reports, either oral or written, which have not
been discussed first in the Planning Board and which are not the basis of sub-
sequent Planning Board work.
In the usual case a Planning Board paper is circulated to the Council ten
days in advance of the Council meeting at which it is considered in order to
give the agencies sufficient opportunity to prepare for Council consideration
and to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff time for preparation of their comments.
Written JCS comments are submitted on most policy papers and are normally
circulated to the Council in advance of the meeting. Each Planning Board
member is responsible for briefing his Council principal on the matters before
the Council in advance of the Council meetings.
As has been indicated, the character of the reports that the Council con-
siders may be of various kinds. Such reports may include, for example, pro-
posed policies prepared by the Planning Board, policy proposals submitted
directly by Council members or other agency heads, oral presentations of
special studies, OCB Reports and regular briefings.
In accordance with a directive of the President in January 1953, one
feature of every Council meeting is an oral briefing by the Director of Central
Intelligence summarizing important developments that are occurring throughout
the world. He gives particular attention to those areas which are on the
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Council agenda that day.* "The President looks to the Special Assistant at
Council meetings to present the items upon the agenda, to brief the Council on
their background, to explain any 'splits' and to initiate discussion. Views
are sought around the table so as to bring out relevant facts and opinions and
so as to give those present an opportunity to participate in making policy
which they must later carry out."** In the course of the Council discussion,
the Council members may agree upon a resolution of the policy questions at
issue or the President may indicate his own decision. The discussion sometimes
stimulates a request by the Council or the President for an additional report
on a related subject.
Following the Council meeting a record of the Council's actions is
drafted by the Executive Secretary and his Deputy, reviewed by the Special
Assistant and then circulated for comment by the Council members and advisers.
This latter procedure, introduced at the beginning of the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration in 1953, gives the Council participants an opportunity to see and com-
ment upon the record of actions before it is submitted to the President. The
President's action on this record, including his resolution of any remaining
differences of view, constitutes his authoritative decision on the matters
considered by the Council. The Presidentially-approved actions and policy
papers continue to be communicated to the Council participants by the means
described above.
Much use has been made of outside consultants and consultant groups
during this entire phase of the Council's existence. Such consultants have
been utilized upon approximately twenty occasions. X The Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs may himself arrange to call in
such consultants, or one of the Council members may be asked to contract with
some existing institution or to form a special consultants group to make a
particular study. Essentially, use of such consultants has served one of three
purposes: (a) to make an independent study of some proposal or of some
problem; (b) to review existing policy on a subject and to make comments with
The report on the status of NSC projects has been dropped as a regular
agenda item. Instead a forward agenda and a summary of Council and
Planning Board projects are issued regularly and are periodically
reviewed by the Planning Board.
Gordon Gray, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formulation of
National Policy," paper prepared for delivery at the 1959 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C.,
September 10-12, 1959, (reproduced in "Organizing for National Security":
Selected Materials prepared for the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate, and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery,
p. .
Supra, P. 16
In a recent review of a fundamental policy paper 23 consultants met with
the Planning Board in groups of four or five and gave their views on the
policy under review; later a large group of them met in a body with the
Planning Board and commented upon the revised draft of the policy paper
prepared by the Board. (Gray, op. cit, p. 65)
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respect thereto; or (c) to comment on tentative recommendations being
considered by the Planning Board prior to their submission to the Council. As
a general rule such consultants discuss their recommendations with the
Planning Board prior to Council consideration of them. In cases where the
consultants have made a study and specific recommendations, those
recommendations have regularly been referred to the responsible agencies for
comment prior to final Council action. The Council's and Planning Board's
work on such consultants' recommendations has often involved thorough study
over a period of several months, followed by later progress reports and
follow-up recommendations by the agencies concerned.
There is so much variation in the manner that the Planning Board's and
the Council's basic procedures are applied to particular problems that it is
difficult to attempt anything like a completely comprehensive account of them
here. However, it is important to emphasize that, if the urgency of the
situation requires it, many of the usual Planning Board and Council
procedures can be foreshortened or altogether dispensed with. For example, if
necessary a subject may be considered in the Council on the basis of oral
presentation with little or no prior staff work.
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The Operations Coordinating Board
Origin of the O. As Indicated in the earlier discussion, the primary
function of the Council machinery has been to provide policy advice to the
President. It has not been itself involved in the implementation of policies.
From the beginning of the Council's existence, when the President approved
policies recommended to him by the Council, he directed that they be
implemented by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies and he
designated the department or agency which had primary responsibility for
implementation as the coordinator. It was the responsibility of this
coordinating agency to see that actions by other agencies to implement the
policy were taken in a coordinated manner. In the defense mobilization
field there was an established coordinating agency (at first the NSRB, then
ODM, and now, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization) with inter-
departmental coordinating mechanisms and procedures. Similarly, after
1949 the Internal security committees of the Council provided an organized
means of effecting coordination of the implementation of the policies in
this field. There were other cases where the problem of coordination
hardly arose because the responsibility for implementation resided almost
entirely in a single agency.
The coordination problems were most difficult with respect to the
policies dealing with international affairs which constituted a majority
of the policies recommended to the President through the Council. As has
been indicated, the normal procedure was to designate the Department of
State as the coordinating agency for such policies though their implementa-
tion almost invaribly involved action by a number of other agencies of the
government as well. In order to deal with this problem, responsibility
for coordination was sometimes assigned jointly to State and another agency.
Such arrangements were, however, of an ad hog character and as of January 1953
there was no regular, established interdepartmental mechanism directly
charged by the President with broad responsibility for coordinating the
implementation of policies dealing with international affairs.
This problem received new attention as a result of the establishment
by President Eisenhower, on January 24, 1953, of the "President's Committee
on International Information Activities" to make a survey and evaluation of
the international information policies and activities of the Executive
Branch and of policies and activities related thereto, with particular
reference to the international relations and national security of the United
States. The Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. William H. Jackson,
made its report to the President on June 30, 1953.* General recommendations
of the report were released publicly on July 8, 1953.**
# Other members of the committee were Robert Cutler, Gordon Gray, Barklie
McKee Henry, John C. Hughes, C.D. Jackson, Roger M. Kyes and
Sigurd Larmon.
## White House Press Release, July 8, 1953. Information on the contents of
the report in this history (including the quotations below) is taken
from that press release.
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The Committee concluded that the existing Psychological Strategy Board
(PSB) should be abolished because it was
"...founded upon the misconception that 'psychological activities, and
'psychological strategy' somehow exist apart from official policies
and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in this
field. In reality there is a 'psychological' aspect or implication
to every diplomatic, economic, or military policy and action. This
implication should receive more careful attention, both in the
planning and execution stage of policy, but not to the exclusion of
other vital factors."
In its place, the Committee recommended the creation of an Operations
Coordinating Board within the NSC structure. The principal function of
the new Board, which would consist of agency representatives at the Under
Secretary level, would be the coordination and development by departments
and agencies of detailed operational plans to carry out national security
policies. This recommendation, it was stated, was designed "to achieve
better integrated direction of the program of the United States in the
world struggle and to fill the gap which has existed in the past between
the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions needed to
give effect to them."
On July 2, 1953, the NSC considered these recommendations and refered
them to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for preparation of a draft
Executive Order. An Executive Order creating an Operations Coordinating
Board and abolishing the Psychological Strategy Board was approved by the
President on September 2, 1953.* It provided for an OCB membership of the
Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of Central
Intelligence and a representative of the President to be designated by the
President. Heads of other agencies were to be invited to send a representative
to OCB meetings when the OCB was dealing with matters bearing directly on
their responsibilities. The Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs might attend any meeting of the Board and the Director, USIA,
was to advise the Board at its request. The Executive Order provided for the
creation of a staff and for the appointment of an Executive Officer for the
Board.
The functions of the Board were stated as follows by Section 2 of the
Executive Order:
"The National Security Council having recommended a national security
policy and the President having approved it, the Board shall (1) when-
ever the President shall hereafter so direct, advise with the agencies
concerned as to (a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities
respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepartmental
aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to
carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinated execution of such
Executive Order 10483
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policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security action or
project so that it shall make its full contribution to the attainment
of national security objectives and to the particular climate of
opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and
(2) initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national
security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the
situation. The Board shall perform such other advisory functions as
the President may assign to it and shall from time to time make
reports to the National Security Council with respect to the carry-
ing out of this order."
Though the Board was instructed to report to the NSC, it was not at this
time placed within the structure of the NSC as recommended by the Jackson
Report.
In essence, the OCB was to provide a regular means through which the
responsible agencies could consult and coordinate their actions under
approved national security policies or with respect to other operational
matters of common concern not specifically related to a particular policy
assigned to the Board. The OCB was to "advise with" the agencies; it had
no power to direct action. It was to operate by agreements, and agreements
reached in the Board would be implemented by each member of the Board
through appropriate action within his own agency. The provision that the
membership of the Board should be at the Under Secretary level was designed
to ensure that the Board members would have sufficient authority within
their respective agencies to direct the implementation of agreements
reached within the Board. In this manner the coordinated implementation of
policies was to be achieved without interposing the OCB between the President
and the heads of the executive departments and agencies.
In practice, though it was not so specified in the Executive Order, the
OCB was limited to policies dealing with international affairs or having
an international affairs aspect, and was specifically excluded by the
Executive Order from two fields in which coordinating mechanisms already
existed - the fields of internal security and defense mobilization.
Initially OCB was assigned coordinating responsibility for only those
national security policies relating to international affairs which were
approved by the President following the issuance of the Executive Order.
As new policies were approved by the President and as existing policies
were transferred to it, the OCB came to be the designated coordinator for
the bulk of Presidentially-approved national security policies since the
majority of such policies relate to international affairs. In addition,
the OCB assumed responsibility for all PSB projects. After a review of
them, it retained and completed work upon the majority of current PSB
projects while dropping others. In accordance with the Executive Order,
the OQB also developed additional projects of its own under the "climate
of opinion" provision and under its authority to initiate new proposals
for action within the existing framework of national security policies.
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Organization of the OCB. The basic pattern of OCB organization was set
during the first month or two following the issuance of the Executive
Order and has changed very little since that time. It is a three-level
interagency organization - consisting of the Board itself, the OCB Assistants
(or "Board Assistants" as they are commonly called) and the OCB Working
Groups - assisted at all levels by the OCB Staff. The basic types of
reports and plans developed by the Board during these first months have
continued to the present day, though the content of these documents has
undergone a number of changes during the period.
Standing and g_d hoe OCB working groups or committees have existed
since the beginning of OCB and, in fact, can be traced back to antecedents
in the inter-agency 'tpanels'' of the Psychological Strategy Board. When
the President designates the OCB as coordinator for a national security
policy, that policy is referred to an existing working group or, if such
a working group does not exist, to a new working group created for the
purpose. The working groups are composed of responsible operating officials
from the agencies concerned with the implementation of the policy and a
representative from the OCB Staff.* The agency which has chief responsi-
bility - usually State - chairs the group. Agencies which do not regularly
participate in the activities of the Board but which have implementation
responsibilities in connection with a particular policy (e. g., Commerce
or Labor) may be regular participants at the working group level. The
working groups have essentially two functions: (a) to provide a regular
mechanism at the working level for consulting and for coordinating actions to
implement national security policies or actions on other matters of mutual
concern, and (b) to prepare reports (periodic or special) and operations
plans for consideration by the Board.
Each Board member is assisted by a Board Assistant, an individual
from the Board member's agency whose rank is such as to give him direct
access to the principal operating officials in his agency. The OCB
Assistants were not specifically provided for in the Executive Order, but
were designated by the OCB at the first OCB meeting on September 17, 1953,
and began meeting together as a group under the chairmanship of the Board's
Executive Officer shortly thereafter. Individually, the OCT3 Assistants
provide staff support for their respective Board members, assist them in
intradepartmental and interdepartmental cooperation on subjects dealt with
by the Board, and aid their agency's working group members in meeting OCB
requirements. As a group, the OCB Assistants meet once each week to review
papers prepared (in the usual case by the working groups) for Board con-
sideration to ensure that they are ready for Board consideration; they seek
to ensure that these papers are adequate and that they accurately reflect
any differences of view among the agencies. The OCB Assistants may, in some
cases, also act on behalf of their principals when they consider that they
have the authority to do so and when the Executive Officer concurs in
such a procedure.
# Agency representation on the working groups is approximately at the desk
officer level, though the designated chairmen are usually Office Directors
or Deputy Office Directors from the State Department and during periods
when particularly significant or critical problems are under consideration
may be of even higher level.
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No changes have been made in the prescribed functions of the OCB since
the issuance of the original Executive Order, but a number of changes have
occurred in participation and membership. The Director, USIA, was added
to the Board's membership by Executive Order on February 28, 1955.* Up to
that time he had regularly attended 0CB meetings as an Observer. When the
Foreign Operations Administration was abolished by statute effective on
June 30, 1955, the membership of the Director, FOA, on the OCB was also
abolished. An Executive Order issued at this time provided, however, that
the Director of the new International Cooperation Administration or his
representative should "participate in the deliberations, and assist with
the affairs of" the OCB.** Pursuant to this authority and by agreement of
the Board, the Director, ICA, participated with the Board in an informal
status as an adviser until July 1, 1957, when a revised Executive Order
made him a Member.*** During this entire period ICA representatives
participated regularly in the work of the OCB Assistants and Working Groups.
By decision of the President, the Special Assistant to the-President for
Disarmament participated during the period 1955-58 in OCB meetings when
matters of interest to the Disarmament Staff were under consideration.
By action of the OCB on March 13, 1957, following a general review
by it of arrangements with respect to participation, the Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commission, the Under Secretary of the Treasury and the Deputy
Director, Bureau of the Budget, become "Standing-Request" members of the
OCB.**** Standing-Request members are authorized to participate in the
work of the 0CB to the extent that they consider desirable, In practice
these three agencies have participated in differing degrees at the three
interdepartmental levels of the 0CB organization. Treasury representatives
are full participants at all levels. The Chairman, AEC, regularly attends
the informal weekly luncheon meetings of the OCB. AEC representatives
attend formal OCB meetings and Board Assistants meetings only when a subject
of interest 'to AEC is to be considered and AEC is represented only on those
working groups in which it has a direct interest. Budget does not attend
OCB luncheon meetings, usually attends formal OCB meetings in an observer
status, but is a full participant at the Board Assistants and working group
levels.
At the time of the issuance of the Executive Order creating the OCB the
President designated his Special Assistant for Cold War Planning as his
representative on the OCB.***** Initially the primary responsibility of
Executive Order 10598
Executive Order 10610, Section 303 (b).
Executive Order 10700, Section 1 (b).
Prior to March 1957 AEC and Treasury had for some time been frequent
participants In OCB meetings under the provision of the Executive Order
with respect to participation by non-member agencies. Treasury and
Budget had been participating in the work of the OCB Assistants and of
many of the working groups.
Officials who held the position of President's representative (and
Special Assistant to the President) through 1956 were C. D. Jackson
(Special Assistant from February 1953 and the President's representative
from September 1953 - March 1954); Nelson A. Rockefeller (December 1954 -
December 1955); William H. Jackson (March 1956 - December 1956).
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this Presidential representative lay in the "climate of opinion" area
referred to in the Executive Order establishing the Board. The Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs also attended all
OCB meetings and was a full participant in its activities.*
The creation of the OCB and the assignment to it of operations
coordinating functions had the effect of superseding the responsibilities
for follow-up of the implementation of national security policies which
had been assigned to the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs by the March 17, 1953, report on the NSC.** Nonetheless,
something of this follow-up function continued to be performed by the
President's representative on the Board. As the OCB evolved and as new
Special Assistants occupied the position of Presidentts representative,
there was a gradual increase in emphasis upon the follow-up function of the
Presidentts representative and he became tied more closely to the normal
activities of the 0CB. This change received some formal recognition in
May 1955 when the President's representative became Vice Chairman of the
Board. Luring the fall of 1956 Mr. William H. Jackson, who was already a
Special kssistant to the President and his representative on the OCB, also
became Acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. When Mr. Robert Cutler resumed the position of Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs in January 1957 he temporarily
assumed both of these roles. However, it was not until the changes of
July 1957 (discussed below) that the functions of the President's representa-
tive were clearly restated to accord with the developing practice.
The OCB Staff. The Executive Order of September 1953 which established
the OCB instructed the agencies represented on the Board to contribute to
its financial support. Until Fiscal Year 1958 the OCB agencies contributed
on an agreed-share basis to the 0CB budget. State provided logistical support
for the Board.
The Executive Order also authorized the OCB agencies to detail personnel
to the 0CB Staff. It was the policy of the OCB from the beginning, in the
selection of its professional staff, to maintain a balance between permanent
staff officers who provided continuity and staff officers on two to three
year assignments from the OCB member agencies who contributed experience
derived from personal contact with the operations of their respective agencies.
For a short period the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War
Planning served as the Board's Acting Executive Officer. However, on
November 4, 1953, Mr. Elmer B. Staats became the fulltime Executive Officer.
As initially organized in October 1953, the 0CB Staff consisted
essentially of four elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and
Deputy Executive Officer: (b) the Secretariat; (c) the Special Staff headed
by an official who was also the Special Assistant for Intelligence; and
(d) the Executive Assistant.
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was represented
on the OCB Assistants until 1957.
" Supra, pp. 33-34
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The members of the secretariat unit provided executive secretaries for
the working groups, contributed to drafting of documents by the working
groups, provided substantive staff support to the Executive Officer on
subjects within their areas of responsibility and generally facilitated
the process by which OCB member agencies reached decisions with respect
to implementing actions to carry out national security policies. In
January 1954 this unit was reorganized on a geographical area basis and
its members began reporting directly to the Executive Officer and his Deputy,
rather than through a Chief of the Secretariat (a position which was
abolished). They were made members of the working groups dealing with those
national security policies for which they had responsibility and were
designated the "OCB Staff Representative" on the working group instead of
"Executive Secretary". This part of the OCB Staff is presently called
the "Area Staff".
The Special Staff (later called the "Special Projects Staff") was
established primarily to perform two functions: (a) to provide staff
support to the President's representative on the Board and to carry out
special assignments for him; and (b) to provide the President's represen-
tative and the Executive Officer current background information on foreign
political, military, economic and social developments affecting implementa-
tion of national security policies. The importance of the former of these
two functions gradually declined as the President's representative's role
within the OCB changed to emphasize the "follow-up" function over the
"climate of opinion" function. Accordingly, in January 1956 this unit
was renamed the "Intelligence Liaison Staff" and its functions were largely
limited to the second of the two functions described above.
The Executive Assistant was a general assistant to the Executive
Officer, performed secretariat functions for the Board itself, maintained
liaison with the NSC Staff and supervised administrative functions and
certain reporting functions not performed by the working groups.
A reorganization of the OCB Staff in September 1954 added a "Communica-
tions Staff" with personnel drawn from other sections of the Staff. This
unit, which was subsequently renamed the "Media Program Staff", and, still
later, the "Information and Education Projects Staff", was concerned with
OCB activities in the information, communications, education, cultural
and ideological fields which cut across the geographical organization of
the Area Staff. It was a "functional" staff.
To sum up, the OCB Staff organization at the beginning of 1957 included
the following elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and the
Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the Office of the Executive Assistant;
(c) the Area Staff; (d) the Information and Education Projects Staff; and
(e) the Intelligence Liaison Staff,
Placement of the OCB within the NSC Structure. On February 25, 1957,
the President issued a revised Executive Order formally placing the 0CB
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within the structure of the National Security Council as of July 1, 1957.*
After well over three years of activity the OCB had proved its value;
the time had therefore come to place it on a more permanent footing and
to establish "a closer relation between the formulation and the carrying
out of security policies."** In addition the order added ICA to the
membership of the Board (as already notedj, changed the arrangements with
respect to the chairmanship and Vice chairmanship of the OCB, and affected
the relationship of the OCB Staff to the NSC Staff.*** Whereas the earlier
order had provided that the Under Secretary of State would be chairman of
the Board, the new order stated that the President would appoint the chair-
man and vice chairman from among the members of the Board. The President,
at the time of the issuance of the order, appointed Mr. Christian A. Herter,
the then Under Secretary of State, as Chairman and Mr. Robert Cutler, the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as Vice
Chairman. However, in May 1957, upon the recommendation of his Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President established a new
position, that of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations
Coordination. The President appointed Mr. Frederick M. Dearborn to the
new position.**** He designated Mr. Dearborn Vice Chairman of the OCB
and his principal representative on the OCB. The Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs continued as a second representa-
tive of the President on the OCB. The new Special Assistant's functions
were much more closely tied to the normal operation of the OCB mechanism
than had been true in the case of previous Special Assistants who had
served as the President's representative on the OCB. Thus, his duties
included, in addition to serving as Vice Chairman and participating in
the meetings of the OCB: (a) consulting with the 0CB Executive Officer
as to the agenda and scheduling of work for OCB meetings; (b) collaborating
with the Chairman and the OCB Executive Officer to assure the effective
functioning of the Operations Coordinating Board; (c) developing for OCB
consideration new proposals for action within the framework of national
security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation;
(d) attending Council meetings and presenting thereat OCB reports;
(e) attending and participating in, as appropriate, meetings of the NSC
Planning Board, of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and other
relevant groups;***** (f) maintaining close liaison with the Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs; and (g) such other assignments
related to security operations coordination as the President might direct.
In performing all of these duties he was to act in close collaboration with
the Chairman of the OCB. Following Congressional action creating a second
# Executive Order 10700
## Quotation from White House Press Release, February 25, 1957
### The effect of the Order on the NSC and OCB Staffs is discussed in
the next major section below.
# ## Following Mr. Dearborn's death on February 25, 1958, Mr. Karl G. Harr
was appointed Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination.
a~#### The Special Assistant became a Planning Board Adviser.- At this time
the OCB Adviser to the Planning Board was eliminated. The Special
Assistant for Security Operations Coordination also attends meetings of
the Cabinet and of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.
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Under Secretary of State, the President, on September 16, 1959, designated
Mr. Robert D. Murphy, the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, as
Chairman of the OCB. When Mr. Murphy resigned the chairmanship in con-
nection with his retirement from government service, the President, on
January 13, 1960, designated Mr. Gordon Gray, his Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, as chairman. In taking this action the Presi-
dent stated in a letter to Mr. Gray:
"In view of your continuing responsibility as the principal super-
visory officer of the work of the National Security Council in
formulating national security policies including those assigned by
me to the OCB for coordination, you are in a position to provide
impartial and objective guidance and leadership to the Board. This
new assignment is one step which I feel should be taken toward
enabling the President to look to one office for staff assistance
in the whole range of national security affairs."*
In a letter to his Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination,
Mr. Karl G. Harr, on the same day the President assigned Mr. Harr special
responsibility in two areas of the Board's work: (a) taking the lead in
initiating new proposals to the Board for actions within the framework of
national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the
situation; and (b) seeing that Board actions contribute fully to the climate
of foreign opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.**
This assignment constituted reaffirmation of the President's desire that
these two aspects of the OCB's activities receive fullest possible attention
in the implementation of national security policy.
The Work of the OCB. The OCB meets at 1:00 p. in. every Wednesday.
The first hour and a quarter is an informal luncheon meeting to which
designated members only are regularly invited. At the luncheon meeting
members bring up any matters that.they consider appropriate. There is no
agenda although frequently members of the Board give advance notice of
topics they wish discussed. No minutes are kept for these meetings. The
Executive Officer is the only staff officer who attends the luncheon meetings.
Board discussions at the luncheon meeting are rarely conducted on the
basis of staff papers. Rather, the luncheons serve as an extremely valuable
means by which the 0CB members consult informally as ranking government
officials with respect to important matters of mutual concern within the
wide range of the Board's interests. This activity is thus distinguished
from the more formal part of the Board's work which is concerned in large
measure with discussion, revision and approval of written documents such
as Operations Plans and reports.
Agreements may be reached during the luncheon on some of the matters
discussed, others are referred to the appropriate working group for study
and later recommendations, and still others are referred to the agencies
White House Press Release, January 13, 1960
# Ibid.
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concerned for decision outside the 0CB framework. The Executive officer
records the Board's actions and later advises the interested agencies of
them.
Items on the OCB agenda are discussed at the formal session which is
convened at 2:15 p. M. As indicated previously, OCB documents prepared by
the working groups are usually presented to the Board only after they have
been reviewed by the OCB Assistants. Usually the Chairman of the working
group which has prepared a particular document (and in many instances an
Assistant Secretary from the same agency) attends the Board meeting to
answer questions and to report on developments which have occurred since
the document was prepared.
The Board members discuss and settle or agree on a method for seeking
settlement of all differences of view contained in the document under con-
sideration. As previously indicated, the OCB always acts by "agreement" or
"concurrence"; it does not "decide" or "direct". Action on a document
therefore consists in concurring in it and agreeing to carry out any actions
it contains. When there is a difference of view among the OCB members which
cannot be resolved within the OCB itself, it is referred to the respective
agency heads. If they cannot resolve the difference, it may be taken to
the President for resolution, sometimes directly, but normally through
the NSC.
The agenda, which is determined by the Board upon the recommendation
of the Executive Officer, includes the following principal types of
documents: (a) operations plans for foreign countries or regions or
major ""functional" areas; (b) reports to the NSC on assigned policies;
(c) semiannual appraisals of the validity of assigned policies and
evaluations of their implementation; (d) the Activity Report and other
standing items (such as the minutes of the previous meeting); (e) special
reports for the 0CB or the NSC prepared by OCB working groups to meet
specific needs for information or action; and (f) oral reports which may
serve as background briefings for papers on the agenda or as the basis for
discussion of current problems of major interest. It is impossible to
generalize about the last two types of report because their character is
determined by the special needs which give rise to their preparation.
However, the first four types of report have a history of development
which is summarized below.
When the President, after approving a national security policy,
assigns it to OCB to coordinate implementation, the Board requests the
working group which has responsibility for the foreign country or area
to prepare Operations Plans for each country. Such Plans are comprehensive,
detailed outlines of operating guidance to implement a policy.
Initially the working groups had carried out their coordinating
responsibilities directly under the policy. In September 1954, however,
following suggestions by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director,
Foreign Operations Administration, the 0CB Assistants agreed, on behalf of
their principals, to initiate preparation of Operations Plans. Their purpose,
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as stated in 1954, was to provide a means by which the Board would review the
working group's agreement as to basic approach, emphasis, timing and
agency action responsibilities under the policy.
The Plans were, and continue to be, prepared by the working groups
on the basis of material submitted by the responsible agencies. Under
the original instructions approved in 1954 the Operations Plan* contained
two basic elements: (a) a statement of basic approach which indicated the
concept of operations; and (b) a statement of actions agreed upon, agency
responsibilities for implementation, and timing of actions. In addition
the Plan included annexes listing for consideration by the Board: (a) de-
sirable actions which had not been included because of policy, funding or
other limitations;** and (b) proposed actions on which there was not
agreement between the agencies. Those proposals in the annexes in which
the Board concurred were included in the final agreed Plan, the rest were
eliminated from the Plan.
During the followin two years a financial annex and a statement of
major U. S. commitments financial, military and political) with respect to
the country were added. In July 1957 agreed courses of action based upon
the courses of action in the policy paper were eliminated in favor of
statements of existing and projected agency programs. In making this
latter change, the Board made the OCB Assistants and the working groups
specifically responsible for assuring that proposed agency programs fully
reflected the national security policy objectives and courses of action.
In the course of a general review by the OCB of its reports in the
spring and summer of 1959, following issuance of the new Presidential
instructions on reporting, the format and content of Operations Plans
was also reviewed. The plans now contain two major sections: (a) a section
containing objectives and major policy directives; and (b) a section con-
taining operational guidance. This latter section consists of a series of
paired paragraphs, the first of which states a problem; this problem state-
ment is followed by one or more paragraphs of operational guidance. There
may be "splits" in these sections when the Plan goes to the Board. Following
the main body of the plan are annexes containing: (a) a statement of
arrangements or agreements between the country concerned and the United
States; (b) statements of the agency programs for carrying out the plan
prepared by the agencies responsible for the programs; (c) financial data
on U. S. assistance and other programs in the country concerned; and
frequently (d) an estimate of Sino-Soviet activities and intentions with
respect to that country.
# Initially called "Outline Plans of Operations"
# This annex was later supplanted by a listing, on a selective basis, of
additional proposals under consideration in the working group which
appeared to be outside existing policy.
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Preparation of an Operations Plan helps to identify, clarify and
resolve differences of policy interpretation, operating responsibility,
or required actions. It also exposes operating difficulties and recommends
practical guidance for the more effective implementation of the policy.
The approved Plan is designed to provide useful guidance for agency operations
in Washington and in the field, with particular reference to those activities
that are of interagency character and that require interagency coordination.
Before a draft Plan is completed, interested diplomatic missions abroad are
asked to comment upon it. When the Board has concurred in a Plan, it is
sent by the State Department to the appropriate Chiefs of Mission abroad
and by Defense to the appropriate unified commands. Copies or appropriate
extracts are provided by other Washington agencies to their field representa-
tives. A Plan is subject to review at any time and may be modified to meet
changed circumstances. All Plans are formally reviewed, and revised as
necessary, every six months.
What are called by the OCB "Reports to the NSC" are the current form of
progress reports on policies assigned to the OCB for coordination. A
September 9, 1953, NSC instruction on progress reports confirmed the existing
NSC directive that Progress Reports should contain two elements: (a) a summary
of significant actions taken to implement the policy; and (b) an evaluation of
the effectiveness, timeliness and applicability of the policy. This
instruction indicated that the "appropriate interval" for the submission of
reports would be three to six months. A May 11, 1954, amendment to the
instructions gave the coordinating agency authority to determine the appro-
priate interval. These general instructions still govern the content, though
not the form or frequency, of progress reports.
The first OCB instruction on the subject, dated April 30, 1951,
provided that progress reports should be submitted every six months unless
otherwise specified. Initially the progress reports contained both a
summary statement of significant actions taken to implement the policy and
a more detailed treatment keyed, on a paragraph-by--paragraph basis, to the
policy. Later this detailed treatment was dropped and by September 15,
1955, OCB reports contained three major sections: (a) a listing of major
developments during the period; (b) a summary statement of operating
progress in relationship to major NSC objectives (including recommendations
on the need for policy review); and (c) major problems or areas of difficulty.
A financial annex was attached to the report. Reports continued to include
these same elements until 1959, although changes in format gave increasing
emphasis to the "major problems" section.
Until January 1959 reports were ordinarily submitted to the Council
every six months, though there were cases of both more and less frequent
reporting. On January 29, 1959, the President directed that progress
reports normally be transmitted at yearly intervals unless the coordinating
agency considered that there were significant developments affecting the
policy or wished to recommend a review. The President's January directive
was superseded on July 29, 1959, by a new directive which required each
coordinating agency to continue to reappraise the validity and evaluate the
implementation of policy, as required by developments or periodically,
normally at six-month intervals. It eliminated the requirement for annual
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reporting to the Council, stating instead that reports should be submitted
whenever the coordinating agency wished to recommend a policy review or
considered that there had been developments of such significance as to
warrant a progress report. Both directives pointed out, in addition, that
any Council Member or Adviser or the Planning Board could recommend review
of a policy whenever developments were believed to justify it. The purpose
of these directives was to eliminate routine reports to the Council and to
concentrate the Council's time and attention on those cases where significant
developments had occurred or where the policy appeared to need review.
They also placed additional and. significant responsibility upon the OCB itself
for determining, through periodic (normally semi-annual) appraisals, the
need for a report to the NSC.
As a result of these changes, the OCB made a general review of its
reports. Under revised OCB instructions, evaluations of the validity and
the implementation of assigned policies continue to be prepared periodically
(normally semi-annually) by the working groups for the Board. These
semi-annual appraisals become reports to the Council only when the Board
determines that developments or the need for policy review justify such
action. In view of the new focus of the reports, the "major problems"
section has been dropped, but, as indicated above, is now incorporated in
the Operations Plans. The reports to the Council contain two sections:
(a) a statement on the adequacy of the policy; and (b) a summary evaluation
of progress in accomplishing U. S. objectives. The financial annex has been
eliminated; as noted, such an annex is included in the Operations Plans.
OCB reports to the Council continue to be discussed in the Planning
Board prior to the Council meeting. The Council notes or discusses the
report and acts upon any recommendation for policy review. If it determines
that such review is necessary, it directs the Planning Board to undertake it.
Since October 21, 1953, an important item on the agenda of every OCB
meeting has been the weekly "Activity Report. The report presently
contains the following types of information: (a) follow-up on Board
actions or matters discussed at Board meetings; (b) significant develop-
ments related to major operating problems described in the latest plan or
report; (c) significant matters considered at the meetings of the Board
Assistants or working groups and committees; (d) schedules of pending
OCB papers; and (e) new assignments to the OCB with follow-up plans for
coordination. Substantially the present format, which is organized on a
geographical area basis and seeks to relate the report closely to OCB
activities, was adopted in March 1956. The Report is prepared by the
Executive Officer with the assistance of the OCB Staff (more particularly
the OCB Staff Representatives on the working groups and committees). It
is based upon current material obtained primarily from the OCB agencies
but due to time limitations is not formally cleared in advance with them.
The Report helps keep OCB Members informed of current developments relating
to the work of the OCB and discussion of the report in the OCB may result
(for example) in agreement to request a report, to take action, or to
follow-up on actions previously taken.
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Changes in the NSC Staff Since July 1, 1957
The Executive Order of February 25, 1957 brought the OCB Staff within
the NSC Staff, effective July 1, 1957. In anticipation of this action the
offices of the OCB Staff were moved into the Executive Office Building in
space adjacent to the offices of the NSC Staff and the two Special Assistants.
A single NSC budget for fiscal year 1958, including funds for both the NSC
and the OCB, was presented to Congress in January; upon its approval the
OCB Staff was for the first time financed directly by a Congressional
appropriation for the NSC rather than indirectly through contributions from
OCB constituent agencies.
The revised Executive Order had three major effects upon the NSC
and OCB Staffs; (a) it integrated the staffs, making them into a single
NSC Staff headed by the Executive Secretary of the NSC; (b) it provided for
close liaison between members of the staffs and for better correlation of
the staff work for the NSC and the OCB; and (c) it permitted the consoli-
dation of certain administrative services for both staffs in the interests of
economy and efficiency. The specific effects of the reorganization upon
staff organization can best be illustrated by a description of the present
organization of the new NSC Staff in the course of which changes will be
indicated.
The first major unit within the NSC Staff is the Office of the
Executive Secretary. The NSC Executive Secretary, as has been noted,
acts for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs in his absence (including acting as Chairman of the Planning
Board)* and advises and aids him in the performance of his duties. He
continues to be responsible for the over-all supervision of the NSC Staff,
to supervise directly the staff services for the Council itself, and to
give general direction to the Policy Coordinating Staff and the Admin-
istrative Office. The Administrative Office, headed by an Administrative
Officer, was created on July 1, 1957, as a part of the Office of the
Executive Secretary to perform for the entire NSC Staff certain personnel,
budget, fiscal, supply and general services and records, reproduction,
courier and related services. The Administrative Office maintains liaison
with the Central Intelligence Agency which continues to perform certain
supporting administrative services on a reimbursable basis for the entire
NSC Staff.
A second major unit of the NBC Staff is the Policy Coordinating Staff,
headed by the NSC Deputy Executive Secretary.* This Staff is comprised of
two elements: (a) the Policy Coordinating Special Staff; and (b) the Planning
The Executive Secretary does not act for the Special Assistant in
his role as Chairman of the OCB. That function is performed by
the Vice Chairman of the OCB.
Mr. S. Everett Gleason, who had been Deputy Executive Secretary
of the NSC since March 6, 1950, left the NSC Staff on August 16, 1959,
and was replaced as Deputy Executive Secretary by Mr. Marion W. Boggs.
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Board Secretariat. The principal functions of the Special Staff continue
to be to (a) assist the Special Assistant and the Executive Secretary by
preparation for them of an independent analysis and review of each Planning
Board report at each stage in its preparation; (b) assist the Special
Assistant by preparation of drafts of the briefing notes used by him in
presenting policy papers to the Council; (c) perform staff work in con--
nection with the Special Assistant's membership on other interdepartmental
bpdies;* (d) seek to determine whether gaps exist in national security
policies and whether the policy implications of current or anticipated
developments are being explored; (e) provide NSC Staff representation
on ad hoc Council or Planning Board committees; and (f) assist in the
preparation of the annual status reports on national security programs. The
Planning Board Secretariat continues to perform secretariat functions for
the Planning Board, and its Director serves as chairman of the Planning
Board Assistants. The Deputy Executive Secretary, in addition to heading
the Policy Coordinating Staff, acts for the Executive Secretary in his
absence, advises and aids him in the performance of his duties, and is
directly responsible for Council secretariat activities.
The third major unit in the NSC Staff is the OCB Staff, headed by the
Executive Officer of the OCB.** On July 1, 1957, when the OCB Staff was
brought within the NSC Staff, it continued to consist of five elements:
(a) the Office of the Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the
OCB Secretariat (formerly the Office of the Executive Assistant); (c) the
Area Staff; (d) the Information and Education Projects Staff (recently
renamed the Information, Education and Special Projects Staff); and (e) the
Intelligence Liaison Staff.
In addition to heading the OCB Staff, the Executive Officer is chairman
of the OCB Assistants. He serves the Board as its principal staff officer,
providing impartial and confidential staff work and advice for the Board
and for the agencies involved in OCB activities. He is expected to bring
to the attention of the Board any matter that, in his judgment, should
receive its consideration. He is responsible for the organization of
necessary staff work for the Board, for obtaining the assistance of non-
member agencies in work on Board projects, and for ensuring that qualified
personnel are assigned by all agencies to such staff work. Through general
supervision of the work of the working groups, he seeks to ensure that they
carry out their assigned functions and that documents prepared by them are
responsive to the needs of the Board both as to timing and as to substance.
* The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of the
Council on Foreign Economic Policy and may attend Cabinet meetings. He
is authorized to attend the meetings of certain other bodies of a standing
character such as the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Federal
Council for Science and Technology. He is also from time to time a member
of various ad hoc committees and groups.
* Mr. Elmer B. Staats resigned as Executive Officer September 12, 1958, and
was replaced by Mr. Bromley Smith on January 1, 1959.
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The OCB Secretariat under a Director who is also Executive Assistant to
the Executive Officer performs secretariat functions for the OCB and the OCB
Assistants and assists in the administration of the OCB Staff. The members
of the OCB Area Staff and the Information, Education and Special Projects
Staff, under the supervision of the Executive Officer and the Deputy Executive
Officer, serve as members of working groups to which they are assigned, con-
tributing to the drafting of documents, preparation of agenda and minutes, and
identification of problems requiring. interagency coordination; select in-
formation for inclusion in the weekly Activity Report; and help identify
opportunities for psychological exploitation. Since the OCB Intelligence
Liaison Staff has recently been absorbed into a new NSC Staff unit, it will
be dealt with separately below.
Until July 1, 1957, the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs had a representative on the OCB Assistants who participated as a
member of that group and who assisted the Special Assistant in the performance
of his OCB membership functions.* This representative was a member of the
NSC Special Staff. In connection with the creation of the position of
Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination, and
the placing of the OCB Staff within the NSC Staff, the separate representation
of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs on the OCB Assistants
was eliminated. Since July 1, 1957, staff support for both Special Assistants
in their OCB work has been provided by the OCB Staff. This arrangement was
continued when the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs became
chairman of the OCB. Members of the Policy Coordinating Special Staff may,
however, attend OCB Assistants meetings as observers for items of interest
to them and OCT, Staff members enjoy similar rights with respect to Planning
Board and Planning Board Assistants meetings. The new organizational
association, as well as the physical location of the Policy Coordinating and
OCB Staffs together, has increased markedly the exchange of information and
ideas between them.
The fourth major unit of the NSC Staff is the Internal Security Coordinat-
Ing Staff, headed by a Director who is also the NSC Representative on Internal
Security. In addition to performing the internal security functions of
the latter office, the Director now provides staff analysis, advice and
assistance on behalf of the NSC Staff in connection with the responsibilities
of the NSC for issuing general directives for the purpose of organizing and
coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the several agencies of
the government. He also performs on assignment the functions of a Policy
Coordinating Special Staff member with respect to certain policies and programs.
Except for a brief period, the Special Assistant who was the President's
representative on the OCB did not have a representative on the OCB
Assistants. Staff support for the President's representative was pro-
vided by the Executive Officer of the OCB and the OCB Staff.
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne continues to hold this position.
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The fifth and final unit of the NSC Staff is the Research and Intelligence
Liaison Staff. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs in early January 1960 arranged for a study of research in
relationship to national security policy. The Planning Board, after
discussion of the results of this study, agreed that a unit should be
established within the NSC Staff to serve as a clearing house on research
on national security problems being done inside and outside the Government.
The Planning Board did not believe that enough was known about the adequacy
of such research and about whether there are serious gaps in research coverage
to justify action beyond the creation of such a clearing house unit at this
time.
The President approved the creation of such a clearing house. The new
unit was created, effective June 1, 1960, by abolishing the OCB Intelligence
Liaison Staff and creating a new "Research and Intelligence Liaison Staff"
under a Director with the following functions: (a) keeping the NSC
Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Special Assistants
to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations
Coordination and other components of the NSC Staff informed of research being
done within and outside the Government which has significant bearing upon their
responsibilities for national security policy-making or operations coordination;
(b) facilitating appropriate access within the Government to such research;
and (c) in cooperation with intelligence and other NSC participating agencies,
obtaining or developing intelligence and other background information needed
by the NSC Staff and the Special Assistants to the President for National
Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination.*
The 0CB Intelligence Liaison Staff, while continuing formally to be a
part of the 0CB Staff, had, in fact, for some time served the Policy
Coordinating Staff as well as the 0CB Staff. The Director of the
new Staff is Mr. Neilson C. Debevoise who was formerly Chief of the
OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff.
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The foregoing history indicates three fundamental organizational
attributes which appear to be required for the effective functioning of the
National Security Council:
1. Ready adaptability of the organization to the particular needs
and desires of each President during the course of each Administration.
2. Well--established organizational structure and procedures which
are thoroughly understood by officials who participate regularly in the
work of the Council.
3. Sufficient flexibility as to the manner and timing of the use
of the organization to enable each project to be handy in accordance
with its particular character and urgency.
Experience since its creation in 1947 has shown that the National
Security Council, when organized with the above attributes, is a valuable
instrumentality for providing the President integrated advice on policies
required for the Nation's security.
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