DULLES SPEECH TO WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 1, 1954
• Content Type: LETTER

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FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 2,p5, D. C.
I readily understand how a verbatim intelligence appraisal,
regardless of editing, may not be suitable for public dis-
semination. For this reason I am returning your Mayors'
Conference manuscript.
However, a resume with classified matter deleted -- as
you suggest -- will be appreciated. We are most anxious
to get all of the Conference speeches, or resumes, in the
hands of the printer as soon as possible. The demand from
mayors for this material is brisk because of their inability
to determine what should, and should not, be reported to
their people.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
incerely,
U
1
On file OSD release instructions apply.
FEMA review(s) completed.
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TM. DULLEST I have asked Gov. Peterson's permission to reverae
him on one point. I welcome questions. If I can't or shouldn't
answer them, I will let you know very frankly. While I only have ==G
minutes to address you, I will try to cut off at least three or four
r
of the minutes at the end so/if there are any questions you can pu,
to me. I may be seeing some of you this afternoon at the White Heise,
and we can get together there)possibly)if there are any more.
The job of the Central Intelligence Agency is to try to ferret
out facts and present those facts to the policymakers of Government. IL
is not our job to say what should be done with the facts. It is merelt
our job-and that is a hard enough one-to try to find out what -UY e
When you are dealing with Russia, sometimes the best you can do
is to come up with an educated guess, based on inadequate facts, .nd
an estimate of what they have done in the past.
In that connection-and this is more from the point of view of
your particular functions as Mayors of our great cities--the Soviets aa7e
able to learn a great deal more about us than we are about them. We p`-'o'?`
lish the essential facts of our situation to the world. We tell the world
where our installations are, where we are making this and that. -+ie give
them a great deal of information. In fact, I think we give them =oba~Lly
too much, but it is a very difficult problem. When you have to cieciOe
between the maintenance of our freedoms, our freedom of the press ana
our other freedoms, and possibly disclosing more information thaw: an
intelligence officer would like to see disclosed, I can quite unc.ersta'tc
that our freedoms are much more important. If we start to abric,;*
them it is hard to tell where we will end.
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To turn briefly to the position of the Soviet Union as we see it.
When Stalin died, early last spring, a change came about in the Soviet
Union; but that change, in our opinion, has not affected its basic foreign
policy. The change was largely internal. We had not realized--an not
until Stalin's death did we realize-the extent to which that old dicta,
the country and of all Oft people deft arm.
for had really taken hold of
p
forced it into a pattern -was not e~ the other leaders
the Kremlin liked. When Stalin was buried, he was really buries is r
.aof
brie of the extraordinary things is the extent to which his successors
have buried his memory. There has been very little mention of Stalin.
The Lenin line has been disinterred and brought out again; the Stalin
line has been pretty well interred.
Stalin had frozen the Soviet internal policy into a rigid framew?r t
and the framework is still rigid enough. He had set so rigid a framawo.
that the people themselves were beginning to feel impatient. He
frozen their foreign police into a rigidity even men like
did not like. They blamed Stalin for the break with Yugoslavia.
h,d
Jolatov
The
probably blamed Stalin pretty largely for the war in Korea and fo-c man;;
other 4{ ctiotk- iW oreign policy. So when he disappeared, they
decided to change certain features of their system. That does nod: me
as I said before, that they have relaxed to any great e1tent. They have,
however, ic ture taken a new look at the /Situation. They siavs
clamped certain restrictions on the internal police. Beria's dismissal
and execution is undoubtedly due to the fact that they wanted to curt,
the secret police. They more or less put a sign up: Don't walk on tt.t=
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grass; Isob if you walk on the path, we won't worry you so much.aw In the
other days, you never could tell you might be walking on the path and
still you find yourself in jail.
They also found apparently that they weren't giving their people
enough -the -point-of- vas! consumer's goods, and they are matting
a real effort now to give them more. One of the interesting thing.' that
we have to watch is as to what extent, if at all, that will force them
to cut down on their production of munitions and war material. So far
r~- 71
we have seen very little sign of ; reduction. They have been ua:-ng
recently quite a little of their goldito buy consumer's goods in the
foreign market. You may have seen fin the papers eports of sale of
Soviet gold. That is going on; the gold sales of the last three or foul-
months have gone up quite spectacularly, largely, we think, so tha-E Russia'
can buy consumer's goods in the market.
We believe that the military now exercise greater authority ii the
Soviet Union than they did before Stalin's death. It is hard to,prove
that, but the execution of Beria, who was the artisan of gUttiag6 inj pol r t.L--
r
cal commissars in the Array, is one of the reasons for ow belief,
We see no signs, however, of a change in their foreign policy
as far as objectives are concerned. They are more flexible. Frat?rni-
zation is on. The Russians are perfectly willing now to rain-whet=l- they.
never would before with the foreigner. They are trying to ive o`itward1 T a
more flexible, a more amenable air; but when it comes to the hard ?7uestic i
as to whether they will make any concessions, either in regard to auro
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or as regards a treaty in Korea, we find no change whatever in the fun _-
mental attitude of their negotiators. The result is that we see no reason
to relax as far as we are concerned. The policy in fact is more a::tute
and a good deal cleverer) because th r .. . ;Lays A
*to the neutralist tendencies of many countries of the world, part icu1.&7r13
Eta, ~.
countries like India, in Southeast Asia, and to certain :eople
even on the Continent of Eurone~ especially in France and in Italy.
Regarding Soviet intentions, it is our view that the 'vdces ncl.
now desire to provoke a hot war. They could stumble into one. The; migLt
couple of years)k hat the Soviets desire 'c e,I'ibe tely to provoke, Cr by
surprise attack to initiate, a hot ward PeaWa4. It is hazard-
feel they were cro rded into one, but we do not feel looking over the ne
ous to predict for a longer period.ey are doing well in the cold? war.
A.-I AA h
They have prospects for further successes in the Far East particularly it
Indochina.
They are also building up their atomic stockpile,to formidable size,.
course, in having a central position from which they can strike out in
safe for us to let our guard down. They have a great advanta~,
will speak of that a little later.
The Soviet has such inherent military strength that it wouldnit, be
and they are"'taoi~g improving their long-range bomber fleet--'. I
various directions, protected by their great land mass.$ b - v jaiQ "
-~ 1-- ', . z, rand flanked by their satellites. One of the
reasons for their keeping a tight hold on the satellites is to protect
the Soviet heartland. That makes them, as history has shown, in tht. lornt?
run relatively invulnerable to land attack, and presumably therefore} orL.-\
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vulnerable to air attack. They have a very large standing, rm r. i=rob--
ably the Soviet Axqc, plm hn ~ tat`Cg -? SU.1 - a1=-ter;`
forces--Army, Na , and Air Force- would be Arpund 4. million. There
*v an additionalI hmill ion in China and about t' million in the sa-,e1--
lites, making a military force--Amy, Navy, Air Force, and securit,' forrc-_B;;---
To turn to a point even more interesting from your angle-the-ix
~ orce: Total numbers are probably very misleading. They have a long-
of around, million in the Soviet orbit e- , - -'
A 7
range bomb r force based on the B-29 that they obtained from us during
the war probably somewhat improved. We would estimate that they Lave
between 1,000 and 1,500 of these medium bombers, called the TIT-4. Their
total range stripped down would be It., 000 to 4,500 miles Tha .
would mean that these bombers are capable on a one-way mission of reaming
almost any important point in the United States. Those of you who liv-i
in the tip of Florida., southern part of Texas, probably have a little
more immunity than those living in the other parts of the country. But,
by and large, assuming they did not care whether the planes got back or
not, they could reach any part of the United States-practically a-),-Y-- part
of the United States. They %6*9 not yet , significant numbers of heavru
bombers which could get to the United States and ..4 back to their basse
Of course, with refueling-and we must assume that they have the p4NOW
to refuel--they could reach a good part of the United States and,presums:ciy,
get back. They could not reach all of the United States; and refueling
in a long-range mission of this kind-particularly two-way refueling-
presents serious difficulties. One refueling present i. d3:"fict.I -
ties, assuming they have the techniques that we have.
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We have felt that in the scientific and technical field, it is not
safe for us to assume that we can do things they can't do. Mere i.;
nothing wrong with the Russian brain. When they put their mind to `:..t,
with the help they have received from the scientists they have acquired
'0icularly -;er~ar r,
from other countries esi# stolen from other countries, particularly
they have the technical ability in any particular field. Where it cu'mc&
e3`'
to aircraft, engines for MIG aircraft, radar, and
the thermonuclear field, they have in many respects surprised us by the
speed and skill with which they have -t results tkat we had hoped
they would not reach. So in general we assume--and must assume to be aaf`i
certainly~in the Central Intelligence Agency-that they can do wwha~; we
can_*
Where it comes to mass production, where it comes to the tech'ii.caI
skills--right down the line-where it comes to doing what we do in our
automobile and our other factories---no, I don't think they can do
because by and large, taking the Soviet citizen from top to bottos-, tt
~. European:
level of intelligence of the American and of many Of 41118 , is
higher. The educational standards in the Soviet union are
B1
and if you can give them a long time, they may yeeak the proficiency U-st
we have now reached. I think our great superiority lies in the ct1aracT r
av
and ability of the American citizen from top to bottom, VAN* we sl ou1c=
not count very largely on a great technical superiority swr*W
scientific field.
That was a little aside ,as I was dealing with the aircraft >itu i L,
one-way inissigin, i?y
but I tried to make clear once
can reach practically any target in.:the United States. Now, as i.o waztz.=r
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they can get through our defense 4 you will hear about that from Gov.
Peterson and others, because n;r problem is looking at the Soviet Union
and not looking so much at what we can do in the way of ? counterattack,.
Whether they would risk their planes on suicide missions of this kind,
whether they would not prefer to wait, if they are going to attacIr, until,
they have the long-range bomber 41t we believe they are starting
in production and may have in a couple of years--that is a questior
*wt
I cannot answer today. But we are inclined to think that c: th
reasons which would lead them not to attack at the moment would be the
;
fact that they do not have long-range bomber capacity
WO-
som 69 the United States an
T--a w11.1 cone to^later I
they em presumably would desire to increase their stockpile of
atomic weapons before they made the attack, if they had the choice, un-
less they felt they+_ts forced Aw a situation where they had to attack.
A
We know they have the AIG-15, an excellent plane for defense. The v
have that in mass production, and they have quite a lot of them. They
have a good light bomber, jet bomber; the TU-! JL I mentioned before
is a'Abomber ~rle _ l _ ; . The IL-28,.is o y available for shorter
missions. The of the Navy lies chiefly in
r i'Fwwhr large submarine
1
force, andda certain number of good cruisers. They have no aircraft
carrier at the moment, and they only have a few obsolete battleships.
They have developed their submarines and they have developed their cruiser:
both light and heavy.
On the atomic side, the President the other day in his speech at
the UN gave you the essential facts, and I won ' t repeat what he said tree.
They have had some tests. They have produced atomic bombs. We believe
they have a substantial stockpile of atomic bombs of various types.
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They have produced at least a prototype bomb with thermonuclear reacticxi4.
indicating the possibility that they have or ll shortly have wea:-aons
with a very high explosive power.
We have some ideas about their stockpile. Naturally, we keep
those ideas secret, just as we keep our own stockpile secret. But,
if they were forced into a situation where they felt it was necessary or
desirable to attack the United States, and if they could get their bombers
through, it would be unsafe to assume that they could not put on us a
substantial load of atomic bombs. I don't think they have the kind of
stockpile they would like to have to make that sort of attack, but it
would not be safe for us to assume that they do not have very serious
potentialities) immediately in that field.
I noticed some questions submitted by several of the
Mayors from California, in which they *Ise raised the question of bacteri-
ological warfare. Our general view on that is this: Where you have a
choice of weapons, you choose the weapon that- you think is most des..;ruc--
tive. We believe that at the present tinie)if they had a choice of carry-
ing an atomic weapon or a bacteriological or gas warfare -weapon, th ;,y
would choose the first-that is, the atomic. We should not, however'...
let our guards down as to the possible developments i in the bacteri-
ological and Ia. a a of chemical warfare.
To back their defensive system, the Soviets are developin ecortaic
strength. Their gross national production has been increasing very rapicd],
at the rate of ab-e p4rcent per annum over the
last four years. That will probably level off. ?
hey devote to military purpose "mucr. urger proportion of their in lust r ?t 1
production than we do. They don't go in so much for refrigerators,
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automobiles, and so forth. They go in for planes and tanks instea-_.
ire,:
1--have one or, t ~ exasnp s -here. Take electronics & We believe abut
90 percent of their work in electronics goes to the military,,.
whereas with us it is only about 37 percent-and that is racier ty:?icaL.
I mentioned that in the agricultural field they were having, certai
difficulties, and they have had to admit that in certain sectors
agriculture they have made really no progressas far as production is
concernedithe days before World War I.
I said at the beginning that we thought it was unlikely that they
would deliberately choose war at this time, One of the reasons fo:~
reaching that conclusion is that they are quite successful with certain
techniques they are eon" mm- the policy of divide and pens-
,~t+ 6L , a
trate. W+*-T-eir phony peace e offensive thap w to
o divide us.
In their propaganda campaigns they have been extremely effective. They
have their apparati abroad and their communist parties in various ~ounuri 3
Italy. We know of the i-rif lueuc3
particularly in Europe, in Franc and
Oft
they have in various parts of Southeast Asia. They have other possibil tL s
for maneuvering, particularly in the Far East. The result is that sin^4
they have not yet the capacity they would desire ~,either from the paint Df
view of atomic weapons or aircraft, and because they have still aood
deal of maneuverability in the foreign field, we are ic=
alined to think they would choose bits Rm?Wt to continue the
cold war, rather than to indulge immediately in a hot var.
There is no reason for either panic or complacency. While we can-a-t
guarantee to youAtime, we believe tkeb-there will be time for planii.ng.
But that time should be used. We have to keep in mind that the Soviet
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has the"pr4gawly?capacityto inflict very serious damage, but probably
not the intention of immediately using it. Consequently., we have
A
a duty to be on the alert from now on, particularly in view of the are-solved wars in Korea and Indochina which might create at any timeApo i.tt1lily-
cal impasses which in the Sot e# view might force the to change
policy. Unless the issues ;aee are solved or easedAqumftotiob
-As
w.t A I-
I am afraid look forward to the possibilitY that
our dangers will increase over the next three to five years)as their
potentiality long-range aircra t and a dos: nticx of Stalin. 7he Lenin
been disinter
l interred.
He had frozen
broujht out Win; the 3talin
internal poliar ( into & rigid f k-
at-.ll rigid enaush. He had set no rigid k f
10 the elvct; were beginning to feel impatient. Htt .
icies into a rigidity that even man like Xoloti-w
did not lie. They bl td Stalin for the break xi
probably blamed Stalin pretty largely for the tar in Korea
other rigid actions in terms
cy. $o vhen he dissappet d, ti~iey
of their system. That does not. s=&
as I said before, that they have relaxed to =y great extent. Tay 1 . , ,
however, in agriculture taken a new look at the situation. They have
ictionss on the interval police. Bent's diaaiss s.
police.
undoubtedly due to the fact that they vWtoaa
more or less put a sins, ups Don't walk on
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until Stalin's defog did we realise--the extent to viii
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valk an the path, ve won'twar3^y you so > h.
Per eauld o-11-.~ might be walkizW
path eat, still you find yourself in jail. Nov ir=e 0
a t l off the grass "A we will give you a little
i ntermlly tea you bM before.
pp&ventlyy that they weren't .vin t vir Leopl
e point of view of consumer's goods, and they are narking e
o give them sore ? su mer's goods. One or the ihtere
things that we have to watch to as to a ctcut, if at all, that
them to cut down on their prod17ctics7 of nitioue and v" nt ' ia1.
,n very little sign of that. They have been using retie t1
r goIA to buy coesu tr' a goods in the ft tgo i rlv . .
3.1 continue or not, I dt*'t fir. You arty here *On in
of sale of Soviet gold. That is going i; eM, whi lie thi;
;ear*s sale will not greatly axcee1 last .r's sale, the sale of t'r
cur n nthe has goner up quite specteculaerly, leargely, we thi
r1 r; goods In the market.
the military near exercise gmter .xtI on t; i::a
did before Stalin's death. It is h5,rd to
disgrace of Bern., who was the artisan of putting it pal t
in the mr, is ow of the reascaas for our belief in tbxe
or, of & c'nn a is their foreign pc
as :for as objectives are concerned. They are score flexible. ?t'atern
tton is on. They are perfectly willing now to Ix--fie they, rarer
would before --with the fore gner . They are trying to give outwa r l wt a tore
flexible,. a =we amemble &Lr; but sbea it cams to the bard question
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ep a treaty # h A Ltria,
in tox4m, ee fl 1. no eha whatever in the fm n-
rgotiators . The resat to t bat, we no
concera cd. the policy in fact is wre
because the present policy of the Soviet pia, 1.rt
of ' co trie* at the world, particular
contries in theaat Asia, and to certain
in France and in ltsly.
tin:: it in am view that the Soviet doer -lot
Eovrolm a hot Mr. They exi t stable into one.
islot tool they were *rom d into one, but
six, eigh
not feel, loo
ttbs, or a year, that the bets desire dellb
attack to initiate, a hot war within fiat pe-~ od .
a lonpr period. They are doing veil i
They ho we promp
cult one. 'hey view it as & situation frau at
a ae fox an they are eons reed.
to burl. up their atc tc stoeWle,
to hut34 up their is -rte her fleet--ash 'I will
,, hover,, a
ats of strength. They have a '
central position fz rat shi ch they can s tri ki
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inherent strength in the jtiitar
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Si
by their great land mew, the 3c1
aM then flanked by their satellites. One of
lug a tiait bold an the sateilitas is to pro-
. That a S then, as histoary has shr 3
X617 intulnerable to 1 attack, and pr ern .b1 ;, efcw
to air attack. They have a very JAxV
plus tbAir s unity traecapn?-I
ailit,,ry
and Air P * ee ? be aroud 4.5 apai31ion. ire i
in ChI c &A about halt a anillion
10 aepi U in
e--AvW# Navy, Air ?cram, ad security f.
aaite.ili .es,
a point even a interesting Napa YOur is-their
t.
a are probably very a aislaraj,#,n,g. "MW bwft
Ou the B -e9 prototype that they obtaa fined. Z cm
t iiraaed. We vwj3A estimate
1,00 and 4500 at these MUM buabSmp, c411ed
raaa +e etri dal m *vU3d be t a 4,
probably. That uouM encase that these .
Those of y Ao Litre in the tip of pler3 , with
AM *tsaic of reaching s3apr it any iap rtaa:at point ;
e a little aaecre iupaouaity than those 1t,t
the other
But, by and large, assunim they did oot
pla * got back or sot, they could reach any part
tidally any part of than United Staters. ' ,
a h e a v y bowbor at the pree ut time which would have the c city to get
States a ad back to their basa#. Of course, 'with rt tueli. .
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that they have the parer to r *f%w .?.th y could
, it is not safe for us to &*sum* that we can do ibine .; he;
prong with Um RusslAu brain,
tot reach. So in , rs3. we a43un--
in the Central Intall,i,sua A, j. t
Wt Uaay ditti
uastbly get beat, They eat a
rza .O a
low ditt'icultia
I =' say right here that we have fait that in the
have reoelvea trV as the scientists
cqutra from oth rr ca a itries and stolen trap otter ^ tries _
WWW* it eaaees to Mesme Prod=tiou" where it cams to t tec ,
n ther ` raolaauccl field, they have in vaW : Wisps: s
s to aircraft, engines for e
they hie technical ability in a4y lr -dais
11X4--art it esamres to duitarg vtat we 4o in c
other tsctwiss- , I dcsast think t eey as (U) t, be
by and #,ar , taking the Ott citizen tram t4o to bottom, the
of the Ia*ri+ and of sm y of the Br ans
iape, they My Bch the prot'iolez y that we
in the Sovist Union are is cr ,
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I think car great otqWieerity- 11ets in the chat-actor
of the Aaoeerioaxa cities tr?a tc to bottm, aaatt we gkmld
s great teahntoaj?
a little aside as I rtes dera z g tsith the
sitt*ti+ , but I tried to mab clear an the bcslber adtva tion,
- -... V+ .w: war aI
as get threw t defense. 1 Vill
Peterson eeaad othms,, bse auae sRr problem to looms at tb:
alt what we can do in the vW of a
sib their sums of aulai4s
as asiaa
to w.tt, it they are voj~ug 1
k, anti
that tw acw be.U.evee they
taxtlzg in prO teticaa *.ad =yr have, ia a e ele of 1*wg--that
are inclined to t that
cb * uU load theca tact to attack a
tt hev* l -raw bomber cupaaity t.ha
of att .c:
Stag aa3 back wad. also, as I v'iU a to
to increase their st ckpil,
thasy 4e the attack,, if they hid the ch .ce,
a aituatton setae: they bad to
') . n -28 is tsa as labl* for
IWW~Uolls, iv4 they have quite a lot of tkdaa.
bcaasber, jet be er, the TU-4 that I manti+vd, _
bave the IG-15, &A ea s.L' ,nt plane tt 4etee&e .
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missions. The force of the !a- lies chiefly in their wulm%rlua
a tar dbzol e-te battleships, They Te
They have
bombs -i
t om. -- dse s? They J . s no ai# N Y ea}i r t
arOl they have devela ed their
facts, and I wt 't
, the Pros ident the
S. They have prc4 ced. is
e , subeteetial sto 1 ile Of
13. have weapons. They
u:fear reactidt s, lad ceting the
-impons witb a very hi&i
iu his rree
tt Y
the megatons.
s ab tt their, stockpile . Netumll's , ee
just as keep our o stockiile eecret, 1.)U; It
-jl not be safe to asst a that--if they were fua.;c**i into a s yta .t ice
they felt it vans necessary
attacit the united 34;
ing they could get their boars ti i-...,hey acralA put on us a sit, -t
tonic beans. y don't think they _'e re the kind of 3ta.:1 ;
d like to have to the
field..
atte k, but it u i nc `
they cio not have certain poteutiakii tie 3 :
I noticed some questions that ,ere au :tom by eevel i.
ological Wart
which they sleo r .iee . the qt tip +f t t
neril viev an that is thisi ere _rou harva ;
..8.
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y w chonse he von that yc think Is amt 4es rii tt .
their + efe lsiv*'-' * '1t -3 the Scvie"
ems j#%r-,Pwv x tbay VVQU ahco
We Ohm.1. now, h ,p a?;
a both in baet4r1o1t .*i t
ion iarodttction b*zn inor
r;1I"i _Zy
at the r _ *bwt 7 or S pert per um oft 3r 14
Tba,t w r i . ? 1 - f l y ievet o f f ba that 's a l st
,mss mt1 1 p r o d z , eti.on is i t a r a a S t n g . Tw-mt I s It
a choice o r, axWTyi.tt an a .csni
see they devote to -AP :- 1i1*
r p ttans of the it goes nation l prodt-t tios .
-refrigerators, at, t obi l"i
about 90
isixrbe and tinks 1.?9 a W -10b ` per*W'
two OXOXT108 here. Two aleectart ios i Vr e!"
their moft in elect"Ulcs OPP4 into tbt * t 11tr- 9s
.y about 37 per*ent--*AA that is rather 1 y pic ,
Z t d t%at ' 1 ha &rieul.tutral f1s14 they
4'fie .t1eo, gVA they 'ia =et had to it that their
reacht
they are a yid on wv-?the pol?-ay Of ditf and
ebinios is tit they wre quite svmessfui ti
With their p# y peace Offs t$iYe they are trying to
h rsately choose- W X at tests ti we- One of the roe ooTlf
l ? ate at the is ;:.rm g i t e* thou ht it
ore the war.
de real. y no progress as far as production i4 coed, tzrc:
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ll Smith will tell you more about that. I Just say
is they have been sxtrm
tries, parttcula rly in Vie, in Prance, and
they have in various parts at Southeast As is . Th
r possibilities fora euverimg, partiausray in the Par :fit.
not yet the ca Vaoity they WMU de:
of view of atomic wespons or airarett, ate. 14eca :ua
ty in the foreilp field, is their
ty would choose the latter--hat is, t
Lust ilia to take
iately in a ht itr.
in stezcl4ing. There is no re aaen for either penie or
While eaaa iot guarantee to you tim, we believe that
iee for p . Taut that tim should be used. We have
s Wrist has the present capacity to infliet ser .
Ivan earn in Korea aid Indochina which might caa
i sees Bch in the Soviet's view might rorae
licy. Unless the issues that face us are solved
I an afraid we have to look forward to t `ie
possibility that our dangers will incise over the Hemet three to five
both f'rca the point of view of la -reane aircraf
But that is a potentiality, as the Preai
said, shy face with calm plan zing rather t with panic.
obobly not with the intention oft diately using it -
tree sate' on, partie.'
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of the tan f B at t0 he :.
to tn.: P! .=err
w 3=L '
a d. can I t to e# tkwre
The job of tie C #.. F= ,y is to t L
out f$ct$ W%d t ,a~aw acts to t :
Thou ~
IV to c
an t of
our other Irc*d=
a r ifI4'IC t nrvbIuv4
Sur 1 z S,RTdt , RJLiz . r
'fit in *rV c t, if, Is ' "t t t ,,,j te. tam wi W. xs ':.
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but that
v4n ad not rt ..
to ext t to
y .3,tt sa At3,
feei t! ,< rl ant` t?
the .f k r t J :U
V)Ofjt
.. l-ix t for the trcvk, i tTt : a k a;. ==
" tt ;elf for #: = ,mr 9
otb.r rigid *ct~ i '+ tU-x~ p~~ o n ? rt~
or3 c*w3
to arw , rmt :' 3;t 140
r e, lsa 2t o'ttu ?? :) ,
the t t, ::r -oI .e . ?t r sY
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s1 but if ix-lk w
' 1' ? f 44'1_
y>
;y4u'. SauI? t.x t a"a': aAdV
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004PO Of Cra v
'1' I>1t.'# &
I Y,
: P*
z,~.'t7!s?,31{S~Bi
44
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It*
0'3 at L nwLun _ *:
d
(if 3 =t om
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1. d it thiWt ~-
fr
of
mid ab lik% o
Utuo
Ste. Lbim o_ L ~
i zo f tam, .* at
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."", st *"t No mm Z4 In Imis
ad that Wl. to attack at this
gaA uo be and 03P* so
kt
Vite at
lot w **:20
enwr1w at*1 0 aidteroft bm" a31
E*vo d ' lr s*mwtao and thty
r i
UM haw a stir. wtoak-#13A cad *U"c bitibe dC { ''
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tot I
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am 0#40
X049
. Am
t ift F
at
At, f:* IP
7or 0-1
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001000030023-5
*or*" Vitt " Lt is
I tiowci that
* t . I12
,ta eittim in
a"
tt .t fsw
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ha" U Uw form
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 B01~~1
UN N~PO it ~ CI E( I` A~IF~C TION 7 6 H6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTI SLIP
TO
INI IA
DATE
Mr. Amory, DD/ I
2
3
4
5
FROM
INITIALS
DATE
1
DCI
W
1/23154
2
3
T
APPROVAL INFORMATION F___1 SIGNATURE
ACTION 0 DIRECT REPLY (_ ] RETURN
COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY I1 DISPATCH
CONCURRENCE I RECOMMENDATION FILE
Remarks: Please look over my revised remarks
and if you have no further suggestio , have a
couple of photostats made, one for yo r ffice and
one for mine, and then mail with tie tt ched
letter, if you concur in my answe ter son.
A ;'
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D UNCLASSIFIED
S
RE
C
ES
C
ONFIDENTIAL R
TRI
TE
EC
T
00030023-5
80RM94 30- 4 16-('854 -1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
00030023-5
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)S. DMMS I
31 y*u
iVm
It tb ana
am. U I mot
frankly. Is I +Ry` 2 a
alu 1 iti 'I
is to s~ VP Al
s sa eta at *&t bay. &ea in the vast.
bis U lotra a amt
to Mok. %at it Is
ib2V
It ve
or
fi
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??? t attest to wbid' tit o14
ct the cams" amd at all the 'l tare
a, p tt that is s patter that the
Varu tip bola to mil 3a#.
t.g potidies Into 4 x4gtdity tat "m "n
IWy bl Sti for fte br" rtlb
Syr. 9o VIM bed ,ae r , tb4
don e fa ac 1ttr tPum- d not 14,
a aff ]A at t`is *jtWtjjft4j 2110Y We
US," *us* to Ow V*mt
t,'lolle late ml -.
ps*wsbly blas halt tt1 Uvfdl ftr thv In 'torn a .
to the taat l t tba~ I
so` 1 put a ist* VP $ "sot 4LA co the
-2 M
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cr the itth, ,ea v-'t worry yi so umb.
o er days, you Sever could tell- ou r bt be *l e - ="
you tied, you elt is Jail. Am 1
tb ' iu _a o~ d s--y r.*
also ft d 1 y that they 't gi i
the point of view of consaaer's goo42, aad they
if et s1,"! , tit t
a .little of their
Id to bur cm's
in the f4 ilm xuriw" -
VI .: x , I + '' kNow. 'Too r ht-tw- solo in tl*
paperv reports of sale of Sioviet gold. Mat is Soing o*;
!; a9g1~lc the +eul ' t' hem
17r 3. r lr, t. hiuk .
We belierre that the niitary am a etee ter a g?
It is hax4 to e^
of
re t.
*-
forsinner. They ame trying to giver i.-3 ; f- =c
tieztbl+e, a more m mumble Ltr- but v hen It cos V) the here q q Uon sr.
'er, of a in their f
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S ' * r t e # t is tbat WO "* m -lea
4 L. polity in fswt is w"
for us U Ur. *W
t wy i. t- leer
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w
M. Oftum.0 slow in 1*034
in& so 4wap tenet t* Of
1oUOT c Ike rt*t :i Wis..
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Out in variau dir* tt
'd i4m, midi Siberia, aM tben flnvk d by their sat*
tie moom for their pig a tight bolt c the satel .itev is to prt-
toot the i "ist heartland.., as lsistcay ban dwa,
r tave 4L Very
b mim
me t t g frm l
14 nislmads -
-2Q - ti at %bm7 Obtal sd
ly xamwbat iullwav!d. We VoWA Y ?
the 10-4. Their to &L nav start dam
4,#500 s a i l o b i . That afta t b u t t b *re
asst-OS md"i s cad" rft4hUM al st air U*ort t poi
at ycu *0 live in the tip C florids,
ly ir. a little soe'~s qty teat III,
But, by 4 VA UM, aas t t'
pUmes Vot back or z t, try cO'u14 ramh $fl7
States and get b.c
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ode f vs to sssMM *at ve Go t2tvas tt TM
jas 3a stn. un tw
a in Vit h eb *Ay bw* r h*t
so in we u0sum
. s c a r s " a y i n the O p u t r a l L
VMduatic , Vbwe it 0000 to
it comw to 44 tag ,mac.
I Bet this* l ** h,
VadA# the -fat oittsan ft~ft top to bottas, the
the Pwo iar*n of
r r s t i l at In iI* Soviet
lie
_6,.
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mat *wwtwiiw U04 is the
aitiaas trat up to be ttmo uA we **Aix
towmiftl eupsries ity eeeere
i the Betide me I was aftaLing vi* the
tom, to neck. au ttm teow stt . ,
ut"iOn, they as rfch * eti r any spt is t Vat
" to Vb*%b*r they 0" got *"A&
'' probl is WUt
at it w cn 40 is thaw wa
st tbeeir pimnss cc sutcida atsis. s
to wait, it they
bamber *at ars mw bra t
qustt the
ft mod ear ha" in a aaa*I* at years- t is
;end 1i fist
o the
have 3.cci-r=p b+ r amity
3tstss need so back %M ems, as I vile -,ome
pnsnob1y vou]A wise to law"" tb&Ix
to a situ tic m A me tbey heed.
13, an ezes1-1 nt plan f
Garay 1 a
t c r ; r s is a p r op badwr
mmag
jet
prqpa-bw
IVA that I
I Sae =4 wfaiUblu or OW-1r tai
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10 8 -
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that you think is most :. ~~ .
'.mot W ylua ~ i . z~
V1t
7or8
%Im"A V1116 %W It is may abou% 37
I
Quit" SINa I
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lwqmwmtu comai s they hw" been e.
WSMti and td'w X emit Wit,-es n
Various *atmtrie*, p tiii3 w v in , is !rave , a4 is It i i We
m the inf1 0 t b&y bWWO in r iA* parts of ~t- An ar ;
h ether p. $tbil tics for warmeri*$, wu'ly in the p12
be" not yet the 0p*Cit7 VWY v$ '
W or St4=da WMp" or airt, 3
iu a~abJusy in the two
*MS to iSIMLIV Axamo!? atS3y in a I*
1$ aaata mesa far eitheer 1 c Or
c a~e+ . Wbt3* ye
Va. lot 1 ti~ sbaa