LETTER TO HONORABLE J. EDGAR HOOVER FROM C. P. CABELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001000010003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 10, 1956
• Content Type: LETTER

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C. P. C"1112
'Affabomok Gamm"I, Uaw
25X1
Q am (10 Oct 56)
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Circulate to DDJP(c%1 ~r
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 OFFICE OF THE DIftECTO TOP `SECR'ET
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
October 4, 19.56
PERSONAL AND CONFIILNTIA.
VIA LIAISON
Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building, Room 123
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
I thought you would be interested in
the information contained in the enclosed
memorandum. It will be noted that this
memorandum sets forth information received from
confidential sources concerning a recent trip
to Moscow of a delegation of the Canadian Communist
.Fartyand the results of a meeting of this
delegation with Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet
officials.
In view of the delicate position of these
sources, it is requested that this memorandum be
treated as "Top Secret. "
The enclosure has been disseminated to
appropriate agencies of the Government.
Sincerely yours,
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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
October 4, 1956
CO1 fvWUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Confidential sources, who have furnished reliable
information in the past, reported the following information
which is believed to be of considerable interest.
An official Canadian Communist Party Delegation
went to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviets on
August 18, 1956, and held lengthy conferences with
Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Suslov (head of the Igternat i onal
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union) and the latter's assistant, V. Ponomarev.
Included in the Canadian Delegation were Tim Buck, leader
of the Canadian Communist Party, and a number of members
of the National Committee of the Canadian Communist Party.
The Canadian Delegation felt that their trip was
arranged by the Soviets so that they saw only what the
Soviets desired them to see; further the Canadian Delegation
was not satisfied with the answers to questions they
proposed to the Russian leaders.
The Canadians asked why inner Party democracy
was violated in the Soviet Union, why there was no concrete
e.xplanat i on of how Party democracy became subordinated to
Stalin and why present members of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,who were also
members during Stalin's life, did not criticize Stalin
and his policies at that time. The Canadians asked how
relations could be improved between the various Communist
Parties, what were the prospects for the Jews in Russia
and whether Jewish children could learn the Jewish
language and culture. The Canadians suggested that an
institute for international affairs be established in
Moscow to which various Communist Parties could send
highly developed comrades for further training. The
Canadians also suggested the establishment of a journal
to take the place of the Cominform paper "For A Lasting
Peace, For A Peoples Democracy" and to give expression
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to communist ideology. The Canadians asked for additional
information concerning the peaceful transition to socialism;
information concerning the cult of the individual; and for
an explanation of democratic centralism and its relationship
to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Suslov answered most of the above questions in
some manners He told the Canadians to learn to apply
democratic centralism concretely and warned them not to
reject the concept of democratic centralism. He stated
that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union does not
reject the philosophical concept of Marx as regards
the dictatorship of the proletariat and that when the
proletariat can exercise power, this is the dictatorship
of the proletariat. According to Suslov, the form of
government is not important. Dictatorship of the
proletariat is a regime that abolishes capitalists
as a class and, once this idea is agreed upon, there is
room for unlimited discussion concerning the form of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. With regard ! to
the question of peaceful or parliamentary transition
to social ism, Suslov stated that the statements of
Khrushchev and other Russian leaders at the 20th Congress
can be regarded only in a general sense and that the
Russian leaders could not specify the countries to which
this statement applied but wanted to emphasize that new
conditions make a transition to socialism a political
possibility.
Suslov was questioned as to why other Communist
Parties had not been allowed to hear Khrushchev's secret
speech (at the 20th Congress) and Suslov answered that
Khrushchev was speaking on behalf of the entire presiding
committee when he made this speech. He stated that the
leaders thought the speech would not go beyond the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and that when it should finally
leak out, it would appear to reflect only an internal
problem of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Suslot
revealed that when Beirut, the late Polish leader, died,
he had seventeen copies of Khrushchev's speech in his
possession but only sixteen were found after his death.
Suslov stated that this might account for the fact that
the speech was obtained by the capital ist press. With
regard to the theory of the cult of the individual, Suslov
stated that perhaps some silly things had been done in
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but since all
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enemies of the Party, both internal and external, had
directed their fire against Stalin., every loyal communist
had to choose between loyalty and disloyalty to Stalin,
that is, communists in Russia regarded loyalty to the
Party as synonymous with loyalty to Stalin. Suslov spent
considerable time in discussing the Jewish situation in
Russia and the Canadian Delegation vus not satisfied with
his answers. Suslov also spent some time in discussing
the fraternal relations between the various Communist
Parties. He said that the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union desired the warmest relations with other Communist
Parties as equals but did not wish to interfere in their
internal affairs. He said the possibility of establ ishina
an international institute in Moscow as well as a publica -ior_
or journal to which all Communist Parties could contribute
their ideas would be considered.
The Canadian Delegation learned from various
sources that the Crimea became almost depopulated after
World gar II, the Tartars having been dispersed. Molotov
and Kaganovich, Soviet officials, had asked three outstancc'ing
Jewish leaders to induce the Jews in Russia to settle in
the Crimea. These Jewish leaders were later executed in
connection with an alleged Jewish plot to establish an
autonomous republic in the Crimea which would be an outpost
of the United States. To this day, Molotov and Kaganovic/i
have not admitted that they originated the plan for the
Jews to settle in the Crimea. The Canadian Delegation also
learned that the families of the executed Jewish leaders
had been subjected to barbaric atrocities.
The meeting of the Canadian Delegation with
Khrushchev lasted four hours. The latter was considered
very crude and undiplomatic and the Canadians are
convinced that Khrushchev is a drunkard. Khrushchev
stated that Russia had given the Jews an opportunity
to build a state in Birobijan where there are many
natural :resources and the Jews refused to settle there. He
stated that the Russians are not prepared to give the Jews
things others do not get; that some Jews do not represent
progressive interests; that many people brought to the
cities from farms have latent anti-Semitic tendencies.
Khrushchev stated that he rimed Israel to be considered
as the rallying ground for American imperialism.
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Our sources also reported that Sam Z ipshi tz,
a member of the National Committee of the Canadian
Communist Party who was in Moscow at the same time as
his Canadian comrades but was not a member of the
Communist Party ;Jlegat ion, had been in Poland prior
to his visit to Moscow. Lipshitz found that the
situation in Poland was horrible. He said that from
1937 to the end of World War II the Russians imprisoned,
exiled or killed more than 30,000 Polish comrades.
As a result, when the communists came into power in
Poland there were very few qualified leaders to assume
important positions in the government, in the Party
and in industry. Many Jewish comrades were placed
in leading positions in the political and economic
branches of the Polish Government. Today, there is
a terrible economic and political situation in Poland
which is due to many factors. For example, in about
1950, the Russians forced the Poles to concentrate on
the production of armaments. Two million peasants were
transferred from farms to industrial plants in the
cities. These people now refuse to return to the farms
and there are now 600, 000 of them who cannot find
employment. In the past, Poland was self-sufficient
agriculturally but today it cannot produce enough food
for its own people. Another example of the Polish
situation is as follows: Poland traditionally is an
exporter of great quantities of coal from the sale
of which was acquired sufficient foreign exchange to
pay for imports. The Russians took most of the coal
from Poland and gave very little in return. As a result,
Poland does not have foreign currency with which to buy
the necessary food and raw materials to keep its plants
in production. The first five-year plan., for Poland
was only 40% completed. The pro-Russians within the
Polish Communist Party are shifting the blame for these
conditions upon the Jewish leaders and there is an
undercurrent of anti-Semitism appearing in Poland.
Poland is rega rc ed as a classic example of how the
Russians treat the satellite nations. Recently, Khrushchev
prevented one Zambro vsk i (phonetic), a Jew, from being
elected to the Secretariat of the Polish Communist Party.
Today, there are 70, 000 Jews in Poland and of them,
15, 000 are willing to leave tomorrow for Israel. Some
Jews in Poland have remarked that whereas Germany formerly
was their enemy, today Russia is their enemy.
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According to L ipshi tz, 3, 000 Party members
participated in the Poznan riots. He stated the Poles
actually needed the food offered to them by President Eisenhower
at the time of the Polish riots but the Russians would
not allow them to accept it. Gomulka, former Executive
Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, was arrested and
sentenced to four and one-half years in jail on the char7e
of being an enemy of the state in that he had supported
Marshal Tito. He was not given a trial and was expelled
from the Party. He has now been released and is one of
the most popular persons in Poland. The Party leadership
in Poland, the majority of whom is pro-Polish as opposed
to pro-Russian, is hesitant to bring Gomulka back into
leadership, despite his popularity. The majority in
leadership, including General Secretary Ochab, Premier C Iran, iewicz
and Oscar Lange, is in favor of closer ties with other
nations in addition to Russia, more democracy, and
economic development along traditional lines such as
the production of coal, agricultural products and textiles.
This majority fears that the Russians will make promises
to Gomulka and place him in leadership. Gomulka is an
extreme opportunist and may desire to assume leadership
with the assistance of the pro-Russian faction. The
majority of the Poles would probably follow Gomulka since
he is popular and they do not know of his pro-Russian
leanings or that he would be indebted to the Russians
for putting him in leadership.
With regard to the Polish situation, one of
our sources feels that the whole question of the
relationship of the satellite countries to the Soviet
Union is coming to the front; further it is an important
question of international significance which is related
to the current talks between the leadership of the Soviet
Union and of Yugoslavia. This source also had the
following comments. The Russians are doing everything
possible to keep in subjection the satellite countries
and prevent them from having contacts with the outside
world, particularly with the United States. The Russian:
are concerned lest Titoism spread to the satellite
countries. Even if the conferences between the USSR
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and Yugoslav leaders result in a communique emphasizing
understanding between them, the very fact that they had
to meet shortly after Tito's visit to Moscow reflects
that relations between them are strained. In Poland
there is a democratic upsurge but the people are, to
a large extent, economically dependent upon the Soviets.
It is known that the majority of the present Polish
leadership would like to establish ties with other
countries.
According to our sources, the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union apparently
does not know the current situation existing in the
Communist Party, LISA, and the divergent views of
William Foster and Eugene Dennis, Communist Party, USA,
leaders, concerning present Party policy. Our sources
state that the Russians would like to have one of the
American Communist Party leaders come to Moscow and
if this is not possible, the Russians would like to
improve the communications system between the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, USA,
which is not good at the present time.
All of the above information is being classified
"Top Secret" and should be treated accordingly because
of the delicate position of our sources. It is requested
that no dissemination be made of this information without
prior consultation with this Bureau.
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DRI I A R 55 3 7 Replaces Form 30-4
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