LETTER TO MR. JOHN W. HANES, JR. FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000800090084-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: January 10, 1961
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
10 JP 191;1
W. Hanes, fir. ? administrator
Mr. John C, aulsr Affairs
Bureau of Security and
Department of State
Washington Z. D. C.
Dear M7- Hanes-
Thy You for sending me copies of the Pagers
prepared by Your ct ultsnt, Mr. Frank C. Waldrop.
'y he klet '}Who Its Soviet Sa ': is a readable
at ideology and its application in the
explanation of communi 's memorandum of May 10,
Soviet Union. Mr. Waldrop et gorssr (1960-1970).
196-0, entitled "A Ten Yeear View 01 Sov'
and the tabs attached form an excellent to the joint chCon'-
volu inous raaterw presented
rests. We are. Of courses, familiar
ttee Of the last Cog
ed
a-A aeated
-with the data, and opinions presd but i ful to have
their significant points excerpted aa-td highlight
Sincerely yours,
SIUNt
Uen W . Dulles
Director
Original - Addressee
1 - SRS/ DDI
MR:
STAT
1- DDC1
STATE review(s) completed.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE'
ADMINISTRATOR
BUREAU OF SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS
Dear Mr. Dulles:
The attached papers have been prepared
by Mr. Frank C. Waldrop, presently a con-
sultant to this office, who has devoted much
time to studying Soviet Communism and its
ramifications.
One of these papers is essentially a
compilation of materials of public record
but presented so as to tie them together
into a meaningful entity. The other is a
basic paper concerning the fundamental forces
underlying the surface of Soviet developments.
I believe these papers will be of inter-
est and use to you. I would also be pleased
to receive any comments you might care to make.
Sincerely yours,
John W. Hanes, Jr.
The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
2430 E Street, N.W.,
Washington 25, D.C.
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WHO IS SOVIET MAN?
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Two classes of people will waste their time in going past this
sentence, those who already know everything about the nature of Soviet
man and those who don't need to know anything.
The first have complete control of the Marxist idea, its origin,
application and effect. They know what they know and why. The
second are not interested. Each is satisfied to be for or against
Soviet man,?the one because his own mind is made up, the other, because
the man is there. And so, these fortunates are dismissed with envy.
For any who remain, herewith a brief defense of the eccentric
writing style, organization and analysis of material following.
We are about to examine with words the qualities and content of
a living organism. Such an effort, no matter how managed, remains a
vague approximation of fact. Literary descriptions tend to be neat,
to put the climax where it belongs and to begin, develop and end
according to convention. But living experience is not so sensible.
It refuses submission to plan. And Soviet society is living exper-
ience, no matter how much its apologists like to say it is planned.
Hence, a paradox and a confusion in the very foundation of this, as in
every attempt to make a good report on the Soviet proposition.
In attempting to get at the living realities of a people, therefore,
we draw briefly on topical history, systematic philosophy, word origins,
psychologic concepts, valuations of emotion and on imagination, doing
considerable violence and little justice. Whoever looks here for liter-
ary symmetry or expert treatment of the disciplines indicated, will be
outraged. But if the reader is stimulated to go on for himself the
mission of the writer has been accomplished. For this is, after all, not
a set of answers but a draft for the inspiration of questions.
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I
The Problem
Men of action have"to learn, sooner or later, that profit lies in the
study of people and in knowledge of what they say measured against what
they do. Such knowledge and measure develop a feel for character and motive.
And that feel is a valuable guide both in dealing with the present and in
sensing the future.
The great puzzle of human relations in our day has to do with Soviet man.
Is there present among us, as declared by the Soviets themselves, an entirely
new kind of human being? If so, what is his nature?
For now approaching fifty years the politicians of the USSR have been
claiming to the world that they were out to build not only a new order of
society but a new type of human to live in it. They have laid down hard
and fast tests for every aspect of behavior and thought. Art is art only if
it is art by the official teat. Science is science by the teat, alone.
Ethics, morality, even knowledge, are true or false only by official test.
And if you suggest that perhaps there may be a case in which the test does not
work, that it fails to give either answer, you reveal yourself as an enenr.
You must say that, though men may be fallible, the test is infallible. It works
without exception to separate true from false. To offer any doubt of that is
to be -- and mean to be -deceptive.
Such is the official view of Soviet authority across a vast range of
territory in Europe and Asia. Such is the official teaching of Soviet politics.
But does this official view really limit official action? Does the teaching
control results? How much do we dare take it at face value? These are
sensible questions and any investigator will soon find that Soviet policy
in action does not invariably match some set of clauses in the official book
of rules. The questions are simple. The answers are not. Indeed, there is
no "answer", as such, at all. There are only pointers and indexes in time,
apace and events, of which we will examine a few leading examples as we go
along.
We begin by taking notice of the physical establishment. In size, the
official Soviet region is unique. It has been built with enormous speed and
in the midst of war and turmoil unmatched in the known history of our world.
Into it have disappeared, since 1917, ancient principalities and noted powers
that once represented millions of varying people with diverse cultures, con-
flicting ambitions and contrary opinions. Nov all these are supposed to be
marching together under a single ensign, the hammer and sickle, in a planned
campaign to master human destiny. But if the size is formidable, the campaign
is not original. The idea of conquering the world for a single cause has come
up before and it has been pushed by organizations seeming, in their day, to be
no less formidable. Yet, all have failed, for with the passing of time the
will t9 conquer has always dulled and the members of the system have lost their
singleness of purpose, diverted by the petty cares of day by day. What, here,
is tip?
Such a line of thought occurs to analysts of the present situation who in-
cline to a view that human nature does not change, no matter what may be the
political excitement of the day. According to this view, N.S. Khrushchev had
best
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best be seen less as the product of half a century's grinding according to
Soviet formula and more as a gifted fundamental Russian in false face. Mao Toe
Tung is not the voice of Marx's prophecy, fulfilled, but a consequence of Chinese
local necessity. And the millions in between these two exemplars of apparent
novelty are not becoming anything they have not always been. They are, by force
of geography and the eternal constants of our human situation, bound to remain
diverse, which diversity is sure to express itself with appropriate collisions
of local interest. Beneath the Marxist surface, so to speak, there lurks the
basic German, Pole, Chinese, Russian or what you will, depending only on where
you touch the map. We may rely on this to serve our welfare as time goes by.
So goes this argument for one view.
Now it is apparent that no attempt has been made here to offer definitions.
What, for instance, is "human nature"? What is a Soviet man? What makes a
German, a Russian, or a Chinese? To answer these reasonable questions is un-
reasonable. Any definition of "human nature" is only an argument of the witness,
his personal estimate of circumstance and his response to conduct in the given
case. And as for a suggestion that "Soviet" is a term properly contrasted with
"German", or "Russian", -- why must that be so?
We are, of course, here being tempted to plunge into a discussion of
cultures as a method of demonstrating diversity. But culture, meaning the
content of thought and the value put on action, is not static. To be sure, geography
is a constant force of direction upon action. Sea is not land and mountains are
not plains. People who abide in the one region must adapt if they expect to
stay. But "adapt" is a word that allows for changes in many a direction as time
goes by. Life adapted to the North Pole once demanded a taste for blubber and
solitude. Now it allows lettuce, ice cream and visits by troupes of lady enter-
tainers. It is usual to say that Russia lusts after warm water ports of call
to the world now as in centuries past. And doubtless such adjuncts of power
will be in demand as long as they last. But in a day of rocket science
they have a value different from that in which wooden ships coasted before the
wind.
Thus, we must proceed here with a realization that it is impossible yet to
lay down the formal terms of those discreit qualities which will distinguish a
Soviet human, if any. The hope is less to draft a collection of formulas and
more to flex the intuition. It is less to engrave the memory and more to
stimulate sensitivity. If we may open the eye so it can see and alert the ear
so it can hear, the man of action may possibly feel more at ease in trying to
interpret experiences with partisans, declared or not, of the Soviet cause.
And so we turn, now, to a development of known material as applied to the
section of the world most anxiously studied for signs and portents of Soviet
potential, that of traditional Russia. There, if anywhere, the Soviet idea
has been tested by time and circumstance. There, able managers of vast power
and great property have now emerged with vested interest in all manner of im-
pulse to self-satisfaction. They enjoy distinctions of rank and privilege.
Superior performance brings superior reward. Effort is stimulated through
incentive pay. The managing class finds opportunity to pass on the good gifts
to children of its kind and there is even a way for limited amounts of real
property to descend by will. One may be tempted quite easily to say that we
see here
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see here no more than a new arittocracy of an ancient habit leaving Marx be-
hind as rapidly as they can dull the fervor of the masses below with conwzmw
goods. And it is certainly true that the economic quality of life in the
Soviet regions can be defined precise]y as a vast and yet rapidly growing rise
in total power coupled with a mildly Improving trend in creature comfort. What
does this foretell of zeal for the Canoe? And What is the Cause?
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manipulations of the Czarist police, but it had the value of sanctifying the
word in the catalogue of Russian national emotions. When, in 1917, Lenin pro-
claimed the world revolution for Socialism, he knew exactly what word would do
him the most good as a tag for the form of organization at home. It was the
blooded and mystically endowed, "Soviet".
Had Lenin been as much interested in that other word he had a basis in
Slavic language, as in Slavic culture, ready made and endowed with all the
correct properties. It was "obahhina", from "obabhi", meaning, "in common".
The "obschina", were ancient establishments among the Russian peasantry, by far
the largest single class of people lying ready to his hand. The "obschina", was
the tribal system of the steppes, the engrained concept of the common pot, the
equal station and the cause of one for all and all for one. Lenin scorned to
so much as consider it. He had other ideas. When he uttered the war cry, "all
power to the Soviets", he was offering up the very spectacle of his soul. This
is to be remembered as we examine the idea which had moved him.
Here now a word about ideas and idea mongers, the people who interest
themselves in trying to see what general rules may account for behavior in part-
icular cases. Most of the time, the world professes a vast disinterest toward
the sort of idea study known as philosophy. The daily round of the philosopher
produces nothing for which the housewife feels compelled to pay out cash and men
of action have been heard to hint that the whole thing is nothing but a dodge
to get out of work. Certainly it is true that nobody goes into philosophy for
the money and if any innocents expect place, power or public honor, they do
not get it.
In the established order of heroes, policemen rank well above philosophers
and as enterprise philosophy may quite justly be regarded as a depressed indus-
try. Philosophers are used to being ignored, most of the time, and some even
claim to like it. It is a custom of the trade to profess stunned surprise when
the world turns suddenly from indifference to indignation and demands that one
of this obscure sect, as with Soaretea, be courtmartialed on a charge of corrup-
ting the public mind. After all, idea mongers do not deal in contamination of
food or in making of bombs, only in the arranging of words.
Why, then, in attempting to solve the enigma of Soviet man, does it matter
what Karl Marx said or wrote a century or more ago? Is it not enough just to
watch whtt the current holders of power do? May we know whether Soviet man ex-
ists without application to the analecta which are credited with breeding him if he is? Unfortunately, no. Some inquiry into the idea is inescapable. The
reasons for this miserable necessity will appear as we go along. But do not
despair. This is not to say that judgment of the Soviet potential must begin
with a prolonged review of the thought processes leading up to the world view
of`U.W.F. Hegel to which, as we all know, Marx paid capital debt. We must not
regard the living condition of human society as if it were controlled by a sort
of fortune-telling word machine into which one feeds particular questions for
automatically extruded answers printed up in advance and invariably true as
foretold.
The review of dogma herein will satisfy nobody, of course. For some
it will be regarded as a nonsensical bit of sloppy foreshortening. For others,
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II
At this point of an inquiry into the Soviet problem it is customary to
introduce an account of the late Karl Marx and to offer in some favored ver-
sion his sulphated opinion of the world and its ways. But reference to Marx
is useless until one knows his own capacity for observing the peculiar relation
of thought to society in action. There are two general illusions which not be
acknowledged. On the one hand there is the notion, Mier suggested here, that
state poser goes its own way wed by campaign oratory. Those who like to
believe this tend to see the USSR governed by practical fellows who are very
careful never to seduce themselves into believing the story that they operate
according to the formal ritual proclaimed. On the other hand there is the
notion that every decision and every action of Soviet management yesterday,
today and tomorrow is meaningful or predictable only as squared with ease es-
pecially flesh-creeping passage from the early works of the Soviet fathers.
It is idle to wrestle with any of the material evidence of Soviet exis-
tence until one knows which of these views best tends to comfort his oen bias.
This writer admits an inclination to believe that ideas do give direction to
action and that words do have a power in the acts of States. That is not to
say acts of state are exact responses to the dictionary, but it is to say words
are clues to the quality within acts. Therefore, in this paper some effort goes
into working through of the idea and power relation by analysis of words in
their ordinary and in their special meanings.
And so, as we approach analysis of the first significant figure in the
Soviet pantheon, we do so informed of two words and their meanings. The. first
is "Communism!. This ward is old in language as it is even more ancient in
polity. The general root is the Latin, "cro minis". Its plain English ancestor
is "common". Its current form derives from the French, "commaunisme", and since
1917 it has been absorbed into all manner of languages. But nothing of the
modern, usage can divest so old a word of its historical inflection and that,
as all of us know, is intended to signify the principle of equal sharing.
Communism is not limited to political doctrine. It is a view of life, an attit-
ude, a state of feeling, an expression of desire, all these to the end that one
partakes of the common lot exactly as the other. As such, it is no kin to the
second word here considered. This word is "Soviet", a sound and a symbol of
idea entirely limited to Slavic culture. The prefix, "So" means "with-, and
"owlet" means, "answer".
The root verb is "Sovetovat", meaning, "to advise". With reason, we call
to mind here that doctors advise patients, mothers advise children. To advise
implies a relation of superior to inferior in the given circumstance. One
hardly takes or seeks advice from a fountain of known ignorance. Really good
advice is not generally looked on as a common commodity no matter how commonly
worthless advice is given. Nor should we be deluded into thtnking political
usage has changed this much. the word "Soviet" enters politics apparently in
1801, when the Czar Alexander I appointed elder statesmen, "Sovietnibi", to
advise him on the wisdom of what, as it turned out, he intended to do anyhow.
In 1905, when the wretched workmen of the Russian cities rose against Nicholas
II, they formed councils, circles of advisors, "Soviets". Their struggle for
power was brief, ill-managed and fatal to many a one lured into it by the
manipulations
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it will have raised propositions perhaps so unfamiliar that they will seem
trivial or, on the surface so obvious as to be more than familiar and settled.
However, a closer look may suggest that some ideas most people take for granted
as well settled, true or false, really are not. In fact, a good deal of the
vice in our present world situation stems from some assumptions by Marx, himself,
that certain points were settled and he. had done it. His very self assurance
was Lenin's tool for achieving "all power to the Soviets", the vexation of more
than one head of state in our day.
We begin with the idea, meaning the notion of the mind, that "Nature" is a
word which suggests any and everything of substance in the Universe, things
living, things that have lived, things thit have not lived, things that cannot
ever live, but always that class of identities we mean by the word, "things".
By definition, we exclude ideas, for ideas are inward impressions of what a
thing "ought" to be, just as words are our instruments for causing others to
agree that they understand what we mean when we express in words our ideas
about the qualities of things.
A surface glance at the things to be seen in Nature may well bewilder any-
body. The surface appears complex, heedless, directionless, a fermentation of
odds and ends without any self-evident rhyme or reason. We do not know how the
universe looks to a horse. We can only suppose that it is regarded as a sort
of alternation between kicks and corn. It is suggested that "a cat dreams of
mice and a goose of maize", though none has yet confirmed this suspicion to us.
But we do know that it is a habit of the human race to reject the appearance of
Nature as the reality. We do not admit the surface random to be the heart of
the matter. Mathematics is our supreme effort, out of many, to reduce unknowns
and to find order in apparent. chaos.
Philosophers, who puzzle with such matters as the above, tend to go in one
or the other of two general routes. Either they concentrate on picking flaws in
what other philosophers have said, or they try to organize something nobody else
seems to have said, as yet. The first kind are called "analytic", and the others
"systematic". The systematic philosophers undertake to show not only that the
apparent hodge-podge of Nature is really meaningful, but also to show what the
meaning is.
G.W.F. Hegel, (1770-1831) was a metaphysician of Stuttgart, Germany, with a
conviction of the mind that by the processes of systematic thought all of Nature
could be explained and with a sentiment of the heart requiring him to confess
himself a devoted servant of God. Hegel, looked upon the Universe and in effect
echoed a declaration of an earlier but somewhat differently oriented thinker,
Heraclitus (51,8-480, B.C.),: "It is wise to harken not to me but my argument,
and to confess all things are one."
Much, here, depends not only on whether you think all things are one, but
also on which one. This is an essential element in the Soviet problem before
us for solution.
The universe, Hegel decided, is soluble in terms of thought. All of Nature
is but
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is but a manifestation of the Absolute, the One, which in his pious heart
meant God. And the mind of man, as an expression of this Absolute, cannot be
overestimated as a tool of greatness and of power. It can even explain history
on a reliable basis, good any time, anywhere, with any audience. The
explanation comes through experiencing inwardly the following process:
1. A point of information comes to mind. This is marked, "a thesis".
2. The point is studied and observed in the fermentations of time and place
and the original idea about it, the "thesis", is defeated by an objection, the
"antithesis".
3. This may seem discouraging until one discovers that after sufficient
concentration a way out appears and the contradictions are overcome by a new
view, an enrichment of the original under the stress of opposition, so that the
whole understanding moves to a new statement, the "synthesis", which collects
all the realized truth out of (1) and (2).
4. Now we discover the synthesis is nothing, after all, but a thesis,
itself, in collision with still another antithesis, from which is built yet a
further synthesis and so on without limit ever approaching the universal One,
the perfected appreciation of reality, in fact, God.
Hegel's thought as a whole has been borrowed in the last century and a
half as an alibi for every sort of political conduct. It has been offered as
the foundation of Christian monarchy (German), and attacked as undermining
Christian monarchy (German). It has been identified as the inspiration of Nat-
ional Socialism (Nazi) and claimed as the inspiration of Scientific Socialism
(Soviet). We will find little satisfaction in trying to adjudicate between
these claimants. We must let it go by taking at face value the attitude of
just one of these, Karl Marx (1818-1883), a systemist from Trier.
Everybody knows how Marx began as a professional thinker in a period of
excited belief in idealism as the way to perfection in systematic philosophy.
Out of his furious passion for scholarship came at last a conclusion,
"philosophers hitherto have been content to contemplate the world. The task
now is to change it," Here is our clue to character. It underlines much of
the feeling among those who regard Marx as rather crude and limited as a techni-
cian of idea. The fact is that Marx took little pleasure in speculation, as
such, so he got out of it by saying he had no further need to examine into the
meaning of the Universe. Instead, he borrowed Hegel's systematic scheme, but
expressly rejected Hegel's conclusions. Hegel had said thit by starting with
the abstract notion of the ultimate One he could learn the significance of any
concrete, specific situation of current notice. Marx liked the utility of Hegel's
process, the oscillations of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, but little else.
He had personal objections to the idea of God, it being his-view that since
things are all we know things are all there can be. He approved of the principle
that there is an ultimate One, but disapproved of identifying the ultimate as
metaphysical, more than physical, a Spiritual statement, To him, the ultimate
One must be as he put it, "material". Hence, Materialism as the simple answer
to Supernaturalism.
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Man's condition in Nature is not determined by his conscious valuation
of Nature, said Marx. It is the other way around. Man's condition in Nature
determines how he values Nature. In reduction to specific content, his for-
mula was that the Universe looks to you the way it does because of the way
you make your living. All human social values are, Marx concluded, the and
results of economic determinism, the product of materialism.
Regal's system for reading the meaning of history is right, Marx held,
if you just'turn it upside down and reason from the particular to the general
instead of from the general to the particular. Start with the concrete thing,
the way you make your living, and you will in time discover all. This upside-
down process of Hegelian dialectic, thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, is the
heart of all stylized explanations by philosophers, politicians, generals,
and street-corner debaters, in modern Soviet affairs.
It provides them with a handy formula for saying that the present situ-
ation, whatever it may be, is not the important point to be considered. They
offer to show that the direction and the motion of the oscillatory process -
not where we are at the moment, but where events are headed -- invariably works
to support their intentions. If you don't see this you are on the opposite, or
inevitably, losing, side.
One of the great manipulators within this system, Ioaif Vissarionavich
Djugashvili (Stalin), liked to explain to his listeners that in the Hegelian
process, refined by Marx, "Many quantitative steps must occur before a quali-
tative leap may come to pass". Another way of saying this is, "pay close
attention to the drift and at the right moment, hit your lick to make things
come out the way you want". The language is less elegant but the sensible
nature of the purpose is quite apparent. But of course Stalin, as others be-
fore him and since, liked to get credit not only for saying something sensible
but also for saying it in a way that would impress his listeners that very
much more was implied than they might guess.
Marx, having contemplated the world, was satisfied that he had now achiev-
ed a perfect explanation of all Causality. He now set out to change the world.
And however much we may criticize him for limitations in philosophy, we must
concede that in other lines of work he turned out to have astounding powers.
The Communist Manifesto of 181+7 is not a small thing. Neither is it entirely
a product of Marx's private thought. In fact, we must remind ourselves con-
stantly:that he did not even write it alone, but in collaboration with his ad-
miring friend and financial supporter, Friedrich Engels, who was especially
interested in keeping Marx attentive to the rising appreciation in Europe of
that which today we call "physical science". It is a melancholy fact that
neither of them had a true vision of what science would do to society.
Like other works which the processes of time have endowed with vast sig-
nificance, the Communist Manifesto can seem to mean different things to differ-
ent people, depending on what quotation is extracted. But some points in it
can hardly be ignored by any advocate. In a relatively short passage of words,
it offered (a) a handy explanation of the past, or "history", (b) a version of
the present, meaning Europe of the 19th Century and (c) a proposition to govern
the future.
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It must be remembered that Marx was himself one of those people less
addicted to physical labor than to thinking of ways to get physical labor done
by someone or something else. For all such Marx borrowed a French word,
"bourgeoisie", and overlaid it with his scorn. Now, it is in keeping with the
bias of this inquiry to examine the very word, "bourgeoisie", to see what
history goes with it. It stems from the ancient French, "burc", whence, the
English "borough", the German "burg", and if we care to look further, back to
the Medieval Latin, "burgus", all adding up, of course, to "town". The French
"bourgeois", then, relates to the freeman of the town who makes his living in
trade, using his head more than his hands. These, we know, gathered in power,
knowledge and money as Europe moved through time and by the 19th Century were
everywhere exuding strength in a kind of society that recognized the effective-
ness of capital investment by individuals in private ownership of things and
processes.
But to Marx, capitalism was obsolete and vile. He saw the economic
process not as carrying men ahead but as holding them back. And so the
Manifesto opened with a proclamation that "A specter is haunting Europe, the
Specter of Communism". There are apologists for the Manifesto and for Marx
who quibble that the rubric of dialectical materialism; does not absolutely
decree people must be killed and whole cultures uprooted to remake the world
as Marx decided it should be. But it cannot be escaped that the Manifesto
called for "the forcible overthrow of the whole extant, social order".
Having explained the meaning of history, to wit, that jobs make it, having
formed a new version of human conduct, "Scientific Socialism", Marx now offered
a directive for action. It was: "Let the ruling classes tremble at the prospect
of a communist revolution. Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains.
They have a world to win. Proletarians of the world, unite!"
It is a curious feature of Marx's commitment-in philosophy that he spent
little effort on making sure that idolators would know exactly what he meant
by what he said. More than one commentator has pointed out that he offered
great political magic with the phrase, "Scientific Socialism", but that he
didn't offer to say exactly what it meant in the ordinary, day-to-day shuffle
through life. We may find it worthwhile, however, to see what he did offer
as a grand-scale formula and how he looked on the people of the world, in
general.
First, let us do what Marx did not, let us empty the word "Scientific" as
we have the other important words in this search, to see what is contained
within it. All the words of kin, science, scientific, conscious, conscience,
omniscient, prescient, stem from one Latin root, the verb, "acire", to know.
In the same vicinity we find, "scion", which emerges from ancient sounds
meaning "seed", or "coming forth", and we can even discover that "scissors",
from the Latin "caedere", or "to cut", tend to drive thought the same way,
to the conclusion that knowledge, the act of knowing, is the power to make
and the power to remove, or if you like, is just power.
And what is "Socialism"? It and all its compounds and allied noises owe
their indicative character to the Latin "socius", for "a companion". We need
stir the imagination very little to see how Marx's word magic performs through
the association of companions with knowledge. But who are the companions? Not
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everybody. Marx was vague about some things but not about who should get
the benefit of his world view. People who were at the moment well off
would all have to go, no matter who they might be, no matter how gentle or
kindly they might think they were in person. They were, by their very
position in society, menaces to a re-ordering of events. No, the only accep-
table companions for operations in the new order would be the "proletarians".
This word is full of directional significance for one who seeks to get be-
neath the surface of language to see what he may find. Out of the Latin we
discover "pro", a prefixed order to go forward, and attached to it we find
"alere", a very signifying "to nourish". And in "proles", we find "off-
spring", hence, "product", and associated concepts.
There is yet one more word which must be investigated. It is "dictator-
ship". The family of meanings built up within this sound is enormous and
richly subtle in application, yet all come from a single imperative quality.
Note first the Latin adjective, "dius" for "godlike". The verb, "dicers",
to say, and "dictus", a saying. Consider, "dictare", to say with emphasis.
The end result is a feeling of compelling authority.
Marx's systematic view of the world at last comes down to this:
Events in Nature run their course according to oscillations of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis. An economic interpreter of history sees and
understands that the social effect of events is determined by the way people
make their livings.
The attitudes of people, their class distinctions, are governed by self-
interest. The social organization of any moment in time, the reigning
"ideological superstructure", is the formal ritual of explanation for this
governing self-interest. As long as any reigning form is in harmony with the
actuality of events it does no harm. But inevitably, time decays it. Then
the self-interest of those who are attached to the old form brings them into
collision with those who are out for a new.
Hence, Marx, his Communist Manifesto and his economic interpretation of
history, were an invitation to the proletariat of Western Europe to rise up,
destroy the established order and institute a dictatorship of their own. To
what end? Marx had a plan. He saw the proletariat not as descendants in
general, but only as the factory workmen of Western Europe. He was a city
man, himself, and spent most of his life in libraries. Like most of his
kind in his time, he had small interest in the United States and he had even
less interest in the agrarian element of Europe or anywhere else. It offered
little promise of action, tended to be non-scientific, mystical and apart
from political management, anyhow.
But the dictatorship of the proletariat would run the state, the operat-
ing machine of society, strictly in accord with principles of scientific soc-
ialism, which principles were conveniently unspecified. In the end after all
dissident elements were removed there would be a perfectly harmonious and
delightful experiencing of Hegel's oscillations in a society that would enjoy
every material thing in common, so intelligently and so benignly that the
state would just "wither away". The state would be communism in action and
communism in action would be the state. Such, roughly put, was Marx's
contribution to thought.
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III
Whoever has survived thus far will be relieved to know the worst is
over, insofar as the worst requires groping through the gloom of thought
and intent behind the utterances of human sound and word formation.
Refinements and additions and subtended remarks about what Marx really
meant are too tedious to pursue, though uncounted thousands of words have
been offered by those who would like to get the Master off or onto, some
special hot spot of theory in the years since he made his pronouncements to
suit himself.
It will do here to say that with his words he gave other men stimulus
to action. He told them which way to go and he decided he knew who not
only should, but would, do the going. It has seemed to more than one obser-
ver that apologists for Marx in the 20th Century might have the grace to
say something about the observable fact that his infallible system failed
rather badly to advise its believers of what to expect as events wore on in
fact, as against expectation.
To Marx, the rise and development of industrial, urban society in
Western Europe was the last necessary event before the revolution which would
be generated in the factories, the revolution which would install a dictator-
ship of the (city) proletariat who would in turn use the state to effect the
final, perfected science of socialism, the communal life which would see all
surviving mankind of one texture and pattern, so intelligent, so self-inter-
ested and so self-serving that not even a government, as such, would be
recognizably present.
But has anything worked out so far in this direction? To see how much
of Marx's science has proved itself we now must examine the doings and say-
ings of a few among the clusters of those who say they know what he meant
and have acted accordingly.
The arrival of the 20th Century undeniably disclosed in Western Europe
a mass of industrial workmen who were self-assertive, politically acute,
socially disturbed and ready to see an end to old orders of social process.
And in the Great War of 1914-18 they had many invitations to rise according
to Marx in one band together to dictate the new order. They had brains,
they had energy, they had leaders who said they knew how it should be done.
The West toyed with Marx, bled, shuddered and rejected him. His partisans
to this day remain essentially outside the Western pale and still unable to
carry the public with them by any ordinary political process.
Twice in the first 50 years of this century, the proletariat of the
Western world have been discovered on opposing sides of vast massacres and
twice have they refused to accept the Marxian solution so long ago proposed.
And though Marxian partisans have worked among them with every manner of
appeal, they still regard the Marxian proposition with profound suspicion.
Marxists still smell as much of the lamp as of blood, they still make it all
seem too simple and final and perfect for the proletarians of the West, who
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are now as they were 100 years ago, the world's best educated, best inform-
ed , most inventive and most industrious working people. As we see the
position of Marxism today in the region where he foretold it would reign,
we find it nowhere official and nowhere even so much as offered, any more,
on the terms he announced. The truth is that the proletariat of the West,
instead of interesting themselves in massing into a single dictatorship of
proletarians, have shown more interest in developing themselves individually
into becoming bourgeois, to use Marx's words, and even to allow his meaning.
There is a reason for this which is commonly recognized among us all, today,
but for which Marx's science of socialism failed utterly to account.
The record shows that instead of history runnirig, in the direction he fore-
told, it ran, if anywhere, in the exactly opposites section.
Out of the first world war we may draw many inferences, but of all that
may be drawn the one most compelling of notice is that at the war's end the
first Socialist state of modern history had emerged in an area which fitted
none of Marx's dogmatic rules. Russia went into that war a loosely held
empire of varying peoples and disjointed forces, nominally governed by one
man in mystical union, so it was said, with many millions. Russia had a
force of city workmen, but their conversion to the machine age was hardly
begun. The idea of an urban proletariat capable of dictating management
over the steppes and the peasants was generally held to be impossible and
hardly anybody planned on it. Certainly not Marx, when he was consulted
back in the 19th Century by various of the Russian thinkers who felt the
Czars had to go and that revolution was the instrument for speeding their
departure. Russia didn't interest him.
But Russia was dear to Russians, among whom we find one Vladimir Ilyich
Ulyanov (1870-192+). Those who wish to divert themselves with the endless
debates about what this extraordinary man might have done, would have done,
meant to do, and about the final meaning of what he did actually do, have
ample excuse. We need here consider very little.
It tells us considerable about him to know that when he arrived at his
decision to direct the reordering of humanity according to Marx he took an
alias, "Lenin", for "lion". We discover him in this word as he liked to
see himself. And we see his successor in power, the earlier mentioned Djuga-
shvili, through the self-chosen alias of "Stalin", steel, and yet another
comvanion of the early days now little remembered but once fearsome as
Molotov, the hammer. It means something to our analysis that in the modern
Soviet techniques of power such romantic and disclosing assumed identifies
are no longer used by office-holders in the USSR. Wt>uld such a practice be
now regarded as contributing to the "cult of the individual", perhaps? The
cant phrase of "organization man" fits better the temper of the going concern.
Lenin, like Marx, jay well be criticized for his limitations as a tech-
nician of idea. He made no bones about it, but was plain to say that the
thinking
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thinking process in itself had no special charms. It was just something to
use for the personal and wanted. He used it for twenty years of concentrated
effort to refine and organize the process of revolution to be laid on in
Russia at the moment when "many quantitative events" have accomplished the
required groundwork for the "qualitative leap", in the new direction for which
dialectical materialism on the Marxian model of analysis had prepared the
elect and foresighted. And like Marx, Lenin was both gifted and prolific at
the writing of political directives. Indeed, nobody denied the archives of
the Kremlin is secure to this day in a claim to know all he said. And as for
what is in those archives we may never be certain. Historians in the Marxist
succession have a way of putting aside that which fails to mix according to
the moment's version of the formula, as they have of discovering something
hitherto unseen which now is offered as verification of a change. However,
we may proceed here with one sampling from Lenin which tells us clearly both
what he thought and how he acted to compel others:
"The teaching of Marx is all-powerful because it is true. It is complete
and harmonious, providing men with a consistent view of the universe, which
cannot be reconciled with any superstition, any reaction, any defense of bour-
geois oppression. It is the lawful successor of the best that has been created
by humanity in the nineteenth century -- German philosophy, English political
economy and French socialism."
It is apparent how dictatorial and lionesque a manner fits Lenin's politics.
He does not offer to demonstrate why Marx is all-powerful, because true. He
just proclaims it and goes on to say Marx teaches a consistent view of the
universe, offering a complete and harmonious explanation of all.
Let us not pattern our own attitude after Lenin's, however, and rest
with a lordly declaration that Marx is all-powerful because true, or all non-
sense because false. Obviously, there must be some reason why so many people
who disagree with him continue to thank Marx for the unsatisfactory condition
in which modern society finds itself. His teaching can be criticized for
limitations as to justice and accuracy, but it is difficult to make out a case
that it has lacked power.
Let us see what Lenin meant when he referred to German philosophy.
German philosophers, as a sub-species, tend to produce systems, as against
picking holes in systems other people produce. They enjoy "ideals", meaning
versions within the mind of what "ought to be so". From the imagining of what
ought to be so it is fatally easy to proceed with a pushing of events to force
them in line with the pattern of "ought". As we have seen more than once too
much such pushing of events can produce nasty conditions of life for not only those
who are being pushed at the beginning but also for those who set out to do the
pushing. Ask Hitler, Goebbels and Co. Idealism, like violence, may get out of
hand if you become too much in love with it.
At any rate, the idealism of the German system builders has, in general,
tended to suggest that the random surface of Nature can be penetrated. We can get
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to the bottom of it all for a patterned explanation of everything. This is
a notion which may well seduce anybody. Not only cloistered philosophers but
men who work strictly with tangible things and with the data that come to
their senses from experience are always in a position to succumb if they are
of a tendency to do so.
One illustration comes immediately to mind. The linked performances of
mathematics, mechanics and associated knowledge have evolved considerable in-
teresting information about Nature, as for instance in the case of hydrogen
bombing routines. The world is no longer dismissed with the simple and common
sense recognition that it is flat. And in the nineteenth century, out of
which the Soviet hierarchy of today gets its authority in thought, the impulse
was to believe at last all knowledge was rapidly placing all of Nature in order
for a grand catalogue of things, their causes and their meaning.
It was this sentiment which inspired Hegel, Marx and Lenin to foresee
perfection and a perfected, idealized, final arrangement of society, Marx's
"scientific socialism".
It creates no small difficulty for the modern managers of Soviet affairs
that they have been locked up by sentiment, faith and some early success, with
a set of formal dogmas originating out of such a tidy attitude, for events
still decline to be subdued to anybody's predictions.
For instance, there is the case of the universe, or the totality of
Nature. Our world and the locality in which we proceed are now regarded by
the people who work in the sciences of real matter as not very closely connected
with the center of the universe. The planet, Earth, is just one of several
objects gyrating around a certain star, the sun, which is itself a rather
ordinary member of a single galaxy, one group of objets associated in space,
out of a very great many such groups.
The center of our physical being is the sun, to which it is now scienti-
fically argued we owe the physical and mechanical qualities of life and of
matter, as presently viewed.
But, say these students of the subject, their experiences with events and
the data recorded by their senses suggest that the universe, so far as we have
discovered it up to now, appears to contain on the order of 10/14 (ten to the
fourteenth power) planets situated= in relation to energy sources like our sun
and capable of maintaining high orders of living organisms. This somewhat
stretches the credulity, to be sure, but they offer more than fanciful evi-
dence. And it is asking even more of credulity to agree that such a universe
was contemplated within the reasoning of perfection offered by Hegel, Marx,
Lenin or anybody also.
Nature is not yet reducible to patterns. Our world is hardly the last
word in nature. It is lucky to be noticed at all. Therefore, we may be for-
given for doubting that Lenin was correct in giving Marx the last word on
anything at all, let alone for everything, on the basis of German idealistic
philosophy or on the basis of any other allegations that it is in the power of
mind to see the ultimate truth of absolute reality, absolute right or absolute
anything.
Yet, Lenin
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Yet, Lenin in 1917, demanded "all power to the Soviets", on the princi-
ple that he held, courtesy of Marx, the keys to the kingdom of truth and that
he could offer infallible precision for developing the absolute best available
to man in social intercourse, the world dictatorship of the proletariat which
would bring communism to perfection for all (surviving).
It is not our purpose here to review the details of Lenin's performance,
but only to describe the idea frames supposed to account for the result. The
result was without doubt to eradicate the last vestige of the social past in
traditional Russia.
In terms of result., we must summarize Lenin's effort in one word, Stalin.
All the blood, suffering and sacrifice of the revolution in Russia laid the
foundation for Stalin to make his own move toward the perfected society. And
he made it.
Stalin's monument is not his leadership of the Russian people in the war
of 1939-191+5, nor even the profit he made for them out of it in terms of ter-
ritory and subjects. Within the terms of this analysis, we must see Stalin's
supreme achievement as the Constitution of the USSR, adopted December 5, 1936.
This is the grant of legitimacy within which the state of our current time
claims to act. This is its explanation of itself. Therefore we are bound to
make ourselves familiar with the explanation.
And before we go into it, there must be made room for the challenge that
the Stalinist Constitution is just window-dressing for something else. This
challenge holds that Stalin never believed in any of the gabble from Hegel,
Marx, or even took seriously anything Lenin said about how power comes to
the right hands and how the right hands should use power. He was, so the
argument goes, a great monarch, a despot, whose mind and genius were centered
on himself as king and czar. He was never fooled a minute by all the talk
about "scientific socialism".
This is to ignore a good deal for the sake of a point of view. It is-
still a fact that Stalin entered the world as a shoe-maker's son in the re-
motest part of Asiatic Georgia. His father was a drunk. His mother was a
pious villager. He set out to rise in the world by studying to become a
priest of the established Church of the mtpire, but found himself better
adapted to the usages of politics. And at the end of it all he sat on top
of a considerable force which was shaped in his lifetime according to acts
for which sanction was claimed in the works and words of the aforesaid Marx,
Lenin, et al.
To ask that he be seen as a mere cynic who believed none of these but
only pretended to for the sake of his career and adventures is to ask more
than will be conceded herein, if nowhere else. It is as if one were to argue
that a Pope sitting in the Vatican, after all his years of work and prayer,
were to say
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were to say to himself it all had been a fake. It would be to say that
a president of some vast corporation of world influence, after all his
care to rise, could smile within and admit to himself he had no real be-
lief in the processes of capitalism. It is the argument of this work that
Stalin was not a cynic toward the Marxist science, but an utter believer.
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The Idea Installed
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IV
The Idea Installed
Those who find the spectacle of violence intolerably repugnant and
those who have less delicate sentiments but do not care to admit in public
what they work for'in private are often heard to argue that revolution and
conquest are not direct needs of the Communist idea or the Soviet system.
It is only ill will, they suggest, that reads into Marx a demand for blood.
And if Lenin's statecraft was rough he was forced to it by malice, ignorance
and misunderstanding from without.
There is this much to be said for their argument: anybody, including
Marx, would agree there is no need to shoot the man who hands over his per-
son and property on demand and obeys orders without argument. But it is
undeniable that so far the progress of Marxism has lacked the peaceful
touch. The modern Soviet state in the USSR and its counterparts elsewhere
have not once arrived by parliamentary method or general public acceptance.
The gateway to power is still stinking with death and destruction.
Lenin stands in history as a man claiming a mission to organize the
whole world on a pattern that suited him and as a man who used any weapon
he could get, revolution first and last, to begin with his own native
country. And as men do, he didd before he could hammer the framework of
is idea down upon the shapeless mass of people and things spread out be-
fore him. By no means had Socialism come to Russia in fact when Lenin died,
nor was Russia yet a Soviet or hardly any other recognizable kind of State.
It was as yet still unformed and bleeding from the spasms of disastrous
foreign war and internal revolutionary shock.
Revolutions, so they say, always eat their own children. This is a
poetic suggestion that maybe Regel's oscillations do have a kind of approx-
imate validity in natural circumstance as well as in philosophic idealism.
This would be a Hegelian description of events in Russia, then, since 1900.
First, the thesis of the Czar in power. Second, the antithesis of the re-
volution, out of which Lenin grasped the unmanaged power of national exist-
ence. And what is the synthesis? We may say of the events, by this formula,
that Lenin was the last revolutionist. For when Stalin took control his
first performance was that of killing off all competition he could find.
Thereafter, revolution was for export, only. The home office reckoned it would
be bad for business on the local market.
From 1917 to 1936, the Soviets were calling for "all power", but the
regions to which they spoke were not exactly harnessed. But on December 5,
1936, a document was delivered in Moscow, entitled "Constitution of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics". It was drafted by a Constitutional Commission
with Stalin as Chairman, given five and a half months' public display and then
adopted by a Congress of Soviets.
It is a masterpiece of its kind and deserves the closest study and appre-
ciation of its utility. Of all its clauses, we need here examine only a few
to disclose kow effective it is at managing the evolution of what we will now
begin to' see as an actual, operating identity, the modern Soviet man. Yes,
it is the conclusion of this work that Soviet man does exist and it is the
intention of all following material to show some of his parts.
Part I.
L.
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Part I, Clause Eleven of the Constitution that guides Soviet man on
his way says:
"The economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by the State
national economic plan". This is simple, clear and conclusive. It allows
no room for error of understanding as between state and citizen.
The aim of the economic plan is given as "increasing the public wealth".
What is "public" wealth? The significance is not exactly that of "communal"
wealth, as we shall see. Another aim of the plan is "steadily raising the
material and cultural standards of the working people", a gain that modern
societies everywhere acknowledge and pursue as profitable to any system of
living. The final aim given is "consolidating the independence of the USSR
and strengthening its defensive capacity". These are ordinary needs and
expectations of any government that means to survive. All depends on how
much of the economic plan goes to increasing the public wealth, how much to
raising the standards of the working people and how much goes to the uses of
statecraft.
Ever since the Soviet state got under way it has operated as a planned
economy. The classic plans are usually set up for five years. The current
one (1958-1965), is in its fundamentals like all th'others. It expresses
a concentration of effort on the implements of state power and discloses
only a grudging release to the other aims of what the State managing forces
evidently consider the least they can get by with for public uplift.
Extensive investigation has led to an officialrecent judgment by the
Central Intelligence Agency to Congress that the USSF is, as of 1960, fully
capable of drafting and executing formidable state economic plans with sobering
implications for other societies which want neither to be swallowed up nor
to be forced into war. And that it is in process now of just such an execu-
tion with the 1958-65 plan. It is noteworthy that all this effective planning
goes more to increase state power than to enlarge public welfare. For in this
knowledge we have a clue to the identity of Soviet w-n. We can see that his
current self-interest lies nearer to staying friends with the established
State system than in risking anything to agitate for a Marxian communism in
which the State has ceased to be. The man is mergir into the State, but the
State fails to fade. It grows. The naked favors of power and office are
what count. They are fed first and foremost as a farce of the State, for the
force of the State. No single clause of the Stalinist Constitution has had
more influence on the shaping of Soviet man than this, the ultimate and
irrevocable power to deprive citizens of any choice in the way they will live
in relation to the economic process. The State will own and plan. The citi-
zens will obey, if they want to survive.
The next clause of interest is Article 14 in Part II, a tedious and yet
vital series of details cataloging the distribution of power within the State
system. The "higher organs of State power", to use the language of the Consti-
tution, manage such matters as diplomacy, war and peace, admission of new
republics, military force, internal security, bankir , insurance, money, the
economics of land and property, justice, citizenship; education and marriage.
This pretty
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This pretty well settles any doubt whether Moscow has its thumb on
every control point in the life of the people. A good way to test the
inclusive list is to imagine how a revolution could staft, unbeknownst
to the state organs of higher authority. In what section of the society
has the state neglected to establish its listening post? We see here that
Soviet man has the State always with him, no matter which way he turns.
He cannot escape it. He can only pray that it will be merciful with him.
Part III, Article I says:
"The highest organ of State power in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR".
This supreme soviet is the final selection from the series of soviets
which begin with precinct groupings of "workers, peasants and soldiers",
established in citizenship.
As a sidelight on the establishment of citizenship it may be worth
remembering that after the German army invaded the USSR in 1941, seven
"autonomous regions" listed among the proud originals in the 1936 Consti-
tution suddenly disappeared from Soviet records and their citizens were
"re-located". The most Stalin ever let out about it was that he felt their
governments had proved treacherous. Whoever really knows the detailed story
of these fledglings that died so soon ought to tell it. Another to go with
this would be an account of the case of the Soviet soldiers under Lieutenant
GenerIl Anton Vlasov who went over to the Germans in large numbers, and what
happened to the citizenship of families they left behind. This, too, is
part of the estimate of Soviet man.
The stability of citizenship is an influence of importance and discipline
in the Soviet man's political judgment as he selects his representatives to
move up and up through the circles of local and regional council to the
Supreme Soviet. Citizenship can be lost for a considerable variety of offenses.
The Oonstitution allows that the Supreme Soviet is not only legislative,
but executive. It selects from within its membership a Council of Ministers,
another Soviet, for the word is still of the same meaning. The Soviet of
Ministers, as the distilled essence of the Supreme Soviet, issues orders and
decrees based on the laws of the Supreme Soviet. These decrees are binding
on all. A study of Soviet legal practice does not disclose any method by
which a citizen may find a Supreme Court which can tell him that a minister-
ial decree is in violation of a law of the Supreme Soviet and that he is
therefore entitled to a redress of grievance. The highest organ of State
authority gives no judge power against its ministers. To the contrary, courts
are candidly held creatures of the Soviets. The State, as it looks at the
citizen, is indivisible. Its parts are made to fit and to support one another.
Here is Hegel's One, or Marx's, and it is very material, indeed. It is the
synthesis of all power. The oscillations stop and if it is not perfect in
other ways at least it is perfected in form to manipulate power.
How may a Constitution organizing control in such a way, be amended?
May some far off region or republic originate a change and circulate it
against the will of the Moscow authority? The Constitution provides against
any such tendency of the public to set ideas in motion on their own. It
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cannot be amended except by a 2/3 vote of the Supreme Soviet, on the Soviet's
own motion.
Nov we come to the detailed method by which any competition of idea
against the established order is sniffed out before it can so much as get a
start. Part IV, Clause 126, offers a formula for authorized organizations of
citizens. These are'spelled out in benign roamer as "trade unions, co-oper-
ative societies, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural,
technical and scientific societies".
Beyond these non-political formations the Constitution provides that "the
most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class,
working peasants and working intelligentsia voluntarily unite in the Cnmist
Party of the Soviet Union which is the vanguard of the working people in their
struggle to build a Consunist Society and is the leading core of all working
people, both public and state."
All the above in quotations is from the official English language transla-
tion offered by the USSR. The descriptive material along with it, not in
quotations, is an attempt to give a faithful reflection of the same language,
omitting no quality and inserting none. Thus, it adds to the reality of our
understanding to note that except in the quoted passage above the 1936 Consti-
tution of the USSR makes no reference to Communism nor anywhere explains what
it is. In sum, whatever Communism may be, the State which is supposedly its
true home has no legal language for describing it.
The effect of the Constitution is, of course, to grant the Ccunists an
exclusive political franchise and to deny legal opportun.ty to any idea of society
except that which the Communist party may compound from within itself, always
supposing that such a compound is enacted as a statute of law by the Supreme
Soviet.
The organizing rules of the Communist party and its method of developing
compounds for the Supreme Soviet's attention are not part of this analysis.
Only the briefest general description of the party's factors is necessary to our
knowledge here. The present institution going by the naaae of the Coat unist Party
of the Soviet Union, is historically descended from the Russian Social Demo-
cratic Labor Party which formed at Minsk in March of 1898, itself a response to
a brief earlier flash of Marxism in Warsaw called "Proletariat".
Marxism seeped into the Czarist empire as one after another group with
ideas of social betterment suffered the repression of a Romanoff dynasty that
could not imagine the interests of a world just beginning response to the im-
pacts of science and industry upon society. By no means were all or even most
of the natural revolutionaries in Russia inclined to Marrcism. Certainly it is
not the evidence that their aspirations were for anything to compare with the
Soviet state as it is today or the Cowtu ist party that is the state's symbiotic
other self.
Lenin was one among many, but entirely in character as the Russian Social
Democratic Party, in fear of its life, struggled to form a line of policy. He
turned all his fantastic invective power against those w_thin the party who
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doubted that he was always right.
His own faction he declared to be the "Bolsheviki", a splendid and sonor-
ous word which should be said once aloud for notice of its thunders. The oppo-
sition were "Mensheviki". Whoever is indifferent to the implication of word
forms may try these two in alternation, imagining how the forensic force avail-
able may be used. The first means "majority party", the second, "minority party".
When he started his operation Lenin called his small body of supporters the
majority, "Bolsheviki", and the opposition, though it outnumbered him, the contem-
ptible "Mensheviki". The word came before the fact but the fact came to the word.
By 1917, the Bolsheviks represented disciplined and directed power among the dis-
tracted many who had so long sought escape from the Czar's misrule and now were
unclear just what to do next. "All power to the Soviets" was the plan but only
trusted Bolshevik lieutenants were permitted to manage the details of delivery.
By 1918, the Bolshevik All-Russian Communist Party was a going concern. In 1925,
it re-described itself as the All-Union Communist Party. The present name was
adopted in 1952?
In the Soviet Union and everywhere else in the world it has extended its
influence, the Communist group differ in the most fundamental sense from poli-
tical action as the term is used in parliamentary language. Membership is not
open to everybody. One does not become a Communist by the simple process of
declaring himself to be one. The significant fact is that nobody "Joins" the
party at all. Candidates for membership are "admitted". And at intervals the
party "cleanses itself", expels whoever is decided to be out of harmony with the
party will.
There is a peculiarly mystical feature to the ritual of party cleansing.
Outsiders do not really know what goes on, they only know what the party's
official story is after the event and the rebuttal of the ejected member, if
he lives to give it. Many words have been written attempting to give some
valid account of party workings but none is worth such at foretelling the next
development. The only observable fact is a plain one. It is that in the CPSU,
as in the USSR, the power flows from top to bottom, not from bottom to top. The
Supreme Soviet generates the power oscillations of government which reach to the
villages. The central Committee of the Communist Party tunes its political sen-
sitivity so "the party can hear the grass grow". How? All we know is that such
is the party's business, to keepthe State informed of what the people feel be-
fore the people themselves know they are feeling it. The Party serves the State
and the State preserves the Party. Such is the nature of the symbiosis. Who-
ever imagines the one apart from the other has not become sensitized to the
nature of this peculiar system built on the premise that it was destined to rule
the world, and has developed a world network of legal and illegal alliances to
keep its courage strong.
Who is the man within the system?
Whether he is a Communist party member, a functionary in State office or
an industrial manager, whether his career lies in the military, the arts, the
sciences, on a farm, in a fishing smack, whether he herds sheep or runs a prison,
whether he is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers or a street sweeper he
is a part of the One. He lives within it and he depends upon its favor. It
can deny him
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can deny him but he cannot a retest it.
When the Constitution of 1936 was produced, apologists everywhere
hailed it as the most democratic and enlightened social contract ever written.
This was because its preaching language dwelt on the benefits to come for the
"workers, peasants and intelligentsia". Of all these apologists none spoke
better of the work than the chairman. of its drafting conrittee, Stalin:
"The conglete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of national
econosgr is thus an accaglished fact. What does that mean? It means that -
man's exploitation of maz is abolished, liquidated, and that socialist proper-
ty in the instrt is of and means of production is confirmed as the constant
basis of society".
There has been a victory, to be sure. The constant basis of society in
the USSR insures that the instruments and means of production are managed by
the Supreme Soviet and its agents. The management is skillful. But it is
only management. It executes policy but it does not determine it. Bow does
policy arise and what is it?
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The Idea Cmmm sii
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V
The Idea Commanding
By now it Will have occurred to any observer that events have left not
only Hegel's idealism but also Marx's Connauaim far 'behind. The modern ver-
sion of Scientific Socialism, inserted into Russian revolution by Lenin and
installed in power by Stalin, has little in common With 19th Century ideas of
science, philosophy or state management. But these were its roots and for
any sense of understanding it the roots must be examined, traced out and appre-
ciated for their current value. They do have such a value. Wherever the Soviet
state seeks power but does not yet have it, the approach remains in the same
19th Century formula. Heavy emmthasis is laid on Marx's version of the good society,
a dictatorship of the proletariat aiming toward stateless Comunism. This is
the public offering, to be used for whatever it is Worth with the innocent be-
lievers. But it is only one of an arsenal of formidable power tools. Another
is the world-girdling organization of revolutionary managers trained in the
Leninist tradition. For almost as many years as it has been in existence, the
Soviet State has operated colleges in Moscow for the explicit trail of field
men Whose duty it is to bring new nations into the fold. Marxiaa, public
Comunism undertakes congenial relations With anybody, anywhere, who feels
abused, unhappy and interested in revenge. Nobody absolutely must be a Co wa-
ist to have friendly dealings With the overt Marxist representation. But there
is little opportunity for the public to get acquainted with the covert Lamaist
operatives. Their business is to manipulate the Marxist believers and Weaken
every non-Soviet goverment in the World, Whenever, Wherever and however they
can, in anticipation of the day when a judgment of Moscow holds the time has
co a to take in another subject territory. Within the Soviet dcmaain the func-
tion of the Party is that of keeping the State informed so that it may keep the
people in order. Outside the domain, the function of the party is the prepar-
ation of conditions for extension of the domain.
What luck has the system had, so far? Since 1917, all the hammering has
failed as yet to bring in any volunteer members. Success, so far, has come
only in the form expressed by the Chinese representative of the Soviet idea,
Mao Toe Tung. It is his proposition that political power "grows out of the
barrel of a gun". How do the Soviet principalities ccmare, the one centered
on Moscow and the other on Peking? Most attempts to make such a comparison
fail because they run out of facts almost immediately. It is difficult enough
to shape a thought about the Moscow operation, even after two generations of
accumulated material. To suggest that the Chinese Marxists are yet knowable
is not serious.
Yet of the Chinese situation certain things may be said on the evidence.
The great political event of the 191+-1918 var was dual in character.
First, the Western, industrial society refused the Marxism gambit, thus forever
ending any basis in fact for claims of Marxian infallibility. Second, this
same gambit Was attempted in the agrarian, amystical Russian mire and as of
now has produced an industrial Soviet empire, hardly Marxism, hardly benign,
but po erful, suspicious, acquisitive and conspicuously aggressive in its pro-
cedures. It negotiates and it maneuvers, but an examination of its hard and
fast comrmitaments to limit its reach supports the view that it is far from satis-
fied.
The great
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The great political event out of the 1939-1945 war for this first Soviet
empire was consolidation of its control on the home territory and extension
of its margins Westward into Europe by right of simple, old-fashioned conquest.
It built a complex arrangement of house rules to govem the territories and to
date it has had remarkably little difficulty, considering the assignment it
undertook in the first place. Ruling middle Europe hat never been simple for
anybody and if military capabilities were distributed In a different order,
there would still be little life expectancy for the Soviet system there.
But the capabilities are what they are and so Moscow holds its gains by force
of arms as tlfe new generation grows up to be trained in the tested pattern
of obedience.
But this extension in Europe was not the and of the case. Out of the
war of 1939-1945 came another victory of Marxism, truly grown out of the
barrel of a Chinese gun. A region even more remote and agrarian than Russia
of 1914, the one part of the world least conforming to Marx's dogmatic rules
of admission to the ranks of Scientific Socialism, was brought under the sub-
jugation of a force about which the outside world heard only rumors, the
"Chinese 8th Route Army", under command of Comrade Mao,
It is little remembered today but early in the emergence of the Soviet
state Moscow kept the back roads of Siberia and Mongolia hot with agents to
inner Asia. One of its early transactions was with the armies of Chiang Kai
Shek, who finally broke openly and completely with the Communists at the gates
of Shanghai in 1927 and went on to form the Kuomintang,, the generally recog-
nized government of China, now situated in Formosa. When it lost its reach
for the Kuomintang, the Soviet made connection with the 8th Route Army. The
force descendant from the Army holds the mainland of China.
None will deny the regime in Peking is belligerent. The examples of
Korea, Tibet and the border of India and its attempts to force through the
nations along the Malay Straits are evidence of an urgent drive for expansion.
This drive has been seen by some as "nationalism", in a Chinese setting, fore-
telling a day when Chinese and Russian interests collide somewhere in the
recesses of Asia wherd their authorities meet.
But none will deny, either, that the regime in Peking is outspoken in its
call for world revolution on the classic Marxist pattern. Not since Lenin has
the public tone of preachment been so violent and stark. After all, the program
has long since passed the modest form of "Socialism in one country". Whatever
it is, it runs from Berlin to the Pacific ocean and from the Arctic to the dis-
puted borders of India. In one way or another it claims authority over more
human beings than any system ever has, however nominal the authority in given
localities and however feeble the execution of doctrine= in specific cases. The
first half-century of operations will soon have been completed and it has carried
far, no matter how managed the going.
Can this amalgam of dogmas and dominance be reduced to a formula? Can
the power centers of Moscow and Peking manage their differences? Can all the
millions with all their innate diversities be homogenized into One? This is
the mystery of the future.
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The fact of the present is that in the USSR power now centers in a formu-
lation that allows no competition. Traditional sentiments are not much in
contest with military power of modern quality.
Can such a regime contain its own tendency to expand and the temptation to
use its enormous powers? There is a way to consider this question in realistic
fashion by imagining what would happen if the regime were to decide of its own
will to dismantle itself. For all the time since 1917, the principle of "all
power to the Soviets" has been in force. Philosophy, education, science, art,
industry, agriculture, militarism, civil and criminal law, every element of
social organization have concentrated on obedience to this rule. Two full gen-
erations have been born under its influence. The very machine of industry, and
a mighty one it is, has been built to deliver "all power to the Soviets".
How can this power be devolved and distributed, even if all the abilities
of the managers were suddenly turned to that end? How could title to property
be handed back by the State to people? How could political competition for
office be generated in minds taught for more than 40 years that such
competition is mortal sin?
The vast machine of state in the Soviet regions has no recognizable escape
from its own commitment. It has assumed all power. It has concentrated on
disciplining tendencies of difference and on homogenizing all the elements of
"human nature", whatever these may be in any understanding, into obedience to
the One. How can the One, then, either wither away or sub-divide itself?
Plainly, in looking at the One we need an idea other than Hegel's or Marx's.
And since their day, the idea mongers have been working with information neither
imagined. Theirs was a time in which the mind was, essentially, a proposition
of intellect and idea had not offered much formal doctrine on the content and
structure of feeling.
Today, the nature of feeling is considered in ways unknown to philosophy
before the 20th Century and the modern thinkers who consider feeling tend to
disassociate themselves from classic-philosophy on that account. They call
themselves, in general, students of psychology, meaning that they wish to
learn what may be the logical significance of human response to actual exper-
iences, as against presumptions of what ought to be the "right" or moral, view.
Psychology is a science so young that philosophy, with its ages of system
building and critical analysis, enjoys impressive residual status and authority
by comparison. But psychology still is a fierce competitor, once imagination
reaches to it.
Consider, therefore, in attempting to evaluate the personality and pros-
pects of Soviet man and his civilization, the implications of just one such
school of psychological inquiry. This goes by the general inclusive title of
"gestalt", by which the German means not only the whole class of attributes
signified by shape but also the concrete thing, itself, shape.
This notion of shape as an attribute and shape as an entity cannot be
imagined easily, without consideration of examples. Let us consider two.
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The notes in the musical scale each have concrete and individual significance.
Each one, sounded alone? has its "shape". Arrange these limited and finite
"shapes" in a chosen pattern and they result in a melody, which is a "shape"
in itself, an entity different from any of the entities which made it. Now
comes the question of the gestalt psychologists:
What gives the melody its own shape? What is its source? What is its
content? How does it come about? How does it appear to beholders, individually
and collectively?
Now let us consider an animate shape, as against a shape not alive. A
regiment of soldiers is different from as many soldiers not formed into a
regiment. Each soldier has his shape, psychologically speaking. The number of
soldiers equal to a regiment meeting at random have snother sort of shape. But
a regiment has its own shape, its own entity, and in . performing sense, its
tAin life and characteristic psychology.
What is the source of the regiment's own shape? And what is the origin
of the Soviet shape, seen from the perspective of the gestalt psychology? It
-,.s beyond the reach of this analysis to say. But certain qualities of the
shape itself are visible.
The Soviet system is monolithic. The State must act as if it were infallible,
whether it is or not, because it will not share responsibility and power with
any of its ingredient humans. Thus, when error does; occur, and in human sit-
uations we cannot expect otherwise, the State must force its way through to an
appearance of infallible foresight sufficient to maitutain internal discipline.
Or try.
The Soviet system is autarchic. It holds a monopoly of goods as it holds
monopoly of political and military force. It has no reason to go outside
5-tself for any article it can find at home and in fa y as long as it can use
discipline to deny need or produce a passable substitute, it has every self-
serving reason to avoid foreign exchange. Trade is a weapon, not a thing in
tself.
The Soviet system is autistic. It has no regarC for damage it may do
others. Indeed, one of its dedicated aims is all possible damage to others.
It is self-centered in the fullest meaning of the word, but in no sense self-
satisfied. Nothing in its catalogue of purposes or performances can be found
to justify a notion that the Soviet system feels a limit on its expansion
would ever be a good in itself.
Is there a model in history for the Soviet style of management? There is,
and the evidences of modern psychology are useful reference in considering that
historical model, which is Sparta. But these evidences are another subject,
for a future paper.
Insofar as this effort is concerned, we have at last reached the point
that something must be said about the nature of Sovie=t man as we may judge it
on the basis of the evidence here offered.
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First and last, he is just a man. His gifts and his limits are all
within the range of the human. We may assume this on the basis of his
biology, even if we deny him any other inheritance. If we are to say that we
know anything at all about. what faculties go into the fabrication of a human
being, we must admit Soviet man, wherever found, has these faculties, no more,
no less.
He knows pain and pleasure. He feels love, hate, frustration, exultation.
He wants the good life and he fears the bad. And he discovers, as do we, that
he has limits. He may imagine as much as he pleases, but he must accept less
than the best when he comes to put his imagination to the test of experience.
He learns to know error.
Thus, after all, we will have to concede that to the extent any of us is
human, our nature does not change. But what may we say about the influence of
Soviet experiences? How are the fundamental drives of human feeling modified by
the conditions of Soviet existence?
Here, we may consider the Soviet state as a source of information.
In any society which relies on central authority. the individual finds
th&t his opportunities to differ with his fellows are sharply defined. He may
differ on how to run a tractor or use a spectroscope, but he may not argue the
wisdom of "all power to the Soviets". He may not speculate after the fashion
of philosophy except in one mode. He has discovered that in the natural
sciences as elsewhere it pays to be sure that he sees Nature conforming to the
official dogma.. He lives in a closed society. Can we say that his facultiev
for criticism of that society and its decisions are of any value? Whatever
is not put to use is ineffectual. The faculty of social criticism may be seen
in a way as a sort of expression of energy, as a creative force for change and
discovery. When that critical faculty withers a sort of effect occurs in the
social realm comparable to that meant by physical scientists when they use
the word, "entropy". The degree of entropy in a substance expresses the
limitation of its energy output. In the social sense, a society which denies
its members range for exploration of social ideas must suffer social entropy
in proportion.
To the degree the Soviet system accomplishes "all power to the Soviets",
we may expect to find Soviet man in a state of social entropy. He is denied
the energy to generate changes and therefore he has no notion of what changes
exist or may be caused to exist.
His ignorance of change and its uses for good must, if he is human,
inspire in him a fear of contrasts and differences. The unknown, simply because
it is unknown, has its terrors. We may reason, therefore, that Soviet man is a
conformist in his social outlook and fears the very principle of non-conformity.
It follows that to a degree above the usual he distrusts the man who is unlike
him.
It follows also that as the generations of Soviet man march one after the
other, obedience to authority becomes more automatic, engrained and reliable.
One violates the very axiom of human quality in human beings to describe this
as leading to the "closed" mind, but surely it leads to a narrowing of the
mind,
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mind, to enormous reliance on belief as against experience and to loss of
reason in favor of faith.
Investigations into faith systems and their influence on personality and
behavior are only in recent years becoming recognizable scientific efforts.
It is not possible here to attempt any extended description of how these are
formed. But we may summarize some characteristics for which ample precedent
in social history is found. Systems which have a tendency toward closed
judgments of the correct view also make it easy for the individual to see
living experience in sharp contrast, "right", as against "wrong", to trust
"either-or", in situations that others would still hold open and to put heavy
reliance on the doctrine that any man is an enemy who declines to meet the
test of friendship on grounds decreed by external authority.
Soviet man would be mystified by the notion, "For if ye love them which
love you, what reward have ye? Do not the publican also? And if ye salute
your brethren, only, what do ye more than others? Do not even the publicans
also?"
To the extent the man managed by the Soviet state sees difference and
change as a threat to the State, he is that much a Soviet man. And to that
extent he must fear and distrust any agent of change. He must deny himself a
party to it. His internal natural compulsion to live in a world and a universe
of endless change produces under stress a dour, distrusting disposition and a
set against symbols of difference all around his border. If any man in modern
society is in need of help and understanding, Soviet man is surely one. He is
living proof that knowledge, as such, is not enough. Considerably more is
needed before any social system, Communist or otherwise, can speak confidently
of perfection.
In the meantime, the Soviet state, as it amasses power and people, remains
a force in the world around it which cannot be seen by any beholder as inter-
ested in mildness or self-limitation. Nothing that is non-Soviet is satis-
factory to the Soviet.
It does not renounce one word of its formal intention to force the world
to become One on the Soviet model, nor does it manipulate its forces away from
such a goal. In the pre-atomic yesterday it was franker in declaring the
revolution would be violent. Today, violence is nobody's monopoly. No man
says how, if it reaches the peak of its known potential, violence can be guided
by plan. This is a shocking thought for the pious Marxist who looks on the
Soviet state as capable of making plans that allow for any combination of cir-
cumstances. It is a terrible reality for every living creature, alike. How
it will modify the Soviet urge to force humanity into the Soviet model remains
to be seen. How it will modify the world that declines to become Soviet is
equally undisclosed. If there is any way to tolerate the world's powers for
violence and the world's changes, without some amendment of the Soviet
intention, this writer does not know of it.
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May 10, 1960
TO : Mr. Hanes
FROM : Mr. Waldrop
SUBJECT . A Ten. Year View of Soviet Power (1960-1970)
1. Here is a short course on. what Congress is learning now
about the Soviet idea in action.. It gives the latest word on.
how economics, politics, education. and language are used as
tools of Soviet power.
2. The most novel piece of evidence is a greatly detailed re-
port and estimate of the Seven Year Plan. (1958-1965) under which
the Soviet economy now operates. What does this evidence show?
Exactly that which any responsible citizen. must know from instinct
and experience.
The Soviet purpose is conquest of the world. It aims now, as
it always has, for unconditional surrender by the whole human, race
to its rule of scientific socialism, about which, more below.
It would be glad to have this surrender without war, but if war-
is the only means that will do the job, then. the Soviet idea calls
for war. And the Soviet power is building that war machine.
It is a machine of high quality, managed by people who know
what they want and how to get it. They are capable, concentrated
and aggressive in. spirit as in. conduct. They live and move by plan.
3. What is the United States to do about them and their plan.?
Here is the advice given. Congress:
Keep the nation. alert. It is no joy, but it is vital to remem-
ber we will be decades, not merely years, at the daily job of wear-
ing down. the Soviet aim to conquer and manage each of us, in person..
The risk of war is constant. Therefore, a military power supreme
in. the world is simple self-protection for each of us, in-person..
Whatever that takes
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Whatever that takes in. body, mind and spirit, in. property and
in time, is justly due from each of us as our fair share in. the
common. lot of a humanity which has its own. ideas of life, as
against the Soviet idea.
4. We, too, have an idea for the world. The message of demo-
cracy, as spelled out in. these briefs to Congress, would be a
pledge by the United States to give its best for others to
model life as nearly after our fashion. as they can manage, but
in. any case, not after the Soviet manner.
This American. idea is, in. the view given. Congress, the real
issue before the world. We cannot survive in. health on. the
negative principle of anti-Communism. The positive view of
life arouses a sincere and driving will to advance the American.
idea. It locks each of us to the propagation of faith in. our
idea, a faith expressed not only in. works but also in words,
through which works and their meaning are understood. The
American idea will be discussed below, also.
5. The accounts to Congress here examined come at a timely
moment. In less than . ten. years, the Soviet idea will have
behind it fifty years' living experience with real government and
applied politics.
The transformation. of the idea from 8n opinion. to a perform-
ance can. be dated as April 16, 1917. On that day, in the Tsar's
waiting room of the Finland Railroad Station., at Petrograd (now
Leningrad), Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, holding a bouquet of roses,
proclaimed:
"We must fight for the social revolution, fight to the end,
till the complete victory of the proletariat. Long live the
world social revolution."
Ulyanov, kn.own.better by his revolutionary alias, Lenin., had
been a fugitive from the fallen. Tsar's police.. Now, he was
returned to Russia with a handful of followers from cellars in.
Central Europe to fish in. troubled waters.
This handful of romantic and primitive believers in the
Soviet idea had in. mind first to seize the power of government
in. a single country, then. to build in that country an.engine
for conquest so that all the race might be governed according
to their
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to their own single view of life. Now, as the last few of fifty
years from that day go by, how does the Soviet idea fare?
Measured in. geography, we find it fixed on. the body of
Russia. North, it runs to the Pole. South, to the edge of India.
East, it runs to the Sea of Japan.. West, to the heart of Europe.
Measured in. politics, it runs the whole of the earth. No
continent is free of its influence. Few countries are without
its partisans, dedicated to destroy their own. national homes
for the sake of the Soviet idea.
Measured in power, the brute force of men. and machines, it
finds that the American. idea survives to organize a force which is
greater. The surveys given. Congress present the particulars.
6. As to such surveys, these reviewed here must be classed
the latest and best of their kind in. a. series almost exactly as
old as the Soviet Government, itself. The first Congressional
notice of Soviet entry into world politics can. be found in.Senate
Document 62, (65th Congress, 1st Session.). The report on. those
first hearings, begun. September 27, 1918, has meaning today. It
includes this:
"The demonstration of the consequences of this movement in.
Russia, no matter how graphic the description., is a distant,
far-away picture to the average citizen. of the United States...
"While entertaining and perhaps amusing him, much as the
novel in. modern. fiction does, it fails to impress him as an. actual,
existing institution., in, a world growing smaller through the ac-
complishmen.ts in. transportation. anal communication., that must be
considered and met as an actuality.
"To understand and realize its real consequences it must be
brought home to the citizen- and applied to the life and institu-
tions which he knows."
The report with this observation, was made on. July 28, 1919.
The. inquiry which stimulated it was not concerned primarily with
the Soviet idea. Its originating authority was a direction. that
a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee look into charges made against
the United States Brewers' Association and allied interests.
From this,
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From this, the investigation led to exploration of "German,
and Bolshevik Propaganda", seen. as attempts to blunt the American.
will in. the war of 1914-1918.
Read against present-day standards of information, that first
Congressional effort to measure the meaning of Lenin's proclama-
tion.for world revolution. seems limited, indeed. Yet, in fact, it
went straight to the heart of the matter.
Now, as then., the major problem of responsible authority is
less to gauge Soviet intention,-- it is constant, and less to
gauge Soviet power -- it is obvious. The major problem is to
interest the citizen at work on. his daily round of life. It is
to remind him that he, too, is personally involved in. all that
happens, like it or no.
7. Now, as to these hearings on. 1959, the first for examina-
tion, is a comparison of the United States and Soviet Economies, made
in. 1959 for the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd Session.,
Pursuant to Sec.5, (a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress. (Tab A).
It is the third attempt by this Committee to make such a
measurement and clearly reflects a growing body of knowledge and
an. improving sense of touch in. the handling of it.
This proceeding adds up testimony and formal papers of
estimate by thirty-one witnesses.
These range from Allen.Dulles, Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, to John. Raber, a speaker for the Indiana Farmers'
Union., and from Benjamin.Javits, President of United Shareholders
of America, to Jay Lovestone, Director of International Publica-
tions, CIO-AFL.
Subjects analyzed vary from living standards to gold policy,
from incentives to population., from food to guns. One witness re-
ports on. the minute details of spendable income for average families
here and in. Russia. Another offers a grand scale measurement of
Gross National Product as the best clue to identity of national
aims.
Many able scholars from great universities have worked out parts
of this total economic portrait, the most detailed of its kind
actually ever offered to public view. And it must be remembered the
witnesses are not all of one mind in reading the character
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within the portrait. But it must also be remembered they
are of one mind on one controlling feature. All see a por-
trait of power in the most modern and formidable sense. Here
is the sum of all their views, put by Mr. Dulles:
"The fulfillment of the present Seven Year Plan is a major
goal of Soviet policy ...If the Soviet industrial growth rate
persists... as is forecast...the gap between our two economies
by 1970 will be dangerously narrowed unless our own industrial
growth rate is substantially increased...
"...The uses to which economic resources are directed
largely determine the measure of national power."
With this testament no witness disagreed.
Attached is Appendix A, which gives in each one's words
a more detailed illustration of the findings on each element
of comparison, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., in economic
power and prospects.
8. The second study is a twelve part panorama of world
politics made for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Congress and S. Res. 31, 86th
Congress. (Tab B).
One system of this analysis treats with the principal div-
isions of the world by continents and people. Another explores
military needs and powers for simple existence. A third drafts
a new American style of diplomacy, with separate departments of
political, economic and cultural administration. A fourth
offers the grand, over-riding aim to put the American idea into
direct competition with the Soviet idea for the whole mind of
man.
These reports, handed in from mid-1959 through the first
quarter of 1960, are foundation material for a "full and com-
plete study of U.S foreign policy" begun by the Senate Comm-
ittee in July, 1958.
Like the reports on economic power, these reflect a thor-
ough grasp and searching realism as to the Soviet idea.
And again, though there are variations in detail, all these
studies come together on one point. It is merely a matter of
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taste that one is quoted over another here to indicate that
consensus. On. that basis of taste, here is a passage from
Report No. 10, prepared by the Harvard University Center for
International Affairs, on. the subject, "Ideology and Foreign
Affairs":
"The challenges facing the free world over the coming years
are much more grave than. those surmounted since World War II.
"While the Communist threat was mainly military, the neces-
sary response of the free world was provoked by the threat it-
self. In. that period fear provided a sufficient spur for
joint action..
"The shift to 'co-existence' has changed this situation.. The
threat has not been. removed but has become more difficult to
meet...
"The rapidly changing world is seeking a sense of direction..
In. the age of ideology, successful political action. must be
related to ideas. Dogmatic systems of ideas can. be undermined
only by positive actions which consistently refute their accuracy
and by affirmative principles which truly reflect the aspira-
tions of mankind."
Appendix B, attached, is a body of extracts from each of
the twelve papers, giving the central theme of each and the major
supports of each theme.
9. The third study is a comparison. of United States and
U.S.S.R. education., made by the National Science Foundation for
the independent offices subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee, as of March 2, 1960. But the message it contains was
given., as a matter of fact, even. before the Soviet idea became
an. action. in. real politics. (Tab C)
The chief witness in. the 1960 hearing used that message as
his opening statement, with this quotation.from an address in.
1916 by Alfred North Whitehead, for many years head of the
Department of Philosophy at Harvard University:
"In. the conditions of modern. life, the rule is absolute --
the race which does not value trained intelligence is doomed.
"Not all your heroism, not all your social charm, not all
your wit, not
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your wit, not all your victories at sea, can move back
the finger of fate.
"Today, we maintain ourselves. Tomorrow, science will
have moved forward yet one more step, and there will be no
appeal from the judgment which then will be pronounced on
the uneducated."
Appendix C gives details of the findings, which are that
the U.S. is today second to none in educational assets but
is being challenged by a Soviet style of education which
guarantees us a competition we can be sure to win only
through work expanded.
10. No issue can produce more difference of mind than
an attempt to form agreement on intent behind the use of
words. The natural character of language is such that words
can be -- and are -- used to inform or to deceive.
The fourth study here listed is entitled, "Language as a
Communist Weapon", the record of a consultation with Dr.
Stefan Possony of Georgetown University held by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities, March 2, 1959. (Tab D)
This hearing has two values above all. First, it brings
together historical matters of fact concerning policies adop-
ted and applied in Soviet philosophy toward language. As to
this, it must be remembered that in the Soviet view of life
nothing is spared from duty to the aim of the state.
For the soldier, it is his life. For the civilian, it is
his labor. Soviet art, literature, science and thought, are
all regarded as properties in the war for the world.
Second, this consultation attempts to read motive behind
variations of Soviet words as used parallel with variations
in Soviet conduct over a time scale closely corresponding
with the periods reviewed in the other three fields of inquiry
by Congress above mentioned.
Thus, it is possible for any Student of Soviet word use and
Soviet policy action, to discover the law of language effective
therein. The first twenty-two pages of the Possony consultation
are best for this purpose. Appendix D offers selected passages
from these twenty-two pages to illustrate the Soviet theory and
practice in the
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practice in. the use of words as weapons.
SUMMARY: Four specialized examinations of the United States
compared to the Soviet Union today and measuring for ten years
ahead, come together in. agreement that each nation. rivals the
other on. an. all-out test of power and the fate of the world is
at stake, therein..
The United States, having already arrived at a point of
superior education., productivity and enjoyment, is to the Soviet
Union. a hindrance that must go. It has a plan. to this end and
the plan. must be taken. as seriously capable of becoming the
fact in. control of our future.
Our problem is not lack of power but the ancient one --
where to go from the present top? And as to this, can we go it
alone, up or down.? So far, the burden. of this paper has been. to
reflect the propositions on. which the Congress must make some
decisions of importance and the information given. with which to
help it decide.
Here following will be the writer's own. attempt to define
the ideas which underlie the action. -- whatever it may be --
of each body of power, the Soviet Union. and the United States.
The Soviet idea is easy to describe, for it is the product
of a rigid and formal set of declarations in principle.
Declaration. 1. -- All forms of government which are non-
Soviet are by their simple existence bad and are not to be
endured.
Declaration. 2. -- The Soviet form is not safe until all
competing forms -- and the people who maintain, them -- are dead.
Declaration. 3. -- Under the Soviet form, all of human. life
and all of property belong to the state as its weapons.
Declaration.4. -- The state, applying a test of 'scientific
socialism' can. organize life and property with superior knowledge
and skill. Therefore, the state must not accept competition
within.-the Soviet form any more than. it will from without.
The key to
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The key to operation. for the Soviet form of life is organiza-
tion.. Only the state shall decide what organization. is, just as
organ.ization.is always a property, itself, of the state. The
result in. action. is that no matter who happens to hold office of
authority at any one time, the Soviet state must be -- unless it
is without rivals, anywhere -- a state consumed with fear, sus-
picion, and threat.
All power is in. the hands of the state. It alone decides.
It, therefore, cannot admit error, shortcoming and ordinary human
failure of knowledge, judgment or will.
At the philosophic center of the Soviet idea is a concept
called 'monism', to indicate that mind, matter and all things
W whatsoever have one and only one definable nature.
The Soviet idea, being 'monistic', produces in. the people
who follow it a compulsion. to class acts as totally right or
totally wrong, to believe an.in.fallible, eternal verdict of cor-
rect handling is available for human beings to apply in. human.
situations.
Such an. idea in control of a people vigorous, ambitious and
endowed with great natural resources of person. and property, can.
have influence. The U.S.S.R., illustrates that the Soviet idea
of scientific socialism must be met, if we choose not to submit,
with more than, simple hope that it will go away.
What, then, is the American. idea? The Soviet idea is dis-
covered by plain. examination. of what the idea's supporters say
it is and supported in. action. by what they do. The Soviet idea
speaks with one tongue and acts with one body, the force of
government, which undertakes to know all, own. all and be all.
The American. idea is less one of declared words, we like to
think, and more one of obvious results in works.
This may be a habit of modesty, but in fact we do live by
declared principles, visible to all and worth mention..
First, the state of government here is well defined in words.
These words insure that power in. the state is at all times
limited. Holders of authority are kept, by the very terms of
that authority, unsure of how far they may go.
Neither judges,
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Neither judges, legislators nor executives, are certain of
continuing supremacy. Nor is government itself, in any shape
or domain, final in judgment on every point at issue. There
is always a way to peaceful change, it being the sense of our
people that of all the laws in life, change is the only one
that is sure.
We allow for change. And to protect the need for change, we
use government more as a way of finding agreement among our-
selves about what change is next, rather than accept government
as a decision-maker for us.
Such a basic approach to life is, in the terms of philo-
sophy, "pluralistic," as against the Soviet philosophy, "mon-
istic." The pluralistic view allows for the chance that mind
and matter may not really be only one thing. It allows room
for discovery -- both of error and of truth -- as we go along.
The Soviet authorities hold that they mist win the world
because they are infallibly right in their estimate of truth.
But they also hold it their central duty to win the world as
fast as they can and by any necessary means. This is their
authority to themselves for all they do.
Are we to decide that since we hold the Soviet idea bad
by our test it is sure to fail?
To say that a bad idea can be trusted to fail just because
it is bad, is to ignore both the American idea and not, only the
American but the totality of experience.
The world is confronted with the idea of a way without room
for error -- organization. There is another idea with room for
error and for change -- freedom.
The conflict between freedom and organization is as old as
human society. It is the difference between the two that organ-
ization seeks to settle everything, once and for all. Freedom
leaves room for one more chance.
It is the mission of our time that the American idea apply
itself to providing the world that one more chance.
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Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies.
From Proceedings of Joint Economic Committee,
86th Congress, 1st. Session, Pursuant to
Sec. 5 (a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress - Nov. 13-20,
1959.
Allen W. Dulles., Director of Central Intelligence, the opening wit-
ness, with. overall estimate of U.S.-Soviet matters. (Pages 2-11 of
Hearings.)
SOVIET.ECON014IC AIMS: "...in the Central Intelligence Agency...we
have a great mass of evidence to weigh. We try to do it without
prejudice... a great deal depends upon the particular sector of the
Soviet economy that is under study.
"The Soviet Union. is extremely proficient in certain areas, es-
pecially in the scientific and technological fields related to its
military effort...
"Some recent returning visitors to the Soviet Union remarked with
surprise that they can send a Lunik to the moon, but don't bother to
make the plumbing work. This is a crude comparison but does help to
illustrate where Soviet priorities lie.
"The lag I have mentioned does not reflect Soviet inability to do
these particular things. It does evidence a definite decision to
defer them to the higher priority objectives of industrial and mili-
tary power...it is a country of concentration -- concentration on
those aspects of production and of economic development which the
Soviet leaders feel will enhance their power position in the world...
they assign a low priority to those endeavors which would lead to a
fuller life for their people."
SOVIET ECONOMIC ABILITIES: "...Once they have determined upon a high
priority project -- and they have fewer echelons of decisions to sur-
mount than we before the final go-ahead is given -- they are able to
divert to this project the needed complement of the ablest technicians
in the USSR which the particular task demands. They can. also quickly
allocate the necessary laboratory or factory space and manpower re-
quired...
"...They do not work on as many competing designs as we. But in
many of the technical and military fields the leadtime from the draw-
ing board to the finished product is less with them than with us...
"...The conclusion is
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"...The conclusion is inescapable that Soviet economy has surged
forward very rapidly indeed... the statement, frequently made, that
much of postwar Soviet growth came from looting plants in Manchuria
and East Germany, does not stand up if closely examined...
"...Espionage and the reliance on outside experts, particularly
German, is also alleged to have been of crucial importance to Soviet
industrial successes since World War II...but looked at in the per-
spective of Soviet industrial military growth as a whole, and their
present competence in both the ballistic and nuclear fields, these
factors played a relatively minor role..."
TH$ SOVIET OUTLOOK: "...The seven-year plan (1959-1965)...is a
reasonable blueprint of attainable growth. Experience teaches us
that Soviet industrial plans should be taken seriously.
"With respect to their intentions, the Soviet leaders have left
no doubt. The obsession with overtaking the U.S. economy in the
shortest possible historical time was the dominant theme of the 21st
Party Congress last February. It continues to be so...
"The USSR, is now in the opening stages of the seven-year plan,
which... establishes the formidable task of increasing industrial
output by eighty percent over seven years. The achievement of this
goal will narrow the present gap between Soviet and U.S. industrial
output. This would be particularly true in the basic raw materials
and producers' goods fields.
"In our judgement, these goals can be met, with certain exceptions.
" ..The magnitude of the investment program in the seven-year plan,
the plan that runs through 1965, is impressive, by any standard...
under such forced-draft feeding, the Soviet industrial plant should
grow at a rapid rate.
"...On the other hand, we see no prospect that the agricultural
goals of the seven-year plan will be approached.
"Apart from the problem of agricultural growth ... the Soviet-will
be forced to cope with certain foreseeable difficulties...more likely
to place a ceiling on the Kremlin's ambitions for over-fulfillment
than to threaten the success of the plan itself...
"...First, due to the war years, there is an obvious gap between
the 1958-1965 increase in the number of persons in the working age
group (15 to 69)
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group (15 to 69) and the labor-force increment necessary to meet
the planned goals...
"...second, the metallurgical raw material and the energy indus-
tries ... must now be brought into balance.
"...a third limiting factor...will be the need for a vastly in-
creased housing program...
"...fourth, the regime faces a complexity of problems in its
attempt to increase its automation and mechanization programs.
"...Finally, the Soviet leadership will have difficult decisions
vfto~ to reach in dealing with the popular demand for more consumer goods...
"Those are the limiting factors on achievement of their program."
SUk4MARY ESTIMATE :
"The Communists are not about to inherit the world economically.
But...we should frankly face up to the sobering implications...and
the striking progress...
"The fulfillment of the present seven-year plan is a major goal
of Soviet policy... the present indications are that Krushchev desires
a period of 'co-existence' in which to reach the objectives of this
plan.
"Future economic gains will also provide the goods and the ser-
vices needed to further expand Soviet military power... also permit
'`/ the Soviet to further assist in the rapid economic growth of the
Kremlin's eastern ally, Communist China...
"If the Soviet industrial growth rate persists... as is forecast...
the gap between our two economies by 1970 will be dangerously narrow-
ed unless our. own industrial growth rate is substantially increased...
"The major thrust of Soviet economic development and its high
techneiogical..skills and resources are directed toward specialized
industrial, military and national power. goals. A major thrust of our
economy is directed into the production of the consumer-type goods
which add little to the sinews of our national strength...
"The uses to which economic resources are directed largely deter-
mina the measure of national power."
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Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies,
From Proceedings of the Joint Economic Committee, 86th
Congress, 2nd Session, Pursuant to Sec. 5 (a) of Public
Law 304, 79th Congress.
Extracts from Vols. I, II and III, of papers submitted by Panelists
before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics:
1. Hans Heymann, Jr., Economics Division, The Rand Corporation,
Problems of Soviet-United States Comparisons. (Pages 1-12,
Vol. I of Panel papers):
"There seems to be a tendency... to focus all our attention
on the relative levels of output-we worry much about the
rapidity of Soviet growth, but rarely inquire into its re-
levance... Do such gains represent a significant improvement
of the Soviet power.. .or is it merely a matter of our being
out-pointed in some meaningless parlor game devised in the
Kremlin?
"The answer-is not entirely clear cut...Economic growth
represents a potential power asset; but... further decisions
are required about how the added resources are to be allocated.
In the Soviet case ...it is not difficult to imagine the dir-
ection in which. . .these.. .will go.
"...It is not the sudden tipping of the scales, but the
steady and progressive dimunition of the U.S. lead that
would tend to be most demoralizing...
"Moreover, such rapid Soviet progress would exercise
fascination and appeal in the vast parts of the world where
speedy economic development has become virtually a prere-
quisite to political survival...
"...A superior U.S. production does not automatically de-
note superior U.S. national power, nor does the political
impact of Soviet resources depend on its achieving parity of
output with us. For both countries, it is the effectiveness
of the actual performance that counts and this must be measur-
ed in the multi-dimensional framework of a society's will and
skill in applying its resources to its national tastes."
2. Robert W. Campbell, Department of Economics, U. of So. Calif:
(Pages 13-30):
"...The past decade
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"...The past decade and a half of research has greatly
increased the amount of solid evidence we possess... at the same
time it has also added greatly to the sophistication of econom-
ists concerning the pitfalls that await those who seek to
appraise the relative performance of two economies so different
"...What is peculiar to Soviet statistical practice... is
the great premium which the Russians place on the propaganda
use of economic indicators...
"...Finally it frequently happens that the concepts relevant
to some comparison in which we are vitally interested are not
well enough defined to be embodied very satisfactorily in
actual statistical data in either country...For example...the
relative efforts...in science and research...
"In the United States this...has been labelled research
and development... the Russians call this activity science...
"Uncertainty in any comparison... therefore, is not so much
due to the fact that the specific content of the respective
ruble and dollar amounts differs, as to the fact that neither
of these amounts measures very exactly just what we would like
to measure.
"...Those who make use of the comparative studies...must
know that such problems exist, that they cannot always be
settled completely satisfactorily and that comparisons... are
always subject to some qualification...
"The Russians are truly compulsive in making comparisons of
their economy with ours and in the process they turn all the
ambiguities above discussed to good account in exaggerating
their achievements relative to ours-all these misinterpre-
tations can, of course, also be employed by those who would
underemphasize Soviet economic performance.
"...We should take pains to point out the errors...and...
avoid the dangers of accepting misleading evaluations of Soviet
economic performance from either end of the spectrum."
3. Populations and Labor Force, by John F. Kantner, Foreign Man-
power Research Office, U.S. Bureau of the Census (Pages 31-93):
"...The manpower
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"...The manpower demands of the current Soviet seven-year
plan (1959-1965) are even greater than those of the defunct
plan 6. At the same time, the estimated net additions to
the overall labor supply are approaching a nadir. How are
the Soviets to make ends meet?.. .Making up the residual,
therefore, would be housewives, domestics, persons in various
lines of private employment and the unemployed, including
youths who have completed seven-year or ten-year school and
are looking for work for the first time...
"There is little doubt that, for the short run at least,
the 'reforms' will augment the flaw to the labor force through
a pruning back of enrollment at all levels beyond the first
eight years of schooling...
"...The twelve million additional workers which the Soviet
Union needs...are largely non-agricultural...However ... the
recruitment of labor from rural areas is not going to be an
easy solution...
"...To achieve the ends of a plan for economic expansion,
labor of the right kind must not only be found but also
directed to its proper destination... to meet its manpower
objectives the Soviet Union must not only release labor for
transfer within the economy but must also develop more eff-
icient ways of transfering it...
"...There is ample evidence that after a long period of
treating labor as an abundant resource, the Soviet Union
must now cope with an acute shortage... it must not be over-
looked that, as in the past, the USSR may employ more direct,
more forceful measures to assure the necessary labor input...
Finally, there is the alternative of general retrenchment and
revision of economic objectives.
"...The Soviet Union is already looking beyond the end of
the present seven-year plan to 1975...The most significant deter-
minent of the future rate of growth... is the trend in fertility
...Soviet mortality rates are relatively low and can be expected
to improve...
"...Putting all the fragments together there seems some
basis of expecting a continuation of the decline in fertility
which appears to have set in already among the higher birth
orders.
"With a slight rise
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"With a slight rise in the death rate and some decline
in fertility, the natural increase rate of the Soviet Union
could easily fall below that of the United States at the
present time.
4. The Labor Force, Warren W. Eason, Princeton University (Pages
73-93):
"...The implication of the declining rate of increase in
the labor force, as already pointed out, is a decided pressure
on Soviet planners and administrators to use manpower more
effectively... If we characterize Soviet... policies... as em-
bodying-the "carrot" and the "stick".... recent evidence
indicates a shift in the direction of the "carrot", although
the change is not in all aspects of policy uniform...
"...There are many aspects of the Soviet system ...many
,people feel at variance with economic efficiency, let alone
human welfare. On the other hand, the basic problems... and
the kinds of solutions required in the area of manpower re-
sources are substantially similar wherever found. Soviet
leadership... has shown increasing willingness...to make a
practical compromise."
5. Warren G. Nutter, U. of Va., Structure and Growth of Soviet
Industry; A comparison with the U.S. (Pages 95-120):
"...As one looks to the immediate future - the next five
years, say - it seems reasonably certain that industrial
growth will proceed more rapidly in the Soviet Union than in
the United States, in the absence of radical institutional
changes in either country...
"...It is more doubtful that industrial. growth in the
Soviet Union will be faster than in rapidly expanding Western
economies, such as Western Germany, France and Japan.
"...One foreboding economic symptom is the slackening speed
at which resource productivity has been growing in American
industry. Incentives are being strangled and nothing is being
put in their place to drive the machinery of growth.
"There is in fact only one thing to put in their place: the
whiplash. The Soviet system has made clever use of both knout
and honey, and the latter has been rapidly supplanting the
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former. If this evolution continues, the balance of economic
growth will surely tip further in Russia's favor, since - for-
tunately, from the broader point of view - the West does not
intend to take the whip in hand".
6. John P. Hardt, Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research,
Inc. Industrial Investment in the USSR (Pages 121-141):
"Tempo - the high rate of industrial growth - motivate Soviet
economic society.. .but the Soviets have net sought growth for
its own sake... Primarily, the attainment of the maximum growth
in certain preferred industrial sectors is sought in order to
maximize national power, both political-military power and
economic power on an expanding industrial base... It is our
view that serious retarding in industrial growth will not
result from changes in their industrial investment policy in
the current plan period...
"The administrative changes in industrial investment planning
under the Krushchev aegis would seem to contribute (through the
use of optimum tautness and maximum incentive in planning) to
efficiency of capital utilization.. .Perhaps as important... is
the evidence of willingness to continue to make changes...
"On balance, the revisions in the Stalinist formula made
under Nikita Krushchev would appear to increase rather than
decrease the effectiveness of capital utilization for indus-
trial expansion... Moreover, with no dramatic increase in the
U.S. industrial growth rate, the Soviet levels will continue
to draw significantly closer to equivalence with U.S. levels
of industrial production."
7. David Granick, Carnegie Institute of Techr:ology; Soviet-American
Management comparisons (Pages 143-150):
"Both American and Russian industrial managements have
displayed a high level of competence and ingenuity....Many of
the problems of industrial management are similar... often the
Soviet managerial solutions is also similar to the American...
"...There is a considerably higher proportion of college
graduates among Soviet than among Americana managers... The Soviet
manager is much less likely than is the terican to have received
any formal training in human relations...
"Well trained, well disciplined, politic ally conscious and
active, the Red
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active, the Red executive seems a figure permanently established
in the seats of the mighty. There is no justification for
picturing him as a man in conflict with the Communist party.
Rather, the industrial manager and the party secretary are old
classmates, neighbors and colleagues, seeing the world from the
same point of view... Both are men well established in the second
most powerful country in the world with enormous personal stakes
in world stability and in peace.. .Their attitude toward world
revolution and other threats to peace must inevitably bear the
imprint of this knowledge."
8. Herbert S. Levine, Russian Research Center, Harvard University
and University of Pennsylvania, The Centralized Planning of
Supply in Soviet Industry (Pages 151-175):
"The general nature of Soviet planning can perhaps be
best described as a combination of the central planning of
aggregate categories with the successive setting of details
down through the planning hierarchy and the application of
constant pressure, from the center to tighten production
methods and to economize materials. This is not a picture
of finely calculated balances, but of a combination whose
aim is to contribute to economic growth."
9. Ernest W. Williams, Jr. Columbia University, Some Aspects of
the Structure and Growth of Soviet Transportation (Pages 177-
187):
"The adjustment of the Soviet transportation system in
reasonable accord with the broad Soviet development objectives
has produced a transportation system vastly different from
our own...the Soviet system nevertheless displays great
strength and must be judged in the light of its capacity for
meeting requirements as generated by Soviet economic policy."
10. Holland Hunter, Haverford College, Soviet Transportation Policies
-- A Current View, (Pages 189-200):
"The Soviet approach to each problem has been distinctively
different from what we are used to. . .Expand transportation only
to the minimum extent necessary for building national power...
Policy with respect to...additional capacity seems likely to
remain stringent.
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remain stringent. Enough will be provided to avert bottle-
necks - little more... the transport sector can supply net funds
for growth of the Soviet economy."
11. D. Gale Johnson and Arcadius Kahan, U. of Chicago, Soviet
Agriculture: Structure and Growth, (Pages 201-238):
"Before attempting to evaluate the possibilities of the
Soviet Union eventually overtaking the United States in per
capita output of meat and milk, we shall present certain in-
formation on the long-run relations between the meat and milk
output of the two nations. What many people forget and what
Krushchev certainly fails to remind us, is that Russia, prior
to the revolution, was a major live-stock producing nation
second only to the United States. If output on comparable
territory is used for comparison, the output of meat in 1958
for the Soviet Union was a smaller percentage of the 1958
United States meat output than in 1913.
"In 1913, -on present territory, meat output in the Soviet
Union was 58.1 percent of the United States level; in 1958,
48.0 percent. Actually, the present level of Soviet output
compares to ours at a lower level than that. achieved by the
millions of peasant farms in 1928. It was not until 1952
that the absolute level of meat output reached the 1928 output.
"With respect to milk output, we are somewhat less certain
concerning the long-term relationship between the two countries
..Roughly speaking, it would appear that the Soviet Union by
1958, had roughly regained the same position relative to the
United States that existed in 1913...
"The major question concerning the feasibility of achieving
either the objectives of the 1965 plan or of catching up with
the United States in per capita production is that of the food
supply. While the labor inputs in lines with production are
fantastically high compared to the United States, it is probably
safe to assume that over a period of a decade that sufficient labor
savings could be achieved to permit the production of the re-
quired output...
"There is admittedly a great deal of conjecture and specu-
lation in the above appraisal of the possibility of the USSR
overtaking the United States.. .but even when fairly startling
increases in yields are assumed, there remains a considerably
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short fall in the available food supply...
"There can be no question that the growth of agricultural
output in the Soviet Union has been at a rather rapid rate in
recent years. The increases... generally fall substantially
short of the increases that would have been required for the
period 1956-60 if the agricultural goals of the sixth five-year
plan were to be achieved.
"In the past there has been little correspondence between agri-
cultural goals and achievement... catching up with the U.S. program
have not and will not be met on schedule, if at all..."
12. Nancy Nimitz, Rand Corporation, Soviet Agricultural Prices and
costs, (Pages 239-284):
"The argument of this paper is that the disparity between prices
and costs has been the chief constraint on Soviet agricultural
performance, that price increases over the last five years have
almost eliminated this disparity, and that improved incentives
and attendant institutional changes have much increased Soviet
agricultural potential...
"Besides greatly improving the size, structure and stability of
farm income, price reforms since 1953 have made possible two major
institutional changes which promise cost reduction. One is the sale
of MTS (Machine Tractor Station) machinery to collective farms.
After abandoning the pretense that farms could produce at a loss
and make it up by volume, the state had no reason to preserve an
instrument designed primarily for extortion... Cost accounting is
the other major change made possible by price increases. By
providing farm management with a criterion of efficiency hitherto
lacking, it removes the last important handicap on collective pro-
duction.
"Cost reduction on collective farms will not follow automatically
from these two innovations. But they are certainly indispensable
conditions for it."
13. Lazar Volin, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture, Agricultural Policy of the Soviet Union (Pages 285-318):
"Agricultural policy has been a prominent question in the Soviet
Union as it was in Czarist Russia. It has emerged at every critical
junction in the history of the country. The recent transition
from the Stalin to the Krushchev regime has been no exception.
"Agriculture,
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"Agriculture, with close to half the people depending on it for
a livelihood, continued to be a more important sector of Soviet
national economy than it is in the more industrialized countries
of the West -- and this despite the industrial growth of the Soviet
Union...
"...The principal objective of the Soviet government has been
expansion of agricultural production. A sharp upsurge ...has be-
come ... extremely urgent for the post-Stalin regime, which cannot
afford to proceed at Stalin's pedestrian pace.
"...Climate is more of a limiting factor ...in the Soviet Union
than in the United States. More important is the fact that other
basic and closely related objectives... clashed with expansion...
collectivization...and (b) the acquisition by the Soviet state at
a low cost to itself of large quantities of farm products, which
left little incentive to the collectivized peasantry...
"...The impossibility of public criticism of a policy, once
it has been officially adopted, and often, inadequate critical
discusions before it is adopted -- coupled with reliance on
pseudo-science of the Lysenko type which promises spectacular
"pie in the sky" -- make prevention or correction of such mistakes
more difficult...
"The efforts of the Krushchev regime to remedy weakness on
the agricultural front is being done without deviation from the
basic principles of agrarian collectivism...
"Although there has been no decollectivization recently in the
Soviet Union such as took place, for instance, in Poland and Yugo-
slvaia, limited concessions were made to peasants within the
framework of Soviet agrarian collectivism...,
"In general, Soviet policy toward peasants has always consisted
of a combination of force, indoctrination and economic incentive
but the proportion varied from time to time. During the Stalin
regime, force predominated. After Stalin, Soviet policy shifted
to a greater emphasis on economic incentives...
"The changes ... have had, for the most part, a beneficial effect
on production. But some aspects, such as the persistent predilection
for farm gigantism and corn expansion on so large a scale, seem
questionable. In the long run, even the program of expansion on the
new lands in the eastern region may more unsound under the cli-
mactic conditions prevailing...
"Experience
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"Experience indicates that the Soviet system of centrally
planned collective agriculture has been generally more successful
in increasing acreage than in improvement of yields...
"Control of farm surpluses and other aspects of farm relief...
have been the principal concern of U.S. policy. The Soviet Union,
on the other hand, has long been bedeviled by agricultural under-
production and agricultural overpopulation..."
14. Lynn Turgeon, lfofstra College, Levels of Living, wages and prices
in the Soviet and United States Economies (Pages 319-340)-
"...Each year a potential develops for raising levels of
living in the Soviet Union. The two principal factors... are
the increase in the labor force employed in food processing and
so-called light industries, generally and, compared with this,
the increases in output per worker in these branches...
"Taking population growth into account, it would seem that the
potential per capita increases in consumption might be running
around five per cent annually...
"...Between 1947 and 1954 the Soviet government pursued a
somewhat unorthodox policy... distributing the annual gains to
consumers. The average annual increase in money wages amounted
to little over two percent per annum, but substantial additional
benefits were provided to all consumers as a result of annual
price reductions of considerable magnitude... Since 1955, there seems
to have been a definite change... selective corrections of existing
wage and income inequities have been effected. The price level
has been virtually stable... .cuts have been insignificant ... increases
in money wages since 1955 have been somewhat greater ... the great
improvement in old age pensions meant approximately a doubling
of pensions of all types between 1955 and 1958...
"The meaningfulness of relative retail prices for Soviet and
United States consumer goods and services can be ascertained...
in terms of the rubles and dollars available... in the respective
household budgets...
" ..Our findings are that for every dollar the U.S. subsistence
family has available for food, clothing, consumer durables, per-
sonal care and recreation, the Soviet counterpart has 4J rubles;
for every dollar the average American family has, the average
Soviet family has 6.2 rubles...the gap between subsistence and
average income
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average income levels as far as the purchase of these day to
day items, is greater in the Soviet Union than in the United
States.
"The average Soviet family's net disposable income is about
2.1 times that of the subsistence family; the average American
family's disposable income is only 1.6 times that of the family
at the poverty level. On the other hand, the consumption of
housing, medical and dental services, and transportation is more
egalitarian in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States...
"It seems clear that... practically all consumer goods and
services are higher for Russians than they are for Americans.
"In the United States we most frequently have a situation...
where sellers are ever searching for potential buyers; in the
Soviet Union the reverse situation prevails chronically...
"...We might estimate that Soviet per capita consumption of food
might be slightly more than half of our own. On the other hand,
Soviet per capita consumption of clothing might be somewhat less
than half of our own. But the big advantage that American consum-
ers have over their Soviet counterparts must surely be found in
the area of durable consumer goods and services.
"In terms of food and clothing the Soviets stand the best
chance of overtaking our level of living. As consumers, we tend
to have reached something of a plateau with respect to our con-
sumption of food ...we tend to have substituted the automobile and
travel for additional food and clothing.
"...It also seems clear that lack of effective demand should
never be a retarding factor in raising the Soviet level of living;
as it sometimes is in our own economy ... the principal-problem...
has been one of restraining effective demand...Furthermore, the
Soviet government... can virtually guarantee a continuation ... if
it so chooses.
15. Benjamin A. Javits, President, United Shareholders. of America, A
Comparison of Incentive in the Economic Systems of the United States
and Soviet Russia (Pages 341-347):
"...Basic differences in the ideologies...make strict parallel
comparison unfeasible...
"...In the Soviet Union wages are, for the most part, based on
a piece-work basis.. .As the worker exceeds his quota, the incentive
system sets up a rising scale to compensate him for increased pro-
duction... In the United States the wage scale is more on a stun-m
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system with piece-work prominent in. on.ly a few major industries...
"Another major incentive of both systems is the bonus. In, many
cases the bonus will make up the larger amount of a Russian. worker's
annual wages. As in. the United States it is paid out of profits...
gauged by its reflection. in. the Government income figures. In. the
United States, of course, corporate profit dictates the size of
its bonus...
...The managerial class of industry in. both countries presents
another broad phase of this subject.
"In. the United States, the salary increase along with the bonus,
has become one of the main. institutions of business ...
"...On.e of the greatest forms of Soviet incentive is to be found
in. the almost lavish rewards held out to technical people... Aca-
demic accomplishment is one of the outstanding efforts of the Soviet
government. ...In the United States this in.cen.tiveis not so profound.
"I don.'t think we have to look any further than. our newspapers
for the proof that great incentives to scientists by the Soviet
system have been. successful.
"Earlier, I referred to a'religious' incentive in the Soviet
system. This has taken. many years to accomplish but now it functions
as an. integral and vital part of their economy...
"...A joint status and economy incentive shared...is the expense
account. This is a surprising demonstration. of a capitalistic
machine at work in. the Soviet Union....
"In the Soviet, the incentive of advance has been. difficult...
There is simply not enough leeway for the average Russian. worker
to advance. Of course, a few do get through, but the degree of
affluence in. Russia is minuscule compared to that found here.
Political implications play an. important part in. the Russian. scheme...
there exists at the top a small stratum filled by the families of
government luminaries and top managerial and technical personnel.
The arts contribute their share as well.
"There is one incentive that is paradoxical insofar as it
shows a relaxation of the State incen.tive...by the Soviet, and a
continued experimentation by the United States.. .the highly pub-
licized incentive to agriculture offered by the United States
at its expense for the private gain of the farmer...this area of
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the Soviet economy is about the only one in. which a free market can
be found. After having sold the required crop to the Government,
the members of the collectives are permitted to market the excess
to the public on. a supply and demand basis...
"...The great American. incentive of capital investment by the
individual is simply unheard of in. Russia... Regardless of what posi-
tion he holds, the American. can.in.vest his savings in. whatever
direction. his interests may dictate...
"In. summation., the incentive systems ... alike in many instances,
aim toward different philosophies. In. Russia we see that control of
many by the few has been. the goal. Coercion., rather than freedom,
is the underlying instrument of growth. Wages, security, recognition.
-- all are given. by the State for the State.. In. the United States,
the regards are'geared to the individual for the individual..."
16. Joseph S. Berliner, Syracuse University, Managerial Incentives and
Decision.-making: A Comparison of the United States and the Soviet
Union,, (Pages 349-375):
"The rewards...are such that...the best young people in. the
USSR turn. to careers in-heavy industry, science and higher educa-
tion, whereas in. the United States.. .the best talent flows into...
heavy or light (consumer goods) industry, finance, commerce and
trade, law, medicine, etc. Higher education., particularly tech-
nical, is more of a prerequisite for...a top business career in
the Soviet Union. than. in. the United States...
"The principal managerial incentive in Soviet industry is the
bonus paid for overfulfillment of plan. targets. The incentives
system is successful in. the sense that it elicits a high level of
marginal effort and performance. But it has the unintended conse-
quence of causing managers to engage in a wide variety of practices
that are contrary to the intents of the State...
"In. those aspects of economic life in. which the U.S. economy ap-
proximates the operating conditions of the Soviet economy, American,
managers develop forms of behavior similar to those of Soviet managers.
"The separation. of management and ownership characteristic of the
modern. corporation. leads to conflicts of interest.. .similar to those
of the Soviet manager striving to defend his interests against those
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"The spread of legislation constricting the freedom of operation
of the American firm leads to the evasion of laws and regulations
characteristic of the Soviet economy, though on a larger scale, there.
."Finally, under wartime conditions, the burgeoning of Government
controls are the dominant role of the Government as customer alters
the operating conditions of the U.S. economy in such ways that it
closely approximates some of the normal conditions of the Soviet
economy...
"...Both nations lose part of the potential pool of managerial
talent, the USSR because of its large rural population, the
United States because of financial burdens and racial and sex
discrimination...
11...The difference in the economic and social position of the
scientist and teacher in the two countries is of fundamental im-
portance in the matter of career recruitment..."
"...The moving force of our economic system is the pursuit of
private gain...the Soviets have at various times experimented
with other forms of incentive.. .but. . ,private gain has for the
last 25 years been the keystone of the managerial incentive system...
according to the eminent labor economist, E. Manevich, it will not
disappear until the day of general overabundance arrives, until
the differences between city and country are eliminated and until
the differences between mental and manual labor are eliminated...
We are safe in saying that for the next several decades at least,
private gain will be the central economic incentive in both
systems...
Summarizing,. industry in the United States has to compete with
a wide variety of other branching economic activity... in the USSR,
the values and rewards are concentrated in relatively fewer fields...
"...Heavy industry, science and higher education attract, by
and large,.a better and more competent crop of young people in the
USSR than in the United States... Sales, advertising, finance, trade
and commerce,?light industry, and law attract a much more competent
group of.people in the United States in the USSR...It is but another
way of saying each society gets what it pays for."
17. Morris Bornstein, University of Michigan, A Comparison of Soviet
and United States National Product, (Pages 377-395):
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"...Of all the respects in which the economies of these two
countries may be compared, national product comparisons probably
provide the broadest, most comprehensive view, because they em-
brace, for each country, the net output of all goods and services
produced during the specified period...
"Although in 1955 the USSR had a national product less than half
that of the United States the USSR had an approximately equal
defense effort and a level of investment about three-fifths that
of the United States. In contrast, per capita consumption in the
USSR was only about one fourth that in the United States...
"...Since 1950 Soviet national product has been growing at
approximately twice the U.S. rate...These rates apparently re-
present a continuation of differential trends. . .in the last three
decades... Primary among the factors responsible are the rate and
composition of Soviet investment. Not only have the rates of
Soviet gross and net investment been high but, moreover, Soviet
investment has been directed mainly toward heavy industry rather
than toward consumers' goods industry, agriculture, housing and
consumer services...
"...One consequence of the higher Soviet rate, of course, would
be an increase in the size of Soviet national product relative to
that of the United States...
"...Such an increase... need not in itself be considered alarm-
ing. More important is the significance of a rapid rate of econ-
omic growth for the world position of the USSR...the consequences
of this enhanced Soviet position will be of great importance to
the United States and the rest of the free world."
18. Francis M. Boddy, University of Michigan, National Income and Pro-
duct of the USSR, Recent trends and prospects, (Pages 397-401):
"...The seven-year plan calls for total capital investments in
the national economy in 1959-1965 of 1,940 to 1,970 billion rubles
an increase of 81 to 84 percent over the investment total for 1952-
58 of 1,072 billion rubles...
"...Even a scaling down.. .will leave possible growth rates that
make it possible for the Soviet income and product to approach the
levels of those of the United States in the not too distant future
if our growth rates of the recent past are not substantially increas-
ed."
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19. Robert Loring Allen, University of Oregon, An Interpretation
of East-West Trade (Pages 403-426):
"...The Sino-Soviet bloc is not a large world trader. The
countries of the free world export less than three percent of
their total exports to the bloc and acquire less than three
percent of their imports from the bloc...The largest component
of bloc foreign trade is Soviet trade...
"Between the two world wars Soviet foreign trade reflected
its policy of autarchy... only enough to insure...its economic
plans...Both exports and imports were below the 1913 czarist
levels...In 1957 and 1958 the bloc countries were parties to
240 agreements, with the Soviet Union having the most agreements...
Since 1953 bloc trade has been rising rapidly...
" ..The Soviet bloc trade is not of any great significance...
It is frequently speculated that the Soviet union now and will
increasingly possess the capability and desire to use its
influence in trade to disrupt world markets... there will un-
questionably be instances... but the general trend at this
time seems to be in normalized trade and the economic and
political benefits it confers...
"...The use of a state-trading agency by the U.S. gover-
nment...would give every advantage to the opposition... the
strength of the United States lies in...a better and different
system of trading. To adopt the oppositions methods would be
to lose before starting...
"Within the limits of the security of the United States there
is no reason why the Soviet Union should not buy what it pleases
in this country... there seems to be little advantage in con-
tinuing to hold lend least and tsarist debts against the Soviet
Union. It would seem more desirable simply to let U.S. ex-
porters decide on credit matters on the merits of each case...
Let the Soviet Union buy what it will; let Americans buy what
they will, -- all within the traditional fra ork ...
"Reliance upon the enterprise system... should be the keynote
of U.S. policy."
20. Franklyn D. Holzman, University of Washington and Russian re-
search Center, Harvard University, Some Financial Aspects of
Soviet Foreign Trade (Pages 427-443):
"Financial factors play a less important role in the Soviet
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economy than they do in the economies of western nations...
nevertheless ... will continue to have significance as long as
trade is not conducted on a strictly barter basis...
"an exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms of
another or in terms of gold, the common denominator of curr-
encies...
... an exchange rate between two currencies which (1) more
or less achieves a balance of payments without controls, and
(2) roughly reflects the price differentials between countries
of "tradeables", is an equilibrian exchange rate...
"...it is no exaggeration to any that over the past thirty
years no western nation has been as far out of line from its
equilibrium rate as the Soviet ruble exchange rate...the Soviet
exchange rate has been so far out of line and controls have
operated so successfully, that it seems flair to describe the
rate as no more than an accounting device for converting for-
eign currency prices.. .f or the purpose of constructing foreign
trade accounts in local currency...
"As a planned economy, the Soviet economy is much more in-
sulated from the impact of foreign trade than are the economies
of other nations...
"...If foreign trade has a net inflationary or deflationary
effect in the consumers' goods market, is this effect likely
to be very significant? My guess is that it is of no great
significance...
"This is not to imply that the Soviets have perfected the
science of financial planihing. Far from it...
"The Soviets are believed to be the second largest gold pro-
ducer in the world, after the Union of South Africa. The Soviets
have not however, published figures regarding either their
gold stock or gold production for at least three decades-they
may have accumulated as much as $2 billion worth of gold prior
to World War II...This would have been an impressive stock at
prewar prices.. .In its annual Bullion Review for 1955, Samuel
Montague and Co., estimated that the Soviets are now producing
10 million ounces or $350 million worth.of gold a year...they
concluded the Soviet gold stock is currently (1955) in the
neighborhood of...7 billion.
"...there is some question as to whether the mining of gold
is an economically profitable operation for the Soviets in terms
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of the imports the gold can buy...Recognition of the relatively
low purchasing power o~ gold has led no less a luminary than
Deputy Premier Mikoyan to accuse the United States of exacting
a tribute from the gold-producing nations and to call for an
increase in the price of gold...
"There is considerable doubt that any system of multi-lateral
settlement could be implemented in terms of Soviet bloc currencies
so long as they maintain exchange rates which are not mutually
realistic in terms of their respective cost-price structures."
21. Henry G. Aubrey, National Planning Association, Sino-Soviet
Activities in less Developed Countries, (Pages 445-466):
"...In the period from mid 1954 to mid 1959, assistance
granted by the Sino-Soviet bloc to twenty countries totaled
about $2.7 billion. About three-quarters of it was economic
aid...in the same five years, the United States gave the same
twenty countries about $5.3 billion of economic assistance,
more than 2? times the Communist assistance...
While this ratio appears comforting, it is questionable
whether quantities count for so much... it is desirable to
distinguish between two impact effects...the first is the
direct economic and social impact, a slow change induced over
time, often unspectacular, sometimes intangible. The second
is the impression aid makes upon the recipients' mind... direct,
immediate and politically potent.
"The U.S. development aid programs have been fashioned with
the first impact in mind. The Communists have shown themselves
much more finely attuned to the second...
"The United States, as the world's largest trading nation
could no well to recognize the trend and to lead rather than
lag on the road to better western economic collaboration with
the less developed areas."
22. Edward Vennard, Edison Electric Institute, Evaluation of Russian
threat in the field of electric power (Pages 467-487):
"There are 52 power systems in all of the USSR. Many of these
are individual plants, not interconnected with any power grid...
at some indeterminate time in the future, these. . .are to be
linked-in European Russia and... in Central Siberia to form
a single power grid.
"...In the field of engineering and construction of power
facilities,
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facilities, we believe the Russians are good. They are making
good turbines and generators. We are unable to get any figures
on the efficiency of manufacture, but the resultant product
is good. We believe the Russians are capable of building the
larger units. Also, in the fields of transformation, transmission
and dispatching, we believe the Russians to be competent. Their
research facilities are good...
"Knowing of Russia's technical and scientific ability, it
would be safe to assume that she is capable of reaching a total
of 108 billion kilowatts in power capacity by 1965...
"In the field of electric power it appears that Russian pro-
duction will be considerably behind that of America for at
least as far as we can foresee in the future...
"Many people feel that Russia is not likely to overtake us
at all unless there is a substantial change in the ground rules.
I am inclined to support this theory. I do not believe Russia
will catch up with us unless Russia adopts the incentives and
rewards of the free enterprise system, or we abandon that system."
23. Charles B. Shuman, President American Farm Bureau Federation,
An agricultural view of the Soviet Threat, (Pages 489-507):
"...the outstanding difference between American and Soviet
agriculture is the fact that our agriculture is characterized
by independent, family type units operating under a private,
competitive enterprise system, while Soviet agriculture is
characterized by collectives and state farms operating under
a centralized system of bureaucratic planning... both... have
very great natural resources for agricultural production;
however, we have some definite advantages in this area...soil
scientists report that the USSR has great soil resources and
that much of the land now under cultivation has a high natural
fertility.
"Adverse climactic conditions are the most serious natural
handicap faced by Soviet agriculture...
"From a long-run standpoint, our greatest advantage over
the Soviets in agriculture, as well as in other fields, is not
to be found in natural resources or in technology, but in the
fact that we have an incentive system while the Soviets have
a planned economy...
',..During the last few years the Soviet Union has moved
into a leading position as an exporter of grains, principally
wheat...
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wheat. . .the Soviet Union possesses the means to seriously dis-
rupt the European market, or for that matter, the world market,
whenever she so wishes -- assuming a normal harvest...
"...It is imperative that our farmers, the grain trade and the
U.S. government understand what is going on and the need to com-
pete vigorously in the European market...
"...Soviet trade policy on farm commodities is tied in to
an extent with the export policies of Communist China... It must
be noted that Red China's exports of soybeans increased from
about 700,000 metric tons in 1957 to 990,000 tons in 1958...ex-
ports will amount to about 1,350,000 tons in 1959... Production
...will continue to increase and American producers must expect
severe competition... It is also believed that the Chinese Commun-
ists have serious future export intentions for other oilseeds and
tobacco...
"On the basis of the foregoing, it obviously is extremely im-
portant that the United States be alert...we must compete on
tough, commercial terms with quality products...
"The American farmer is the most efficient producer in the
world. We can become even more efficient and we must. This means
an end to unrealistic farm price support programs and a return to
the farmer of those opportunities and incentives which permit and
induce him to produce for the market as economically as possible...
we are in a weak position either to criticize Soviet pricing pol-
icies, or to urge that other countries take countervailing action
against disrupting Soviet pricing tactics as long as we subsidize the
bulk of our agricultural exports..."
24. John Raber, Indiana Farmer's Union, Statement of Indiana Farmers
Union (Page 509):
"As an Indiana farmer traveling in Russia in July of 1958, I
had the opportunity to talk with Russian farmers, to see and
evaluate their system of agriculture as compared with our own...
"...In comparing the Russian farm economy with our system, I
have concluded the American farmer and his equipment is superior
to the Russians. But the attitude of the American farmer today is
lacking in enthusiasm and purpose and this will to succeed is dying.
The Russian, on the other hand, accepts this comparison and is ded-
icated to his task. He has confidence and is living for his future."
25. W. W. Eshelman,
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25. W. W. Eshelman, National Education. Association., Some Comparisons
Between the Soviet and the United States Economical Commitment
to Education. (Pages 511-515):
"The over-riding characteristic of the Soviet system is its
fervent dedication. to world communism and its strong belief that
communism will inevitably dominate the world....
"...We simply do not know enough about Soviet educational
finance to make anything more than intelligent guesses about this
important problem... Our scholars do not have enough help to trans-
late those works which are necessary to assess the extent and
direction. of the Soviet effort.
"...I am not happy to report that the Soviet society seems to
treat its teachers better, financially and prestige-wise than. we do...
"...It is likely that ten. years hence our schools and colleges
will require at least double their present level of financial sup-
port to handle our growing student population-
" ...Within. the context of their system and their objectives,
the Soviets may well be achieving more progress toward their ends
than. we are toward ours... Our nation is faced with internal and
external problems that will force us to do a better job of educa-
tion. than. we have done at any time in. our history."
26. Howard C. Petersen., Committee for Economic Development, Soviet
Economic Growth and United States Policy (Pages 517-527):
"The rapid growth of the Soviet economy is one of the leading
facts of our lifetime ... but just how it will affect us and how we
are to respond are, in. my opinion., far from clear or certain....
"Surely, the Russians may be expected to take pride in. their
progress and to exult if they ever succeed in.their goal of over-
hauling us in. what they view as an.econ.omic race. But it is hard
to see how the Soviet leaders could become more implacable
enemies of the Western. democracies than. they have in. the past. And
it is hard to see why their own. success should in.crdase hostility
toward us among the Russian. people...
"Our reaction. should not be one of amazement or despair... Our
reaction. should not be to attempt to match the Russian. growth
rate simply
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rate simply because the Russian rate is higher than ours. Those
suggesting such a course have not, in my opinion, even begun to
explore its implications or its costs.
"In general, there are four broad types of action we might
consider to accelerate our rate of growth.
"First, we can try to reduce involuntary unemployment of
our resources...
"Second, we can try to make our economic system work more
smoothly so as to get more real product from the resources now
going into production...
"The third possibility, then, is to increase the amount of
work done...
"Fourth, we can increase the rate of economic growth by
devoting more of our output to uses that promote growth...
"We are engaged in a competition of systems, not a competition
of growth rates. Our strategy should be to make our own system
work as well as we can, inierms of its own values. The values
that our system serves are the values that men everywhere would
choose if given the chance...
"The Russian threat is grave. . .we should be providing much
more economic development assistance to the underdeveloped
countries... additional public expenditures ... must be matched
by higher taxes...
"Our success in the continuing struggle against Communist
imperialism will be determined by our faith, determination,
willingness to sacrifice, intelligence and ingenuity. If we
fail it will not be the result of an inadequate economic base..."
27. Gerhard Colm, assisted by Joel Darmstadter, National Planning
Association, Evaluation of the Soviet Economic Threat. (Pages
529-543):
"...Soviet economic growth is a threat to the extent that it
serves as an instrument of military buildup and militant foreign
policy-the United States can, for decades, still have the
greater economic capacity. What is decisive...(is)...the extent
to which the potential is realized and the allocation which is made
to purposes
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to purposes of defense and foreign economic policy...
"...(1) Soviet claims -- past and projected -- are by no
means outlandish compared to the Western "probable" estimates.
(2) Even a declining rate of growth will, at the relatively high
levels deemed reasonable, often yield impressive increases. This
means, for example, that even with Soviet steel capacity equal
to one third that of the United States, a Soviet rate of increase
three times as high as ours, will produce annual increments to
output as high as those of the United States...
"Reviewing what the Soviets have undertaken in their "econ-
omic offensive"...Soviet bloc activities do appear as a threat
only because they must be interpreted as elements in Soviet
strategy. It.must be assumed that this strategy is still in-
fluenced by important aspects of the Marx-Leninist creed...
" ..Western strategy must be designed to meet two inter-
related challenges, namely (1) the worldwide strategy of Comm-
unism based on the conviction that all countries "must" become
Communistic... and (2) the fact that the USSR has entered the
group of great industrial nations...
"...An economic growth race per se would not contribute to
meeting the Soviet threat. There is, however, a big difference
between engaging in a 'gross national product race' and promot-
ing a rate of steady economic growth...
"Such a rate of growth, appropriate in the light of U.S. con-
ditions and objectives, would be less than the Soviet rate of
growth, but higher than the rate of growth of the U.S. economy
in recent ye ars...the Joint Economic Committee is devoting a
special study to this vital task...
"It is important for Americans to realize that our productive
resources are adequate for any requirement... the Soviets must
recognize we can stand an armaments race better than they can,
so that it becomes more prudent not to engage in it..."
28. Jay Lovestone, Director of International Publications, CIO-AFL,
Basic Distinctions Between the Soviet Economy and American Econ-
omy (Pages 547-568):
"The economy of a country is much more than a compilation and
comparison of production figures. The men and women who work in
industry, agriculture and the services are more important... the
human element
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human element is the decisive factor...
"...The conception of American capitalism expounded by Krushchev
during his recent sojourn in our country, does not correspond with
reality. In fact the very characteristics he attributes to the
American economy are inherent features of the Soviet economy...
"...In the Soviet economy, the workers are defenseless and ex-
ploited ...In the United States, economic progress is becoming more
and more associated with social progress...
"...In the USSR the State has final and complete authority over
every phase and expression of economic life and activity... there
exists a political machine with absolute power...this political
machine... the Communist party... is the residuary of all power--
economic, military, social, political, cultural, religious... Such
a society and its economy are totalitarian to their core, anti-
democratic...
"...The Soviet economy is dual in character. It is national. It
is, at the same time, Communist and, therefore, worldwide in its
overall and ultimate objectives. Given this dual character, the
aims of the Soviet economy are...to attain such economic progress
and strength as will make the Communist system serve as a magnet
and model especially for the industrially undeveloped countries
and, thereby, further hasten Moscow's conquest of the world and its
remolding on the Soviet pattern...
" ..American labor is deeply concerned because of two grave
dangers which emanate from the degraded and degrading position
which the workers occupy in-the Soviet economy... the potential
menace of the growth of Soviet production based on low pay and
poor standards, even on forced labor conditions; and the enhanced
power for aggression and war...
"...Talk about the state withering away with the 'building of
socialism' is being heard less and less in Soviet ruling circles,
these days. Instead, there is increasing talk about the state be-
coming the dominant force in determining the 'factors of ideological
and moral influence in all spheres of life'...
"...The totalitarian state economy of the USSR cannot be under-
stood or judged on the basis of the criteria applied to other econ-
omies...
to t e c es that v eawnges to b ie eovie c n yi wp ce inthinkigi in cise Alf a my
t nave ece 1 Paken
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would be very dangerous ...the total subordination of the economic
and technical experts to the professional party bureaucrats (who
owe their privileged position and very existence to Krushchev and
his machine) is not an act of genuine decentralization or liberal-
ization of the Soviet economy...
"...the last two years have been a hardening of Communist policies
toward the workers in the USSR...to cap it all, Communist party
control is being expanded and intensified on the field of labor
and economy in particular...
"...An examination of the Krushchev labor reforms ... will show
how little they mean...
"...The well-being of the American people urgently requires that
our nation step up its rate of growth...the high rate of Soviet
economic growth has also been attained in very great measure at the
expense of labor's democratic rights and by denying the Soviet
peoples freedom... American labor is for an expanding economy in
freedom ...The reserves of vital forces in our Nation and its econ-
omy are enormous. We have nowhere near topped them. We can and
must do so..."
29. Willard L. Thorp, Merrill Center for Economics, Amherst College,
Soviet Economic Growth and U.S. Policy (Pages 571-588):
"To catch up with and surpass the United States' is an incess-
ant Soviet slogan. . .In the United States there is no comparable
drive to keep ahead of Russia...
"The new seven-year plan does not suggest any major changes
from the past. Investment still is to go largely into industry
and mostly into the basic industries...
"It seems clear that both the United States and the USSR are
strong enough so that they can fully support such military require-
ments and foreign economic policies as they require. The relative
rates of economic growth are not the key elements in either of
these areas...
"What is very important is the image of each country which is
created in peoples' minds throughout the world. The great danger
is that the Soviet Union will become associated with growth which
the Western countries will be maneuvered into positions where they
seem to be more interested in security and stability...
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"Perhaps rising living standards may lead to humanizing
political and economic changes within the Soviet society... and
a less truculent attitude...
"Speculating along these lines may be of great importance to
one seeking optimistically for some ultimate basis for peaceful
coexistence, but clearly any such development is a long way
away. . .the distant hope cannot be given much weight in the
consideration of present policies."
30. W. W. Rostow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Summary and
Policy Implications (Pages 589-608):
VERDICT: "I believe I speak for virtually all the panelists... when I
say...Our dangers do not lie primarily in the size of the Soviet
economy or its overall rate of growth. Our dangers lie in a par-
ticular allocation of Soviet resources; in particular Soviet
policies; in the way we Americans now conceive of our problems
on the world scene; and consequently, in the way we allocate our
resources, human and material...
"The fate of the United States does not depend on immutable
laws of economic growth nor the curving path of index numbers;
it depends upon the actions we Americans take or fail to take;
and ultimately it comes to rest on our faith in the democratic
process..."
PEOPLE: "Soviet war losses and recent fertility rates set against the
American birth rate have yielded over the past generation a dra-
matic narrowing in the relative size of the Russian and American
populations..."
FOOD: "After a long period of notably sluggish productivity in agri-
culture, Soviet policy has moved with some success to improve
incentives and organization and to increase output of higher
grade foods ..."
FUNDS: "The rate of Soviet gross investment (about 25 percent of GNP)
is likely to persist and to remain slightly above the American rate (about 20 percent of GNP including government investment.)"
MOVEMENT: "Russia remains and is likely to remain for the next decade,
more heavily dependent than the United States on the intensive
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use of its railway net..."
ENERGY: "...Both nations are sufficiently well endowed with resources
sufficiently economical to justify only a relatively slow intro-
duction of atomic energy...technically, there appears to be
increased emphasis in the USSR on thermal rather than hydropower;
and the relation of power sources to industrial areas hAs led to
virtuosity in high voltage transmission..."
OPERATORS: "Over the past thirty years the Soviet Union has demised a
framework of education and Administration, compulsion and incen-
tives, which yield men and institutions capable of operating a
modern, rapidly growing economy..."
GOODS: "...In 1955, Soviet industrial output was not more than a
third of American, perhaps substantially less; industrial pro-
ductivity per man, certainly below one third; and GNP about
40 percent.
"Soviet industrial output is likely to increase... at about 8
percent per annum, GNP at about 6 percent.
"Assuming optimistically a rise of 4.4 percent in the rate of
increase of American GNP, the ratio of Soviet to American GNP
would rise from its figure of 43 percent in 1958 to 48 percent
in 1970, the equivalent per capita figures being 36 and 41 percent.
"A three percent U.S. growth rate would life Soviet GNP slight-
ly over 50 percent of the American figures by 1970.
"Given the differences in growth rate this would mean that the
Soviet Union would dispose for the first time of a larger annual
increment in GNP than the United States, at the end of the coming
decade."
BUTTER: "Taken all in all, a rise in the Soviet standard of living
from something like one third to about 40 percent of the American
level is to be anticipated over the next decade."
GUNS: "When corrected for all the relevant factors, Soviet military
expenditures are at about the same level as American outlays;
that is to say, the Soviet government is allocating more than
twice the proportion of GNP to military purposes than the Amer-
ican government."
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DRIVE: "Although Communist bloc foreign-aid figures in no way
measure the scale nor define the nature of the Communist threat
in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, Soviet
military and economic assistance to underdeveloped areas was
about half the level of American assistance in the period 1954-
1959. In addition, Moscow may have granted impcrtart assistance
to Communist China over these years, although it is not certain.
In 1959, some 4,700 Soviet technicians were engaged on work in
the free world, about 75 percent of the number of Americans."
MEANING: "To make sense of this broad picture, and to pose the
questions it raises for American policy, it is important to
look far back into the history of the United States and Russia...
"...This analysis would define societies as falling into
the following broad categories: the traditional society; the
pre-conditions for takeoff; the drive to technological matur-
ity; the age of mass consumption..."
USA "...American industrialization took hold seriously in the
two decades before the civil war...at about the turn of the
century, Americans developed new concepts of their status on
the world scene. . .But when the possibilities of technological
maturity had been sorted out, Americans, in effect, decided to
use their industrial machine to create a new way of life...
we have built up vast requirements for social overhead capital;
to round out the new suburbs; to reconstruct the old city
centers; and to meet the requirements for the enlarging American
population..."
USSR "...Russian industrialization took a firm grip some forty
years after the process had begun in the United States -- in,
say, the 1880's. And the Russian equivalent of the American
pre-civil war takeoff took place in the decades before the
first world war...In terms of these stages of growth, Russia
is now roughly at the level of the United States in the first
decade of the 20th century; but it comes to maturity aft- a diff-
erent, more advanced level of technology. And Russia, like
the United States and nations which have achieved tnological
maturity, confronts the question, to what larger purpose should
its mature establishment be put -- to enlarge Russian power on
the world scene, to soften the harshness of the drIve`to matur-
ity or to enlarge consumption?'
CI b$ ;
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CHOICE: "Since 1953, the Soviet Union has, to a degree, reduced the
harshness of police state rule and cut down on forced labor.
To a degree it has increased the level of consumption of the
Russian peoples. But its basic decision has been to use the
annual increments in production to maintain a very large mil-
itary establishment and to continue pressing for enlarged power
on the world scene."
CHALLENGE: "In historical terms, the challenge posed for the United
States is whether a nation which has gone beyond the age of
the automobile and suburbia, and is concerning itself with
larger families, travel, the refinement and differientation
of consumption, and the various uses of leisure can cope with
a nation now arrived at technological maturity, pressing out
on the world scene with high ambition, to see how far it can
go even'at the expense of postponing the satisfactions (and
problems) of the mass automobile and the single family house.
"In policy terms, the challenge posed for the United States
is symbolized--not defined, but symbolized-- by the fact that
a nation with less than half our GNP, living at about a third
of our standard of welfare, is spending as much on military
matters as we are; putting 75 percent as many technicians and
50 percent as much capital as we are into the non-Communist
world, quite aside from its allocations of men and credit
within the Soviet Bloc."
POWERS: "The potentials for American growth in the next decade,
would, I believe, permit us both chronic full employment
and one of those surges of growth which transcend the long
average of 3 percent per annum in GNP...
"The achievement of a high rate of growth is, however,
neither automatic nor assured; we shall have to find new ways
of handling the inflation problem, and we shall have to take
special steps to assure that the potentials for productivity
increase are, in fact, exploited...
"Our experience of the past century, and three quarters,
should convince us that the democratic process in the United
States is tough, resilient and capable of handling whatever
problems the flow of history may place on our agenda."
FORECAST: "Between now and 1970 a decisive test will take place. The
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real lesson of your panelists' papers is that there is nothing
in the structure or growth rates of the two economies that will
automatically determine the outcome of this test. The answer lies
in whether our political leadership mobilizes the evidently ample
resources that lie to hand -- resources of will, of skill, of talent,
of commitment to the American heritage, as well as goods and ser-
vices -- to do the job. II
31. Harry Schwartz, New York Times, Reflections on the Economic Race
(Pages 609-615):
"...We are on the eve of a tremendous increase in Soviet capabil-
ities of all kinds and of a vast expansion in Soviet competitive
power against us...not restricted by the Soviet Union's potentiali-
ties...It is essential to bear in mind the growing economic strength
of the total Communist bloc...
"...The free world as a whole has no more right to complacency
than does the United States alone. Moreover, it should be borne in
mind the Communist bloc as a whole has only about half as many
people as the free world...
"...Even the minimal 1965 estimates... give Communist bloc per cap-
ita 1965 production estimates substantially exceeding the actual per
capita free world figures for 1958 in the case of pig iron, steel
and cement.
"This is a useful reminder that the free world consists not only
of highly industrialized countries... but also of many undeveloped
countries... which at present contribute very little to the indus-
trial strength of the non-Communist world...
"There would seem to be in this country a substantial amount of
informed and responsible opinion which recognizes that we must meet
this challenge and this competition within the framework of our
democratic institutions.
"I take it that this recognition is, at least in part, behind
such suggestions as President Eisenhower's proposal last January for
a committee to set up long-range national goals as well as last year's
recommendation'by the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund study group on the
national economy that this nation seek to expand its output more
rapidly and more regularly than in the past, perhaps by five percent
per annum...
"...The real danger, I fear, is that we will do too little and too
late to meet the Soviet economic challenge, rather than that we will
engage in any mindless, reckless rush to change our basic institutions."
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United States Foreign Policy
Studies Prepared at the Request of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
Pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Cong.
and S. Res. 31, 86th Cong.
1. Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research, Inc., World-
wide and Domestic Economic Problems and their Impact on the
Foreign Policy of the United States :
"The fundamental fact which guided our foreign policy
problems is the determined, relentless intention of the
Soviet Union to control the world. It is important that
the United States realize this is not an idle threat, be-
cause the unusually rapid industrial growth of the Soviet
Union adds menacing power to its designs...
"To face the facts of future Soviet power politics, we
must think in terms of a ten- or twenty-year 'endowment
policy' of adequate size. . .well within our capability be-
cause the free world has at present four-fifth of the
world's income and two-thirds of the world's population.
"America's foreign policy must increasingly seek to
mobilize these free world resources for the military
and economic programs necessary to frustrate Soviet de-
signs.
"...(1) The USSR is prepared to use force wherever
it believes force will pay off, and (2) the USSR is
undertaking a varied offensive against the vulnerable
parts of the free world -- the undeveloped countries.
"The cost of meeting both threats is the long-run
premium for our security insurance. To consider one
and not the other, or to pose the issue, 'military
versus economic aid' overlooks the multipronged off-
ensive we are facing. This country and its allies have
the resources to handle both costs-the United States
must become increasingly 'growth conscious'...face up
realistically to our danger.. .the obvious need is for
the free world, first to find a way to act together,
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and second to act decisively enough.
"This is the challenge to the legislators and admin-
istrators of America today. The fate of the free world
may well rest on their energy3 courage and wisdom in
the years immediately ahead."
Stanford Research Institute, Possible non-military Scien-
tific Developments and their Potential Impact on Poreigh
Policy Problems of the United States:
"Scientific developments in the next decade will give
rise to or intensify many prdbledde that must engage the
attention of foreign policy planners. Scientific devel-
opments will also help stylise foreign policy problems.
"But the outlook is that the progress of science and
technology will do Lord to create or ihtensify than to
ameliorate such prdbldtfis, unless deliberate policy mea-
sures are taken...
"The national interest fettiir6? a more conscious
direction of scientific actiiity_iri ways likely to
assist in airhievetneht of Ath tica's ihternational goals.
it "?
The security and Well=beitig bf the United States tall
for a reappra.ie&l 8f irt;sbfit A iocfitibrig of scientific
and technological effort with a view to directing more
effort towafd fibh-n ilitftfy fo"f eigrl policy challenges.. .
"It is feasible, tdthih lifnits, to think out what
kinds of discoveries And inventions are needed and then,
by deliberate 061i6y, to stimulate the desired types of
development...
ii?breign policy planning of the broadest kind, making
use 6f the best scientific a8si6tarice, will be a crucial
requirement in the eafe &6&d. This planning should in-
oittde continual resew of prospective scientific develop-
tnbftts and th6if a ig iifican6e f 6k iriternatiohal relations ...
"...In certaiff stitfttiflc 9H 61s) ffidfi 19 tttily engaged in
worldwide a6tiftiti?g == activities that can no longer be
contained within the seop& of national boundaries...Fd3reign
policy probie tuii 1 f6siiit -- fbese ii problems will r
quire coopera dii beti;/bei cations ...best achieved if it is
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worked out before the full impacts of the developments
are with us...
"...In the absence of catastrophic war it is likely
science and technology will develop even more rapidly
in the future than in the past. The evidence for this
view is compelling... we need notmerely wait passively
for whatever comes.. .it is possible to take the initia-
tive..."
"...Every electric motor and generator in the world
stems from the basic research in which Faraday discovered
relationships between the flow of current in a wire and
the movement of the wire in a magnetic field...
"Pasteur's linking of micro organisms to disease,
Einstein's statement of mathematical equivalence between
matter and energy, Keynes' theoretical development of
the interrelations among savings, investment, income
and employment, are examples from the biological, physical
and social sciences of basic research which has contribu-
ted to very important practical results...
"...The major need is for better theory...--that is, a
mental model or map of the way things seem to be arranged
in the real world, of the way things interact, of cause
and effect. Better theory comes from basic research...
"...The modern world-is continuing to change all the
time...Conventional wisdom is not an adequate guide to
policy in such a world...
"...International scientific conferences... merit further
encouragement ... the United States might give leadership in
establishing...'The International Development Year--Science
and Undeveloped Areas'...also the lead in proposing.. .a
United Nations university system at the advanced (post
graduate) level, with campuses ... in various regions of the
world..."
3. Foreign Policy Research Institute, U. of Pa.,,Western Europe:
"The future of the free world depends upon the strength
and unity of the North Atlantic community of nations. The
Atlantic peoples have developed strength and unity through
diverse organizations. Among these the most important is
the North
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the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
"...the idea of North Atlantic unity shows its strength
from forces more fundamental than the immediate dangers of
the Communist threat...
"The world is passing through a systematic revolution...
this process poses problems which challenge all Atlantic
countries-their closest collaboration is essential if they
are to assure the gradual and peaceful integration of the em-
ergent nations into the free world and to secure to them the
benefits of freedom and the better life which only the North
Atlantic peoples can help them to obtain...
"Thus far, the realization of European unity has been func-
tional and partial rather than political and universal-during
the next decade, the United States will face problems more com-
plex than those of the first postwar decade...
"...Neutralism...has become a more pervasive force ...a serious
obstacle...is the persistence of fears...the United States may
grow weary of the cold war and agree to some modus vivendi
with the Soviet Union...
"...NATO forces need nuclear weapons desperately... to meet
the military technological problems of the future...
"...The Soviets may be planning for all-out war...the de-
velopments of European capabilities, given the lead-time pro-
blems of modern arms...must begin forthwith...
"...Limited conflict in Europe may occur at any time.
"Under each of these two timetables, the redesigning of
European defenses and the development of a more flexible NATO
strategy are urgent requirements. ,
"...The creation of a military posture which will make it
practically impossible for the Soviets to conquer Europe...may
be the most effective way of depriving the Communists of their
motives to go to war.
"...The anticipated expansion of European industry is likely
to produce surpluses which will enhance the attraction of Soviet
trade offers. As the Soviet pull on the European economy grows
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stronger, it will be necessary for the TO allies to coor-
dinate their economic policies more closely...
"But the effort to insulate the free economies of Europe
against the dangerous effects of Couununia t state trade mono-
polies will ultimately depend upon a sizeable increase in
the absorptive capacity of free world maa:kets...
"...As partners Europe and the United States can remain
economically well ahead of the Sino-Soviet bloc for an in-
definite period of time.
"The United States, during the next decade, should have
one over-riding objective in its foreign policy -- to strength-
en the NATO military alliance and to unify the Atlantic comm-
unity in both the political and economic field."
4. Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, AFRICA:
"The United States has never had a positive, dynamic
policy for Africa. Until very recently, we have looked
to the continuing control by friendly E r opean powers as
a guarantee of stability and dependable cooperatign and
have been reluctant to acknowledge the principle of self-
government as fully applicable to its peoples."
"Yet, in 1960 we shall be dealing with nine or ten fully
independent states in Subsaharann Africa alone, and a decade
later with perhaps more than twice that number...
"Official statements repeat our historic positionwith
respect to the aspirations of African peoples for self-
government. However, those ideologically significant de-
clarations are so qualified, as they hasten to add that
self-government is only for those who can demonstrate that
they are ready for it, that they lose much of their effect...
"A position of this kind nettles the Africans because
of the qualifying contents, while the Eix opean governing
powers react to the presence of our traditional affirmation...
"For the continuation of good relations between the
United States and Africa, we tm3st relinquish the negative,
ad hoc approach that has marked minty of our policy statements
and operations... we must, above all, move beyond the compul-
sive preoccupation with Communist penetration that has so
strongly
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strongly motivated our actions...
"Because an African state exchanges diplomatic representatives
with Iron Curtain countries, or sends some students to study
there, or accepts technical aid from them, this does not mean
that political commitment to Communism will necessarily follow...
"It is common knowledge that Africans have shown a preference
for assistance from the countries with which they have had
earlier and extended contact, and are turning to Western Europe,
Israel and the United States for technical personnel...
"...U.S. policy, in furthering its own best interests and
in accord with the action of some of our NATO associates, should
be guided by expectations of the Africans in all Subsaharan
Africa.
"The United States must treat Africa as a major policy area,
to be approached on a level of equality with other policy
areas, particularly Europe, where African-American interests
are involved..."
5. Conlon Associates, Ltd., Asia:
"This study describes and analyzes major trends in Asia
over the next decade and suggests courses of policy action.
The impact of these policies will be determined to a.large
extent by the total context in which they are carried out.
Global problems cannot be handled in a compartmentalized fashion.
Communism is fully aware of this and exploits it effectively.
"U.S. policies in Asia should also take this fact into account
and develop a strategy in which the timing and relationship of
specific policies are carefully calculated...
" ..The traditional fabric of societies in Asia is rapidly
disintegrating while the creation of viable modern nation-states
is lagging behind.
"...Communist methods have appeal, particularly in Southeast
Asia. At present, the prevalent attitude in much of South and
Southeast Asia is that Western methods are desirable, but often
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do not seem to work under current circumstance:, whereas Comm-
unist methods seem to be workable, but are not desirable. The
combination of political maturity and economic promise which
immunizes against communism cannot be expected generally in the
next decade...
"The United States should take the lead immobilizing the re-
sources and talents of the free world to assist the countries
of Asia in an assault on the problems created by rapid economic
and social change. Scattered insights and experience... need to
be pulled together...
"Meanwhile, although substantial U.S. aid will continue to be
required... other approaches to foster economic and social pro-
gress should receive increased emphasis...
"The United States must find means of taking into account
more effectively Asian attitudes and viewpoints in developing and
carrying out U.S. policies... make every effort to encourage co-
operation between the countries of Asia in solving common problems...
re-examine the role of local military forces and U.S. bases...in
relation to: (a) total U.S. strategic objectives in Asia, and (b)
political and economic objectives. -
"The whole question of U.S. strategy in Asia in light of the
increasing political and military vulnerability of our bases and
the rapid change in military technology should be under intensive
study by a combined American civilian-military team."
6. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse
University, The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy:
"The accelerating rate of worldwide change and our deepening
involvement in the internal affairs of other nations are not yet
adequately reflected in U. S. foreign policy ...it is important...
to be able to get along in each country with the 'next govern-
ment'...
"The yearning for economic development presents unique oppor-
tunities ... to participate in the revolutionary processes that will
determine the future of political institutions in the world's less
developed areas.
"The key to such participation is a transfer of capital great
enough to modify the present trend whereby the rich nations are
getting richer and the poor nations relatively poorer...
It is
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It is therefore proposed that the U.S. government decide,
for a 10-year period starting in the fiscal year 1961, to
devote one-fourth of its additional production each year, over
and above present levels of production, to the economic devel-
opment of the less developed areas...
"...The trend toward regional institutions is broadly in
the U.S. interest. Regional groupings present opportunities
for reconciling the two existive bases for world order which
are both too narrow -- exclusive nationalism and the parti-
cularism of worldwide functional agencies.
"Regional institutions may also contribute to making the
world a less bipolar and therefore a safer place for mankind...
"An operational foreign policy requires new thinking about
the administration of foreign affairs, to organize for dealing
inside other societies as well as with them...
rr..,Think in terms of country programs for development, and
...place in each country a country director,... with some real
power to coordinate... agencies which now deal separately with
health, food, children, education, culture, and investment
capital...
"...The trend...has been away from strong field organization
and toward minute supervision... in Washington. A reversal...
is essential...
"On the Washington end, foreign operations must now be seen
as a governmentwide function, not the exclusive or even primary
function of one Cabinet department...
"...The real task of the Secretary of State is to be the
President's chief of staff for coordination of the foreign policy
aspects of all government activity, including such difficult
cases as the Defense Department, the budget process, the setting
of monetary, loan and tariff policy, and the disposal of agri-
cultural surpluses...
"The presence of foreign policy considerations in every major
governmental decision suggests.. .a new look at the organization
of Congress for its task of participating in the new-type foreign
policy made mandatory by the accelerating pace of world change
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and our increasingly intimate participating in other peoples'
national affairs..."
7. Council on Foreign Relations, Basic Aims of United States
Foreign Policy:
"...Only with a sense of purpose, one which holds deep mean-
ing for the American people but must be given voice by their
elected leaders, can the government of the United States set the
goals of foreign policy and work out the means of attaining
them. The role of leadership under our democratic form of
government can hardly be overemphasized.
"In times like the present, when world affairs are infinitely
complex and the dangers seem intangible or remote to so many,
it is a task far more difficult than in time of war...
"The tendency toward relaxation of effort, which may be
encouraged by a spurious atmosphere of peace, must be countered
by the farsightedness and plain speaking of America's leaders.
The responsibility rests above all on the President...
"...The people should know the magnitude of the threats to
their freedom and that they will shirk the necessary measures
to meet and dispel them only at great peril.
"But America would be blind so to limit its basic aims. It
has accepted the fact that its owls destiny as a nation depends
on the survival and growth of freedom in the world. It must,
then, express and pursue aims which respond to the deep aspir-
ations of other peoples and enlist their cooperation, despite
all differences of culture and historical experience.
"...Leadership cannot rest solely on the strength of America's
armed forces or the skill of its diplomats. It must also rest
on principle.
"The United States should welcome the cooperation of the
Communist powers toward these goals. If it is not forthcoming,
as is likely, all the more reason for going ahead in associations
with nations of the free world, holding the door open but not
vitiating the aims or policies or inviting their sabotage for
the sake of gaining the participation of those who reject them...
"The United States should represent and set for itself a
positive
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positive ideal, the ideal of a world not only safer and saner,
but also one in. which basic human. needs are met and human. values
can flourish...
"If the American. people have shown. a genius in. their own.
history, it is in the development of political institutions
balancing essential freedom and necessary authority, and in the
creation. of material wealth on. a broad basis without coercion..
"Surely, if we can see the meaning of our national experi-
ence in.relations to the broader and changing world scene, the
goals for the future become clear.
"The basic challenge is whether we as a people can. move toward
them with the urgency, the vigor, and the understanding of human-
ity`s needs which are so obviously demanded by the times in. which
we live."
8. The Washington Center of Foreign. Policy Research, the John.
Hopkins University, Developments in. Military Technology and
their impact on. United States strategy and Foreign.Policy:
"...Adequate and appropriate military strength is the pre-
condition-of free world security.
"Broader objectives of U.S. foreign policy not emanating from
the struggle with the Sin.o-Soviet bloc, such as the promotion.
of economic progress in. the underdeveloped countries, call for
continued attention and sacrifice, but their pursuit is affected,
and at times impaired, by the requirements of meeting the
Soviet threat.
"These military requirements are unprecedented in scope.
...The United States is faced with the dual military mission
of protecting its overseas allies on. the exposed Eurasian. rim-
lands against a wide range of possible forms of Sino-Soviet
aggression., as well as protecting its homeland which is no
longer secure from Soviet attack...
"The military position. of the United States has declined
in the short span. of 15 years from one of unchallenged security
to that of a nation. both open. and vulnerable to direct and
devastating attack... The advent of the nuclear-missile
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weapons generation., heralded by the Soviet ICBM text of
August, 1957, brought a drastic compression of the time re-
quired for the delivery of nuclear explosives at intercon.-
tinen.tal ranges and a corresponding reduction. in the attack
warning time...
"... It is this possibility that disturbs those who see
in the 'missile gap' of the early 1960's the greatest mili-
tary danger the United States has ever faced...
"Progress in military technology will continue at an ac-
celerating rate during the next decade...
"To assume that the level of mutual destruction now pos-
sible from a total nuclear war, or the magnitude of the
accompanying radioactive fallout, is sufficiently high to make
nuclear war 'suicidal' (and therefore 'impossible') is but to
evade the most serious military problem this country has ever
faced...
"Foreseeable progress... will make possible ... consequent
availability of fissile materials ...to facilitate the nuclear-
izing of small wars, the nuclear arming of allies, and the
spread of nuclear power to additional countries. It seems
unlikely, however, that these effects will be significantly
asymmetrical in their impact on-the U.S. - USSR power equations..
"Progress in chemical and biological weaponry is still far
from the point where toxicological warfare could be considered
of strategic decisiveness ... their present military utility has
been exaggerated...
"Operational satellite and satelloid space systems promise
to become available in considerable numbers and sophistication
during the next decade.
"Their military employment...will be of relative advantage
to the United States in view of its existing needs for intel-
ligence of the Soviet Union and the management of globally de-
ployed forces. Their use... will... sharpen existing tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union and provide
fruitful sources of new ones...
"...The weapons systems of the next decade will, by their
sheer cost and complexity, preclude nations other than. the
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United States and the Soviet Union from attaining the status
of major military powers ... thus amplifying divisive strains
within. the present alliance and complicating the problems of
preserving and strengthening the solidarity of the free world...
"...Top priority should be given and increased and timely
efforts should be made to reduce the vulnerability of American,
and allied strategic forces...
"...A most strenuous effort should be made to accelerate
development of solid fuel ICBM's amenable.. .to both large-scale
production. anal mobile siting...
"The over-riding objective of such a strategic weapons
program should-be-early attainment of such ... divers and
relatively secure retaliatory systems that the potential ag-
gressor could not have con.fiden.ce...to risk launching a sur-
prise attack.
"...The United States should discourage...in.depen.dent
nuclear forces. If our allies cannot be dissuaded... the United
States should attempt to channel their efforts into mobile or
otherwise protective retaliatory systems.
"...The equipment of...troops with weapons appropriate to
tactical nuclear warfare, while necessary, should not be
treated as a substitute for ... adequate non-nuclear forces...
"Because space technology offers one of the few areas in.
which the development of a new weapons generation. may be pos-
sible, the United States should not permit the Soviet Union. to
outdistance it...major space efforts should continue ... unless
...it becomes apparent that military implications ... are
negligible.
"...The United States should avoid such sources of insta-
bility as the deployment of highly vulnerable strategic missile
systems...proximate to the Communist bloc.
"Arms control policy should not aim for total nuclear dis-
armament which would permit a violator to gain supremacy
through the surreptitious production-relatively few weapons.
Instead, strategic forces should be limited to retaliatory
systems capable of surviving a first strike, though in.suf-
ficien.t...for a first strike."
9. The Brookings
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and their images tend to affect the relations between states,
and the bases for conflict and hostility or understanding and
cooperation..
"The report focuses its attention on three political
ideologies commanding the greatest allegiance in. contemporary
times: constitutional democracy, nationalism and communism...
" ..Communist ideology provides a conceptional framework
for viewing the world. It looks on. history as a continuous
conflict in which 'progressive' forces continue with 'reaction.-
ary' forces and defeat them ...In short, tl.e basic Communist
faith is that capitation. is doomed, that Communism is certain
to replace it, and that this process must be vigorously abetted...
"...An . axiom of Communist strategy Vitas been the injunc-
tion against risking a direct clash unless certain. of Communist
superiority.
"The tactic to be pursued when faced with a superior force
is to engage in gradual envelopment and penetration and to
destroy the enemy by a process of attrition..
"To undermine the morale of the superior force, to foster
in the opponent an-inclination to ever-increasing compromise --
that is the way to victory whenever lacking the power to impose
one's own solution...
"Communist ideology makes power central in. its analysis of
society and history and its own methods in.d goals. Indeed, the
main focus of Communist writing in. this century has been. on. the
methods of acquiring and consolidating p9wer.
"...By reason of the nature of the doctrine and the party,
those reaching the top of the Communist movement are usually
driven by an. intense urge for political power and dedicated to
the use of any and all means to achieve the goals of the party...
"One fact about the decades ahead is certain: the inter-
national order will be profoundly altered by the forces of change.
"In. the less developed nations, the quest for a better life
is bound to transform radically their political, economic, and
social
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social structures, amid turmoil and disruption,. These countries
will doubtless try to pursue both strands of their nationalism
...independence and progress.
Few of them now have governments adequate to fulfill these
tasks. Most of them lack the prerequisites for stable democracy:
literacy, a sense of tolerance, minimum political consensus, as
well as political and economic stability...
"The advanced nations will have to continue to cooperate
intimately among themselves and to develop new bases for assist-
ing and working with the less-developed nations.
"The requisite range of actions will be broad: maintaining
dynamic societies in. the advanced countries, assuring the flow
of adequate capital to the less-developed states, keeping pace in,
the scientific and technical fields, keeping adequate military
strength...
"...U.S. policy should start from the fact that its primary
interest toward the underdeveloped countries is in. their continued
independence. Our aim should be to cooperate with each nation
for this purpose on. as wide a front as is acceptable to it...
"The United States should not judge new nations by standards
derived from its own experience...
"Eventual erosion. of Communist ideology will depend mainly
on the working out of forces within. the Communist societies and
orbit... Efforts might be made to draw the satellite states in.-
to the European community...
"To encourage evolution. within. the Communist system and
the Communist bloc, we should promote the most extensive con-
tacts possible within. the Communist world...
"It would be misleading to expect too much... The cumula-
tive effect is not likely to be felt for a number of years...
Through a very gradual and pervading skepticism of some
Communist ideological assumptions...
"Democracy will not survive merely by reactive to the
threats of tyranny... In. the age of ideology successful political
action. must be related to ideas.
"Dogmatic
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-17-
"Dogmatic systems of ideas can be undermined only by positive
actions which consistently repute their accuracy, and by affirm-
ative principles which'truly reflect the aspirations of mankind."
11. Columbia-Harvard Research Group, USSR and Eastern-Europe:
" ...Althnugh the emphasis in. current Soviet policy is upon
'peaceful co-existence'. Mr. Khrushchev has remind us quite
frankly that this line does not mean. a suspension of the under-
lying conflict between. our societies,..
"..,As a consequence, if present trends con.tinuaefurther
increase in. Soviet power and influence is to be expected...
"Dealing with the Soviet challenge should not becomeaanfocus The ct
exclusive preoccupation, of Amoiiticalogrrnwth?an.d economic im-
political
provement our policy should be the
of the non-Communist world...
,,...It is vital that the United States not allow
ot only
of military power to develop in. the Soviet favor, Y
the interest of...peace, but also to protect the non-Communist
world against a process of piecemeal disen.tegration...
"It would be an error to assume the infallibility of the
feour
Soviet system, and it should therefore also be a part of
outlook that we be continuously alert to the opportunities
presented by Soviet shortcomings and contradictions...
"Finally, then is the requirement on which all others avydepe end,
the development of a public understan.ding...to support
and sacrifices without the stimulation of crises or bellicosity,
without wild alternations between.optimi.sm and pessimism.
"This is the source of strength which could make it possible
for a democratic society to preserve the essential qualities of
democratic life while it mounts the degree of mobilizatione
g
necessary to deal with the mortal and continuing,
of the Soviet system...
"In the Soviet view, the world is divided into two camps,
one representing declining capitalism and the other rising
socialism; and between.d these two camps a fundamental and inevi-
table conflict exists.
"This conflict
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"This conflict need not result in. war, but whether it
does or not depends primarily upon-whether capitalism is
graceful or stubborn-about recognizing it is outworn....
"This, in. its simplest form, is the nub of the problem...
"Against ...This long term expectation. there has taken place
an. important shift in. Soviet short-term policies... toward the
advanced industrial n.ations...a modification. of their national
policies... It is not a question., in. any short-range projec-
tion., of trying to communize the countries of Western. Europe,
but rather,...of weakening the Western. alliance; later...to
orient their policies more favorably toward the Soviet Union.
and to make their ... output available...
"It can. be seen, therefore, why the 'proletariat' of the
West seems to be of less current interest to the Soviet Union
than the 'bourgeoisie.' It is not a matter of chance that the
Soviet leaders who have visited the United States and Western.
Europe recently found the business leaders more interesting
than. labor leaders.
"With this short-range purpose in. mind, it becomes clearer
why Soviet policy is currently emphasizing nationalist,
pacifist, and commercial appeals to the 'bourgeoisie' of the
West...
"By the use of such appeals...the Soviet leaders ... hope to
encourage the demobilization. an.d disintegration-of the Western.
Alliance.. .the.,. .transition. to a 'socialist' form ...can await
the next-stage of development...
"One of the cardinal elements of the Soviet outlook is the
belief that the revolutionary wave now sweeping across Asia,
Africa, and Latin America is an.importan.t factor favorable to
Soviet interests, perhaps decisively so...
"First ...the disintegration of the world system of hate and
investment between the Western. industrial nations and their
markets and the sources of raw materials among the underdeveloped
countries...
"Second,, the coincidence of this development with spectacular
Soviet economic and technological advan.ces...increasing Soviet
influence in. these areas as a model...
"There, the
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"There, the Soviet Un.ion.feels it is in. a better position,
than are the Western. powers to relate its interests to those
of the nationalist movements...
"The problem facing Soviet foreign-policy in. these areas
is not how best to achieve the transforuaation.of these
countries to 'socialist' as soon. as possible, but how to insure
the most profitable immediate effects or this process upon the
configuration. of power distribution in.the world...
"The next stage ...in.volves...moving toward membership in the
Soviet sphere. Then., in. that time and in that way, will be
fulfilled Lenin's famous prophecy...."
"What does Mr. Khrushchev mean when. he asks us to accept
the 'status quo'? He has been explicit. His conception has
three elements: First, a recognition....of the Soviet right to
control the territories it has won ...an?d a commitmen.t...n:ot to
try to undo these...; second, an agreement-not to interfere
with the process of revolutionary change ...third, an agreement
that there should be no change of frontiers by military force
(excluding 'internal' problems, such as China-Formosa or Viet-
nam.) ...
"...Mr. Krushchev is not proposing a definitive settlement
of the conflict... A resolution... is .possible only if we are
willing to yield the Soviet Union. what it wan.ts...
"Whatever changes in the climate may take place, or what-
ever settlements of specific issues may become possible, should
not be allowed to obscure the reality of this underlying con-
ditions of deadly conflict.
"...It is possible to draw some principles to guide our
conduct...
"The American. public should have a steady, unemotional
understanding of the fundamental nature of the conflict. This
is the essential bedrock foundation for a wise and steady
policy.
"...It is a vital interest.. .that the Soviet Union be pre-
vented from a further extension of its power and influence...
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"...It is of fundamental importance that a gross equili-
brium of military power be maintained...
"...We should be continuously prepared to explore through
negotiation. the settlement of any outstanding problems...
"...We should be prepared to take advantage of ...con-
tradictions between. Soviet professions and behavior, by dilemmas
and errors in. Soviet policies...
"...The policy most likely to influence the Soviet Union
in. a favorable direction ...is...a healthy economic and poli-
tical growth among the non-Communist nations...
"This is more likely to influence the course of the Soviet
development than. anything we can. do directly. Until this time,
we must be prepared for a continuation of the conflict into
the indefinite future."
12. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Economic, Social, and Political Change in the
Underdeveloped Countries and its implications for United States
Foreign. Policy:
"The United States confronts a world in. which more than
a billion human beings living under non-Communist rule are pass-
ing through the complex and lengthy transition-from life in.
the setting of a traditional society.to life in. a modern.settin.g.
Within the Communist bloc nearly another billion. are passing
through a special version. of this transition....
"...While the transition. to modernity is inevitable in. some
form the precise form it takes will be critically influenced by
what America is and what it does...
"...The form which the transition, to modernity takes will
affect in. critical ways our most vital domestic interests...
"...Finally ... the transition. will alter the economic,
political, and social environment in. which American. society
must operate, more profoundly and more rapidly than it has
ever been. altered before...
"...Unless we make an-extraordinary and explicit effort to
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understand what is happening to the complex world we live in.,
we are in. danger of losing control of our own, destiny...
"...A gradual consensus appears to be developing in this
country as to the course taken. by the traditional societies.
It is in our interest to see emerge out of the transition.
processes nation-states which --
"I. Maintain effective independence ...
"2. Do not resort to violence ...
"3. Maintain effective and orderly government internally
without resort to totalitarian : con.trols...
"4. Are capable of progressively meeting the aspira-
tions of all major classes of their people...
"5. Are willing to cooperate... to the functioning
of an. interdependent world community.
"6. Accept the principles of an open society...
"Our basic view, then., is that we Americans must enter more
deeply, if vicariously, into the experience of transition...
"...It is in. the American interest to use such influence as
we have ...to help make the evolutionary transition. to moderni-
zation. successful enough so that no major group will opt either
for regressive efforts to repress social, political and economic
change or for extremist measures to promote it.
"We can express this interest in terms.. .psychological,
political, economic and axial.
"Psychologically, it is in the American interest that the
peoples... perceive constructive alternatives both to the regres-
sive clinging to old values and to the radical overthrow-and
desperate rush to totally new on.es...
"Politically it is in our interest, that chaos, tension and
failure do not lead people to accept a repressive concentration.
of power...
"...In. the early stages-perception of both the possibil-
ties and the dangers of modernization. are likely to be found
mainly in. small elite groups -- the traditional feudal or
tribal leaders, the military, the initially small but growing
urban. commercial and business class, the landowners, and the
intelligentsia. As the transition. proceeds...n.ew groups become
important -- the peasantry, urban. labor, the new student class.
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"It is in. the American. interest that each of these groups
should perceive the practicality and attractiveness of the
third choice.
"Finally, there is.the economic dimension-of the third
choice ...Econ.omic growth is particularly important to us...
because the principal instruments available to the United States
for influencing the transition. are economic instruments.
"It should by now be apparent that the problem of making
the evolutionary alternative seem both real and attractive is
one with many facets.
"It is useful to look at it from the varied perspective
of the psychologist, the political scientist, the sociologist,
and the economist; but it is one problem, not four.
"If American. action, is to influence the choice, those wield-
ing the various elements of American policy must see the problem
in. these times and see it whole, since each instrument affects
all facets of a society's evolution....
"There can. be no easy optimism about the consequences of
American action....
"We must recognize, too, that everything we do involves
risk ...we should be prepared for setbacks...
..If we do nothing or not enough the hope of maintaining
a world environment in. which our society can prosper will grow
dim...
"...The failure thus far to put American. aid programs on a
genuine long-term basis is perhaps the most serious weakness
in our economic assistance effort...
"...The economic criteria for economic assistance must be
unambiguous and firmly applied...
"...Capitalimust be made available over sufficiently long
periods of time...
"Amounts... must be increased and the...terms...flexible ...
"Capital must be made available for all important sections
of the economy ...
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"...National development programming should be encouraged...
"...Development efforts should be related to the inter-
national economy..."
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National Science Foundation
Comparison of United States and USSR Science Education,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Independent Offices,
House Appropriations Committee 86th Congress, Second Session,
March 2, 1960.
1. Alan T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation:
"Our evidence at present is that in quality of research,
...we are second to none, generally speaking, and the Rus-
sians are very close in many fields...especially good in
polar research...in their systematic seismological and geo-
graphical studies.
"They are good but not superior, in astronomy and mathe-
matics; in theoretical physics they are very good...pretty
much on a par with us, probably; in experimental physics we
have a very definite edge.
"Their great weakness, of course, is in the straight bio-
logical sciences where they have been out of date because of
their philosophy with respect to the Lysenko movement.
"By and large...the concern is not the present quality
but the future...
"...The opinions of our scientists who have gone to Russia
are very much that while we can hold our own very well with
them now, when they look at the very thoroughly trained young
people... bright and keen...given every opportunity...they are
concerned...so it is the future that we are really thinking
of ...i1
2. Roger R. Revelle, Chairman Divisional Committee for Mathe-
matical, physical and engineering sciences, Director Scripps
Institution for Oceanography:
"...One of the striking things ... about all Russian science,
is that they are not, as we are, wasting half.the brains of
the human race by inhibiting women from going into scientific
work...
"Second, at the IGY meeting in Tokyo which I attended a
few years ago, there was a group of Chinese scientists. These
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were men of great sophistication and experience in science...
they could hold their own with any of the Americans there...
"Third, in space research, we are familiar with the fact
that the Russians have rocket engines with three or four
times the thrust of any of ours. This is not due simply to
a massive effort, but to a systematic development..."
3. Harry C. Kelly, Associate Director, Educational and Inter-
national activities :
"...the Soviets, in planning the future of their state,
determine the needs for people in different professions...the
number of students in each area. In the free world, education'
is directed toward the development of the individual. The
young people of the Soviet Union know that a good way out of
their low economic and social environment is through education.
"The material rewards of training are real -- better food
and lodging, for example. Because we already have the physical
amenities the Soviet people are still seeking, the motivations
of our young people must not only include material rewards but
also the more intangible -- love of liberty and love of learning.
"Despite the amazing progress of the USSR in developing its
educational system, we are still ahead of the Russians in the
educational level of the populations as a whole...Less than
two percent of their citizens have completed higher education,
compared with about five percent in this country...
"My observations there lead me to feel that we should have
apprehensions not about them but about ourselves -- as to
whether we have our own goals in mind as clearly as the Russians
have theirs...
"...The proportions of our graduates in science and engin-
eering has been far below that of the Russians. At the same
time, our free choice system has been quite responsive to
demand as represented by employment opportunities...
"..,In general...we are slightly ahead...in terms of scien-
tific and technical manpower, but the margin is narrow and we
must keep up steady and sustained pressure for both quality
and quantity if we are to maintain superiority."
4. Paul M. Gross, Vice-Chairman of the National Science Board and
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Chairman, executive committee of the board; Vice President,
Duke University:
"...The Russian educational development really ...is a
further move in the direction of a good European 'continental'
education. This...we all have respect for historically, and
for its merits -- which are real. The continental system has
never, however, been broadly based so as to include large seg-
ments of the population. In England it has been largely
confined to a limited number of people. By and large these
have been highly selected, good people.
"I think the danger from the Russian situation... is that
they have taken the best elements of the continental system
of education and applied them broadly to a huge population.
This is where we face what many of us believe is a real
challenge."
5. Julius A. Stratton, President, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology:
r"I share completely the views expressed by Dr. Gross...
we can by no means relax. But this does not mean necessar-
ily that we should adopt the Russian system for our own. I
do not think there is any such simple solution...our system
of education is indigenous...draws upon our traditions and
background and is related to the things for which we stand..."
"...We lack...the intensity of feeling of the Russians
about the role of education and the essential conviction that
education and science are of overriding importance for our
national survival.
"We also fail to recognize that we are in competition not
only with Russia and China but must soon meet. a new kind of
competition from newly emerging countries all over the world...."
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-3-
the time being the Soviets cannot stop ctf=xisting with non-
Communist nations...
"Lenin used the term first, when in the early weneieint.e-
and
peasants were allowed more freedom of producing
coexistence did not last long.
"Stalin originally used the expression to oht eoeffect that
different nations were 'coexisting Union,
the Ukrainians with the Russians and the Armenians with the Georgians ... in practice the Russian nation enjoys hegemony...
"Coexistence is a temporary situation and it is a description
of fact...it specifically does not mean Communism ought to be
prepared to coexist with the Capitalist system til the end of
the world."
WORDS: 'Communist semantics have the following roots:
1. Every problem, however unprecedented it may be, must be
handled in original or purified Marxist-Leninist terminology.
`2. Every change in doctrine or 'line' must be dressed up as
a trestatement' and its tdeviationist'character must be con-
cealed.
"3o Every Communist commuting message ctovthe partyhand its
that is, revolutionary,
followers.
?,4. This same commdlP~alyzingtmes age to thefoppo'nent?of
soothing, pacifying communism.
05? Every communication has a speciic meaning within the
context of the incessant intraparty struggle.
roof against counter-propaganda
by Every statement must be proof of communism.
by all external and internal opp
,' Communist semantics are more than a tool of decepptioviendreon-
cealment. They are also a tool of legitimacy --
gime can assert its legitimacy only within the framework of its
sacred ideology.
"But it is also
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"But it is also characteristic of the Communists that
they fight against each other by semantic means -- until the
loser is liquidated. To them struggle is everything. Even
language is part of the struggle."
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