A PLAN FOR REDUCING ARMAMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600060002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 148
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 7, 1951
• Content Type: TRANS

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A PLAN
for
REDUCING
ARMAMENTS
ADDRESS BY
HARRY S. TRUMAN
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES
NOVEMBER 7, 1951
State Deriartment review cbmpleted
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This address by the President of the United
States was broadcast to the Nation over
major radio and television networks on
? November 7, 1951. The Tripartite State-
ment of France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States concerning the proposals men-
tioned in the President's address is included.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 4409
International Organization & Conference Series III, 76
Released November 1951
Division of Publications
Office of Public Affairs
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A PLAN FOR
REDUCING
ARMAMENTS
The General Assembly of the United Nations
is now meeting in Paris. This great town meet-
ing of the world has assembled for its annual
session. What is done there will be of vital im-
portance to us in the United States and to all the
people of the earth.
A few hours ago, the United States, Great Brit-
ain, and France announced that they would pre-
sent to the General Assembly a joint proposal of
great significance. This is a proposal for lessen-
ing the burden of armaments which now bears so
heavily upon the world. It is a common-sense
way of getting started toward the regulation and
balanced reduction of all armed forces and all
implements of war, including atomic weapons.
We hope the General Assembly will consider this
proposal as an urgent and important matter.
I want to tell you something about this proposal
and why we are making it. Let's begin by talking
about the nature of the disarmament problem.
All of us know how difficult the world situation is
today. Fighting is going on in Korea, and the
threat of Communist aggression hangs over many
other parts of the world.
To meet this situation, the United States is now
rapidly building up its armed forces. So are
other free countries. We are doing this because
we must. The Soviet Union and its satellites
have very large military forces ready for action.
The Soviet Union has a growing stock of atomic
bombs. The aggression in Korea has shown that
Communist imperialism will resort to open war-
fare to gain its ends. In these circumstances we
must have strong military defenses, and we are
building them.
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General Eisenhower has just given me an en-
couraging report of the progress that is being
made under his command in Europe. Serious
difficulties still remain, and they will require
vigorous effort from us and from our allies. But
the free nations of Europe are creating effective
defenses. As a result of General Eisenhower's
visit, arrangements are being made to speed up
the training and equipment of the combined de-
fense forces in Europe. We shall continue to
build strong defenses in Europe and in other parts
of the world?just as long as that is necessary.
Our own armed forces and those of our allies
are essential to the protection of freedom. They
are an essential part of our efforts to prevent
another world war. As they increase in size and
effectiveness they make it plain to an aggressor
that he can have no hope of quick and easy con-
quest. As the Kremlin comes to see that its
aggressive policies cannot pay off, it may abandon
them and join in reasonable settlements of world
problems.
This build-up of the defenses of the free world
is one way to security and peace. As things now
stand it is the only way open to us. But there is
another way to security and peace?a way we
would much prefer to take. We would prefer to
see the nations cut down their armed forces on a
balanced basis that would be fair to all. That is
the way we hoped the world would follow 6 years
ago when we helped to set up the United Nations.
And it is what we are still working for?an inter-
national order without the burden of tremendous
armaments.
It may seem strange to talk about reducing
armed forces and armaments when we are work-
ing so hard to build up our military strength. But
there is nothing inconsistent about these two
things. Both have the same aim?the aim of se-
curity and peace. If we can't get security and
peace one way, we must get it the other way.
The way of reducing armaments?the way we
prefer?can be undertaken only if there is a work-
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able international system which makes reduction
possible without endangering the security of any
nation. No country can afford to reduce its de-
fenses unless it is sure the other fellow is reducing
his at the same time. To reduce armaments, there-
fore, we must have, first of all, a safe and fair
procedure.
Three weeks ago, in a speech in North Carolina,
I said that we are willing, as we have always been,
to sit down in the United Nations with the Soviet
Union, and all the other countries concerned, and
work together for lessening the burden of arma-
ments. The proposal we have announced today,
along with France and Great Britain, offers a
practical way to do just that.
This proposal is in the nature of a fresh ap-
proach. It has been very carefully prepared, and
we believe it is an improvement over previous ap-
proaches. If it is accepted, it will open a way to
reduce armaments and lessen the risk of war.
The basic principles for a real, workable system
for reducing armaments are well known. I out-
lined them in my speech before the General As-
sembly of the United Nations a little more than a
year ago. The General Assembly has endorsed
them. They are simple. First, such a system
must include all types of weapons; second, it must
be accepted by all nations having substantial
armed forces; and third, it must be based on safe-
guards that will insure the compliance of all na-
tions?in other words it must be foolproof.
I also suggested to the General Assembly that
the two United Nations commissions working on
the control of armaments be consolidated into one.
One of these commissions has been working on
atomic energy, and the other commission on all
other types of weapons and armed forces. It is
clear, however, that all types of weapons and
armed forces must be covered by one over-all plan
and should therefore be under the jurisdiction of
the same United Nations commission.
As a result of work during the past year, the
General Assembly is now in a position to merge
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the two commissions and to direct the new body to
get to work on concrete steps for reducing and
controlling all kinds of armaments. We hope the
proposal we are now making will be the first order
of business of this new commission. Let me tell
you just what it is that we are proposing.
First, we propose that a continuing inventory of
all armed forces and armaments be undertaken.
This inventory would take place in every country
having substantial military power, and it would be
checked and verified in each of those countries by
inspectors who are nationals of other countries
working under the United Nations. These in-
spectors would have authority to find out what
the real facts are.
Second, we propose that while this process of
inventory and inspection is taking place the na-
tions work out specific arrangements for the
actual reduction of armed strength.
Third, we propose, on the basis of these two
steps, that the reductions which are the goal of
the program be made as soon as that can be done
with full knowledge and fairness to all.
Such a program would have to be agreed upon
by all the countries having substantial military
power and ratified according to their own consti-
tutional practices.
The key to this plan is the proposal to find out
exactly and precisely what arms and armed forces
each country has. This is the first essential, on
which all else depends. Unless this step is taken,
no real progress can be made toward regulating
and reducing armaments.
Any nation which is not willing to agree to this
step, and to carry it out, is not really interested
in disarmament. The Soviet Government has at
various times talked about reducing armaments,
but they have never proposed an effective system
for finding out the facts. No responsible govern-
ment can agree to cut its own defenses unless it
knows where such a cut will leave it in relation to
the armed forces of other countries. That is why
we propose the first step of an honest, continuing
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inventory of all armed forces and armaments, in-
cluding atomic weapons.
Such an inventory would proceed by stages, dis-
closing the least vital information first, and then
proceeding to more sensitive areas. Each stage
would be completed before the next began, until
all armed forces and armaments of every kind had
been included.
There is another important point. Any pro-
gram of reducing armaments will necessarily be
complex and, even with the fullest cooperation of
all the parties, will take quite a while to work out
and put into effect. Even after it is put into
effect, there will have to be safeguards against its
violation. The fact finding must, therefore, be
continuous. It cannot be a one-shot affair. The
fact finders must know not only what the state
of armament is on any given date, but how it is
proceeding?whether the armed forces of the
country concerned are increasing or diminishing.
As the facts are revealed, progress can be made
toward working out, by mutual agreement, the
exact amounts and kinds of armaments and armed
forces which each country will finally be permitted
to have. It might be possible, for example, to
agree that each country would have armed forces
proportionate to its population, with a ceiling
beyond which no country could go. Furthermore,
each country might be limited to using no more
than a fixed portion of its national production for
military purposes.
With respect to atomic weapons, the plan al-
ready approved by a majority of the United Na-
tions fits right into this present proposal of ours
for the control and reduction of armaments.
Atomic weapons would be revealed at the ap-
propriate stage in the process of disclosure. Such
weapons would ultimately be prohibited, and
atomic energy would be controlled under the pro-
visions of the United Nations plan. We continue
to support this plan as it now stands, but we are,
of course, always ready to consider any better plan.
Let me stress that each stage of this program for
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reducing armaments would be entered upon only
after the previous one had been completed. And
each stage would be continuously policed by in-
spectors, who would report any breach of faith.
If the Soviet Union and its satellites are really
afraid of the intentions of any of the free coun-
tries, as they say they are, here is a plan they can
adopt with safety. It would give them the same
protection, every step of the way, that it gives
every other country. And, on the other hand, we
can afford to go into such a plan as this because
we would have safeguards against bad faith. All
nations would have to lay their cards on the table
and keep them there at all times.
Here, then, is a real, down-to-earth approach,
fair to all concerned. It would move forward step
by step. Each step, when completed, would build
up mutual confidence for the next step. If at any
stage there were a breach of trust or an act of bad
faith, all participating nations would have im-
mediate notice and could act in time to protect
themselves.
In the face of the long and gloomy history of
our negotiations with the Soviet Union, there are,
no doubt, many people who think that any further
attempts to control and reduce armaments are a
waste of time. It is true that we have experienced
much bad faith, deceit, and broken promises on
the part of the Soviet Union over the last 6 year
It is true that we have met rebuffs and refusa,
from the Soviet Government, ever since the day
we offered to give up our monopoly of atomi
weapons and to prohibit them under a system
international control. Nevertheless, as respoK
sible men and women, we must try for disc
mament in spite of all difficulties. We cam
permit the history of our times to record that
failed by default.
We make this proposal because it is the rip
thing to do. We are not making it in any sud( ?
spirit of optimism. We are not making it a
last gesture of despair. We are making it beca
we share, with all the members of the United N a-
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tions, the responsibility of trying to bring about
conditions which will assure international peace
and security. The people of the world want peace.
To work in every possible way for peace is a duty
which we owe not only to ourselves, but to the
whole human race.
In making our proposal for reducing arma-
ments, we are not suggesting that the crisis in
world affairs has passed, or even that it has
lessened. It has not. We cannot afford, for one
minute, to let down our guard or falter in our
defense program. We must not weaken in our
firm stand to resist aggression in Korea.
While aggression and fighting continue?as in
Korea?and while the major political issues that
divide the nations remain unsettled, real progress
toward reducing armaments may not be possible.
But we cannot fail to bring before the world the
problem of growing armaments, which presses so
heavily on all mankind. We believe deeply that
discussions of this question in the United Nations
can and should begin now, even though tensions
are high. Indeed, one way to reduce these ten-
sions is to start work on such proposals as the
one we are now making.
I urge the Kremlin to accept this proposal. I
urge them to make it known to the people of the
Soviet Union. The men in the Kremlin are re-
nonsible for the lives and the future of a great
ation?of a great and creative people?a people
who long for peace, even as all people long for
)eace. The men in the Kremlin must know how
.ie people behind the Iron Curtain are crushed
,wn by the burden of armaments and produc-
n for war?how they hope for release and for
joyment of the better things of life.
And there can be a release from the burden of
reasing armaments and the fear of war. The
'ions are not helpless chips in the tide of events.
e,y can control their destiny if they will. The
den of armaments can be lifted. It can be
ie. And if it is done, think what a prospect
would open up for the future of mankind.
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The United States and other countries are now
helping the people of the free nations to fight
against the ancient enemies of man?hunger,
disease, and injustice. But what we can do now
is sharply limited by the cost of maintaining de-
fenses to prevent aggression and war. If that
cost could be reduced?if the burden of arma-
ments could be lessened, new energies and re-
sources would be liberated for greatly enlarged
programs of reconstruction and development.
New hope and opportunities would be given
everywhere for better conditions of life. There
would be greater freedom, greater production,
greater enjoyment of the fruits of peaceful in-
dustry. Through the United Nations we could
wage the only kind of war we seek?the war
against want and human misery. In the lifetime
of our own generation, we could bring about the
greatest period of progress for the world in all
recorded history.
This is our vision. This is our hope. This is
what all free people have been striving for. We
are determined to gain these tremendous oppor-
tunities for human progress. We are determined
to win real peace peace based on freedom and
justice. We will do it the hard way if we must?
by going forward, as we are doing now, to make
the free world so strong that no would-be aggres-
sor will dare to break the peace. But we will
never give up trying for another way to peace?
the way of reducing the armaments that make
aggression possible.
That is why we are making these new pro-
posals to the United Nations. We offer them in
good faith and we ask that they be considered in
good faith. We hope all other nations will ac-
cept them and will join with us in this great enter-
prise for peace.
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TRIPARTITE
STATEMENT
1. France, the United Kingdom and the United
States will submit to the sixth General Assembly
of the United Nations for its consideration pro-
posals for proceeding with the regulation, limita-
tion and balanced reduction of all armed forces
and all 'armaments, including atomic.
2. As long as present conditions of international
tension prevail, the three governments have the
inescapable duty and are unshakably determined
to continue their efforts to develop the strength
required for their security and that of the free
world, because without security there can be no
peace with justice. They also believe that if all
governments sincerely join in the cooperative and
effective regulation and limitation of armed forces
and armaments, this would greatly reduce the
danger of war and thus enhance the security of all
nations.
3. In any honest program for regulation, limi-
tation and balanced reduction of all armed forces
and armaments, a first and indispensable step is
disclosure and verification. The system of dis-
closure and verification must be on a continuing
basis and reveal in successive stages all armed
forces?including paramilitary, security and po-
lice forces?and all armaments, including atomic.
It must also provide for effective international in-
spection to verify the adequacy and accuracy of
this information.
4. Such a system of disclosure and verification
in successive stages would be an essential part of
the program for regulation, limitation and bal-
anced reduction of all armed forces and arma-
ments to a level which would decrease substan-
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tially the possibility of a successful aggression
and thereby decrease the chance that armed ag-
gression would be used to further national
objectives.
5. The three governments believe that a work-
able program should include criteria according
to which the size of all armed forces would be lim-
ited, the portion of national production which
could be used for military purposes would be re-
stricted, and mutually agreed national military
programs would be arrived at within the pre-
scribed limits and restrictions. The United Na-
tions plan for the international control of atomic
energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons
should continue to serve as the basis for the atomic
energy aspects of any general program for the
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of
all armaments and armed forces, unless and until
a better and more effective plan can be devised.
6. The three governments believe that discus-
sion of the program should begin now. However,
such a general program cannot be put into effect
while United Nations forces are resisting aggres-
sion in Korea. Moreover, concurrently with the
coming into effect of the program the major po-
litical issues which have divided the world can
and must be settled.
7. The three governments share with all Mem-
bers of the United Nations the responsibility to
promote world conditions in which international
peace and security are assured. They believe that
their proposals offer an opportunity for the world
to move forward toward that objective.
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: I951
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To 'ME lJENEItAl, rtSSEMBLY OF THE UNITED 1N ATIONS
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HOTEL ASTORIA
131, AVENUE DES CliA1PS-21ASEES
PARIS (8') FRANCE
Press Release #1282
November 8, 1951
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY,
THURSDAY NOVEMBER 8 1951
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED QUOTED FROM
OR USED IN ANY WAY
ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY
OF STATE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE U. S. DELEGATION TO
THE SIXTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
BEFORE THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
NOVEMBER 8, 1951
All of us are indebted to the people and the
Government of France for the excellence of the arrange-
ments for this meeting.
We moot here in Paris on her two thousandth
anniversary, We offer our congratulations and see in
the monuments of her bimillenial progress the symbol
and the promise of our United Nations which is still at
the threshold of its existence,
We, the United Nations, are young indeed, but we,
too, mark tha monuments of our progress, As Paris is a
symbol of European culture and beauty, so the United
Nations is the worldts symbol of peace. This city has
seen its wars, its strife, and its sorrows, as well as
its triumphs, Since we last met in this General Assembly,
there have been tensions and crises and armed conflict
in the world, but the cause of peace has prospered in
tangible ways.
We came into existence as an organization at the end
of a great war. Our business is peace, The victories of
peace are the victories of the United Nations wherever
they take place,
Since we last met, 48 nations have signed a peace
treaty with Japan, The way has been opened for other
nations to do the same. A long period of free negotia-
tion was crowned with success. For much of this
negotiation the mooting of many statesmen at the United
Nations offered fruitful opportunities,
These nations did not merely talk about peace, they
achieved it, Some prefer to mouth the word peace and to
oppose the reality. But the peace treaty has been con-
cluded. This is fact, not fiction, It is tangible
accomplishment, not mere empty protestation, The
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ACHESON
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2 -
signatures of many free nations on a just and unvengeful treaty
are worth far more on the balance sheet of history than the sig-
natures of those who by fraud or compulsion subscribe to vague
slogans whose promise is belied by the deeds of those who pre-
fabricate the slogansc
Those who unite for peace have also laid solid foundations
in the Report of our Collective Measures Committee, The Report
wisely stresses the need for a "mutually supporting relationship"
between the United Nations and the regional collective defensive
arrangements. This expresses well the direction in which we must
irk, and I strongly urge that we seek ways of translating this
principle into action.
If we are to carry out the Uniting for Peace Resolution which
we adopted at our last session, we must develop the capacity of
the United Nations to act Promptly and effectively in event of ag-
gression. Such preparation is important. It will do much to dis-
courage and deter potential aggressors from carrying out their
evil designs.
To carry out the Uniting for Peace Resolution effectively, we
must be prepared in case of need to muster our strength in various
parts of the world. No area should be completely unprepared to
meet aggression if it strikes.
In this part of the world where we now meet, the group of
41, nations in the Atlantic Community, acting in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, is fast building bulwarks of peace.
The Atlantic Community is building its strength in support
of the principles of the United Nations. In particular, the
Atlantic Community is building its armed strength so that free
Europe will not bo powerless in face of the armed strength of
powerful and none too peaceful neighbors. We are, as I shall
explain later in my speech, eager and anxious to discuss effective
means of reducing the burden of armaments. But we are not willing
to discuss unilateral disarmament or the holding of armaments at a
level which will guarantee the existing armed superiority of the
Soviet Union and leave free Europe powerless to meet aggression.
The nations Who believe in peace and who support the United
Nations system of collective security have now been forced to re-
verse their post-war programs of demobilization, not to threaten
their neighbors but to protect the peace of the world. They are
laying a foundation for the strength that will protect the world
against a renewal of aggression.
The structure is not complete; the world is not yet secure
against the danger of a third world war. But we have made a
beginning. The peaceful nations of the world aromore unified and
better equipped to prevent aggression than would have seemed
possible only a few years ago. Centers of defensive power have
been, and are being, built up, not only within individual states,
but to an increasing degree in mutual defense arrangements and in
the United Nations,
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ACHESON -3-
This progress will in time bring us to the threshold of a
111 new period in the affairs of the world. Then the forces of
aggression and tyranny will no longer be in a position to attack
free nations and find them helpless to resist,
The tasks presented by this stage in our efforts are as
difficult as any that statesmanship has ever been called upon to
fulfill.
They are difficult because we must at the same time build
strength and work for peace, These are not contradictory; they
are two sides of the same coin.
We Are building strength for one reason, and one reason only
--that is, because there will be no peace so long as the peaceful
nations are'weak and vulnerable, There is no way of escaping this
requirement, as the last six years have shown.
But building arms alone is not enough. We must use our '
strength with moderation and restraint. We must work for peace,
for understanding, for a reduction of tensions and differences.
We must neglect no opportunity to reduce the danger of war in
any way that is open to us, and to get on with our main job, which
is to work toward the kind of a world we want to build,
While we have worked to build up the strength of the free
/II nations, we have also been deeply concerned with the economic
and social needs of the people of the world. Much has been done
this year in international cooperation for economic and social
well-being,
Som two billion dollars of now capital have been made
available for economic and social development by private investors,
the International Bank and governmental institutions. Under the
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, experts are at work
in 43 countries,
These are merely a beginning. They point the way in which
We Mist move.
As President Truman has already stated, our rate of advance
has been impeded by the necessity of building up the defenses of
the free nations. If we can be relieved of some of this burden,
the possibilities of improving the lot of mankind should be well-
nigh limitless.
As for the future; we recognize.that there can be no lasting
peace, no real security, while hunger, disease, and despair hold
millions in their grip. Every people must have a stake in peace worth
defending.
.By the energetic application of known techniques, and even
0 without any great increase in expenditure of funds or resources,
we can make substantial inroads against poverty and famine,
We would welcome the establishment of targets setting forth
practical agricultural and industrial goals to be attained in a
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ACHESON -4-
In the field of agriculture, the Food and Agriculture Organi.
zation . has already indicated the increase needed to provide
adequate nutritional diets in the year 1960. The magnitudes
required are by no means staggering, and the advice of experts
is that the goals can be attained. The world has the natural
resources and the technical knowledge to meet these needs, and
it should be our goal to do so.
The progress which has been made during the past year in
the field of Technical Cooperation should give us encouragement
to go further. ,Time and again, there have been amazing exanpl(s
of what a few techniciansand a few simple implements -- like a
hoe and a steel-tipped plow -- can do with a few bags of seed
in countries there people have been going hungry. These examples
ought to inspire us to further effort.
I am also encouraged by the attention and study which has been
given over the past year to the problems concerning the ownership
and use of land. The report of the Secretary-General, and the
action of the Economic and ''ocial Council point the way by
which individual governments and the United Nations can provide
farmers in many parts of the world with both the incentive and
the meaig for increasing their output of food for the world.
Hand in hand with the increase infood supply must come an
increase in the worldls Ledustrial outiorte th,1-(, too, it is
not revolutimary technological dir!coveries 1,1.1.ch are required.
Even with the present rate of new investmalt, w, have the males
at hand to secure an enormous increase in proCuctive output. The
more efficient use of existing factories, mines, and tralsporta-
tion facilities could, studies indicate, boost the world's produc-
tion on the order of about 10 per cent within a relatively short
period of time.
At the same time, we should be on our Guard to see that
a fair distribution of the increased output, that would flow
from this increased productivity, results in higher wages for
workers, and in lower prices to consumers.
With this possible increase in productivity of existing plants,
and with an emphasis on the direction of new capital toward under-
takings that will add to the output of the world's supply of needed
goods, it should be possible, within a decade, to increase the
world's real annual income by more than 200 billion dollars. This
would add to the present production in the world the equivalent
of the entire productive output of the United States only four
years ago. Think what this would mean in numbers of pairs of
shoes, in clothes, housing, education and the other basic require-
ments of mankindl
This challenge, this opportunity for expanding the economy
of the world, should be one of the principal concerns of this
organization and all its members. And it could be, if the will
to peace were universal.
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ACHESON
The great constructive accomplishments in the past five years,
and those which lie before us, are the sort of international co--
operative effort in which my countrymen and those of most of you
here join wholeheartedly. This is the work we like-- to develop,
to build, to expand opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Our
country, as its history and institutions show, is dedicated to this,
But Actually what has been done--and apparently what lies before
us--must be done in the face- of obstacles made by man and undoubted-
ly made to impede progress toward peace and human welfare, Again
we have a symbol,-Korea.
Korea was the place chosen by those who plan aggression on a
world-wide scale as the scene for an imperialist blitzkrieg. The
Russian state has repeatedly in modern times tried to make Korea
a province. When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule and the
Republic of Korea was established under the auspices of the United
Nations, the Soviet Union withheld from the Republic all that part
of Korea which was under communist control. The iron curtain
clanked down on the 38th parallel. Suddenly, on June 25, 1950,
the curtain was raised to allow Soviet-armed and Soviet-trained
armies to pour across the border in their brutal assault on the
free people of Korea.
With courage and determination, the Koreans resisted the alien
aggression, resisted the familiar imperialist expansion. But as
the aggressors knew, the young Republic was not strong enough to
stand alone against an aggression so carefully planned and so
thoroughly equipped.
The aggressor did not know that the young international
organization, the United Nations, could act with unity, speed,
and eventual military superiority. But that is how it did act.
The United States is proud to have boon able to play a load-
ing part in this great practical demonstration of collective
security. Until there is peace in Korea, the United Nations will
urgently need the maximum contributions--in armed forces and in
other means--from every loyal member state. And when peace has
been restored to Korea, the United Nations must be able to marshal
the material aid of all its members in the groat task of recon-
struction and rehabilitation.
But when will there be peace? We all know that it depends
upon the will of those who support, maintain, and defend the
communist armies. At a word from them the fighting could end in
Korea. Some months ago, it seemed that the word had boon spoken.
But has it been spoken?
The United Nations Command has been negotiating since July
to try to bring about an armistice, so far without success. It is
only now that the aggressors have agreed to negotiate on the basis
of a military and not a political line, taking into account the
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We are hopeful that the achievement of an armistice in Korea
might make it possible for this Assembly to bring about a final
settlement for Korea -- a settlement which will be in accord with
the established United Nationst objectives in Korea, A settlement
such as this, if reached in good faith, could open the door to
broader consultations on other aspects of the Far Eastern situa-
tion,
There are many other areas in which the Soviet Union could
demonstrate its desire for peace in action, if it chooses to do so.
Another example can be found in the case of Germany,
A proposal has been submitted for inclusion in the Agenda
of this Assembly for the establishment of an impartial inter-
national commission under United Nations supervision to carry
out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany, The
purpose of this investigation would be to determine whether
existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely
free elections throughout these areas,
We have consistently maintained, and we continue to maintain,
that Germany should be reunified as soon as this can be brought
about on democratic lines, It must be done in a way which will
ensure there-establishment of a free Germany able to play her
part in the peaceful association of free European nations,
This is,a constructive effort, and it presents those who
claim to support the reunification of Germany with an opportunity
to prove their good ?faith,
AustriA is another example of an opportunity to demonstrate
by action a will to peace,
For more than five years now, the United Kingdom, France, the
Soviet Union, and the United States have been discussing the
conclusion of a treaty for Austria, The Four Powers have promised
the Austrian people independence, The Austrians have long ago
fulfilled all the conditions for the restoration of their complete
sovereignty, But the country is still under occupation, Here
again; the Soviet leaders can speak the word which will fulfill
their premises to Austria.
Again, in the case of Italy, the Soviet Union could fulfill
its obligations and make a contribution to the international
community by withdrawing the obstacles it has placed in the way
of Italy's entry into the United Nations,
Another example of an area in which the Soviet Union could
demonstrate its desire for peace in action is in the .field of
human rights, in which the Charter also expresses a profound
interest.
In a large area of the world_, human freedom is bein_g
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_7_
Millions of persons now work as slaves in forced labor camps,
and tens of thousands of persons are being compelled to 1Lave
their homes by mass deportations.
I would-like to cite one example of these brutal mass
deportations, because it is important for us to remember that
these are human beings and not mere statistics.
In the city of Budapest this spring thousands of innocent
and helpless families were aroused by the police at dawn and given
twenty-four hours in which to prepare for departure. With just
a few of their belongings, these people--including infants, the
sick, the aged--were transported from their homes to camps and
hovels in the country,
As one of these unhappy victims wrote, in a letter which
reached the outside world, "It is very bitter to have to dissolve
everything in the course of twenty-four hours."
The hopes of the civilized world that the mass persecutions
of the Hitler regime would never be repeated have proved to be
in vain.
Culture and religion have been made the special victims of
this tyranny. Scientists and scholars, artists and churchmen--
all are forced to conform to the single dogma of the all-powerful
state,
The result is not just sterility; it is the dangerous sub-
servience that results from thought control and makes aggression
possible.
It was a matter af proper concern to the entire world recently
when a foreign correspondent, William Oatis, honestly seeking
to report the news in Czechoslovakia, was thrown into prison with-
out a fair trial and on the flimsiest of charges. This man is
much more than an individual victim of tyranny. Ho is a reminder
to the world of how free journalism is deliberately throttled by
totalitarian regimes.
These calculated denials of basic human rights are a matter
of concern to the world community.
Let all who desire peace and talk of their pecceful intentions
demonstrate their good faith by putting an end to slavery, rather
than seeking to extend it.
But the record of the past-yeer does not reveal a single action
--and I am talking about action, not words--by the Soviet Union
that indicates it is willing to cooperate with the rest of the
world in abating tensions and the danger of war.
Their only contribution has been an artificially created
"mass movement", built around slogans of peace.
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Dospitc these slogans, the familiar methods of threat and
subversion are today used against Yugoslavia as once they wore
used against Turkey. The method of attack by guorilla forces to
upset governments is used today in Indochina as it once was in
Greece.
The Soviet Union has talked a groat deo.] about peace, but,
when it comes to achieving peace through deeds, or to uniting for
peace, they obstruct, They call for a now Five-Power Peace Pact,
but refuse to carry out our Sixty-Power Poace Pact - the Charter.
One of the most urgent of international problems is the level
of arriaments among nations.
Soviet policies have obliged the free nations to begin build-
inr up their armaments to levels necessary for their defense. But
we do not want an arms race.
We are determined to do all in our power to ensure our safety,
but we are no less determined to continue to explore, as we have
been doing for many years, every possible way of bringing about a
safe reduction of armaments.
This effort is too important to the world to leave a single
stone unturned.
A year ago, before this body, the President of the United
States proposed the merging of the two United Nations commissions
dealing with the problem of armaments. We have before us the
Report of the Committee of Twelve recommending that this hu donu.
I hope that this Assembly will approve this recommendation.
At that time also, the President expressed the determination
of the United States to find ways of bringing about control and
reduction of armaments as a moans of moving forward toward the
ultimate goal which the United Nations has sot for itself?the
goal of a peaceful world in which disagreements are settled by
peaceful Means,
He outlined the basic principles for a real, workable system
for reducing armaments and the General Assembly endorsed those,
principles. The principles are three in number:
1. Such a system must include all types of weapons
2. It must be accepted by all nations having substantial
armed forces
3. It must be based on safeguards that will ensure the
compliance of all nations -- in other words, it must
be foolproof.
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ACHESON .9-
The United States Government, together with the Governments
of France and the United Kingdom, has been studying earnestly the
real problems that must be dealt with if we are to make genuine
headway toward the reduction of armaments,
The world does not want catchwords and tricks. It does not
want propaganda gestures. It wants an honest program which will
protect the safety of free men, not a cloak for aggressive designs.
After a long period of study, we have arrived at a series of
proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction
of armaments and armed forces which meets the test of reasonableness
and feasibility. Last night the three Governments announced their
intention to submit such proposals to this Sixth Session of the
General Assembly.
We are therefore asking that a discussion of these proposals
be added to the Agenda as an item of urgency and importance.
I firmly believe that those proposals can lead to an agreed
program here in the United Nations, if all nations approach them
with good will and a sincere desire for peace.
Last night, the President of the United ,Statos discussed our
proposals in a broadcast to the Amomican people, and assured them
that we would, for our part, approach these discussions with the
most sincere desire for a successful outcome. I wish to repeat
here the essential elements of the program outlined by the,
President.
The first element is disclosure and verification on a con-
tinuing basis. It is impossible for the nations to proceed with
such a program unless each one has knowledge of what armed forces
and armaments other nations possess. This knowledge must be
continually 11110 to date. It must be full knowledge and there must
be guarantecr that the knowledge is accurate. This in turn means
that there must be a system of inspection. The national inventories
of all armed forces and armaments must be checked and verified in
each country by inspectors who are nationals of other countries
working under the United Nations. These inspectors must have the
power to find out what are the real facts.
This system of disclosure and verification must be a system
which progresses from stage to stage as each one is completed.
As our three Governments have already stated, this will mean
revealing in appropriate stages all armed forces whether military,
para-military, security or police forces, and all armaments,
whether atomic or non-atomic. The least vital information would
be disclosed first, and we would then proceed to more sensitive
areas. As I have said, each stage would be completed before the
next began, until all arms and armaments of every kind had been
included.
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ACHESON - 10 -
Since 19L9, there has been before the United Nations a proposals
supported by the United States, for a census and verification
to be carried out on a one-time basis. We are now moving forward
from that proposal in two ways. One is that while the process of
disclusure and verification is taking place, we would be working'
out the further steps of regulation, limitation and balanced reduc-
tion. And we are also proposing to alter the earlier proposal so
as to include in the syttem of disclosure all of the aspects of
atomic energy.
In short, the first step of the general progbam we are now
putting forward would be the disclosure in stages of all military
matters. This would enable us to work out specific arrangements
for the regulation limitation and balanced reduction of national
military establishments, while the process of inventory and
inspection is taking place.
Moreover -- and this is of the greatest importance -- the
continuing disclosure and verification which we propose would pro-
vide quick and certain knowledge of any violation.
In a world charged as ours is with suspicions and dangers,
our peoples want the safeguards that disclosure and verification
can provide. As we move from stage to stage, we would have
increasing evidence of fr,eed faith and honesty. We could not go
forward without that evidence.
Of course, we have always recognized that a census or dis-
closure of armed forces and armaments would not by itself bring
about the change in the military situation which the people of
the world so eagerly desire.
This leads to the second element of our proposals which i-s its
general application.
It is not enough that four or five states should agree to such
a program. It should apply at least to all members of the inter-
national community who have a substantial military potential.
We would hope that the program would 1:e universal.
The third element is the establishment of some sort of criteria
for the balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces.
These criteria, which can be worked out, would determine the
exact amounts and kinds of armaments and armed forces which each
country will finally be permitted to have.
As examples of criteria that could be considered by the United
Nations, the United Status would suggest:
First, limiting the size of all armed forces, including para-
military, security, and police forces, to a fixed percentage of
111 population?with a coiling beyond which no country could go;
Second, restricting the proportion of national production
which could be used for military purposes to an mount that would
bear a direct relation to what was needed for the armed forces
permitt?'
A013riiVaMi eiWitffilibbeildClIAW6PEliff61 eti6g6000g
be a
ceiling expresso in terms o percentage o 1-1c, a 16tM. product;
and
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ACHESON -11-
Third, developing mutual agreements as to the composition
of national military programs within the over-all limitations
and restrictions. Such mutually agreed programs should be
developed within the framework of United Nations' principles in
conferences under United Nations' auspices,
With particular respect to the control and regulation of
atomic energy, we will continue to support the United Nations'
plan as providing the most satisfactory basis, unless and until
a better and more effective plan is devised.
These are the general outlines of our proposals. They cou1,1
establish absolute limits for armed forces and armaments, adequate
for defense but not enough for aggression.
We will be prepared to explain them in greater detail when
the appropriate Committee of the Assembly takes them up for con-
sideration.
We believe that discussion of the program should begin now,
But no such general program can be put into effect while United
Nations' forces are resisting aggression in Korea. Moreover,
concurrently with the coming into effect of the program, the
major political issues which have divided the world can and must
be settled.
We pledge ourselves to do everything in our power to this
end.
If such a program could be put into effect, the immense
military expenditures which now press on nearly all peoples of
the world could be largely lifted.
The Charter of the United Nations speaks of prom-)ting "the
establishment and maintenance of international peace and security
with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and
economic resources."
At the present time, the demands of security, requiring the
use of treasure and resources for military purposes, have
necessitated in all countries the postponement of great positive
programs of reconstruction and development which had been planned
nationally and internationally,
If the world could use its resources, its skills and energies
for non-military projects, as the United States most earnestly
desires, then vast new opportunities would open up for the bettor
and happier conditions of life which all men sock.
We could then get ahead: as President Truman said last
night, with the only kind of war we seek -- the war against want
and human misery. Within developed countries, new resources for
peaceful production could be put to work, not only for their own
benefit, but to the advantage of all.
4cilt81-9;NiNstioopk9tali Oetoboio802-Flier,
millio upon mi ions 0 people are struggling wit. poverty,
hunger, and disease, the groat constructive efforts of the United
U4A,Annn,,e,,,
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ACHESON -12-
This is what could be done, if all of the nations here were
willing to serve the cause of peace by their actions.
But so long as some nations talk of peace while their
actions make for war, the free people of the world will continue
with determination and steadiness to build the full programs of
defensive strength which their security requires.
We must never cease trying to change this state of affairs.
That is why we are submitting these proposals now for
proceeding with the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction
of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic. The
United States is prepared to begin negotiations on these proposals
in the United Nations at once.
We firmly believe that a workable agreement is within our
roach, if all nations will approach this task with good faith
and a will to peace,
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TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED 1NATIONS
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HOTEL ASTORIA
131. AVENUE DES CHAMPS-ELYSEF.S
PARIS (8') FRANCE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FOR InIEDIATE RELEASE
(Provisional Transcript)
STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON,
SECRETARY OF STATE I:1D U.S . DELEGATE TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN COMMITTEE ONE, ON
DISARMAMENT
duo
press Release 1298
November 19) 1951
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
With the permission of the Committee) I should
like this morning to elaborate upon the tripartite
proposals-which were put in during the general debate
and which have ben reduced to the form of a resolu-
tion sponsor.cd by the three powers-which you have on
your desks before you this morning.
In placing these items by general consent first
on the egende of this committee, I think the Committee
has indicated the vital importance which it attaches
to them. These pr000sels are being put forward at a
time when there is in progress in the i-orld, in the
western world) one of the greatest efforts ever mcle
in peacetime to rebuild the defenees of that pert of
the ,orld in the face of very grsve threats which con-
front it.
Therefore, in putting forward these proposals)
we are doing it at a time which may seem somewhat
anomalous to some of you. In my view that is not the
case. fn my view there never Was a time in which it
was more imoortent than the present to put forward pro-
posals such as those tabled by the three powers.
I believe that these proposals if accepted could
and would produce a turnin2 point in history, a turning
point at which the world could turn beck from the
tensions, the dangers which conftoelt all of us in every
country, could relax the effort toward armament which
is going on all over the world end ty doing so could
find a way to solve some of the greatest questions which
divide East and -Test.
Therefore, the three powers attach to those pro-
posals the very greatest importance and I am happy to
see that the committee attaches the same importance
to them by placing them first upon its agenda.
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ACHESON
-2-
N-ow, in talking about these proposals, I should like to begin by
very briefly putting three questions. The first question is:
411. "In putting forward these proposals, where do we wish to go?"
The second question is "Why do we wish to go there?". The third
question is "How do we propose to get there?".
?
Where do we wish to go? We wish to go to an international system'
which will include the regulation and reduction of all arms and
all armaments of all types. We wish to go to a system which
includes all nations in the world which have substantial military
forces. We wish to go to a system which prohibits and abolishes
the use of atomic weapons. We wish to go to a system which in-
cludes safeguards by which'all of this can be done with security
to all nations involved. We wish to go to a situation in the world
in which no country will be terrified that some other country or some
other group of countries is proposing to attack it or to threaten
it or to overawe it. We wish to reach that point by bringing about
a reduction in the level of armaments, by bringing about the prohi-
bition of the atomic bomb, by bringing about a situation where
everybody knows, everybody in the world knows what the situation is
in regard to armaments and keeps on knowing it.
We wish to reach a position where we have lifted from the world
the fear of war. We wish to go to a point where we know more
about one another, where, as Mr. Schuman referred to it, the mystery
of the present situation is lifted and where there is reciprocity
in knowledge so that all countries know what all other countries
are doing.
1? 49k
We wish to help meet the reasonable demand in the world for
peace, meeting it by reducing the burden of armaments, the level
of armaments, prohibiting atomic weapons and by providing safe-
guards.
Now, why do we wish to go there? We wish to go there because
as I indicated a moment ago, the level of conflict and tension in
the world is rising to a very dangerous extent. I have mentioned
the arming of the Western world which is taking place. There is
throughout the world actual fighting going on, particularly in the
Far Eist, fighting in Korea, fighting in Indo-China, fighting in
Malaya. This is not good for the prospects of peace. Therefore
we wish to reach the goals. that I have mentioned and we wish to
reach them quickly because we believe that the tension in the
world has reached a dangerous point.
Now, how do we expect to get to the point we reach? We
expect to go there by producing practical pronosals. We are
not putting forward any easy suggestions. We are facing the
complexity and difficulty of this matter squarely and we are
going to go into it facing every problem of technology and poljti_
cal nature which is involved and laying before you the perplexities,
laying before you certain directions which we believe will be pro-
fitable, but not attempting at any point to gloss over difficulties
0 or via catchword or slogan trying to make this committee or the
world believe that things can be achieved easily in this field
of disarmament, because they can not. This is a difficult field.
It is a field which requires practical and sensible treatment.
It is a field where we get nowhere by propagandistic slogans,
where we AO birdklif (roPRifila@@ 20 6316910 YCFPAbintilkl 6168 Feb CtIfeibl0066:42-0
difficulties and finding solutions to them.
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Now the first thing which we suggest in attacking this
problem is the need for an international mechanism. Reduction
411, of the level of armaments) prohibition of the atomic bomb can
not be brought about by mere resolutions) by a mere agreement
that these things are desirable and therefore) ipso fncto) they
happen. That is not the waw 4,t can, be brought about. It can
only be brought about by paftitntly diScussing and analyzing in a
permanent body the problems which confront us.
Therefore, our first suggestion relates to item two on the
agLnda. Our first suggestion is that we should go forward in
accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Twelve
to create one commission) the powers of which are outlined in the
resolution which we put before you and in the recommendations of
the Committee of Twolvei that we should create this commission
and charge it with certainduties) giving it certain guid-ncel so
that it may get on with its tasks) with a little more direction)
as to where it is to go and how it is to get there. Theref)re) we
favor the merger of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Conven-
tional Armaments Commission.
This I say quite frankly is a chnrw_e in the position of the
United States. For some years) we thought that this woiff be a
mistake. We thought that it wcA11,2 be better to keep the two
commissions separate. But last ye4r the President announced our
decision that that was no lJnFer our view. We had thought in the
first place in reaching our earlieT conclusion that there were
such peculiar problems connected with the control of atomic energy
that it should be dealt with in a separate commission.
?
? Those problems have been dealt :with. There has been discus-'
sion in the meparate comniimsian'end thM-rePort of the.slx permanent
members-of-..the AtoMic-EnergY Commission in i94, which you remember
has stated .that: it is.no:longer profitable to continue discussiOn
in that meparate-foru.m.because these questions now must be dealt
with in a wider framework if we are ever to break the deadlock
which has unhappily existed for so long.
We had hoped also that the matter of conventional armaments
might find an almost automatic solution in the disarmament which
took place in the West through the great demobilization of l94,
1?46, 1947, but that did not occur and therefore that hope has
been frustrated and can' not be relied upon.
We had also thought at one time that the Atomic Energy
Commission was making such progress that its progress should not
be impeded by putting new problems into the same commission.
But unhappily, as I have already stated, the six permanent
members have indicated to us that that progress has stopped and
that it can only be resumed by considering these questions in
a wider framework.
We are now prepared to change our earlier view and have
changed it and urge the consolidation of the commissions and the
charging of the new commission with certain duties, goals and
responsibilities.
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ACHESON
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What are the chief elements of the plan which the three powers
have put forward? There are four principal elements. I shall run
over them and then go into each of them in some detail.
The first is an inventory, an international inventory and check-
up of arms and armaments: what is called disclosureand verification
and is the first element in this program.
The second element is disarmament to agreed levels, the reduc-
tion of all arms and all armaments to agreed levels.
The third element in these proposals is the prohibition of the
atomic bomb.
The fourth element is the creation of safeguards to make sure
that all nations are complying with the agreements into which they
would enter if these proposals are carried out and to warn the world
of any nation which is not complying with its agreements.
First of all, let us discuss this matter of disclosure and veri-
fication. At the outset, I should like to say that we believe that
the verification is more, infinitely more important than the disclo-
sure. Disclosure is important but disclosure withoutverification
is not really disclosure at all. Therefore, these must be along
with disclosure a system for verifying what is disclosed and dis-
closing other things which have not been disclosed.
This procedure of disclosure and verification must be a con-
tinuing process. It is not enough tohave it done once and then
stop, because the whole program which we are outlining here will
take some time. It can not be done overnight. Therefore, the
disclosure and the verification of the disclosures and the knowledge
of the facts must be a continuing thing so that everybody may know
at all times what is happening in this field
In talking about verification, inspection, I want frankly to
meet a situation of great difficulty. This is not an easy thing.
It is easy to say that there should be verification of what is
disclosed, that there should be inspection, but it is not an easy
thing to do and we must face that clearly and we must understand
why this thing which is difficult is so necessary.
It is so necessary because we are dealing here with the very
element of security of national states. We are dealing with the
survival of national states. In dealing with that matter, we cannot
brash important matters aside by slogans, We must understand that
we are dealing with the most serious and vital matters which any
statesmen around this table or elsewhere ever have, to deal with,
and that is the security, the survival of their countries.
Therefore, when we are discussing a program for the limitation
of armaments, we are discussing this elemental central fact of
national security and since we are doing that we can not rely upon
the statement of any country or any statesman or any officials of
any country, however friendly, however reliable they have proved in
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the past. It is not a proper thing to do -- it is not a proper
thrng for me to ask anv othar eceollntrev La ge uliprLsti-,,Ents or
disclosu4APITMAF8s7Rwm-IE*44-2 ?tAivx-11 ifi?mgyA90 uthe
iierification of those statements and I most certainly would be vary
derelict in my duty to my country, and so would every man at this
table, if he put the safety of his country upon unverified state-
ments made by nationals of other countries.
That is the situation. Thote 'ere- the actual facts which we face
and we must face them boldly and clearly and not be led away by
some slogan which says, well we could agree to do all of this and
check up on it later. We cannot do that, gentlemen. We must start
at the very outset with knowledge of what is going on and it is
only with that knowledge that we can be true to our own duties to
or own countries and embark upon this program which holds hazards
for all of us, and yet which I believe holds the greatest premises
for the future. But it must be done on the basis of knowledge and not
on the basis of mere faith in the words of officials of another
country.
Now, that is the first element. The first element is disclosure
and verification and the verification, as I have said, is the more
important of those two.
The second essential element of this program of disclosure and
verfication is that it must apply to all arms and all armaments, all
armed forces and all armaments. It cannot merely apply towhat some
nation wishes to describe as its armed forces.
For instance, let us take a mythical country which we call
country "X". Suppose that country says that its armed forces are
in the neighborhood of four million people, four million men. We
believe that the so-called regular armies are somewhere in that
neighborhood, perhaps we believe they are a little greater. But
suplose we also have reason to believe that them are between half
a million and a million people who are Calledeeither security
police or border guards or customs officials and that these additional
men are organized into military units; they have their own artillery;
they hive their own tanks; they have their own supplies; they have
their own general staffs. Suppose it is an organization not unlike
some of tae organizations which existed in Germany prior to World
War II. Are we. expected to take the word of country "X" that its
armed forces are only these four million people, which they classify
as their regular forces and that this other group, whether it be
half a million, a million, or a million and a half, are not armed
forces at all? That those are just security police and they must
be excluded from any system of disclosure and verification? Such
an attitude, of course, is impossible.
We are not the least interested in what a country calls its
armed men. It may call them an army, or a navy, or an air force,
or it may call them security police or customs guards 'or border
guards. We don't care. ? ' All of us are entitled to know how
many such people there are, whatever name they go by, what their
armaments are and where they are deployed.
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That is is what we call the system of verification and disclosure,
and it must include everything.
Also this system of verification and disclosure is, as I have
said, a difficult matter. It involves some matters which are very
secret. It involves other matters which are not so secret. How
do we propose to proceed? We propose to proceed by stages. We
propose to proceed by taking, making disclosures and having verifica-
tions of those thinFis which are less secret, what I called the other
day in my speech, somewhat to the amusement of some in this room,
those things which are less sensitive.
Now, what do I mean by least secret or least sensitive? It
does very little good to joke about the word. The point is what
is the basic element of this thought in this proposal.
It again has to do with the security of national states. There
are some things which if disclosed will be a great deal more dangerous
to the security of the state than other things. All of us know that.
Everybody around this table knows that. Therefore, in starting on
a program which is new, starting on a program which involves,
even with all the verification in the world, a considerable element
of faith, we must aart with those things which if disclosed and
verified will be less dangerous to the security of the national
states than those things which will be most dangerous, Because we
have only hope and faith to assure us that this whole system will in
effect actually work and that nations, all nations, necessary to
make lit work will in good faith make the disclosures and in good
111 faith permit the inspection.
It is for that reason and that absolutely sound ad essential
-reason that we must start with those things which are less. secret,
.,those things which if disclosed are less damcigingeto the security
of the national state and then proceed,after there has been a demon-
stration that the system can and will work and is working, to
::matters which are more secret and more damaging to the security
a -of the national state if disclosed.
We think, therefore, that In the early stages, in the beginning
? of this matter of disclosure and verification, we should disclose
? and verify first of all all types of the armed forces of a
-nation, including the paramilitary, the security and police forces,.
.and the organized reserve components of these forces together with
the conventional arms and armaments which they have, By conventional
.1 mean the least secret, the least damaging if disclosed. We believe
. that concurrently with that disclosure and verification there-are
-certain parts of the atomic field which can also be disclosed and
verified,
I need not dwell at great length upon that matter because in the
.Ato:nic Energy Commission many of you are very familiar with. those ?
-discussions -- you know perfectly well that if one says lightly why
0 'doesn't a nation disclose how.many atomic bombs it has, there
is no disclosure in any such figure that might-be given, The Atomic
Energy.Commissibn has made it.plainaover-and over andbver again that
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it is is not the energy which one has contained in a fabricated
bomb which is the important thing. What is the important thing is
the amount of fissionable material which has been produced and is
being currently produced. That is the measure of atomic armament
and not what has been put into a bomb. Therefore, if there is
going to be disclosure in the atomic field, as in the other fields,
it must begin with those things which are least secret and
damaging to the security of the state and proceed to those things
which are more secret. This has been gone over and over again
in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, so that you
know, as well as I do, that in order to get an-Ultimate'disclosure
of these essential facts, one must begin with the raw materials and
.cork on through the stages of disclosing the plants and the
capacities of the plants to the finished matter of the material
itself.
After these early stages of disclosure and verification have
been completed in the last secret fields, then we would propose
the disclosure and verification of more secret field3andthese
more secret fields include atomic energy wea,ons. Of course, they
do; they also include all other weak one which are of a highly secret
nature and your scientific and military advisors can tell you that
there are many such. It is not merely a matter of atomic energy
alone.
I wish to stress and say as vigorously as I can that the
'proposals of the United States do include in stages disclosure and
verification of atomic armaments. That again is a change in the
position of the United States. Beforelwe had taken the position
that there could be no disclosure until the whole system of control
had been set up. We are now ahanging our position and we are changing
it in the hope that that change may enable the United Nations--
through this Committee and through this effort in conjunction
with British and French delegations__ may enable
us tomake progress, successful progress toward a reduction
in armaments, the prohibitioa of atomic weapons and the disclosure
and verification of all armaments of all sorts.
Now, there has been the suggestion made that the proposal that
this should be done in stages instead of one great burst of
disclosure contains some trick. It has been suggested that the
United States,would find some reason never to go on and get to
an important part of disclosure in the atomic or secret weai-on
field. It has been suggested that those who control -- I think
that was the phrase-- those in control of a commission would pre-
vent in some way this happening. Now, if that is an attack upon
the good faith of the three powers putting forward the proposal
or if it is an attack upon the good faith of any future commission,
thet of course is a very serious thing indeed and that may indicate
that there is not a sufficient basis of international trust oven
to set up a system of disarmament. I hope that that is not what is
meant. I hope that the statement that this was a trick was made
merely in a forensic way of saying that the proposals were not clear
in certain respects and it is in the belief that that is the way
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One provision that could be I?L; in any international agreement
which would prevent any such fear, I believe, would be that the
progression from one stage to another should be an administrative
matter within the control of the Commission controlling and ad-;
ministering the disarmament agreement. In other words, it should
not be a political decision to be made by states with reserve
power in the states to make that decision. But, the agreement
should be contained in the document itself that when the Commission
is satisfied that a stage has been successfully completed, then as
an administrative decision the Commission should proceed to the
next step. That, perhaps in part, would meet the difficulty which
has been suggested.
Another obvious suggestion is that no Commission which is
charged with the administration of something as vital to the
security of every nation seated around this table as reduction of
armaments, should be controlled by any nation, whether that nation
is the Soviet Union, or the United States, or Great Britain, cr
France -- or any nation that you speak of. There should not be
such a control, and, of course, none of you would agree to such
control and none of us would ask for it;
Therefore, I think that this matter of stages does not contaill
411 a trlok. It is a matter which can be successfully handled by a Com?
mission clothed -with appropriate powers, and it is absolutely
essential, as I have said before, in beginning a vast undertaking
of the magnitude that we are proposing that it should proceed with
an accumulation of trust and confidence, so that when we reach the point
that nations are asked to make disclosures which vitally prejudice their
national security, they may have some background of successful operation of
the system against which they can rely and against which they can say to ?
their people -- this international system is actually working. Therefore,
when we make a disclosure which does prejudice the security of our country,
we are doing it because we are entitled to have faith that this system having
worked successfully so far, will work more successfully in the future . And,
we are all making these sacrifices of our national security in the great common
interest of preveng the catastrophe of a war which would destroy us all.
Now, the next important element in this matter of disclosure and
verification, is the establishment of an international inspection staff. The
form of this inspection must be international. No one can or should rely on the
nationals of a country performing the inspection in their own country. If there
is to be faith that this inspection is a sound one and that the results of it
can be relied upon, there must be no question of nationals of a country inspecting
in their own country. That is vital and fundamental. The inspection staff must
have the power and authority to find true facts. It cannot be limited to
verifying any statement which has been put in or to inspecting declared plans
only. Its duty must be to find the true facts and it must be able to go anywhere
it has to go and look at whatever it has to look at. Therefore, there must be no
limitations of any sort, both as to papers or areas, in which it may go.
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Now, this is fundamental and I think common sense to all of us here.
Most of us are familiar with the operation of the system of bank
examiners which is pretty much the same in all of our countries. It would
utterly absurd to set up a system of bank examination where the bank
examiners were allowed to look only at the statement of the bank and only
at certain boxes in the vault. You would be 100% certain that such a
system of bank examination would disclose nothing whatsoever. Because, if
there are any irregularities in a bank either by the company itself or by
employees of the company, you may be sure that those irregularities are
not going to be disclosed in the statement of the bank and not disclosed
in certain identifiable places into which the examiners are restricted.
If there are irregularities in a bank, the only way they can be discovered
is by only the most searching examination of the bank's affairs.
Similarly, in this vitally important field of arms reduction, in-
spectors mast be free to do what inspecting they think is necessary to
determine whether the tally sheets -- whether the disclosures made by the
country are complete, and whether they have covered everything within the
categories to be disclosed; and, if not, then the insp6cturs must make the
disclosures themselves. They cannot content themselves by saying this is
not complete; but.must say that this lisclosure is not correct and here are
the correct facts or the complete facts.
Then we come to the second matter in the proposal. That is the matter
of the reduction and the limitation of armed forces. So far we have been
discussing disclosure and verification. Disclosure and verification, as I
shall come to say in a moment, is something which might be dealt with first
while the rest of the proposals are being worked out by the Commission.
But, the second thing, the matter of the reduction of armed forces,
again involves certain elements. Here also the reduction of all armed forces
must apply to all forces, not merely to certain named categories. The same
examination which I gave in the matter of disclosure and verification is due
here, We cannot permit an agreement to be made which says that only regular
armed forces shall be reduced or limited, and forces known as security police
cr border guards are not limited. They must all be included in the verifica-
tion and limitation.
The second essential fact is that all countries which have any kind
of substantial military or paramilitary establishment must fall within the
system. It will not do to provide a system of reduction or limitation of
armed forces which applies only to the so-called Big Five. There are just
too many countries which have substantial military establishments to make
that possible. This agreement must therefore be open to all countries and it
must be entered into by all countries which have substantial military forces,
forces?
Now, how do we go about getting a reduction and a limitation of armed
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This has. been one of the thorniest problems .which has confronted
international bodies for the past fifty years or more. And, therefore, one of
the things which we suggest in the tripartite resolution is that the Commission
shall be directed to find, if that is possible, -- and we believe it is pos-
sible -- some criteria of general application which can be simply stated and
understood by everybody and which can form the basis upon which the agreement
shall be worked out as to the limitation of forces and the point to which they
shall be reduced.
Now, we understand perfectly well that there is no formula, no natter
how intricately and well one works, which can be applied to every country
and bring about the magic solutim. Therefore, whatever criteria are developed
are general guides and the final solution must be by agreement specifically
directed to the forces of each country. But, there are some Criteria which
we believe will reduce the solution to manageable proportions. Without such
criteria one only gots into a bargaining or horse-trading position. That is
a very difficult position from which to proceed.
In the past and at the present time all sorts of factors have been
mentioned which bear upon the armed forces which a nation might legitimately
have -- factors such as the geographical position, the area of the country,
the nature of the terrain, the length of its sea coasts and borders, whether
its frontiers are protected by natural barriers, and the size of its popula-
tion, and the amount of natural resources, communications system, and size
of industrial plants.
Now, as you see, when you begin dealing with vast factors of that sort,
one results only in utter confusion. Therefore, the task is to find some
criterion which has a certain general application and from which one can make
specific agreements as to specific countries.
Now, in searching for the criterion, I think that we must have in mind
that this is not an abstract exercise. This is not an exercise in which we
ask people to be very subtle and very complex and to juggle a lot of things
around and come out with a formula.
What do we have to do? First, we must look at the nature of the evil
we are trying to correct and then get some criterion which will be applicable
to correction of that evil. What are we worried about? What we are worried
about is that large and powerful countries and their associates may so in-
crease their armaments and armed forces that other countries will believe that
aggression is threatened and then they increase their armaments and armed
forces; and, in turn there is another increase. So, there is this rise in
the armed forces and armament S of the various countries and an increase.-- a
dangerous increase in tension. That is what we are trying to deal with.
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Therefore, how do you try to deal with it? An important way to deal
with it is to say what we are trying to achieve here, that is, an agreement
which will restrict the forces of certain countries to what is adequate for
their defense and no more. Because, if the forces are adequate for defense only
there is real assurance that they are not designed and intended for aggression.
Therefore, what sort of criteria are we looking for? One not directed
against the small country 'which is not doing any great harm in the world; but
against large countries which may be raising this danger of aggression. The
possibility of trouble breaking out between smaller countries is a serious
one, but not to be dealt with in this way. It must be dealt with in another
way. What we are now dealing with is a limitation of arms of thoSe great
countries or groupingsof countries which may increase the tension.
How does one go about that? It is clear that a criterion may have
some relation to population. That is clear because a great country has a
great many people and therefore can afford and will have a greater army than
another country. Therefore, what does population have to do with it? It may
have this: There will have to be a flat limitation beyond which no country
is permitted to go, no matter how vast its population is. It may be that this
Committee or the Commission will find some flat limitation. Very well, that
is a possible relation to population. It may be, that in regard to other
countries there can be some sort of proportion to population. That will be
difficult because any-)one of us here can readily think of countries which are
vast in territorial extent but small in population. On the other'hand, one
can think of countries small in area and very large in population. There-
fore, the"question of population is not an automatic rule at all. But it
may be a help, a guide.
Therefore, there is one field in which one can search for a criterion,
and that is the relation of population to the problem.
(
In the three-power resolution there is no reference to individual
criteria. There is no reference of what I am now talking about
some possible relation of population to criteria. We have left it out because
it seemed improper at this stage of the discussion to ask this Committee
to commit itself to any criteria. The Committee should now consider, I believe,
the possibility of finding some basis for the discussion of this problem.. There-
fore, in its debates and discussions it should indicate to the Commission \ Which
we hope will be established the direction in which to look.
Now, may I add something else. One does not solve the problem of the
numbers of armed forces even if one establishes a criterion which has some re-
lation to population, because there always will be ingenious people who try to
get around whatever rule is set up . All of you will remember that under the
Treaty ofVersailles there was a limit put upon the German army. It was set
at 100,000 men and ingeniously that number of 100,000 men was revolved so that
there were an increasing number of people who went into a trained reserve and
thus the limitation was gotten around. So, it is not enough to say that the
armed forces be limited to a certain number. And that is another area in. Which
some criterion must be developed. ME
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In another field also there is a possibility of devising a criterion.
That is in the amount of the national products which should go into armed forces
and armaments. Here again we are considering the nature of the evil and the
nature of the remedy.
Why do we suggest that the national product has something to do with it?
It has something to do with it because great countries have much larger national
products than small ones, and, therefore, the great country may put so much of
its resources into armaments that all the rest of the world is dragged along
and made to do the same thing.
Therefore, what we are seeking is a criterion which in SOM2 way will
restrain countries having vast resources to put only a certain amount into
defense and not cause the rest of the world to follow in this trend. One of the
great problems before World War II was the degree to which Germany and Japan
poured their national products into armaments. They were building up such
reserves of war materiel that the security of the rest of the world became
dangerously undermined and led to the disaster of World War II. It is that
which we are trying to prevent.
In the area of national product, we believe that some kind of ceiling
must be proposed in terms of critical materials steel, aluminum, etc. --
which may limit to the amount necessary for defense that proportion of the
national product whicbgeed.nto armed forces and armaments. Again, it is a very
difficult matter because one must draw a line between a sensible limitation
here and interference with every kind of industrial aCtivity of a Whole nation.
That would be untenable and no one would suggest that.
But there are undoubtedly some criteria in this field which will give
assurance that no more than a necessary amount of certain important materials
of the national product are going into armaments and armed forces.
Then there is a very important additional matter. I think the Com-
mission, when it studies this matter, will discover that even though it evolves
limitations on the number of people which go into the armed forces of each one
of the countries sitting around this table -- even though it evolves the limita-
tion of national products which go into this field -- there is still something
left open. That something is: how this is used within the armed forces. There
will always be ingenious people who will try to evade any kind of systam. It
has happened in the past and will happen in the future. Therefore, I believe it
will be necessary to have limitation on the number of people, and, in addition
in the amount of materiel which each of us vat put into our armed forces; there
also must be agreement on the nature of those armed forces. In other words, we
cannot leave this to a system of chance in which a group of nations might get
together and say: "Very well, we have agreed not to have more than so many mon
and so much materiel in our armed forces. How can we use this so We can be quite
a menace to the rest of the world? Shall we do this by putting it all in long-
range bombers? Or, all of it in a highly mobile armored outfit? Shall we put
all of it into submarines?"
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That should not be permitted. Therefore, when the limitations have
been evolved, each nation should be required to submit that it proposes to
do with it so that it is subject to international scrutiny. So, that if a
trick is about to be developed by any group, the rest of the nations can
say: No, you cannotdo that.. That is not necessary for your defense. We
object to that, and, therefore, it cannot be a mutually agreed upon program."
What we mean by that is a scrutiny under the aegis of the Commission of what
is proposed to be done, and that agreement is in accordance with the purposes
of the treaty.
. So much for the reduction and limitation of armaments. The propose:
also involves the prohibition of the atomic bomb. And I think there should be
no question and no doubt about that. The resolution Which you have before you,
introduced by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, begins by
saying:
"Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of
increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new
energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction
and development,
"Believing that the necessary means to this end is the develop? -
ment by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans,
under international control, for the regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction to levels adequate for defense but not for
aggression of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the
effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the
prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes only,"
and further on:
"3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to
be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all
armaments. The Commission shall be guided by the following
principles:
"(a) It is a primary objective of the United Nations to bring .
about the limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces
and all armaments to levels adequate for defense but not for
aggression and to achieve effective international control to
ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons."
Now, that is a flat, direct, and clear statement. That is the purpose
and should be the result of the efforts of the Commission proposed in this
resolution to prohibit atomic weapons.
There has been in speeches before the General Assembly, a statement made
that the plan -- the majority plan of the United Nations -- and the various
proposals and plans of the United States have not had for their purpose the
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abolition of atonic weapons -- the prohibition of atomic weapons. That
statement is wholly untrue and therefore I shall spend only a few moments
here in demonstrating that that is the case. I should like briefly to go
over the various statements and proposals which have been made to indicate
as clearly as I can both the attitude of the United States and the attitude
of the United Nations.
We begin with the statement which was made by the Prime Ministers of
Great Britain and Canada and by the President of the United States on
November 15, 1945. That, you will remember, was a proposal which waS to
be made to the United Nations to set up the Atomic Energy Commission. It
said that the Commission would be expected to make specific proposals --
a, b, c, and d. Proposal "c" was: "for the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction." That was the statement made by the three heads of governments.
It is a statement which later on was joined in by Generalithoimo Stalin on
behalf of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I think we may assume :., that state-
ment of policy that there should be the elimination from national armaments
of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
That is the first statement on this subject, the lead being taken in this
case by Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. It was joined in by
the Soviet Union and it was laid befrxe tha United Nations and the United
Nations established the Atomic Energy Commission for the purposes outlined
in the Declaration.
The next document that I should like to refer to is a letter of my
own which has been the subject of gross misrepresentation. The Secretary
of State directed that a Commission should study the practical methods for
bringing about the elimination from armaments of the atomic weapon. I
was made the Chairman of that Commission and we made our report to the
President in March, 1946. At that time I wrote a letter which has been much
misquoted. That letter transmitted our report and pointed out certain
things about it. It has been said that in this letter I stated that the
plan did not require the United States to discontinue the use of atomic
weapons. I should like to read you what I said and I shall not after that
characterize the misrepresentation of my remarks, but I shall leave that
to you. What has been quoted from my remarks are the following:
? The plan does not require that the United States shall
discontinue such manufacture (of atomic weapons) either upon
the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the inter-
national agency. At some stage in the development of the plan
this is required. But neither the plan nor our transmittal of
it should be construed as meaning that this should or should not
be done at the outset or at any specific time. That decision,
whenever made, will involve considerations of the highest policy
affecting our security, and must be made by our government under
its constitutional processes and in the light of nil the facts of
the world situation."
Mal E
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I think it is plain as? any words can be that what ny letter of trans-
mittal said was that if the United States enters into an agreement embodying
this plan, the time will come when atomic weapons cannot be manufactured and
are prohibited. But, my transmittal of this proposal does not mean that the
United States should unilaterally do that, nor the United Nations members
must unilaterally do it.
Following that proposal, the plan which the Commission of which I was
the Chairman worked upon, was turned over to other authorities in the govern-
ment for the purpose of making certain proposals to the Atomic Energy
Commission-of the United Nations. These proposals were made by Mr. Baruch
on June 14, 1946. Mr. Baruch said the following before this Commission:
'When an adequate system for.00ntripl of atomic energy, includ-
ing the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon has been agreed
upon and put into effective operation, and condign punishment
set up for the violations of the rules of control which are to
be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that:
1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
"2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms
of the treaty; and
"3. .The Authority shall boAxa.possossion of full information
as tothe know-how for the production of atomic energy."
That is the proposal of the United States in 1946 and it involves, as
you see, that the manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop when you have an
effective system for assuring that it shall stop, and existing arms shall be
disposed of in accordance with the terms of the treaty.
On July 2, 1946 another memorandum was presented by the United States,
and according to this memorandum the treaty itself should set out certain
specific provisions. The fourth of those provisions was this:
"A provision specifying the time when and the conditions under
which Lational and private possession, manufacture and use of
atomic weapons shall be outlawed. "
That was on the 2nd of July. Shortly after that the United States submitted
provisions for a suggested Charter to the Atomic Development Authority, and it
said that the Charter should contain the following purposes:
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"1) To prevent possession, Manufacture, or use of atomic
weapons for mass destruction,"
That is the record of the United States in this matter.
In 1948 the majority plan of the United Nations was put forward. It
has been stated that that plan did not provide for the abolition of atomic
weapons. Nothing could be further from the fact. The summary of that plan
which is published by the United Nations in a document entitled: "Atomic
Energy Commission Official Records, Third Year, Special Supplement", contains
the official summary of the majority plan. On page 17 of the document, the
official summary states:
"As an integral part of such a comprehensive system for con?
trol, the treaty would:
"1. Prohibit the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic
weapons by all nations being a party thereto and by all persons
under their jurisdiction.
112. Provide for the disposal of any existing stocks of
atomic weapons and for the proper use of nuclear fuel adaptable
in weapons."
? That ie the United Nations statement of the proposals of its own majority
report.
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Finally, in 1949, as a result of General Assembly action,
the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission were
asked to meet and consider what would be done to bring about the
effective control of atomic energy. It was within that report
that the six permanent members stated, as I said earlier, that
it was of no use going forward in the Atomic Energy Commission,
that this discussion would have to be conducted in a wider frame.
They repeated that the majority of the commission had attempted
to bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons, and they say
the following:
In their view, the Soviet proposals would not only fail
to provide the security required but they would be so in-
adequate as to be dangerous. They would delude the peop13 of
the world into thinking that atomic energy was being con-
trolled when in fact it was not. On the other hand, under
the approved plan the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons
would rest not only on the pledge of each nation but no
nation would be permitted to possess themeans with which
weadons could be made. Furthermore, the government of the
Soviet Union took an improbable stand as regards the question
of timing or stages by which prohibition and control could
be brought into effect.
Now, I go into this recitation of past history because what .I
wish to say is that not only did the United States proposals pro-
vide for the prohibition of the atomic bomb, but the United Nations
proposals did so also, and the proposals which are before this
committee now also make that provision. I wishto prove what I have
said is correct and not rely upon any forensic distortions of
the record to make what I nay a. ppear to be true. It is true.
It is true that the United States proposals have from the start
attenpted to bring about the prohibition of the atomic- bomb. It
is true that the proposals of the majority of the Atomic Energy
Commission of the United Nations did the same thing. It is true
that the proposals made by the three powers here today are to
bring about theprohibition of the atomic weapon, Those are facts.
We have talked about verification and disclosure. We have
talked about reduction and limitation of armed forces. We have
discussed the prohibition of the atomic weapon, all df which are con-
tained in these proposals. It remains to speak briefly about
the necessity for safeguards.
Many of the observations which I made in connection with inspec-
tion under verification and the verification of the disclosures
is true here. The same principles apply, The same principles that
these safeguards require the inspection of men who are nationals
of countries other than the one being inspected. It requires also
that all nations must come into this agreement and that the inspec-
tion must take place in every nation. It is true also that this
must be done through and by the United Nations. It is a United
Nations function and it can be done best by and under the aegis
illof the United Nations.
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I shall not repeat all the things that I have said under the
heading of verification, but they are all of the most vital
importance and we go back again to one idea with which I began
and which must run all through our discussion, that is, that we are
dealing with matters of the most vital importance to our national
security.
We cannot, therefore, rely on promises. That is not to
disparage a promise, but it is to say that we can not rely upon
anything except the knowledge of fact. Therefore, if we put into
effect, all of us put into effect, a 'system of reduction and limita-
tion of armaments we must h;--?ve safeguards. We must know that this
is being done in every country. We must know if any country violates
what it is supposed to do because we will be required to take
immediate steps either to bring about a correction of the trans-
gression or to look toour own security. Therefore, this matter
of safeguards is absolutely essential and is basic, fundamental
in any proposal which we would support.
Well, how, then can these proposals be worked out and put into
effect? On this there may be many ideas and the views of my own
government and its representativec here are very flexible, indeed,
and will be very influenced by the discussion and the ideas of
other members of this Committee.
The Commission which is spoken of in these proposals will have,
of coarse, the same main elements of its work that we have already
ben discussing. It will have to work out provisions for disclosure
and verification. It will have to work out provisions for the
international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic
weapons. It will have to work out criteria or provisions for limit-
ing armed forces and armaments, attaching schedules and details of
that. It will have to work out provisions for a continuing inter-
national agency for the supervision of the work which it will have
established.
There are two main ways in which the commission might con-
ceive of its task and either one of these ways would be wholly
agreeable to the United States. One way might be to say that the
Commission might say let us put our energies first upon the estab-
lishment of a system of disclosure and inspection disclosure
and verification. Let us get that work out and let us get that
into operation and that in turn will greatly help the subsequent
steps of limitation and prohibition of atomic weaLons.
That is one way the Commission might go about it. Or the
Commission might say it is better to do all of this at one timer
that is, to work out the system for inspection, disclosure, work out t
tho system for reduction of armaments, work out the system for the -
prohlabition of atomic wea,ons and work out the continuing safeguards--
do that all at once in a series of treaties, perhaps, and then ask
the nations to act upon them all at the same time.
That might be the way to do it. As I say, it is satisfactory
to the United States to do it either way.
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In some ways it seems preferrable to put into effect the
system of disclosure and verification first, but that is a matter
in which we will adjust our views to the views of others.
When the Commission has reached its conclusions on this and
when it has formulated proposals which could be put into treaties
of this sort, then we contemplate that the United Nations would
call a conference or conferences of all nations who would be
involved in this matter -- all of them -- to consider the proposals
elaborated by the Commission. All nations must be in. There can
not be any nationswith importantmilitary establishments which
are left out because the system will not work if that is so. It
would be, in our judgment, quite futile tocall a conference of
some 50, 60, 70, 80 nati ns with no proposals of any sort elaborated
for their consideration. That would just create a tower of Babel.
Nothing would be accomplished.
If this Commission will go ahead painstakingly and work out
proposals then these can be considered either seriatim or altogether.,
so that the nations involved with the proposals before them can sit
down in a conference and work out treaties to put these into
effect.
Quite clearly that conference will have to establish, perhaps,
a series of bodies. It will certainly have to establish one
continuing international bodyto carry on the various inspections
and provide the safeguards and also to continually review the
agreements which have been reached on the limitation of armaments.
Some of these agreements may turn out in practice to be wrong
one way or another. They may turn out tobe too large or too
small and there should be some machinery for the adjustment of this
matter upon proper showing.
One such body will be necessary. It may be that several will
be necessary. Perhaps one to conduct tha verification of the dis-
closures and another to supervise the reduction of armaments or
perhaps those two could ultimately become one. But, thatis the
method by which this would be put into effect.
Now, what is the relation between these proposals and other
events which go on in the world? There is, of course, a very
close relation.
It is quite clear, for instance, that there can be no system,
no general treaty for the reduction of armaments can go on and be
put into effect while fighting is going on, for instance, in Korea.
It is utterly absurd to think that it makes any sense for nations
to be saying well we must reduce our armaments when we are trying
to conduct this resistance to aggression in Korea. It is quite
obvious that no plan can be put into effect while that situation
continues, but perhaps that is not a practical difficulty because
we are all hopeful that that fighting will be over much sooner than
any of these difficult questions can be worked out. But, that
would be fundamental.
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There is a relation between putting into operation some of
these matters and the solution of other problems. That is obvious.
Any sensible man must see that. There is no reason in the world
why we can not begin at once to work out all these treaties and
all these proposals. There is no reason if actual fighting can
be stopped why the system of disclosure and verification cannot
be put into effect. When it comes toreducing armaments, there
must obviously be some connection between the solution of great
problems, the reduction of tensions and the reduction of armaments.
That does not mean that we are suggesting that there are
any unexpressed conditions that -L.-Lis problem or that problem or some
other problem must be solved before this goes into effect. Eut,
it is saying that if we arehonest, if we are stating what is true
and if we are not making slogans or not making propaganda we will
say that if,at the time this system of reduction of armamens is
worked out, we are in a period of highly mounting tensions and
additional frictions throughout the world; it is highly unlikely
that nations would enter into a system of armaments reduction.
On the other hand, the very working out of such a system,
the very working out and implementation of disclosure and verifica_
tion will in itself help to reduce these tensions and help us to
find solutions for problems which now seem very difficult to us.
So what I say is, in candor and in honesty we must say that
there is a direct relation between the ability to put into effect
a system of disarmament and the international temperature. If
the international temperature is approaching the boiling point,
few things are possible. If it has reduced so that solutions of
problems are on the way and are quite possible, then disarmament
becomes a wholly different thing so far as the immediate future
is concerned.
I believe, my country believes, our delegation believes that
the inauguration of such a system will in and of itself, as I said
at the outset of my remarks, furnish a turning point in history,
a point from which the world can turn away from tension and the
danger of war and turn toward cooperation for the establishment
of peace.
Gentlemen, T have taken perhaps too much of your time to out-
line these proposals. I wish to say to you in concluding that these
proposals are not ends in themselves. There is no magic in them
which by itself con solve the troubles of this very grievously
stricken world. They are proposals which may be a key to solutions
in the future. They are proposals which in my estimation open up
a broad highway along which we can all march together to find solu-
tions to our problems, to reduce the tensions and difficulties
between us, to move toward peace, toward cooperation and away from
the very dangerous rapids which all of us can see before us. We
can follow that broad, clear path, or 1:.:e can turn aside into the
dark and noisesome alleys of propaganda and bickering and assertion
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411 ACHESON -20-
and counter-assertions. We can fritter away the hope af the world.
We can fritter it away into little small advantages that arc taken
of one another here and there for minor and really silly purposes.
Or we can seize this great opportunity before us. My country is
willing to seize it. Our colleagues in France and Great Britain
are willing to se ize it v:ith us. I believe that around this table
there are scores of delegates who are willing to seize it .also.
The great question is are all of us ready to do this.? Are there
enough of us to seize this opportunity, to turn from the dangers
of the world into a path of peace? That is what this debate will
disclose.
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3ENERAL
iSSEMBLY
LI/Z111
A/L.25
Af 12 Jtnuary 1952
Sixth session
Agenda items. 66 and. 16
REMLATION0 LIMITATION AND 3ALANOM REDUCTION OF AL
-ARMED FORCES. AND .ALL ARMAMENTS; ID.ITERN.ATIONAL
CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY ?
. ..
ORIGINAL: MqGLISH
Dual Distribution
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at .its 358th
. plenary meeting on 11 January 1952.
(adopted on the resort of the First Committee (A/2025))
The General. Aetembly,
Moved by anxiety at the general lack of -confidence plaguing the ,world: and.:
leading to the burden of. increasing armaments and the fear: of .war,,
Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this ,burden an& this fear,
. and thus to liberate.new allergies and resources for positive programMes of-
, .
-'reconstruction and., development,
Reaffirming. Its desire that the United Nations ?develop ,an.:effective
collective security system to maintain the peace an& that the;arthedlarces a0k.
armaments'Ofthe world. be progressively reduced 'in accordance with the Purposes
and Principles of the Charter,.
Believing-that'a.necespary means to this end is the developmentby,the
United:Nations:of,cOmPrehensive and co,ordinated plans, under international
control, for the regulation, limitation and. balanced reduction of all armed_ forces:
and. all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass ,
destruction, and, for the effective international control of-atomibenergy to
ensure the prohibition of?atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy-for
"peaceful purposes only,
.Recognizin,i: that a genuine system for disarmament- must include all kings of
armed forces andarialaMents, must be accepted by all natiOns:mhbse-,military
i -resources' Are_siich'ithat their failure to accept Would. endanger :the: system, an
must Include safeguards that will ensure the compliance :Of. all suchnations,
/
/Noting -the
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Noting the recommendation of the Comaittee of Twelve established by-
. resolution 496 .(V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission
to;parry, forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission .
and the COMMiS4011 for Conventional Armaments,
1. Establishes under the .Security Council a Disarmament Commission, This
-Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and. the
Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall functiOnuncler the rules
procedure of the Atomic Energy CommiseionWith'euchifications as the Commission
shall deem necessary,
2, :IlisaolVes.the Atomic Energy Commission and-recommends,tothe Security,.
Council that,itjlissOlvethe Commission for ConventiOnai:Armaments;
3. Direcie-thej)isarmament Commission to prepare .proposals to be embodied
draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction.ofall :armed forces and 411 armaments, fortheelimination,14:.alLmajor'
weapons,adaPtabie-tolmass destruction, and for effective control of
atomic energy:A?. ensure the prohibitiOnr.of:atomiCaPonsandtWusp:of.atomic
?
energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission:?shalIbe guided by the
?
following principles:
(a) In a ,system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive ,
disclosure andorerification on a continuing basis of:aItarmed.forces,-including
para-military, security and police forces - and all armaments :including atomic;
(b) Such Verification must be based on effective international inspection ,
to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed;? this inspection
? .?
to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of,the'international control
organ (or organs) to' be established;
(c) The CoMmission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for
control that may be put forward invOlving either conventional,armaments or atomic
energy, Unless a better or no less effective system is devisedlotho.:United Nations,
plan for the international control of atomic energy andithe%prohibition,of atomic
weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of
atomic"?energy,,to' ensure the.prohibition%of atomic weaponskand%:theuSe,Ofatopdc
energy for,rappf6Ijurposes only;.,
(d):::Th:ei4gSt:be. an adequate system. of safeguardEptOZensure:Ohser,Vande
he disarmadent4rogramme, ao-aatO.provide for the prompt of-deteCtion- , ...? , , ...?..
. .. ?. ,
1, 1.
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Page 3
violations while at-the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in
the internal life of each country;
(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open'to'all Stats for.,,
signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide
what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall.'
enter' into force; '
J/1
4. Directs the.Commission, when preparing the proposals referred' to in the,,'
-v!
preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for 'the establishment, within the
framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs),
to ensure the implementation.of the treaty (or treaties), The functions and
powers of the control organAor organs) shall be defined in the treaty which
establishes it;
5. Directs the Commission, in preparing .the.proposals referred to in,
paragraph 3 above,;tO'Conaider from the cut-set _plans for larogressiie and
continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized
as a first and indispensable step in carrying cut the disarmament 'programme'
envisaged in 'the present resolution;
6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;
(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces
and all armamentsan be calculated and fixed;
(b) To consider methods according to which Statee:Canagreeby negotiation
among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission:, :concerningthe
determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referted,ton,
sub-paragraph (a)above andothe allocation within their.respectivenational
Military establishments of the permitted national armed'forces and armaments;
7. Directs the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days
from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periOdicallyi.for,
information,- td'tlie 'Security Council and to the General-Aasembly,:pr. to the ,
Members of the United Nations When the General Assemblyis,notHWsession...
Commission shall submit it first report mit later thanJUne 1952;
?-;
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8. Declares that a conference of all States should be convened to
consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission
as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to ?a point where
in the judgment. of the Commission any-part of its programme is ready for.
,submission to .governments;
, 9. Requests the Secretary-General to convene suah a conference when so
advised by the Commission;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff an
facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective
accomplishment of the purposes
of the present resolution. ?
?
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LIN LTE D N ACT IONS
r3ENERAL
ASSEMBLY
GENERAL
A/2068
18 January 1952
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN.
Sixth session Dual Distribution
Agenda Item 67
MEASURES TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF A NEW WORLD WAR .
AND.TO STRENGIEEN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG THE NATIONS
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft resolution
1. The General Assembly declares participation in the aggressive Atlantic
bloc and- the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of
.America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territories incompatible
with membership of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly recognizes it to be essential that:
(a) The countries taking part in the Korean war should imnediately
end military operations, conclude an armistice and withdraw their forces from
the. 38th parallel within a period of ten days;
(b) All foreign troops and also foreign volunteer units should be
withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months.
3. The General Assembly, considering the use of atomic weapons, as
weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance
with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of
.the United Nations, proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons
and the. establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of
this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons
and the institution of international control shall be put into effect
simultaneously.
The General Assembly instructs the Disarmament Commission to prepare
and submit to the Security Council not later than 1 June 1952, for its con-
sideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation
of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the
cessation of their production, the use of already-manufactured atomic bombs
exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international
control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.
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Page 2
4. The General Assembly recommends the permanent members of the Security
Council -- the United States of Atherica, the United Kingdom, France, China and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- to reduce the armaments and armed
forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation
by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption.
5. The General Assembly recommends that forthwith, and in any case not
later then one month after the adoption by the .General Assembly of the decisions
on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the
armaments and armed forces of the five Powers, all, States should submit complete
official data on the sitliation of their armaments and armed forces, including
data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. These data
shall be submitted with reference to the situation obtaining at the time when
.
the above-mentioned decisions are adopted by the General Assembly.
6. The General Assembly recommends the establishment within the frame-
work of the Security Council of an international control organ, the functions
of which shall be to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the
prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces,
Fnd to verify the data submitted by States regarding the situation of their
armaMents and armed forces.
With a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees
for the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of
atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments, the international control organ
shall have the right to conduct inspection en a continuing basis; but it shall
not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.
7. The General Assembly calls upon the governments of all States, both
Members of the United Nations and those not at present in the Qrganization, to
consider at a_ world conference the question of the substantial reduction of
armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for
prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the
observance of such prohibition.
The General Assembly recommends that the above-mentioned world
conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and in any case not
later than 15 July 1952.
8. The General Assembly calls upon the United States of America, the
United Kingdom, France, Chine and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact,
and to combine their efforts for the achievement of this high and noble aim.
The General 1:.ssembly also calls upon all other peace-loving States
to join in the peace pact.
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Sixth session
Agenda item 67
LIMITED
A/L.57
21 January 1952
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Dual Distribution
MEASURES TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF A NEW WORLD WAR
AND TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AAM FRIENDSHIP AMONG THE NATIONS
Resolution udopted by the General Assembly at its 363rd
plenary meeting on 19 January 1952 .
5.dopted on the report of the First Committee 611206717
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution adopted at its 358th plenary meeting on 11 January
19521/, which established a Disarmament Commission and authorized it to consider
all proposals designed to achieve the reglAlation,? limitation and balanced
reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including effective
international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic
weapons,
1. Decides to refer to tho Disarmament Commission the proposals contained in
paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive of document A/C.1/698, together with any other
proposals which may be made during the present session of the General Assembly
on matters falling within the ter.t.* of reference of the Disarmament Commission;
2. Decides also transmit to the Disarmament Commission for kts information
the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this item was discussed.
1/ Document 4-t/L.25.
P/52-392
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(
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UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT
COMMISSION
PROGRAMME OF, WORK ADOPTIIP BY THE DI ? T COMMIS. ION AT ITS
EIGHTH M7TING ON 28 *ARCH 1952
Discloaure and. verification of all armaments, inclur Dag atomic
armhments, and of all armed forces.
, .
l3. Regulation of all. armaments and. armed, forces, includ ng:
-
? 1. Elimination of atomic weapons and, control of ate %Ix energy
with a view to ensuring their elimination;
_ Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and ct citrol with
, a view to ensuring their elimination; .
.3. %Limitation and balanced reduction of all other aiz laments and
of all, armed. forces, and. control of this limitatio..
and. reduction.
Procedure and, timetable for giving effect to the disarms lent programme.
Points A and. B to be studied concurrently in the first at' go of the
Commission's work.
AppeoNled Fa!' efeaSi ti
UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT
COMMISSION
GENERAL
? DC/C .2/1
5 April 1952
_4Z4ISH
?Committee
WORKING PAPE2 SUBMETTIED BY TEEIMPRESELITATIVE OF 92Ea
Timm sTAM ON 5 APL 1952
Pro osals 'for Prorixessite and. Continuing Discloeure and;
Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments
?
INTRODUCTION
. . The General Assembly resOlution calling. for -regulation limita.tion.and.
balanced. reduction of all armed. forces and. armaments -directs that the ?omission
be guided. by a number of Principles including the fo1l:3:011g;
. (Operative paragraph 3)
"(a). In a system of guaranteed. cusantarnent there must be progressive
disclosure and. verificatton on a continuing basis of all armed forces -
including para-military, security and police forces - and. all armaments
including atomic;
".(b) Such vertfica.tion must be based. on effective international inspection
to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the taformation disclosed; this.
inspection to be carried out in accordance' with the decisions of the
international control organ (or organs) to be established."
Operative paragraph 5,of the resolution reads as follows: '
"5; Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred. to in
paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive
ami continuing disclosUraand-verification, the, implementation Of which
is recognized. as a first and. indispensable step in carrying out the,
disarmament programme envisaged. in the present resolution.
It is therefore. apparent thatrtheLGeneral Assembly resolution contemplates
? . ? . _ - . .
that the, newly created.' Disar;mathent -gailAtfision should. as -a tatter of. priority Idea
with the problem of progressive and. Continuing: disclosure and.30r if lea t Ian of
-? . . _
armed. forces and artgamantb.
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A. Extent of Disclosure and. Verification
The system' of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis;
DiSclosure is of a particular date on 6. "one time basis" and. subsequent
-verification Of such disclosure would. not meet the requirements of a continuing
programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed. forceS,
Therefore it is contemplated that - the rnachtnery which will be sot up should be
on a permanent Or at least 6. long term basis, since, the disclosure and.
verification of 'armed forces and. armaments will be on a continuing basis.
? The disclosure mist cover all aimed forces of every kind, including
parai?military, security and. police forces and. all armaments including atomic.
3 The ?verification of armed force6 and armaments must likewise cover all
armed. forces of every kind. -including para-military, security and. police forces
aiic1 all armaments including atomic.
Iv. The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate safeguard
Under a competent international authority having appropriate status, rights and
powers.
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B. Stages of-Discloaure and Verification
Disclosure and verificaticn must be carried out step -by Step with
appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and 'only when-
previous steps have been satisfactorily completed.: The reasons for proceeding
by staos are two: ?
(1) In the existing state of international tensions all states must he
protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the system of
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of axMaments. The existence
of stages gives all states the opportunity over a period of time to teat
the gond faith of all other stateS. The mere agreement to enter intn'a
system for disclosure and verlfication would give no assurance that the
parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all. With
disclosure and verification-in several stages and with each ste:' nf One
stage completed prior to the commencement of the-neXt-stage, all States
have the opportunity at periodic interTals- of checking the good faith Of
other States through review of the information theretofore disclosed.
(b) It is contemplatedithat the disclosure and verification would proceed
from the less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in early
stages to the more secret areas. A phasing cf this nature in addition to
furnishing the best test. of the good faith of all States would cause the
minimum degree ')f interference in the internal life of each country, since
the lees sensitive inforMation can in fact be more readily- verifiedl and
would, in cases Of differences or delays, prevent premature diselosure of
information which many Stateis would like reserved until substantial
0-operatinn and good faith has been demonstrated'.
6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States had as
its objective the full implementation of the programme of disclosure and
verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of
International tensions. An. excessive number of stages, each of which-must be
completed prior to the commencement of- the next stage, would unduly delay not -
tnly the programme of diaclosure and verification'but also the .exadre programme
' for regulation limitation and balanced reduction' of armed forces and armaments.
With this in mind, the United States concluded and it proposing that the number
/of stages
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ef stages of :disclosure and. verificationshould be five a figure wh:ich
represents the :minimum number consiStent with the considerations 'set forth in
the previous paragraph, In each stage, the discloeure aa verification
processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in erder
to accelerate the successful completion nf the programme.
7, Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and armaments
(excluding atomic) to be disclesed in the respective stages and. the Manner of
verification of the Information required to he disclosed, -Annex II sets forth
the same information with respect to atomic armaments.' The proposals with
respect to atomic weapons are presented in a separate annex solely In the
interests of clarity of presentation. 'Both the problems involved and the
appropriate terminology With respect to atomic weapons differ so rrxeatly from
the problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a Single annex
Comprehending both might be confUsing. It is Contemplated that all stages of .
disclosure and verification co-ver both atomic non7atomicweapons. In
other words, the first stage inqludes'the:Items set forth both in Annex I and
in Annex II for disclosure and verification in that stage and the same is true
As to all succeeding stages.
e, Without_sommenting In detail at this: point on the specific 'items subject
to disclosure and verification in the respective stages', it should he noted.
that the armed fercesiand armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have
three general characteristics:
(a) They should prove to be the least secret items.
(b) , In the:mainl.they are toot susceptible of verification by periodic
visits of inspection and through reference- to statistical records with
the result that verification can take place with the MinimUst of -
interference In the internal life of the respective countries, SOM15
resort would nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot" inspection, and
aerial reconnaissancewould be required in all stages to assist in'ohedking
the adequacy of' the disclosure.
(c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the
military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification
as provided in this stage in and of itself would act as an indication of
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fourth and fifth staged 'are progressively more secret and more difficult to
verify except through "onthe-opot" inrostigations In 'Conjunction with extensive
aerial recormaissance.
10. The character of the Items to be disclosed, and verifie& Lathe five Stages
as outlined in:Annexes I and 11 can in general be surnarized as follows:
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goo& faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ultimate
goals of the entire programme of regulation, limitation:and balance&
reduction of all armed forces and. armaments.
The armed foroes-and armaMents to .be disclosed- in the second, third,
Stage II.
Stage III.
Stagp IV.
A quantitatiVe count in the nature of a report on existing
strength levels of all armed forces and of the lobs:tic:a of
Installations and facilities concerned with armaments ct all
typos including atomic.
Detailed disclosure of organization of armed. forces and of
Installations and facilities concerned with the basic material
required for production of all armaments including atomic.
Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel armaments),
fissionable material and installationS-and facilities utilized
their production. .
Detailed disclosure of installations and facilities utilized ir
the production,of novel armaments including atoMic (armaments
not in general use by the end of the second World War-but in
.volume production today). .
. Stage V. Detailed disclosure of mvel armaments including atomic.'
11. 'The information to be disclosed and verified in all stages - and
particularly in the early stages - is OQ vast that there,appear to. be advantageL
In disclosing material' only at the rate at which it can be Trocessed.
Therefore, in general within each stage, disclosure should proceed progressively
atop by step in accordance with an agreed plan frm the less sensitive
information to that which is mere sensitive.
Jo. I4ans:)qt,INI
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C. 'nal:section
12, The aystem.Of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the
system of safeguards which, must be established to ensure,observance_of the
coverallprogramme,of regulation, limitation and, balanced reduction of_armed
forces andarmaments,so as to providefor_the.prompt detection of violations
while,at:theeame time causing the:mlninumkdegres of interference in the .
internal life of each country. It will not be adequate t9 Provide merely for
.the verification?of discictsed?informaticn,. In addition, provision must bp made
,
for determining the adequacy of the 400losed.informatim4 througkbroad.,
general pOwers pf?7on,thel..epot". inspaCtion, through access to statistical data
permitting independent confirmation o' required reports and through aerial
surVeYs.
13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification
procedure in Order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed informatim
It win be obvious that aerial reconnaieSance furnishes the easiest method of 110
determining the existence of large undiselosed'facilitiesand installations.
Aerial survey will be essential in all 'Stages of the disclosure and verificatiot
proCedure.:
It is contemplated that,7on-the-Spot.inspection will take clace in all
Stages as a part of the Verification Proceaure. Its use,:however, will be less
extensive in the first than in the later stages because of the. greater ease of
verification through other methods of the itema disclosed' in the first stage,,
'will of course be necessatrat each stage to regulate inspection in: such a
way as to prevent disclosure of' information which is to be. withheld fram.
disclosure and verification during the particular stage. Certain principles
governing:limitationson the right.of."on-the-spoe inspections in early stages
are set forth in Annexes I and: II.
15. Each state at the commencement of each stage should submit to the
Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities
falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to Such locations,
reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed should be granted to,
Inspectors. Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a
411
.previously acCepted plan.
16. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the
internatiMveMUSIsieldfAVOT: menglagwwions P4-ci
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facilities be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national
territory in order that the Commiesibn may determine within reasonable limits
the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accerdingly, each
State should be required during each stage :of the,process of disclosure and
ver!.fication to permit the International inepectors such freedom of movement
and to give them access to suchinstallatienS and faeilitiee, records and data
as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimension
of all facilities and installations wherever situated
17. Each state should facilitate the activities of the international
inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably roquire.
18. Proeeduro should be set up in order to permit a determination by the
Commission of the necessity for inspection of any facilitieSinstallations
access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the
inspectors such inspection is required.
19. The Inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating
a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting
disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination
confirmed by the Security Counciln by the Affirmative vote of any seven Members.
of such a major violation during an stage and the failure of the stte guilt
of violation to repair the: same within a reasonable anecified peric.1, ether
states should be free, to euspend the operatione of the discloeere eed
verification system.
20. The first stage of disclosure and verification shculd cemmence.upon
(a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the programm. of.
disclosure and verification and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the
General Assembly'reeolutien, and (b) the establishment pursuant te such
treaties of international machinery responsible for carrying out the programme
of disclosure and verification including the portion el' such machinery locate&
within the territory of states adhering to the programme.
21.. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first -stage
could eommence upon a COmmlesion determination that the previous stage has
been satisfactorily completed.
/D. Miscellaneous
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D. Miscellaneous
22. The United Nations should edtabliih cohoUrrently with and. at the time of
the adoption of the general prinCiges goVerning this programme the necessary
inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed forces
armaments, including those involving atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to
programme. In establishing this machinery, consideration should be given
its subsequent utilization to supervise the programme for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The
machinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably
be utilized in connexion with the disclosure and. verification of armaments
involving atomic energy. The problem of appropriate United Nations machinery
both for purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and for the
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of arbed forces and armaments is
the subject of a separate study.
23. It is contemplated that the disclosure
respect to all adhering states should begin
at approximately the saw tempo.
24. The draft troaties or agreements bringing into effect the
and
the
to
and verification processes with
simultaneously and should go forward
disclosure
and.
verification system should specifically provide for .adherence of states in
accordance with the principles set forth in paragraph 5 of the Preamble and
paragraph 3(e) of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:
Paragraph 5 of Preamble
"Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament must be accepted 17
all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept
would endanger the system ?"
Paragraph 3(e)
"The treaty (or treaties) shall ,specifically be open to all states for
signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty ;or treaties) ..ehalI provide
what states must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall
enter into force."
- ANNEX I
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Disclose
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(a)
(b)
Verify (a)
(a) and (b)
extent neces
declared. A
.extent.
Disclose
Verify
ANNE I
Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification
Armed Forces and. Ar:Laments
Stage
Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forcerl
and para-military organizations, including training establichn'
and security and police forces, broken down into each category
Location of all operational military installations.
By examination and cross-checks of central records to include
personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by
access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.
By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and
physical dimensions of installations.
- inspectors will have access to entire national territory to
sary to determine that all facilities and installations have been
erial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same
Stage II
Organizationj composition and disposition of units making up
over-all strengths disclosed in Stage
Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments
to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.
By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel,
movement of units and administrative support supplemented by
access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records
access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to
materials used.
(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.
Disclose
Stage III
(a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up
over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II except units
equipped with novel weapons.)
/(b) Production
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Verify
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b) Production facilities for-manufacture of weapons and heavy
equipment for units making up overo,all strengths disclosed
in Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location,
type and capacity.
(a)
By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of
organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of
equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected
, units-and installations,
(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination
of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials,
available labour force, and finances, and by-access to and spot
checks of selected units and installations,
(a) a (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.
Disclose
(a)
Sta5e IV,
Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons
to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological
warfare and .atomic weapons,.
. .
(b) Installationis and :facilities devoted to manufacture of novel
weapons,
Verify (a) By cross checks with Stages I arid I/ and quantitative inspection
of units disclosed.
(b) By inspection of physi.041,41mPPsiOne Pf.plants_andexamination
of records pertaining to conSumption of power and raw Materials,
available, labour force, and finances) and:by.access to and spot
checks., of selected unite and Installations;,,_
(a) and.(b) by aerit4,survey as set-forth ,in p...a845 1,
Disclose
(a)
. Stage v
Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.
ir,sEtzr (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross
checked with Information disclosed in Stages I, II, III and IV.
/ANNIE II
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ANNEX II
Proposed States of Disclosure and Verification
Atomic Armaments
Stage I
Disclose (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with
production of atomic energy, or the product of which is
primarily useful in the production of atomic energy.
Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power
input of each installation, (Excluding weapon storage
sites).
Verify
(b)
Uses or functions of these installations. This should
be confined to a statement giving the input material, the
produce material and the process used in each instance.
By direct examination, location, manpower used, power
Input and physical dimensions of installations,
(Inspectors will have access to entire national
territory to the extent necessary to determine through
such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and
railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations
have been declared).
Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination
of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior
inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the
particular stage in -which it will take place depending upon
the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will
be of value as partial verification of plant use or function).
(a) ,and (b) - by aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to
same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-atomic armaments.
(See Annex I).
'Disclose
(a)
Stage II
Details of design and operation, including present and past
output, of all those installations or parts of installations
concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed
materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy
water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including
reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear
conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable
material.
/Verify
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Verify
Disclose
(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the .
installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with
Stage II
Stage III
) Detai3,0 Of design and:Operation, including present and past
outtiut:of'all those atomic energy installations, or parts
.of installations., concerned. With the, conversion of feed
?materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with
the:Preparation of radloactiv*materials in large quantities.
Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on
hand or in process; amolints and types of radioisotopes on
hand. or in process. " '
(b),
(0)
Verify (a)
. (b)
(0)
Disclose
(a)
'Verify (a
Disclose (a)
Verify .(a)
General detign and operationaicharacteriatics of research
laboratories involving :reactors operating at a power level
14 1 MW or more, inC1411iAg amounts .of radioactive, or
fissionable or fusionable materials produced.
. ,
:By direot and detailed: iAtyection of all aspects the
,installationd and appropriate records. Cross checks with
Stages I and II.
By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or
fusionabie material, orradioactive-materials installations
for production thereof' and appropriate records.
By survey of,facilities associated with reported reactors,
by det4iled inspection of. 'reactors themselves.
?
'.Stape IV
n,
Details of design and Operation, including'past and ,
present output of all those atomic energy establishments
and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic
or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.
By direct and"detailed.inspection f installations and
appropriate records.. Cross checks with: Stages I, II and.' III.
Location, numbers, And typec6,f atomic and radioactive
weapons on hand. Weapon storage sitet
By direct inspection. Cross-checks with Stages I, II and
III and (a) above.
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T - SCURITY I FORNATIp;
Ap
u0427 PliPtre
Suggestions re Praline to be *red.
G-eneral Views of the U.S. "
U.S.Position on Soviet Proposals for
Prohibition of daf
I Armed Ford.* and
Non-Atosirminente
eq. Dettntt.to,x and Liste
(None)
tat
t
RAC OM) D-la
RAC (NS) D-2a
View of US Concerning Determination of Over-all
Limits and Restriotions en all Armed Forces
and All Armaments, Including Atomic Weapons
Proposals for Numerioal Limitatien of
Armed Forces
13.-Bibiatsul
The Establishm
Control Organs
(None)
U.
of Internatio al
tomic Energy
/II - General Questions
h eded
(Nona)
agd Ay eponiviition of Plan
Prooedure an T 'met able for Gavin
DIsansement Progru
DAC D-6
DAC D-8
DAC D.Sa
DAC D-7
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an,
- ki17.20.2.1trelk Alastati
Aw SM. ttaltvirelta../S4-2219,4111q .
1. Armed forces. inolynion of pars...military. security and pollee
forces, trained =germs, dofinition of VADO
2. Definition or list of standard armraestoi
3. Definition or list of other weapons
? 4., Definition oraiste of -basic materiels Vseabli,.*Milesively0L
prinsurily or saibetanttaili fox' the menufacture oferS0MOW:e.
Iiii&.4.4.2A and A.1.1mttos.21_,Arm_e4 Fames snd Armmmmatqs::
1. Determination of maxima permitted levels of natiOnal irmcd
foroees (References DAC D.6)
(a) Criteria and factors to be considered and relatiVe:sMight
?to be 8iven them;
(1) Pastors relating to the comtry. population, silo,
geographical features, etc.,
(2) RelationshiP of country to regional and other
political groupings,
(3). Defense by metropolitan powers of their monioloilf..
governing and trustterritoriee,
(b) Methods of adjustment of permitted levels to reflect changes
in conditions,
Determination ofmalimus persitted levels and kinds of armaments
(References DAC D.6):.
ON
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(a) Oriteria
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determining =dram pernitted levels
(b tot tr determining maxima permitted prod/Jo.
tion of ntanftzd annfimmtm. re:VItionahlp to gross national
produatm. ad;h1tmmt for proaduation:for permitted export to
idaraLMINII---Arx"-U-'?.1:22V-V54---AnEateS
Dttormination amd spnbronimtian of stages to reach permittal
levels*
1, Disoleuure and verification (both a safeguard and a
,partial precondition to the institution of a control syetash
2, Nature of ether contro1s.. supervision onnageosoto
Ounership, destructioni
3. Points in the economy at uhich controls must be appliod.o.
stages In the proceasing of essential basic materials and stages
(A) Controls
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Be
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Gentram Wier international eommerce in armaments emd in
materials used excl=ively, primarily or a/abstention for orsemetntee
5. latelinationAl onams for implerentation...-, mature, oompewdont
size of personnel, location, financing, methods of reaching decislonli
relationship to existing Z5 organs; (Rea DAO.Dis)Q
6, Determination of what censtitutes minor and major violations;
metheds of .reaching decision on violations and pcmiebnent; types of
pumishmentte be tweed*
XS. tttxgp.ftggtt
ReaPPraisal of Ulf atomic 'energy plan to determine possible improvements
and degree of flexibility lu details* (First, Second and Third Deports of
VS AZO)
1,, What fOrther Wet-cation and research is neocssery to
provide adequate basis for intelligent resolution of the above peoblems?
2. Bow should the elements of the disclosure and verification
system, the =atomic energy plans and plane for limitation and control
in the non.atomic field be synchronised, 10e.? what is the desirable'
time.table and what flexibility is possible in the sequential relation.
ships? (Ref, 1A04)
30 What segmente (if ax) ea comprehensive plan Cantle
segregated and put forward in the Disamemmmat Commission separately
at least in general terms in the immediate future? (Rafe MOW)
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. CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION
RAC (NS)-D4a
DAC D-4a
April 11, 1952
EXECUrtilL COMMITTEE ON THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS
General Views of. tk, United ;tates concerning ftegu3tation.
,imitation mg Balanced Reduction ot Armecl Forces ani Armaments
The attached paper contains the following revisions,
1. Paragraph 4(a) has been rewritten to conform to suggestions
made at the first RAC meeting on April 9. The language is now in
substantial conformity with that used in the United States proposals
to the British and French made last October which have been approved
by the President.
2. An additional clause has been added to paragraph 4(b) to make
the language conform to that used in the original United States
disarmament proposals of last October?
3. The language of paragraph 6 of the Annex has been slightly
amended in accordance with suggestions of the Department of Defense.
4. Certain extremely minor word changes have been made.
?
It is understood that upon informal clearance of this paper by
Mt. Nash of the Department of Defense and Mr. Nickerson of the Departs.
went of State, it will become a cleared RAC paper to serve as general
guidance for the U. S. representative on the Disarmament Commission.
Leonard J.-Horwits
Secretary of DAC
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Vientg ga tja gnitid ?StiN esulatias,
Iiimitption oft Zan of Armed Fsmo FA imam*
?? In trolid btxtlinea ths united States -views are as follows:
1. An ad 1,0140
The ultimate objestive 0 the united States in.making proposals for
reduction of armed formes and armaments is an open and relatively disarmed
world.
? By an open world we wan one where all States will have sufficient
knowledge of. the :Lotions of other States so that etsoossatal aggression against
another Stet* would be impossible.
By a relatively disarmed world, we mean one Where armed forces and ?
armaments are tr. International agroemencreduced to levels:
(a) Necessary for the maintenance of internal order.
(b) Appropriate: for individual and collective action in accordance
with the United Natisima Charter, in such an open end relatively disarmed
world.
The first and baldamental step in the settaiment of an open world is
the establishment of a syntax for the disclosure and verification of all
armed forces .and armaments ? which is the subjoet of spa:iris U. S
2.
4.k
praposalso
'14%1
The attainment of a relatively disarmed world will require effective
international contrel of atomic energy to ensure the ollaisation from
national moments of atatto weapons and the *so of steeds energy for ?
lartelt*
peasohl
This paper is intended as general guidence fbr the 0.3?Representatitve
on the Disarmament Cemmission, and not fer outaisaion as a U. 3.
position &a the OIS48?101to.
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peaceful purposes purposes only. To accomplish this aim, the United States will
continue to support the UN plan for control of atomic energy unless and
until a better or no less effective plan is devised.
30 Wective elimination sat: weapons, cambia uf:mesa destrqption.
The attainment of a relatively disarmed world will require effective
elimination from national armaments of all weapons capable of Mass destruc*
'ion with adequate safeguards to ensure that such elimination will in fact
take place.
4? fiffective limitation gni balanced, reductiou Q1 armed, forces ail,
other armaments.
The attainment of a relatively, disarmed world will require effective
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all other
armaments to those necessary in an open and relatively disarmed world as
here defined. This will require all the great powers to reduce materiallY
and some drastically their armed forces. andarmament.e. time precluding
mass armed forces. This should involve a reduction much more comprehensive
in its scope than a proposal for a one-third reduction limited to the
Great Powers. The first steps towards reduction in armed forces and
armaments (other than atomic weapons and Weapons adaptable to mass
destruction) should be:
(a) Agreement to limit the size of armed forces, including para..
military and security forces, for each country to an agreed maximum figure
beyond Which that country cannot go but to which it need not necessarily
raise its armed forces. In determining such maximum figures consideration
might
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might to given to limiting armed forces to a fixed percentage of popula-
1
tion. Such agreed maximum figures for the Great Powers and possibly for other
States should be radically less than their present armed forces, and within
these limits the levels of the armed forces of all States should be calculated
in such a manner as to prevent imbalances of power inareao of possible
tension.
(0 Agreement that the armaments of the allowed armed forces should
be confined to those reasonably required for such armed farces in an open
and relatively disarmed world ea defined in paragraph 1 above' thus resulting
in-limitations of armaments comparable to those of armed forces.
Attached as Annex 4 are certain general principles concerning limitation
and reduction heretofore presented to the. United Nationstehich support and
expand the views set forth above.
5. Foolproof gatem4a.
?Mile principles relating to the reduction of armed forces and armaments
should be considered immediately and,if possible, agreement on principles
should be obtained as expeditiously as possible, progress in the implementa?
tion of such agreements depends upon the establishment of foolproof safe?
gUardt which will ensure that the agreements will infect be carried out.
The most important of those safeguards presently proposed are:
(a) The progressive and continuing disclosure and verification
system, covering all armed forces and all armaments;
(b) The UN plan for control of a tont* energy,
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Qinfag itaustain
1. Any system far the regulations limitation and balanced redo.-
tion of armed Aims and armaments must embrace all kinds of mod foresee
including parasailitary and security tomes and all armaments, including
atomic, rteneral Assembly Resolution A/L?25, 12 January 3952 Preamble
paragraph 5 and Operative paragraph 37
2. Thin system oust be accepted by all. States whose saltery
resourose are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system*
The States falling *within this category should be deteralned in the treaty
Car treaties) which pit into effect the disarmament system and which should
mini& that the treaty will not enter into faros until these nations are
designated therein. general Asseiably Resolution A/L?25 32 January 1952,
Preamble paragraph 3, Operative paragraph 3(9)7
36 The principal objective of the system Dir regulation and
reduction should be to bring about balanced redaction of all lamed feress
and all armaments. By Rbelaneed reduction* is meant reduction which (1)
applies to al]. States with substantial military powers not merely to a
few great powers, and (Li) which seeks to rodeo Awned farina and armaments
in such allUIDer as to make remote the possibility mf sucoessfa aggreedee
,by State es grouping of States. z.neral Assembly Resolution A/L?259
12 January 19520 Preamble pexagraple 4 and 5, Operative paragraph 3; Trim
partite Statement* 7 November 1952, paragraph
40 Sodalities arid limitation of armed Throes aed armemente *hada
premed by progressive stages, with edentate safeguards at sash stage to
eases
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ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed and to provide
for the prompt detection of violations, while at the mme time causing
the Minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each State.
Aneral Assembly Resolution A/L.25 12 January 1952, Preamble paragraphs
. 3 and 5, Operative paragraph 3W7
5. The concepts uponwhich the system for limitation and reduction
is based should be as simple and practicable as possible. Statement by
Secretary of State of the U.S., in Political Committee of the General
Assembly, 19 November 1951, Department of State Bulletin Vol. XXV, No. 649,
December 3, 1951,44 840
6. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation, apart
from the major international tensions existing in the world. There is an
obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues,
thereduction of tensions, and the limitation and reduction of armed forces
and armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of the
disarmament program, the major political issues between the Great Powers
should be settled. However, agreement upon plans for a system of limita
tion and reduction of armed forces and armaments should measurably reduce
these major political issues and facilitate their solution. Lfripartite
Statement, 7 November 1951, paragraph 6; Statement by President Truman,
7 November 1951, Department of State Bulletin Vol. 1XV, No. 647, November 19,
1951, pp 801-80e
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(b uhioh
ti=s for
properationa ler - -taro
oult
, Ix? .tittiob al
am0 refl t Ar.
(a)
(b) th,a
doelt.
e &ub te011art
onauv
p-z.41-zu3.nr.
!-7.27 t7::' )17
that atcolo
all in 17 trt4ant3 ociaptablo to mato
Such Int,
ra5oivendoon
rrituumt? Ixtelur
m4t'i% Dative
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Ths attaoded paper, redrart of= (ES) D;2
rreting of RAC on April 9th and iB being ritt
Representative on tbe DisarEsment Cormisslon for ge
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OL)
Ict Sir o7a alcIer,,k. _en LI to
CCI., .e g.o ''ne questi ; o 75,elat ion of t;
eerfare (eee)s, ta1,r.11.11111,1; of tlea use or bacteriolngdezel
liCtp( d the. caUin te aerteure ehose veto violate the ban on bactere
ielec,acel wer are.* Reeerdleee of the epereelatenese of the=
(reactions fee eczwidezatiori by the rieeememerie. Ocerdasion, we can expect
centinuing Seviet references ti the subSont in future Comical=
meetinge. Purthervores, it mem apperee, that the Soviets are making
t'ecs qu.estian of a spiohibitirig ccerecntion* Efa the theme of their
major croagenda effert for this year* awl that they trill use the
World Peace Ccx.nci1 cseetiage in Oslo te .furthr3r their objeetivea as
they ;lees in the pact in ceneeetion with ir cry for a *prohibiting
coy/cation* for etorde weapeee,, el7ele pregarela attacks the
Soviets can be ceepeoted to paint to such feete es the United States
refusal to 'atift the 3.925 Ceova Fvotcc1 far -t.ho prohibition or the
une in war of etephyzciating, poleonoue oreeteee gasees, awl of boater..
ielogical weapons of warfare. They wAll to ay that they
aro willing to "prohibit* auch "char,lefull, now but that the
Unitsel Statect,, though dezering its use La Koeyex is utreilling to atato
that it or:popes the lee* of BK. The Seele,ee iU untoubtedly constantly
repeat, the charm that the peat cad pre=nt, pc,cition of t..,Niz United
State e reepezt to BW :thaw that th.c, 1.....1-...-11?Lt government in 'wee
paring to uze
The See:lets will make an, al t effort in the Comedesien to
force the United States e as well the 01;11'31" Coareiseion members -
tc take a peer:A.0n OA theu(13t.toll of a cnnvantien 1,prohibiting"BL
It is therefore eacanearyto decide whet our efesition ahead be ani
upon what? gre-xyli . vs should take c.'?-tr starcL, Becaune of the nature of
the Soviet appreech to the out,leet, coneideredon in this pp er hen
Leen centered en theprorixA!:am.4:E., af3-irantagoa anti disadvantages of the
available alt,?11ative positions and on the taat,ical iiplicationa of
each in the elearmament Convraseiea diem-el:11one,, '
The rubjeet of e:/.54-49.t10.17 of Es LU0,3-4-taill3.,y be ruieed iii
the CeillniOSIOil under item B2 of the plan, of weeks entit1e:14 "Elimie
eatioe,of weep:els of mess destrectien ere ecetrel with a view to
eesue.le.g eleteination*, The Unitse tt hes cone/ stently
tekon ke poeitiort that the subject, of iV?lorYt apreweintely be
considered UXY,a02^ such, a Yee...Ileee,
There
4
62*W, ?VC*.AZISAr Yr"'
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There would s
might takei:
Agree to the draft4ng of a co
immediate "prohibition" of
2. Agree to the elimination of
general pregraMMO of regulat'.
reduction of *rued Amoco anti,
Ann Ist asitillas
&Iowa travniziatt sg,
the United States.
Providing for the
Safeguards;
- of an effective
7...,.miteLelon and balanced
ream:As, including atomic.
Apart from the probable vitel so -y 1,riplicAiOneof thie alter-
native - with which we do not deal in thie eepar - we abet recognize the
fact that this position could and nnque8tieneh4would be used as a
tactic to undermine seriously our position on atomic energy control in.
'particular, as well as our generZpopitien that sefeguards'must accompany
any programme of armament control. We have ineisted that prevision; for
adequate safeguerds must accompany any agreement in the atomic energy
field, In advocating a grogram for regnlation, limitation and -balanced
roduation of all armed forces and .armaments, we are taking the same
general position in the non-atomic field. Uwe were to agree to a
"prohibiting treaty" on BR without insisting on adequate safeguards,
the Soviets undaubtedly would pose the question of why we are unwillisg
to agree to the sane procedure for atomic energy or for chemical warfare.
or for the reduction of armed forces. It would lend immeasurable support
to the general Soviet contention that paper prohibitions, which we
believe to be terthless, should precede efforts to achieve agreement OU
effective safeguards. This would not only prejudice our position on '
atomic energy and on our general approach to the problemS of disarmament,
but would also tend to delude the worldwith the misconception that real
progress was being made,
ilhazzaetaell-ilarsakiztAtglialaa2r. met:gads
alLeS-VAIMICZE.21.raciaati9.%=tai-99-WklIan...gdr....Sagaedu
2itaMit202,1212-.1t110.-WinZa2,11.11.9-,.
An essential aspect of this position - as With other parts of the
general program of regulation and control - is the institution of
adequate safegthards. The technical safeguards connected with Wwould
differ from those of atomic energy in that different materials and
techniques would be involved. However the first and all. important
safeguard for BW? as for most non-atMic weapons, roast be an open world.
WM, S'?CDRITT xgrovaTtott
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The
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The osrt,abliehmeut of the,
itop in the field of
r,rtf,t.',,;:xtarest such a.
'on is the
_Othcr
bc desi.rable errl can be
In additiont the second eat
tactfi,caldimdVanbageepres
At the saw time,
the Uilitcd Ztat es on di
etr,J, pGrition with res
.S.S coni '75th the gentral position of
eu : c.,-1:1 leave us in a reasonably
to f7,1:? 11,7e 2o sande efforts.
'TzAri
eata r71 ?
arri Elfth stageo. If th,3
ii
until thc..1
SC irilla%'r;7F,:i. i;hat ovule, ;;;"c,Drkfc,'?
? up tr.)
fax:
to
Tiu. r - remain Fs:civial; icvera,,,nde charge
?.L tee iv in fa iv; '1;ca-ohl.bi;;;ion" of W.
:Cra rptrrL1 t,73o .,c:t defense acaine':, be to evy.imsfoe the
the Sovi :too 7; la eh iv a
pal,%raz and tha Clin7..te0
cor4a4-1 viith obtbininc; ;:,itiNgivrtfiu tf;-?;-a I.,:v?ffreCol-G.,lortIn
,.
thia A ction, tha T.Tnitef:4 atateo. ::47r,.-0,11. ? t. ird 11,-vort. of
the Uit....r.ted Nations Atomic 7:nora, Ccmi 11017 pettorno of
intermtlonal cooperation L.,,agi the .5U.]izrt?-.3 of Op921r195Sin the
,3ne ermztry '.pensib1e in the
field. el toulle energy mijht practice,pi.. th3 way for international
ci:/nii bre,'dor fie2d:4 for ',",7..te cov,:.-aT,s3, of other wenpme of mass
and -even for tha eliraftion of likr itself as an instrument
of nPAticn,:a policyn. The poii:O.; f.0.3011:1d f2A:'71t:',1:ii:10' is that the perioi
cif dAczare end wsrification9 whiAt trcufl e;caT,Diali tha postponements
would Ltu z.ssoseray ordcz to dets%nino 'ho reltwarst facts end to
acbi7o the open world teccosLry effeol;i7c onfoguards, In addition,
Tye sho,:14.1 ,:;(1,r.,thitarl to atretic, the inzt that, 171thollt the necessary safe-
guarde,, ne:Uo7,, et212 be mi.:tested to ,..tbandon ret;ocizeh in 1317s for ouch
reseezch :13 the 0:7.74 Man* by which nationu dorise defenses against
its uae possible aggrescces.
With to to tact,..4:al al ..,tion the Counissiozto the
second a?,ternative is infocTra-d w?h cur i..pneral thesis that the various
issues connected vith disarmament a,ermament control rust be treated
as inter-re4ated olomonts of tt
cir?
thA states would live.
is cesential the
-a it ? -ssible
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2.1291nAmo:
The United States should reject the approach involved in Alternative I
and should agree to the elimination of BW ns a part of a general program
of reguletion? limitation and balsnced reduction of armed forces and
armaments, including atoalco As In, the case of atomic weapons, the
4prohibitionn of BV1 an pmpesed by the Soviet Union could talv place
only when eit,ination is in fact possible through th; eateblialunent of
an effective ot of aeoguards to ensure thnt an agraerent will be
more than a paper promi5e,
?
?
SE= PECURITX, MORMATIOI
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CONFIDENTIAL
geourity Information;
D0,0-6
14 April 1952
WORKING amp ON PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
Draft Pa r on General ViBWIS of the United States Obncern
Dete nat on o r LC a en str ct one on
orces an A
if
nts
nclu uo Ato. c T.apona
The Attached draft paper is distributed for the information of members
of DAC, for the purpose of considering the paper at a future meeting of
the Working Group. &Wan comments should be directed to Howard Meyers,
UNP, Room 6104 New State Building.
Leonard J. Horwitz
Secretary
Attachment
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DAC -D-
Anril 14, 1952
GENERAL VIEWS OR
0 - ?
0 0 ON
?7.
I. Atomic Energy, Control.
1. There should be effective international control of atomic energy
to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes only.
2. While not prejudging any proposals which May be presented, the
United States believes that, unless a better or no less effective System
is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of
atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to
serve as the basie'for the international control of atomic energy to en-
sure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes only.
CERNING-DETERNINATIOK
II. Limitation and Reduction of all Armed Forces and Armaments.
ommemmErmr.........1..rs
A. General Principles.
1. Any system for the regulation, limitation and balanced re-
duction of armed forces and armaments must embrace all kinds of
armed forces, including pare-military and security,forceS, and all
armaments, including atomic. 3
2. This system must be accepted by all states 'Shoo military'
resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the
system. The states falling within this. category Should be deter-
mined in the treaty (or treaties) which put into effect the disarma-
ment system. and which should provide that the treaty will not enter
into force until these nations are designated therein.
3. The principal objective of the votes for regulation and
rednction should be to bring about balanced reduction of all armed
forces and all 'armaments. By "balanced reduction" is meant reduction
which (i) applies to all states with substantial mIlitary power, not
merely to a few great powers, and (ii) which seeks to reduce armed
forces and armaments in such manner as to make remote the possibility
of successful aggression by any state or grouping of states. -
4. Reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments
should Proceed by progreseive stages, with adequate safeguards at
? ? ? ?
? .. ?
each
?
?
CONPIDEN 413CLURITX DIE
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- 2 -
each stage to ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed
and to provide for the prompt detection of violations, while at the
sane time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal
life of each state.
5. The concepts upon which the system for imitation and reduc-
tiowis based should be as simple and practicable as possible.
6. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation,
apart from the major international tensions existing in the world.
There is an obvious Connection between the solution of current major
political issues, the reduction of tensions and the limitation and
reduction of armed fordes and armaments. Consequently, concurrently
with coming into effect of the disarmament program, the ma** political
issues between the Great Powers should be settled. However, agree-
ment upon plans for a system of limitatiomand reduction of armed
forces and armaments should measurably reduce these major political
issues and facilitate their solution.
B. Specific Considerations,
' lb The concept of "qualitative disarmament" (lim(tation as to
form or functional cheracteriatics, or qualities) does not appear. to '
be a precticable_area of examination when taken by mos. Thm
principal characteristic of this concept is an attempt to draw a
distinction between "aggressive" or "offensive" weeponeof greater
utility to attack and "defenaive" weapons of great utility to. defense.
In fact, the principal element in the concept of qualitative disarma-
ment Would seem to be the intent with which such weapons are Used,
and not the inherent nature Of the weapons. Any weapon can be employed
.either Offensively or defensively, depending upon whether the nation.
using such weapons is mounting orA.s resisting aggression.
?
2. Similarly, demilitarization of specified areas or zones'
("geographic disarmament"), control of_privatemenufacture and sale
of armaments, and limitation as to the necessity ,or desirability of
uie do not appear practicabIe.approaches when considered by them=.,
selvei. They form part of. the general question, and if considered
in isolation tend to Complicate the problem of finding simple and
generally applicable means to limit and reduce armed forme and.
armaments.
3. Armed Forces.
The key factor in the problem of reduction and limitation
appears to be the size of armed forces available to states. If these
forces are reduced on a balanced basis in such way as to make the
possibility of successfui.eggression remote then it should be corre-
spondingly easier to limit and reduce the armaments supporting these
armed forces. Accordingly, the following approach might be practicable:
(A) ' Powers
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3 ,
60 Powers Possessing Groat ?hLtlitary Strength. China,
France, thrUlirthdlcingdom, the unitedStates, and the USW
should be in one cntegorY. It is recognised that a bewildering
nuMber of factors must be considered -- such as length of sea-
coast, terrain, length of common border with other states,
strategic position, area, whether frontiers are protected by
natural -barriers, natural resources, industrial plant, etc.'
These factors, although they may be considered. to a greater or
lesser degree in Agreeing upon the permitted levels of armed.
forces, are all subordinate to one principal element but will ?
prevent uso.or? that principal element as the sole bees for. an
automatic formula. That principal element is population.
Accordingly, a percentage of the total population of a state
would be. the starting-point-in determining the permitted level
of armed forces. In arriving at this poptilation figure, non-
self-governing territories administered by. tho Metropolitan ,
power should be included, sines the defense of these territories.
is a responsibility of the metropolitan power. When such terri-
tories become self-governing, their population need no longer
be included with that or the metropolitan area 0 they Will
probably provide their own defense.,
Accordingly, it suggested that the two following formulae
might be considered as bases for discussion:
(1) The armed forces of the Great Powers might be
limited initially by taking such a percentage as, soy,
1% of the total population However, there should be a
maximum limitation on,buch forces, in order to ensure that
there is an actual reduction in size and in order toetrive
for that balanced reduction which is bn Objective set by
the general Assembly. Therefore, the maximum limit of these
armed forces might be set as, for instance, 1,500,000.
(2) Alternatively, in order to recognize the differ-
ences between the population of the mdtrOpolitan and non-
self-governing territories with regard to their role in the
defense of the interests of the metropolitan power,. Ulm
suggested that the population of the non-self-governing
areas might be given a different percentage weight in esti-
mating the size or Armed forcet. Thus, the armed forces
permitted betause of this population might be, as'an.oxamPie,
A of 1%.
tm thie.baSis? a formula which might be et:maiden&
for discussion in reducing the armed forces of the Great
Powers is to take 0 of the total -metropolitan population
and of 1% for the population of the non-self-governing
territoriee administered by the metropolitan 'power.
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llowever,-there Should be a maxiiiiiiiiimttation on
such forces, in order to ensure that there is an actual
reduction in size and in order to strive for that balanced
reduction which is an objective set by the General Assembly.
Therefore, the maximum limit of these armed forces might
be set as, for instance, 1,500,000.
To illustrate concretely the difference in a rthad forces under the
formulae, the following chart may be useful:
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? China
? USSR (including Ukraine
and Byelor-Russia)
o. France
RaiWolitan France
(plus Algeria):
overseas Territories
excluding Indochina
? ? linAtsd_l_tiz_nn:
a
Non-Self-Governing
Territories
e. United States
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Estimated
Population
_ 5 _
(Total)
Permitted Armed Forces
Alternative (1) Alternative (2)
10500,000
463.493,418
194,490,385
1,500,000
1,500000
50,226,000)
(1%-502,260)
41,456,000)
91,682,000
916,820
(i of 1%-1030640?
50,368,455)
(11-5030684)
88.515,511)
a of 11-221,289)
13808839,966
- 1,388,840
151,132,000
1,500,000
1,5009000
605
724,973'
1,500,000
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(B) To dispose of countries other than the five Great
Powers, a somewhat different concept is needed to obtain a
balanced reduction. For this purpose, it is suggested that
the concept of regional disarmament might be the beet approach.
This would be directed towards obtaining a balance in a geo-
graphic region of the morlds.seeking to ensure that successful
aggression would be most difficult if not impossible to acco.plish.
Accotlingly? the world might be divided into the following regions:
Europe
Middle East
Africa
Far East
. North America
Central and South America
Regional conferences might be called under the auspices
of the Disarmament Commission-, to work out and agree upon the
limitation and reduction of armed forces in that region. At
such conferences, the five Great Powers might be represented,
in view of their global interests in disarmament. Such an
approach Would be consistent with the General Asseinbly direc-
tion, in paragraph 6(b) of Re5olution.A/L25, 12 January1952,
to "consider methods according to which States can agree by
negotiation awing themselves, under the auspices of the Commis,
sioni concerning the determination of the over-all limits and
restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the. .
allocation Within their respective national military establish-
ments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments".
? In apy event,. it is suggested that armed forces within
each region for each Country might be limited so that they
would be no morethan, for instance, I% of population:with a
maximum of 1 million men.
Attached ae Annex A is a chart showing estimated population
within these regions and armed forces of these countries based
on the I%-1 million concept for each individual country.
(C) The limitations suggested above are initial targets.
It is suggested that further reduction of permitted armed forces
might be made when substantial progress is actleved on any or
all of the following:
-(1) The program for progressive and continuing dis-
closure and Verification;
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(2) The
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- 7 .
(2) The program for effective international control
of atomic energy to endure prohibition of atomic weapons
and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;
(3) Agreement on forces available for collective
measures under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter,
or extension of agreements Under the "Uniting for Peace"
resolution (UN Doc.. A/1481? 3 November 1950). ?
4. Allocation of Armed Forces Dithin National Military
Establishments. On a preliminary basis, it is suggeefed that the
Dr?sarmam?erirro'imtission should not attempt itself to allocate per-
mitted armed forces within national armed services. However, alloca-
tion of forces to the air, naval and land establishments will be
required to a certain extent in order to maintain the concept of
balanced reduction, which implies prohibiting excessive concentra-
tihn on any one armed. service. This allocation depends on a con-
geries of factors so varying in the case of each country as to make
the working out of a satisfactory formula exceedingly difficult if
not impoisiblo. One way of solving this problem night be for the
,Disarmament Commission to recommend that undue concentration of
permitted armed forces in any one armed service is contrary to the.
concept of balanced reduction, and that national plans for allocating
armed forces to the respective service eetablishMents should be
approved by the Disarmament Commission only insofar at neceesary,to
decide that there is no undue concentration upon one or another of
the armed services. One*, there has been agreement on the concept
of reducing armed forcee,,a4 suggested iffparagraph 3 above) and
once the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and veri-
fication has been put into effect, then any undue concentration by
a state on one armed service to the virtual exclusion of other'
alined sPrvices would be. noted at once and would be a warning which
would bring to a halt the entire system of limitation ahd.reduction,
unless a valid explanation was reteived. Concentration withaat
satisfactory explanation, in other words, would be the Prelude to
rearmament. Under this concept, the allocation Of permitted. -national
armed forces within the respective air, land andnaval establishments
would be a matter to be determined by each country for Wolf, subject
to approval by the Disarmament Commission regarding the one question
of undue concentration-of forces in any one armed service.
Alternately, if the Disarmament Commission does not believe.
that this concept should be adhered to, it is suggestegthat the
matter of allocation be left to bilateral negotiation by individual
states falling in the category of states with substantial military
power. In effect, these states,would have to justifytheir own.,
allocation at permitted armed fordes to satisfy all other states in
this 'category.
5. Armamen s
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5. Armaments.
,The suggestions made 'herein precede from the presumptions
that atomic weapons should be eliminated and that Some'satisfectory
?means may be found to eliminate all, major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction, in accordance with the mandate of the General AseembIY,
establishing the Disarmament Commission and setting forth its tasks.
Thus, armaments should be keyed to permitted manpower.' Further, it
is assumed that an adequate system of continuing disclosure and veri-
fication will have been put into effect at the time reductions in
military establishments take places so that this,system:will give
warning of any undue build-up of armaments. 'Accordingly, the fol-
lowing formulae are suggested as alternatives:
(a) 'Standard armaments sufficient to support permitted
armed forces as allocated within each state, plus reserve stocks
adequate for replacement under normal peacetime-use. What
constitutes standard armaments is to be agreed 'upon by the, ?
five Great Powers, and might be subject to revision periodically
say every five years. . -
(b) A formula' similar to "a" abovet'except that the atm.-
ments allowed should be determined by bilateral treatise between
those individual states considered as having'substantiallailitary
power.
Oa National Industrial Production Devoted to Armaments
. It is clear that the industrial might of a country is a
key factor in military strength. However, any limitation which would
hamper production for peaceful purposes should be avoided. In fact,
it is to be hoped that one Of the benefits of a disarmament program
would *the ability to devote industrial. Production to expanding
standards of living throughout the World and to aiding destressed
areas. Sayings Accrued:frosidisartament might be channeled into-.
world-wide programs of reconstruction And development. TWA, hamper-
ing nitional industrial production would defeat .5? prindiParmeans,
of helping bringsabbut conditions aiding international peace and.
security_through creating and developing conditions Of economic and
social stability in the World. ?
Consequently, it would seem logical to limit that portion of
national industrial production which supports its own armed establish-
ments only to the extent necessary to ensurethat no more' armaments
are produced than are needed by such national armed establishments.
However,
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However, in order to provide for those instances in which one statcv
may supply armaments to other states which do not produce such arma-
ments? a possible limitation might be to st a maximum on all national
industrial production manufacturing purely military goods using a
formula based on a percentage of the national product.
III. Elimination of Major Weapons Aatat:abk to Mass Destruction*
l. Under the provisions of General Assembly Resolution A/L.25g
12 January 1952, all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should
be eliminated if possible.
2. Exactly what constitutes such weapons appears in the first in-
stance to involve a concept not subject to precise definition. It would
seem preferable to relate this subject to the other specific tasks before
the Disarmament Commission: (i) regulation, limitation and balanced re-
duction of all armed forces and all armaments, (ii) prohibition of atomic
weapons as the result of an effective system of international control of
atomic energy. As has been suggested previously in this paper, the United
States believes that the key to the problem of limitation and reduction
appears to be the size of armed forces available to States; that if these
forces are reduced on a balanced basis, then armaments 'should be keyed,
in turn, to permitted manpower. On this basis, the armaments allowed to
support permitted armed forces ?mild be standardized according to a formula
or formulae,. and of course would exclude atomic weapons, under the aesump-
tion that such weapons would be prohibited as the result of an effective ?
systemcr international control of atomic energy. -
3. Cmsequently, it is the preliminary view of the United States
that it would be more practical to examine the question of weapobs
adaptable to nabs destruction from the presumption that these are weapons
which should not be included among the standard armaments tUfficient to
suppart'permitted armed forces, and that the Disarmament Commission might
wish to develop a list ofsuch weapons. On this presumption, the two
types of weapone which 'appear at first glance to fall into this category,
and are not eliminated by the prohibition of atomic weapons, are lethal
lethal chemical ind biological warfare agents. A definition which might
serve as a.basis for examination of this general topic is as foil-owes
"Major weapons adaptable to mass destruction are all atomic explosive
weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological
weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteri-
!tics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or
other weapons mentioned above," gesolution adopted by the Commission
for Conventional Armaments, .12 August 1948, S/c.3/32, Rev. 1, p47
*Note: The following views are directed toward obtaining a technicallY
correct position, and are subject to revision in the light of propaganda
consideration -- which, in this field, are of great importance.
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4. The United States believes that lethal chemical and biological
agents should be eliminated as part of the general program of regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, includ-
ing atomic weapons. As in the case of atomic weapons, the elimination
of lethal chemical and biological warfare should take place only upon
the establishment of an effective system of safeguards to ensure that
agreement not to employ such means of waging war would be adhered too
The establishment of a system of progressive andcontinuing disclosure
and verification is, obviously, an essential first step in creating such
safeguards.. Other safeguards should be examined in the course of the
Disarmament Commissiongs work.
^
UNA:UNPONeyers:sas
April 14, 1952
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ANNEX A
IG Europe
Estimated
Permitted
222LA!M_E
Population
Armed Forme
Albania
1,175,000
11,750
Austria
7,090,000
70,900
Belgium
8,639,000
.
6cmEg7
10,8 4t7
19,443,761
194,437
Bulgaria '
7,160,000
'71,600
Czechoslovakia
12,463,000
124,e30
Denmark
4,271,000
42,710
Finland
4,0640000
40,460
Germany
Llet Germany:
47,607,000
(476,(770)
East Germanys
17013,700
6790320242
(173,313)
670,322
-
Greece
7,9600000
79,600
Hungary
9,205,000
92,050
Iceland
140,000
19400
Ireland
2,958,878
29,588
Italy
46,4240000
464,240
Liechenetein
? 13,000
' 130
Luxembourg
295,000
2,950
Netherlands
10,212,684
102,316
Norway
3,2810000
3208/0
Poland
24,976,926
249,769
Portugal
8,618,000
86,180
Rumania
15,873,000
158,730
Spain
280600,000
286,000
Sweden
6,986,181
69,861
Switzerland
4,700,000
? 47,000
Yugoslavia
160250,000
162,500
,
II. Addle East
Egypt
20,045,000
200,450
Iran
1800000000 .
180,000
Iraq
4,799,500
47,995
Israel
1,400,000
14,000
Jordan
1,500,000
15,000
Lebanon
1,238,000
12,380
Saudi Arabia
6,500,000
65,000
Syria
304'00,000
340000
Turkey
20,902,628 '
209,026
lemon
3,500,000
35,000
/II. Africa
Ethiopia
Liberia
Libya
Union of South Africa
1,072,000 100720
10600,000 16,000
100720000 10,720
12,112,000 121,120
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Far East
Country
Afghanistan
Australia
Barma
Ceylon
*Formosa
51ustlationalist
Estimated
Population
Permitted
Armed Forces
12,0000000
120,000
02185,539
81,855
170000,000
170,000
7,193,000
71,930
3,7600000
37,600
Chinese from mainlang
India 361,820,000 10000,000
Indochina
(Associated States)s 27,0300000 270,300
Indonesia 78,0000000 780,000
Japan 829525,000 825,000
Korea 29,271,000 292,710
Nepal 7,000,000 70,000
New Zealand 1,939,703 19,391
Outer Mongolia 850,000 8,500
Pakistan 75,6870000 7560870
Philippines 19,557,000 195,570
Thailand 18,313,000 183,130
V. North America
Canada 13,845,000
bmico 25,564,218
VI. Central and South America
138,450
255,642
Argentina
17,1110000
171,110
Bolivia
3,990,000
39,900
Brazil
52,619,000
526,190
Chile
5,809,000
58,090
Colembia
114,260,000
112,600
Costa Rica
800,875
8,008
Cuba
50348,000
53,480
Dominican Republic
24210000
21,210
Ecuador
3,076,933
30,76;
Guatemala
20787,000
27,870
Haiti
3,112,000
31,120
Honduras
1,5340000
15,340
Nicaragua
Panama
1,053,000
801,000
10,530
8,010
Paraguay
1,406,000
14,060
Peru
Salvador
Uruguay
Venezuela
80405,000
1,858,000.
2,353,000
4,985,000
84,050
18,580
23,530
49,850
?
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EXECUTIVE COWITTEE ON THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS (RAC)
Working Paper for Committee I of the Disarmament Commission
Numerical Elaiaion ar-Arned Forces
The attached paper is a re-draft of DAC D-8, revised in the
Light of the comments made.by'Mr. Hickerton, Mr. Naih and Ambassador
Cohen at the RAC meeting on April 29, T952. ,
In view of 'the urgency of submitting this paper in the Disarma-
ment Commission, it should be considered simultaneously in State,
Defense and AEC with a view to its clearance as a Working paper only
(not as a United States 004ernMent position) to be submitted to the
Disarmament Commission as quickly as possible.
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MC (NS) D-11,
brkinm i122X t2K Committee L sinizavaant iisaLuiss
Mantis& LimilalLoa gat Wig tam
A- hum* ihtlerlija lust.
LA cOmpreheisive program for the regUlatiose liaitation aid
, balanced reduction of armed forms end irsameats Must Contain gamy
eleeents. One essential component of emy sash progrem is the sumerioal
limitation of used forcesi, the subjeet of this paper. ?
2. The general subject of reiulation, limitation imd balanced
reduction of armaments and armed forees'covers so 'alien area that
simultaneous discussions of all phases of the subject would dm147
progress. We are admitting this mrkimg piper in Order to focus
attention on one important and iseential component of the total program.
We thus hope at least to make a start toward as agreed comprehensive
program.
3. Examples of other essential components include:
s. The control ef atomic ezergy to ensure prohibition or
atomic ,weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes mayo..-
where the United Nations has slready approved 0 plaa;
b. The progressive and continuing disclosure and verification
of &rued forces and armaments where the United States has already
submitted a Workimg Paper to eraittes 2;
c. Allocation of armed forms within national military
establishients so as to assmre balanced reduction and prevent undue
concentration of permitted forces in say particular (Category or aotivitY;
d. Relation of armaments to permitted manpower in order that
permitted armaments should not exceed those required to support per..
witted armed forces, as allocated within oath eta*, 'plus reserve stocks
adequate for replammett under norwal peaeectiue use.
*. Restrictioest on the portion of national product 'blob cal
be weed' for national arsamentspvith due.care not to hemper production
for peaceful purposes.
Paragraphs Op dp aid are particularly closely related to the
subject of this paper.
?Ec4r1. upsima Lintwu.r
4. pisarmseent
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-2.
, 4. Disarmament proposals cannot be esoneidered in isolations
apart from the major international tensions existing in the world.
There is an obvious connection between the solution of current major
political MUMS the r uction of tensions and the limitation and
rednetion of amid forces and areaments. Consequently, concurrently
with oolning into effect of the distaraasent program, the major political
issues between the Great roweri should be settled. FLOVOTer agreement
upon plane for isystas Of limitation and redaction of armed forces
and armaments should measurably reduces these major political issues and
facilitate their solution.
1. Ahle Eittm la Wanda& inariag,11UUsizat.
? 5. In determining numerical limitations of armed forces, it is
'recognised that a bewildering amber of factors must be considered**
such as length ofseacoasts terrain, length of *gammon border with
other state:0s strategic position, area, whether frontiers are pretested
by natural barriers, natural resources, iodustrial plant, etc. These
factors although they may be considered to a greater or lesser degree
An agreeing upon the permitted levels of forms are 011 tah..
ordinate to ome principal element but will prevent use of that prin..
cipal element as the sole basis for an automatic forsola. That pris..
cipal element is population. Actoordinglys a percentage of the total
population of a state would be the starting-point in determining the
persitted level of' armed forces. In arriving at this population figuresnonself-governing territories administered by the metropolitan power
should be included, since 'thi defense of these territories is a
responsibility of the metropolitan power. When such territories become
solf-goWernings their population need op longer be included with that
of the metropolitan area "as they will probably provide for their own
defense.
6. Accordingly, the following formula might be considered as 40
basis for discussion:
a. The *animus level of armed forces of a state should not
exceed the lower of the following figuren:.
(t) IS of its population;
WO A fixed numerical coilimg, say between
1,0000000 and 105000000.
? b. Relatively minor adjustments upward and dowmward *Quid
have to be made in some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power, dangeroue
to international peace.
ItGLART Mara INkORWATIOR
0. While .
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c. Whileatats should not be permitted40 s sped maximal
levels, they should not be required to raise their sefied &tile to
such levels.
?
C.
Oulioral Weide& Rattail& kisii4iss at /alarms**.
?, Amy system, for the regulation, limitation and balanced red4*..
tion of armed fore** must embrace all kinds ofarmed forces, Swanks(
pare4ilitary and security forces, and the formula as set forth in
paragraph 4 Includes ill such forties.
8.7 Adequate provision must be made to ensure that Oa***
liaitOtion on armed.ferees is not eircumeented through buildimg Up
Urge forces of trained reserves.
9. This.wyatem most behaceepted by all states adios, military.
resources are such that their failure to accept woulolendaeger the spits*.
The states falling within this category should be determined Is the
treaty (or treaties) which put into affect the disarmament system smd
which,should.provide that the. treaty will not intbr.into fore* Wit$1
these nitione are designated timbre/A.
. 10.- The principal objective of the formula and gyetem for,regula.
tion and reduction of ermed'forces should be to bring about 410,000
reduction of all arued.forees: Ny ."balanced reduction' is least ',duo!
tion *hick (1) applies to all states with sulostantial military Power,.
not merely to a few great powers, and (ii) which seeks to reduce *rood
forcesInauch-nspntrAis to make .remota the possibility of Sp0001,001
aggression by any stats or grouping of states.--
?
11. Reduction owl limitation of armed forces should proceed by:
progreseive stages, with adequate safeguard' at each stage.* ensure,
that the agreement' reached are in fact observed and to provide for
the prompt detection of violations? while at the ease hive allusive the
minimum degree of interference in the Interpol life of each stat*
?,
12.. The Concepts upon which the system for limitation and redu0-
tionls.baied should boas simple and practicable as posaible.
D. Zinnias** 9; hand*L2mitati L tt Emu..
13 It.is.trui_thet a Actioes &rued forms are not the only
'measure.of-its strength. Other factors-4o name only a few...jeolude
its industrial production,- with particular reference .to that portion
devoted toarmiteilts, its natural resources, its papulation skills, aid .
of course, the armaeonts of all kinds devoted to the supporta its '
'rood forces. A program for regulation, limitation andbalincid reduo.
tion of arme4 forces and armaments must deal with all of these elements
or national sight.
14. Nevertheless,
?Igat
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14 lleverthe1ese0 a nunerical limitation on armed fore.. is a
major element in amy program of Wowed reduction for the following
meow,
a. All arennentsprograns depend upon *never and there,
fore enet.toavgyeater or less degreCbs iffeetid by limitations oa -
permitted armed. forces.
-b. "A siabstantial reduction ot *rued twee* as here auggeetcd
in .and of itaslf coed:minimise if not.ellainate the possibility.of
suocessful aggression. ' ? ,
a. It armed forces are reduced on s balaeced Wrists sunk ,,
* way eel* make the possibility 0 suecessful aggression remote* then
it should be correspondinayaisier to reduie the &Memento en0Portio8
.these *rued fersest;
14Pol0000tilical at. triiniamia fiwarlsali 144.takisA otiatui
bum.
15. The implementation of agreed redictions shoUld 'be Closely
related to progress in conosetion with the, systole of disclosers Ind
verification. Thus the agreed reduction* might oommenaa upon the MAI.
lag of 'the control organ. with responsibility for regulation. limitation
and balanced reduction of armed forces and ermaseents, thst an appropriate
stage of the?diselostu-e and verification plan hod been eomPletOC
16. The reduction should be tarried through in a Isanner, and In
aceordance with a time -schedule prescilbed by the -international c Ontrol
011,0 and should -be. completed within the shortest feasible tins after
its commeneement. ?
17. The implementation of the reductions should likewise be
related to other phases of the program for regulation* limitation mai
balanced reduction of armed forces and armemente,such as the control
of atimate onitly4
18. In the future* furtter numerical limitation of permitted
armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress* is achieVed
towards the easing of international tensions and toward suolosofol
achievement of other phases of the program for regulatiolky limitation
and.balaneed reduction of armed torsos mod armementsp.?in partieular
the programs for progressive sled continuing disolosure laud verification
and for effective international control of atomic energy io ensure the
Prohibition of atomie weapons and-the WW1 a atomia,ehergg for peaceful
purposes only:
r4EMa Oa= IftgAtial
19. The?
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5611
19. The *extent and timing of the proposed reductions, together
with the general manner of their accomplishment, including their
relationship to,other components of thvirogran for regulation,
/Utica and balanced reduction of Armed forces and armaments? shoUld
be comps's:heeded within the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph
31 of the General Assembly Resolution of Jenuary 11.0 l952c.
rgenakatisint
1. All States hewing substantial military forceo should agree
to retinae these armed forces to fixed maximum levels.
2. The following formula might be oonsidored as .a.basis for
discussions
ad The maximum level of armed forces of a state should met
ixoesd.the lever of the following fignrente-P
(0 Sof its population;
OA) A fixed numerical ceiling, say between
100000000 and 10500,000.
b. Relatively minor adjustments upward and downward would
have to be made is some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous
to International pease.
0. Shile states should not be permitted to exceed Maximum leieli,
they should not be required to raise their Armed forces 'to such levels,
3. The proposed agreed' reductionmight commence upon a finding of
the international control organ with responsibility for regulation of
armed forces and armaments that ela appropriate stage of the disclosure
and Verification plan had been completed; should be carried through j:
accordance with the time schedule prescribed by' the international.control
organ; and should be completed within the shortest feasible specified
time after.its oommemeement.
4. The extent and timing of the proposed reduot7lons, together With,
the general summer of their accomplishment* including their relationship
to other components of the program for regUlatiOn, limitation and balanced
reduction of armed forces and armaments, should be comprehended within
? the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph ) of the ,General Asesmbly:
re:Solution of January 11, 19529
5. The initial reductions should be followed by further reductions
as appropriate in the light of then existing circumstances, bearing in
mind the obvious. Connection between the solution of current major political
issues, the reduction of tensions, and the limitation and reduction of,
armed, forces and armaments,
Van $ICURIT1 SLABLAAW
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aEcRET
gwvailt; Information
DAC D.8
APrirl Al 1952
WORKING ggpm
PREPARATION.S FOR pis +11/110121T C014MISSION
U. a. Working Paper
Proposals at Numerical awmum at Armed rorceg
The atLached is a redraft of a paper on this subject which was
distributed at a meeting of the Working Group on April 22. The
redraft incorporates the most important suggestions made at the
April 22 meeting.
In view of the urgency efts paper, as stated in the meeting,
it should be considered simultaneously in State Defense and AEC
with a view to its clearance as a Working Paper (notas a 14 S.
Government position) which would be submitted to the Disarmament
Commission about Nay 5.
It is contemplated that the various comments on the paper will
be considered at a meeting of RAC to take place about Nig 2.
Leonard J. Horwitz
Secretary
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geallritv, )formation
\
N
WAD& 12.4.2tE
Proposals tgr N2Ltleal LimItation ot Armed Forcee
A. Relation of numerical limitation of armed forces and armameds to
disarmament.
1. The numerical limitation of armed forces must play a major role
in any disarmament program. it is true that a nation's armed force:: are
not the only measure et its strength. Other factors....to name only a few-i.
include its industrial production, with particular referent:: to that portion
devoted to armaments, its natural resources, ,itis population skills, and?
of course, the armaments of all kinds devoted to the support of its armed
forces. A program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of
armed forces and armaments must deal with all of these elements of national
might.
2, .Nevertheless, a ,numerical limitation on arMed forces is a major
:element in any program of balanced reduction for the following reasons:
a. All armaments Programs depend upon manpower and therefore must
to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on. permitted .armed
forces.
b. A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in
And of itself would minimise if not eliminate the 'possibility of successful
aggression,
C. If armed forces are reduced on a balanced basis in such a .igy
as to make the possibility of successful aggression remote, then it should
be correspondinrk easier to reduce the armaments supporting those armed
forces.
8. General principles governing programs for limitation of both armed
forces and armaments. '
3c Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in. isolation, apart from
the major international teations existing in the world. There is an obvious
connection between the solution of current major political issues, the
reduction of tensions and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and
armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of, the die.'
armament program, the major political issues between the Great Powers should
be settled. However, agreement upon plans for a system of limitation and
reduction of armed forces and armaments should measurably reduce thew
major pOlitical issues and facilitate their solution*
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INFORMATION
.2.
? 4. Apy system for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction
of armed forces and armaments must embrace all kinds of armed forces',
including para-military and security forces, and all armaments, including
atomic.
5. This system must be accepted by all states whose military resources
are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. The states
falling within this category should be determined in the treaty (or treaties)
which put into effect the disarmaMent system and which should provide that,
the treaty will not enter into force until these nations are designated
therein.
6.. The principal obj e ctive of the system for regulation and reduction
F
should be to bring about lanced reduction of all armed forces and all
armaments. Be.. "balanced eduction" is meant reduction which (i) applies
.60 all states with substantial military power, not merely to a few great
powers, and (ii) which seeks toasduce armed forces and armaments in such
manner as to make remote the possibility of successful aggression by any
state or grouping of atates.
7. heduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments should
proceed by progrossive stages, with adequate safeguards at each stage
to ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed and to provide
for the prompt detection of violations, while at the sane time causing the
minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each .state.
8. The concepts upon which the system for limitation and reduction
is hated should be as simple and practicable as possible.
CO Chief factors in determining numerical limitations.
9. In determining numerical limitations of armed forces, it is
recognized that a bowildAring number of factors must be coneidered--such
as length of seacoast, terrain, length of common border with other states
strategic position, area, whether frontiers aro protected by natural
barriers, natural resourcesp industrial plant, etc. Theta factorS, although
they may be considered:to a greater or lesser degree in agreeing upon the
permitted levels of armed forces, are all subordinate to one prindipal
element but will prevent use of that principal element as the sole basis
for an automatic formula. That principal element is population. Accordingly,
a percentage of the total population of a state would be the starting-point
in determining the permitted level of armed forces. In arriving at this
population figure, nonsat?governing territories administered by this
metropolitan power eould be included, since the defense of these terri-
tories is a responsibility of the metropolitan power. When such territories
become self-governing, their population need no longer be included with
that of the metropolitan area as they will probably provide their own
defense.
10. According
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10. Aceordingly? the followimg female might be considered as a
basis for dissuasion,
a. 411 States having a population in excise at 150 million
should accept is an initial maximum level, may, 1,500,000.
b. The initial maximum levels for all other states should not
normally exceed, say, 1% of their population, but relatively minor adjust.
meats upward and downward would have to be made in some areas to avoid a
41.44411hr/um of power dangeroms to international pesos,
? e. While States should not be permitted to exceed maximum levels,
they need not necessarily vales their erred forges to such levels.
4. In determining maximum levels under b, it is 12SOOSSOZy to
reeogeise the differences between' the population of the netropolitan and
neepselt.governing territories with regard to their role in the defense
of the intemste of the metropolitan power. It is therefori suggested
that states with populations of less than 150 million and with resnOcci*
bilitieafor non-self.governing territories for this purpose might compute
their population through adding (1) the notrepolitan population and (2)
swy, 504 of the population of the non-self..goverming territories for
trhich they have responsibilities.
D, Inplementution of proposals for numerical limitation of armed forces,
11. The initial Agreed reductions might penance as soon as the inter.
national control organ with responsibility for regulation limitation, and ?
hallooed reduction *farmed forees and armaments tide that the first 'stew
of the plan for progressive and continuing disclosure aneverifionticeet
armed forces and armaments has been completed.
?
. 12. The initial reduction should be carried through in a manner and
in accordance with a time sebedule prescribed by the international control
organ, and should be completed within a specified time...say 28 months after
its comeencement.
15. Further numerical limitation of permitted armed tones would he.
contemplated as 'substantial progress is achieved towards the elapsing of
' international tensions and toward successful achievement of other phases
of the program for regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed
forces and arMementel.--iwpartioular the programs for progressive and
' *optioning disclosure god verification and or effective international
control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons
and the use of.utoilic energy for-peaeeful purposes only.
`081
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14. The extent
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14. The extent and timing of the initial reductions, together with
the general manner of their accomplishment, should be comprehended within
the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly
Resolution of'Januury 11, 1952.
E. Wald factors
13. It must be recognised that these are merely initial propoaald and
do not purport to be a comprehensive and final plan even as regards this
segment of the field of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of
armed forces and armaments,
16. Among the factors most closely related to these proposals and
which will require extensive study.ares
a. Allocation of armed forces within national military establish.
-
merits mo as to assure balanced reductionend prevent undue concentration of
permitted forces in any particular category or activity.
b. Relation of armaments to permitted manpower. It seems clear
that permitted armaments should not exceed those required to support per-
mitted armed forces, as allocated, within each State, plus reserve stocks
Adequate for replacement under normal peacetime use. -
c. bee Of natural resources and industrial potential. It may be
undesiruble to permit the unlimited use of resources and industrial poten.
tial for.militury purposes, under a plan for limitation and balanced reduc-
tion of all armed forces and all armaments. Therefore, it might be
advisable to restrict the portion of national product which can be used
for national armaments, with due care not to hamper production 'for peaceful.
purposes. It may be advisable also to establish a ceiling which it might
be possible to express in terms of a percentage Of the national produCt.
17. These proposals supplement ad do not replace nor modifi Proposals
in connection with other phases of the program for regulation, limitation
and balanced reduction of armed forces and.armaments such as disclosure and
Verification, international control of atomic energy, And elimination of.
major weapons ,Adaptable to mails destruction.'
C.CrIS)40121.12.:
. 1. All States having substantial military forces should agree to
reduce these armed forces to fixed maximum levels.
2. The initial reduction might be in aCcOrdance with the following
formulae which should be conaOired as bases for discussion.
a. All
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a. All States having a population in excess Of 150,000,009
should accept as an initial maximum level, say, 1,500,00-,
b. The initial takimum levels for all other States should not
normally exceed say, 1% of their populations but relatively minor adjust..
. tents should be made in 80110 areas to avoid a disequilibrium Of power
dangerous to international. Iseace.
O. In computing, pursuant to le? the populations of States with
responsibilities in, connection with non-self-governing territOriesp. such
'States 'should be permitted to add to their Metropolitan population one-
half Of the population of the non-self-governing territories Per whiqh tWAY
have responsibilities.
5. The proposed initial agreed reduction might commence? as soon, as
international control organ with responsibility for,regulation, limita-
tion and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments shall have.
determined thut the first stage of disclosure and verification has been
oompleted;'should.be carried through in a manner and in acoordancoh.
a time schedule prescribed by the international' control organ; and should
be completed within a .specified period--say 18 months..after its commence-
merit.
4. The extent and timing of the initial reductions should be speeified
in the :treaty or treaties for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of all arMed forces and armaments as provided in.Paragraphof
the General Assembly Resolution of January 111 1952.
5. The initial reductions shouldte followed by further reductions as
appropriate in the light of then existing circumstances, bearing in mind
the obvious connection between the solution Of current major.nolitical
issues, the reduction of tensions, and the limitation ancireduetion of
armed forces and armaments?
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April 15, 1952
pOklaii0 WOOF IS PREP4BATI1N FOR ?MEW= cortopice; (ag)
? Me.that 12plementing and eta - DM Programmes
Thit itab1fhaeq2 xasesamas) pima with Appropriate
MAUPol...jet.ers Func.Mal
The attached draft is distributed to members of DAC for their cone
sideration prior to its formal consideration by the ttee at its
next meeting on Tuesday, April 22,? in Boom 5105 Ni State. At this
meeting DAC D4, previously distributed, viii also be considered.
It is requested that written eminent* on this paper be sent to
MI-. lavrence Ileiler? SNP, Room 6115 New State.
Your attention is called to the bracketed sections of this paper.
Braokets in the numbered paragraphs indicate sections about which
sone reservations have been expreased. The unnumbered bracketed para..
grepha indicate alternative positions.
Leonard J. !brats
Searetary
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SECRET - SECURITY I1SORMATION
IMO at, Imam
Rissumega &amnia
tiO2 Control atm
&MU ang.
Igtroduatio4
The General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952 calling for
regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and
armaments and for international control of atomic energy directs the
Disarmament Commission, when preparing proposals, to farmlate plans
for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of
an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation
of the treaty (or treaties).
United &du PugReAions
1. The broad objectives in establishing control organs to carry
out the system of disclosure and verification and the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed farces and armaments ares
1) to develop an open world by assuring each signatory
state that other states are obsevring the various agreements,
thereby creating a basis for Mutual trust;
(2) to establish effective and suitable international
controls0
(3)to make it possible for signatory states to take
rapid action to provide for their security should other
states refuse to rectify violations of the agreements.1
2. The United
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OPAL_Irg_pgnriqii
2. The United States suggosts +ablishment of the following
organs*
1) a United Nations Disclosure and, Verification Organiza.
tion, the -temporary body to function during the.varioun stages
of the discloaure and'verifiection prograMme. The Organization
would have two operating divisional
a) an Atomic rmorgy
b) a Non-tonic Armolronts Division;
2) a tit :d Nations Disarm:mat and Atomic Dovelopomb
Authority, the permanent control olzan. The Authority would
also have two operating divisionst
a) an Atomic Enorgy Division,
b) a Non.Atomic Armaments Division.
alternative
4Wa2ternatmarrangemast that might be eonaiderod in the ostablidho
ment of the Disarmament and Atomic Dovelopment Authority to carry out
both C:aclosure and vorification and the aubseolont Pormanont sycteri of
control of =moments, armed forcos and atomic moral
A. matIktionn Disclosure and Verification OrEanization.
GehoEW
3,, A United Natio= Diacicoure and Verification Organization should
be estalAishod within the framework of "6ho Security Council to aupervisd
the prolroa6ivo:and continuous disclosure and verification of all armed
forces. including para.militarY, becurity and police forces and all
armmnente, including atomic.
? 4. The Organization woyld derive itc pouarc and authority trot.: the
troaty
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treaty (or troatios) which would deal with other aspects of the dioclosure
and verification system. The United Nations would tako appropriate
action, in anticipation of tho signing of the treaty (or troaAos) ()stab.
liohing the cyst= of disclosure and verification, to onsuro tho ?stab.
lishuent of the Organization with ito full powers irmediatoly upon the
coming into effect of the treaty (or troatios).
???
II. Composition and Ornanization.
5, The Organization ohould bo corposed of States which are Security
Council Nombers tho nonspermanent nombership chancing in conformity with
elcction to v_1,. rotiroment fro: the Security Council.
6. It mi-:ht be deoirablo to rake special arran-oments to Permit
States that are not noribero of tho United Nations o be olootod by the
Oonoral Asootbly to two-par toms on tho Organization.
Whilo it is preferable to keep the Organization to eudh a workable
sizo for tho sake of overall officioncy, it is rococnizod that it anr
be desirable to includo as_rombera Statos which have appreciable quantities
of essential atomic materials.
8. Any Stato which isa'signatory of tho treaty tor troatios)
ostahlishing the cyst:ma of disclosure and 'verification but not a :somber
of. the Organization should ha-o tho richt to participato, without vote,
in tho discussion of any question brouCht befo7o the O_Leanization Uhonovor
the latter oonsiairs that tho interests of that State aro spools:Ur
affoctod. Air signatory State should have an autamatie right to partici.
pato, without vote, in discussions of tho Organization opocifically
concerned
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10.4.
coneorned with that State.
,
9. Each Nbmbor of the Organization sliov.Jd havo one ropresontativo
plus deputy reprooentatives find technical advioors.
10. Decioiono made by the Organization within its defined functions
Should not require unanimity. 11xcept for this pro/talons the Organization
should have the right to adopt its own rules of procedure,
11. The Organization should function continuously and each N6Mbor
should be represented at all ti op at the seat Of tho Organization.
12, The Organization should be authorized to hold meotings at ouch
places other than the. soot of tho Organi2:at1on as in ito judgmont would
best facilitate its work.
13. It would be desirable from the stanpoint of administrative
efficiency and of facilitating the 'transfer of functiono to tho pormanont
organ to have two sections within the. Organization; =Atomic Ener
Division and a Nen-Atomic Arms:Monts Divinion. ConsiClorable attantion-
Uill have to be given, to the question of the budget of tho Organization.
The expenses connected with the operation of an offoctivo oyotom of dis.
closure and verification will be considora'Ao. The Uhitod States ouggeots?
therefore, that it would bo desirable to have each of the Stees porno.
=ay reprosonted on the Organisation bear aneeiChth of the total cost
of operation. The remainder of tho oxrenoos should be born by the acna.
tory Sta-Ixm as apportioned by the General Assembly. Tho Budcet should
be conoidored and approved by the Orcanization.
140 ,Tho Organization should a;:peint a DirpctOr General to be in
chargo of operation and admin o%rcOion, While the Diroc',-er General oholld
be
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=.5m
be subject to general directien.:by the Organiation, he should bo allowed
sufficient dl'oretion in ca;:ryin,... Out tho - of the treaty (or treaties)
and the inetructione of tho Organization to OPSUI'0 the effeotiveness of
tho syeten Of diselnoure and verification. The Director General shotld
not be required to refer day.to.day routin decisions co-cornir.g the
normal operations of the discloctre and vorification syetem to the
c_treanization. Extraordinary re7xvto, charges of violations, complaints
reardinc tho Director General or hie ctaff, end other important develop.
ments would, of co7rso, be referred to the Organization automatically.
15. Zit miht be docirable to Irwo the firct Director General named
in the treaty (or treaties) estalaiching the system of disclosure and
verificatianj Should the nocesaity arise, succeosors should be appointed
by the General Aoconbly upon the rocormendation of the Organization.
The international accrotariat of the 0?..ganization and the eorps of
Incpectors wo.ld be rocponsible to the Director General*
16. Tho Organization might have an indepondant Secretariat separate
from the nmular Secretariat of the Unita, Nationc. It diould to able?
however, to utilize the cervices of tho rocular Secretariat to the extent
rtativilly.agreed upan. T.e mnMbera. of the Ct.ganicationois Secretariat
should be appointed by tho Director Genera/ =der regulations specified
in the treaty (or treaties) ostablichin:: the system of disclosure and
verification. Susequent changes in the regulations should be made bye.
two.thirds vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Organization.
17. The
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17. Tho*SooretOria of Vo Organization should bo diroct4
rosponoiblo to the Diecbor
28, Each signatory Stato s tominato as now inspectors
as tho OLganization may roquiro it to furnish, and nondnees
should its-la Corps e Inspeotors. The Corps of Inapectors prOhably
would be composed of two grouoctone coming the Atomic ?moray DiViSial
and another carving tho Non.Atomic Armaments Division. .
.19. The necessary inspection teams would bo formod from the Corps
Of Inspectors, ?
20. Each inspection team should have at its disposal a staff
composed of personnel of tho Secretariat of the Organization.
21. In conducting individual inspoctions, oach inspootion team
should be permitted to divido into such groups as may be necessary to
comploto oxpoditiously the functions assi7Aod to it.
22. Each signatory Stato should be entitled to have a reprosonta.
tivo an each inspection team, (=opt whom tho st,matoi7 State is itself
boing inspoctod. The State being incy)cted should bo Obliged to
appoint a lialcon ?Moor to accompany each inspection team.
/n alternative arrangomant for the personnol of tho Corps of
Inspectors would be to staff that agency with a rop!osontativo body of
intornational civil servants. Under suCh circumstances, provision
Undoubtedly would have to be made to ensuro each of the Groat Powers
that they would have adequate representation an the various inspection
teams, oven though the roprosontation would be in tho form of nationals
serving as international civil corvants2
s" s-,cuary
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111?Zp..=eaul.
23. The Organization should have the rcoponsibility for carrying
out tiv.: disclosure and verification programa as agroed to in the
treaty (or treaties). The United Statos suggestions for such a. programme
are set forth in the United 1.3ate,.., R:opocals for Proressivo and Contimum
.ing T.sclosure and Verification .of Armed Forces and Arnamosto (DCANI)
The Organizations functions should include the follominat
24. Koko preparations, within thl:rartnuork of the. treaty (or
traaties)0 for the disclosures, incluling the development of standardized
forms tabled,and other organizational details/
250 ROCOINO from each State the information disclosed. The Organizap.
-Lion motld, in accordance mith the treaty (or tl'oaties), specify the
tic at uhich information should be submiAcd rand, uithin the framauork
of the treaty (or troatios), the particulars of information desired from
Statosi7
26. Conduct statistical verification/
27. Organize and conduct such fiold inspections and aerial surveys
as stay be necessary to verify information at the location of inatallations
and to detormine whether all installations and facilities have boon dia..
closed, Inspections should be conducted in accordance with the principles
listed in Section /D/
28. Nnintain pormanamt personnel designated by the Organization
to remain stationed in countries adhering to tho program for the purpose
of onsuring continuous verification;
29, Review
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29. ROV-101I and interpret data derived from roports of States
and from its own inspections;
30. Prepare reports of the discloouros and Irxifications for
the United Nations an2 tho signatory statees
33, Report to the Security Council any ovaoions, violations*
discrepancies, or pertinent omissions by Statos resulting from disclosure
and verification;
32. Stbmit such periodic and special roporto to tho Gonoral
Asoonbly as may be requ-st:d by that body or any ouboranato annoy
that tho General Anse:11)1y ni7ht authorizo to mako roquootes
33. Datornino when the rospoctivo inspection and v.zification
stages, as sot forth in tho United States Pl'oposals for Pro7rossivo and
Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forms one Armaments*
have boon co:Tletcd and take the necessary action to pr0000d with the
konovirk; stage. The Organization would also porform the sono function
with regard to to prOgrooeivo stops to be taken within each stages
34. Issuo adninictrativo ro-zulations Eind ontOr into such albs
agroemont as may be desired to facilitate its operationkg
55. Interpret the terns of tho treaty (or troatios) ostabliching
the system of disclosure and vorificationa
1.7 4m4M29.91465010
36. Tho Organization should be required to oaduct such inspootions
as are necessary to no fulfillment of ito functions. The inspections
should
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3 t)Pae? 3CUTL 'Y IN O" TION
.9.
should be conductod in accordnnce with princ:Iplos a1on7 the lines sot
forth in Section 0 of the Unitld States Pro.ThDo[.ao for PDo:resoive and
Continuing DiscloSuro and Vorificatim of kTrd Forces and Armaments.
In addition, the following principles should:sad? the Organization in
=Ring its inspections, and should be included in the treaty (or troatios)
establishin: the sycton of disclosure and verification.
37. The overall objectivo is to anorre effective, progrossivo and
continuous verification in order t: give assurance that no omiosions or
other violationn of the treaty (or treatios) occur, and to justify advanc.
ing the,disclosurc nm -verification process to the sucdooding otago.
38. The typo of inspection process oelectod for each star.p should
depend on i%s suitability to achieve the above, ob3octi7e.
39. Inspections should be mado of armed forces, doclarod plants
matorials? installationci, or any other items specified in the treaty
(or treaties) which the Organization might os ire to survey or inspect
in. order to dotormine whether all facilities have been disclosed.
40. These inspections should ..00pect diaestic laws, provided such
laws do not prevent offectivo verification; in this connection, undor?
certain circnmstancos the Organization should obtain national warrants
in order to conduct invootigations.
41. The Organization should requost such reports and data ad it ?
vadat mod in order to aid in inspections am 0 verification.
42. It is
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400
42. It is desirable, that 'most impactions be schodulod In
advanoo, but the Organization might aloo make phrsical inspootions
without notice so long as they are Appropriate for the particular
phase as proscribed in the treaty (or troaties), In case of aerial
survoys, tan Organisation should bo required to give roasorable prior
notification.
43, inspections ehould be c4m41rn in character for Pouors of
? ?
SilAlnr strength.
Ohe above ovation (blvections), with tho oxpeption of Paracraph 361,
mizht be omitted ontirely, for it is in effect mero37 as elaboration
of Section C of the Unitld States Proposals for Pro7ressivo and Cantina:
lug Disclosure and Voritications7
B. kagelsw_gLResponsibilitios from the Unitsis
? and Valtication Orm.nization totjastArarMaixnjUnagriokug
Ateasp_b(13.mtADouthatitze
4.4. Consideration should bo given to instituting the atomic
energy control vet= during tho latter etaTes of diecloeuro and
verification, possibly beginning with tho third stage. Undor this
arrangement, the Mitod latice-s Disainnomat and Atomic Dovolopment
Authority would assume responsibility for tho third, fourth and fifth
stagos of disclosure and vorificati4n of atomic armemoots, Tho United
Staes? how3vor, is prepared to carry through all tho stages of dis.
closure and verification before reaching agreement on intornatialml
control of atomic energy
45. At the
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.9114.1
459 At the timo of the transfer of functions, the Atomic Enora7
Division of the Disclooure and VerificaUcr Gfgenizations including
the Corps of Inspectors, weld be absorbed by the Disarmamoat and Atomic
Dovelopment Authority.
469 The Unite Nations Disclosure and Verification 0:genizationes
responsibilities for inspection and verification of non.atomic armaments
nrd armed foroos should be taken over by the Disarmament and Atomic
Developmont Authority following the coupletion of the fifth disclooure
and verification stage.
/47. At ;:are tiro of the transfer of functions, the Von.Atomio
Arrniotts, Division of the Discloouro and Verification Organization,
incluang the Corps of Inspectors, would bo absorbed by the Disarmamont
and Atom1c Dovelopment Authority.
489 The Director General of the Disclooure and Verification Organize/.
tion should automatically become Director General of the Disermommat
and Atomic Development Authority upon the constitaAon of the lattor
organ.
49. AS the Disarmonart and Atomic Developmont Authority would
cob into being at the time of the first transfor of Pancticco fran the
Disclosure and Verification Organization, if the trooty (or troaties)
provides for institution of the atomic energy control system during the
latter stages of disclosure and verification, the Disarmament and Atomic
Devolopment Authority would wow? the resulting responsibilities in
connection with atomic energy before assuming responsibilitios for
non.atomic
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non.atomio armaments, In such circumstances, the Director Gemara&
of tho Dieclosure and Verification Organization would concurrently
serve as Director Goneral of the Disarameaut and Atomic Dovelopmont
Authority,
0, Naltod Nations Disarmcnt and Atnric Dckqlmtop.t_Wanrjaa
I.iciozta
50, 'The bated Nations Disaremmmet and Atomic Dovolopaant Author.
ity ahould bo established to act as the permanent organ of control for
the regulation and devolopment of atomic onergy and for the operation
of the general system of inopection, regulation, and balancod reduction
of non.atomic ornamente and armod forces. Tho Authority mad derime
its powors an authority from the treaty (or treaties) eetablinhing
the amoral system of =Aral. The Unitod Nations uotid take appropriate
action, in anticipation of tho signing of the treaty (or troaties) eetsb.
lishing tho general system of control, to ensure the outabliahment of
the Authority with its fUll pouors immediately upon tho coming into
effect of tho treaty (or treaties),
5l, The nomborahip of tho Authority should be tho samo as that of
the Disclosure and Verification Organization, with the non.pormenent
memborc seloctod in the same nanner as thoeo of tho Disclosure and
Verification Organisation.
520 In general, the arrange:manta for the Authority concerning
ouch questions as the placo of mooting rights, of representation at
aoetingo
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S7,CRET:. SECURITY MCOMATION
meetings for State concerned, Mt compoitiGn of inspection teams,
and powers and responsibilities of the Director General should be
the sane as those established for the Di-closure and Verification
Organizatiope Arrangements concerning the budget should be similsr,
with the possible exception of the Cost of operating the Atomic Energy
Division, which in part co7ld be borne by the Division itself as part
of the expenses connected with the development of atomic energy.
53. To facilitate the execution of its responsibilities, the
Authority, like the Disclosure and Verification Organization, would
have two operating divisions, an Atomic Energy Division and a WOn4tomic
Arnanents Division. The Authority should have the right to establish
such additional divisions as might be necessary to enable it to fulfill
its responsibilities,
54. The Authority should be authorized to establish regional
brandhes.
II. Functions and Powers of Diszt Atomic DevelounAn&
hutaisk..111411_192keet to the Control of Atomic Eneta,
55. If the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of dis?
closure and verification provides that the Authority assume the responsi?
bilities for disclosure and verification during the third, fourth and
fifth stages, the Authority should have those powers panted to the
Disclosure and Verification Organization.
56. As soon as practical and in any event following the completion
of the fifth stage of disclosure and verification, the Authority should
function
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function In accordance with the United Nations Plan to control atomic
energy, prohibit atomic weapons, and ensure the use of atomic snow
for peaceful purposes only. The Authorityss functions and powers
should be those set forth in the United Nations Man. Za accordance
with the provisions of the United Nations Flan, the Authorilly should
have the responsibility to determine and report any violations,
evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions in connection with the
execution of the provisions of the treaty (or treaties) establishing
the system for control of atomic energy.
III. gmotions and Peters of the Disarsessent ta.0 ittalik?NY14211NNa
uthori with Res ct to Nonmk
57. The Authority should have all the rovers and responsibilities
with respect to receiving reports and conducting investigations relating
to non-atomic armaments and armed forces that would have previously
been given to the Disclosure and Verification Organization,
580 The Authority would be responsible for supervising the regula.
tion and the balanced reduction of all armed forces including .
parammilitary, security and police forces and all non-atomic armaments.
590 The Authority would also have the duty of devising safeguards
necessary to assure regulation Without unduly Interfering with domestic
situations,
60. The Authority should have the responsibility to determine
and report any violations, evasions, discrepancies, or pertinent
omissions In
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ontssions in connection with the execution of the proviaions of the
treaty (or treaties) establishing the general system of cortrol of
non.atcmie ammonts and armed forees.
610 In addition to inspection and verification of the status of
armed forces and armaments at any given time, the Authority, in accord.
mice with the terms of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the genral
system of controll would have the taak tf det, rminino the time and the
manner of tho reductions of armed forces and almcnants.
maganggeog the Disarmosient_and Atcfsto Develonment Angel=
to Other Organs of the United Nations and to individual States.'
19.14121%;2=-9.23X422
620 The Authority should submit periodic and special report; to
410 the Security Council.
63. The Autborityes findings in respect to violations, evasions,
discrepancies or pertinent omissions Should be im7ediatelY referred,
with certification of facts, to the Security Council. Sudh finding$
should state whether the violations', evasions discrepancies or pertinent
omissions are of a sujor or minor Character.
64. Such findings vey be accompanied by such recommendations as
the Authority May deem appropriate. Zs this regard, serious considers..
tion should be given to the need to provide for specific steps that
might be Wren by the Security Council andAr the General ASseth.liy to
bring about rectification of violations of the terms of the treaty
(Or treaties). Provision should be mode in the treaty (or treaties) to
enable
*In general the relationships here set forth could be applied to the
Disclosure and Verteication OrgaSisationo
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enable members of the United Nations to take action necessary to
provide for their security in ease minor violations are not rectified
or in case amajor violation odours.
65. The Authority should be required to submit ouch special
reports as might be requested by any seven members of the Security
Council,
Xo the General Assembly'
66, Under Articles ID, 21, and 12 of the Chartor the General
Assembly has brawl authority to consider and make recommendations concern.
Ing the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaMente.
ln order to assist the Assembly in the exercise of this function, the
411 following relationships should be established*.
67. The periodic reports. and any findings in respect to violations,
evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions which are sUbmitted to
the Security Council should be tranemitted to the General Assembly.
68. The Authority should be required to submit such special
-reports as might be requested by the General Assembly or any subsidiary
General
boar that the/Assembly might authorize to ice such requests.
2:12.teLiebtemgme3. Csat of st
69. The Authority should be authorized by the General Assembly to
request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope
of the Authority's activities. Proceedings Wore the Court, however,
should not delay the taking of measures necessary to Maintain internat.
ional peace and security.
22.1111.?_qemtaija
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70. The Authority might ha7e an independentaecrdtariat separate
from the United Nations Secretariat. It should be able, however, to
utilize the serAces of the ttaitcc Nations Secretariat to the extent
mutually agreed upon.. Reportc, and Other ca-mmications from the Authority
ether
t4/organs Of the United Nations should be transmitted through the Secretary
General.
To the Economic and Socinl Com911
71, Such relationships as mrly be necesstry should be established
between the Authority. and tho Economic and Social Council?.its commissions
and sub.commissions, and related specialized agencies.
ita Couno,54
72. Such relationships as nay be necessary should be established
between the Authority and the Trusteeship Council..
gtlaUWIADL01,_a_ja.Lit
73/ Agyfindings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or
pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council should
be transmitted to the signatorykstese
U. The question of the relationship of the Authority to each
participating State will require careful treaty definition, particule47
as regards the extent to which the privileges and immunities accorded
t?
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4d.
to the Authority will exempt it from tho operation of national 'ewe
and the means by which individual rights and liberties will be pro.
tectel against .possible infringement stemming from inspections. The
grant of privileges and immunities to the Authority should be based
on the principle of minimum interference with the national lawn of a
State consistent with adequate supervision of the regulation and red*.
tion of armanents.
75. The Authority should have no authority to issue directions
or instructions to any State, except as soy be provid,..4 in the treaty
(or treaties) establishing the general system of control. the Authority
shoed be authorized, however, to negotiate with each participating
State such administrative agreements as *my be necessary to carry out
the treaty (or treaties),7
,760 Each participating State should be obliged by the treaty
(or treaties) to designate a national agency to supervise the execution
of its obligations with respect to nonNatamic armaments and to assist
the Authority in its work,
77. The privileges end immunities of the Authority should include,
a. The right of its accredited representatives to the iv11.
egos and facilities of ingress, egress and access into and from the
territory of participating States, including rights of transit for
persons and equipment across or through such territory?,
b. The right to the use of communication facilities adequate
to the discharge of its responsibilitiesi
a, each
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oo Such exemption from customs and immigration regulations
as say be necessary to effective operations;
d. Inviolability of premises, property, and archives,
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sECRET
pEcuian
DAC 6.7
April 18, 1952
WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR PISARMAMENT COMMISSION
gmlo Position sau Procedure la Timetable fqr qving Effect
Disarmament Prorrqm
The attached draft paper is distributed for the ,information of
'members of DAC, with a view towards a subsequent meeting to discuss
this or a later draft of the Paper.
Coullents slculd be addressed to Mt. %wren Chase UNA/Po Room
607, SA-5.
Leonard J. Horwits
Secretary of DAC
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PTV V13411:
PROBLEM
To establidh a US position on Item of the plan of work adopted by
the Disernmenst Commission on Marsh 280 1952 CM Dominant DC/5). The plan
is attached as Annex A,
DISCUSSION
A MOMS aigthiSeg Sit sasabagra.
The following paragraphs of the GA resolution of January 11? 1952, on
the regulation, limitation, and reduction at armements and armed Throes ere
espeelally relevant:
gional
(JlggLIALEralgrult.ijadja.N.,,tagA)
* * * *' * * * * * * * 0 *
*5. Zink the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to
In reships)* 3 'above to consider from the outset plans for progressive
and continuing discl:sure and verification the implementation of which is
recognized as a first and ledispensible step in carrying out the disarmer.
smut programme envisaged is the present resolution;
4. laidatbe Canissice, in working cut plans for the regulation('
limitortion,drednotion of all armed fess and all armaments,
(a) To determine how overall limits and reetristions an all armed
forces and ell armaments can be calculated and fixed;
(b) To eonidder netted' *wording to which States can agree by
negotiation among thawed:vest under the =splash of the Commission, oaa.
earning the determination of the overall limits and reetrietions referred
to in Whoperagraph (4) Shore and the allocation within their respeetive
national military irstahlistnents of the permitted national armed foram
and armaments;
*7. the Commission to commies its work not later then
thirty days fran the adoption of this resolution end to report periedleally.
for Informatics, to the Security Council and to the General Asselbly, we
to the Members or the United nations when the General Assembly is not in
session, The Commission shell submit its first report not later than
1 Jane 1952;
"Se Mani
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' - that a conieramse of all States should be commeed
t. eosidthsproposals for a draft treaty ,(or treaties) prepered_by
the CommisSion as soon as the wet ef the Commission falai have pro.
greased to a point where in the judgeent of the Cammiesion any part of
its programme is ready for stinr.Ission to governments;
94 based the Seenttry4eneral to wavers =Oka Conference
so advised bY the-Consgertocx."
B0 :Wu at assaldesattaa at Dm rfp
.In additton to adopting the seemed plea of work the Disarmament Commissien
on Hersh 28, 1952, voted to emeider Items A end B'eonourrently and to setup
two oomittees for this purpose. Censiderston of Item C um deferred. That
item presamehly will not be considered ;ending progress ea Items A and B. Never.
theses, it seems desirable to totting, at this time the dile Immo arising
ardor the !tee, sinew it Is emtirell. possible that eirouseateness will develop
requiring consideration of the it.
C. thist wasidassl alas &a An gaol gianamomi ammo
The GA resolution of January 210 1952 coatemplates a enter of procedure
steps in Commotion with the implementation& the disarmament program. Mess
ere twenties es relieves
.1 wa* kayo/dna Obviously all proposals will first be eonsi.
dared and approVde by the Disarmament Commiesion,
20 Aussizastraidastai Whim km mad U. it /debt vial be saultdored
desirable toobtain frocruble action br the SC or by the GA, or by both, on
any proposals for draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Disarmament Comm
mission bears convening a conference of all states to ?welder theme
Although SC consideratica of such proposes before their submission to
such a conformer Is not called for by the GA resolution, and although the =Ober*
ship of the SC and of the Commission are the same swept for the inclusion of
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op 3 411
Craft to the.Ccealasion when that state is not sa SC mallar, SC eonsiduia.
tion of stash proposals before a conference 'of states might nererthaless be
6111tOrniald to be desirable in view of: (a) the provisiods of paragraph?
of the resolution (quoted above)iv (b) the fast that the Cameissica is ea-
tabliabsdiender the SC"; end (c) the responsibiLttiss with 'moppet to the
regastica of armaments imposed on the SC by Article 26 of the UN Charter?
The existense of the "veto" in the SC ahcald not proved sutrilastar of prow
paras to the SC, singe presumably no coatlereme would be ocavened.entil the
ettaisumat of ? measure of agreareat smug the great powers*
LIthough GA, oonsideration of sash Tropoea3.18 before their aubmission to a
emiferease of all states is not sailed for by the GS reeeietlee, it might
mevertbeless be determined to be desirable in "day oft (a) the provisions of
ppb? of the GA resolution (quoted above); (b) the probable desirabilitp
of obtaining in this manner the remoticas of most governments to the proPesals
before ?awaking a conference of all states to aossider this; and (e) the
probable desirability of endowing the proposals with the prestige of GA approval
before subrdtting them to snobs emsterrnoe. Should it appear likely that a
law delay 'would result five avaltdag GA consideration of the proposals, this
Governarat might prof* to forego their schrrission to that arms,
aft3ai3th inado The IllegOtiatialia Snag Ostia
larder the auspices of the Disareamart Commission ealiad for by paragraph 6 (b)
of the GA resolution (quoted above) would not be part of the work either of
the Camidesica or of a confirenee of all states. It nay be decided that _agree.
Monte on eartain other natters involved in the regulation, limitetion .and rides-
tits of sieremnts and armed foram also shoold be negotiated elsewhere than in
the
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the Comelesion or in a contemns, of all state?, For the reason give r
D.2 CO below, sons of tho negotiations =dor Commission auspices should take
'place prior to an international confertnoo.
4. adigaantlwasiterstan. Paragraph 8 of the GA reeolution (cuotel
above) provides for the convening at an appropriate time of an international
(=forgoes. Ths ohist problems ?oncoming tho (=ravening of such a conferenoe
are dealt with in Seotion D below.
This proodure for giving effeet to spy progrma agreed upon in the Cam.
missice 14411 accordingly include at least the following steps:
P doelsics by the DIsermasent Cessission that part or all at
it pro grmn is ready tor submission to a oomfewinee of all states,
or will be ready for subnissiom when stated medal:me hove been
fulfilled.
2) A sonforesce of ell stems ?missed by the SIG in consequesee of
the Commission's &Rolston.
3) Negotiations among goverment' to reach iny agressents not
reached it the Conission or In an all states conference which :An
be neesseary to give full effeet to the Commissionis propos, 'Who
for ememple, as the kind a:wows:A referred to in paragraph 6 (b)
of the GA resolution (quoted above).
The prosedure followed may include one or both of the fallowing additional
steps discussed abovo, to be taken before:: I:antenna, of all states is sailed
to consider Commission proposals:
1) SC ossideration of the proposals*
2) GA sosideration Of the proposals.
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De% MISS dutertastuata. acaeriam.
Wile the overriding considerstien in determining the appropriate tine
for a onterenoe of all istatos nay well be the relationehip of such a oon2erw.
ones to onr general policy Umtata the Soviet Unica, neverthaless a =her
of teohnieal factors set forth balm will Influenos the US position on this
nattar.
1, The US prefeered position should, be to seek to have the Cemissioa
eamplete its work en all items of the ommexed plan at work before. ?odorants
is monad. melees it appears likely that to await the led of the Ccaminsionts
labors as the entire propel would unreasonably delay presentatioa to a am-
feriae* of a detailed proposal covering all phases of diselosure and verifies-
tin (ItIVIL of the mossexed plan of weat). In that case the US gbasid prow
for a ondlarease to consider a Teoposal of the latter :mature without awaiting
Commission agreemeat on other proposals? The ecoference might also oonsi6mr
other Candesime proposals which Iwo reedy for ackeisidas to it,
20 comieirease of all states would serve no purpose:
(a) If the proposals to be considered were known to be taw
aceeptable to any state whose rat.tfleatins of a treaty embodying
them weld be easomstial,
(b) Until the governsente disposing of much military power and
perhaps sertain other gosertments bad reaebed agreement cm all
important mattare which would he negotisted elsewhere than in
the Omission or in the conferetee and which were obesely related
to the natters to be considered by the eonfereesee, *Ago p the Wee-
meats in elaberation of Commission proposals which are mentiosed
in paragraph 6 (b) of the esi resolution (quieted above)
30 Se
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1, "Overpass weld be serve" by. selling a conference to oonsiderany.
propesed.treaty en disclosure and verification (item A of the annexed plan of
wart) which, in ooddnetion with any agreements on the subjest which had bees
or repulsed to be negotiated elsewhere then in the Commission or In sueb a
=aeronomy would net ?entitle sufficient detail to provide for an effective
*stemof diecloeure sad verifisation.
Netters which would mood to be covered in detail in a treaty on disalosure
and Verifiestion tarlatan (a) the staging mad timing of disclosure sad the
attestation of completion of each stage; (lb) the methods and machimw" for
verification, imeludtag procedures for resolving dispatie between inspeeters
end individual statovand for bandllag major violations; end (s) the determine.
tian of conditions goveraing the going into effect of the treaty, tneleding ?
0 list of the states whose ratifleatta weld be essential.
Sablest to the ereepties noted bereafter with respect to proposals for
the control of atamic.emergy, no purpose would be served by selling a eanfir.
woe to consider *proposed treaty on the regulation, limitation, and balanced
reduction of armememts and armed forces (Item 10 =leen in ocableation with
previously negotiated treaties sad the agreements tibia had bees eir remained to
be negotiated elseWhere than in the Commission or in so* a conference, the
treaty vou3di contain sufficient dote4 to provide effectively for the regale.:
tion, limitation, and reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including
disclosure and vorifieetton, wed the control of atomic asergy. The &attire on
which agreement would be neosseary for thet purpose would go much beyond general
principles.
Natters which would need to be covered in detail in a treaty (or treatise)
or the effective regulation, limitation and belanoed reduction of all armaments
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and armed formes indlude, in addition to mattare?-tAsesury forth. putting
. Into offset of an effective system of dicoloc/ro amd verifications (a) the -
program of regulation, limitation and balanoed reduction; (b) a system for
. the control of atomio energy not less effactive.than the UN plan; (s) criteria
for limitotion of armed forces and armaments; (d) national program within
thee* criteria, including specific ceilings for armed forces and certain stow.
'noes; (e) elimination of certain categories anon...Unto vaapans; (f) establish.
met of international machinery to ensure effective implementatice; and (g) the
oanditions for the going into effect of the treaty or treaties, including a list
of states whose ratifioation would be essential1
? fa view of existing US commitments this Government could not oppose the
. ening of a conferee?. ?fell states to consider as the eels item proposals for
-16 tertat7 for the contra of stomis semergy. /t would be necessary. Weever, for
'rthe propoeed atomic energy treaty tot (a) ensure when operative the efefetive
control of atomic weapons and the ims of atomic energy for peensitil purpose only;
and CO establish aeceptIble time and other relation/Alpe between the program '
far atomic emergy control and the general program for the regulation, limitation,
and reduction of sil'armed forces and all other armaments, includinr diaclosure
and verification,
SWAIM AND CONCLUSIONS .
A, The preeedure for giving *trona to Coy program agreed on in the Diserk.
seavert Commission will or may include the following steps:
I, ?twill include a deelaice by theTisarameent Commlision that pert '
or all of it. program is ready for sobaission to a eceterenea Of all
states or will be reedy for sehmlasion when stated coaditions have bean
fulfilled.
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2, It say include calaideration of the Carmissics prepares by the
SC, by the CA, or by both, before their submission to an ellosetates
canforenee,
3. It will includo negotittiors wane states talder Ca:mission
auspice:: to reit& all agree:mato almivirmstme needed to give full effect
:ditch ars
to the Candasiones progremAo be negotiated elsewhere than in the
Caarission or in an allootatos conference (e.g., the warmest* maw
timed in paragraph 6 (b) of the GA resolutica of January 11, 1952,
quoted in the Discussion)? Same of the negotiations should take
plass prior to an tin..411t41.9 COOr01111101 (see B,2 (b) belev).
' 4,- It will incl uis a confacenam of all states.
B, While the overriding consideration in determining the appropriate time
for an all-states conference may well be the relationship of snob a conferemes
to our general polley tomards the Soviet Union, the fallowing teohnieel teeters
will Influence the US position an ti-is :matter:
1? The US preferred position should be to seek to Ivan the Crandesion
armlet* it. WOrk on all item of the annexed plan of vast before an
slip-states ocaterenee is celled, unless it appears likely that to wait
the end of the Cosnissiones labora on the entire program would Me.
reasonably delay presentation to such a conference of a detailed pro
-
/meal comering all phases of disclaim: and tarifisatial. In that
ease the US. shmeld press for a conferees* to consider a proposal of
the letter nature withatt awaiting Commission agreement on other pre-
posals. The ea:femme might alga consider. other Commission proposals
iihieh viers ready for atdaniasiem to it.
2. A
MUT SECUR/TI INFORMilTILS
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A oceferenee of all states would aerie no purposes
(a) If the proposals to be considered mare hewn to be un-
eeceptehle to air state whoa* 3ratifisatica of a treaty embodying
? then woad be essential.
(b) Until the govercausts disposing of much military power and
perhaps cartes other governments had reached all important sem.
=atm to be negotiated eleeibere than in the cceferesse white
vire ?lowly related to the natters to be ocesiaered by the
eaderenae.
(e) %lam a treat, embotilIng the Teoposals to be oonsidered
the oonfereneet in combination with agreemede negotiated.er to
Is negotiated eleadisie:
(1) imild provide in 1%11 detail for an effective system
of disclosure and verifiestims; or
(2) would provide in Atli detail for the *Mostly* mule-
Um, linItaticm, and reduction of all aimemente and aimed
forces, including disclosure end verification end the SOS-
trol of atonle energy; or
(3) would (1) And operative ensure the effestlie eontrol of
steal. %maples and the use of atcmle 41101111tr for peaceful
purposes only; and (11) establish aseeptible t.bie and other
relationships between the progress for atcatte MOM ocntrol
and the eseeral megrim for the regulation, limitaticat and
reduetion of all armed forego end or all other ansemets,
including disclosure end verifleatica.
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MLA
magma issigiusz
9LIAS
Diselosurs and veritiaatiou of all armaments, including
atomic armaments, and of all armed forces,
Regulation of all armaments and armed tome, including:
1. Elimination at atomic weapons and control of atomic
enemy with avisnrto caeuring thair elimination;
Elimination of weapoas afraid dsstruction and control
with a view to easuring their elissinatdos;
30 Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armor
smuts sod of all armed farms, wad control ef thie
lleitstion and reduction.
C1 Precedes* sad timetable for giving offset le the disovenent
progress*.
Points A vnd B to to studied ooncurrantly in the first stage
of the Ommelesionts wok.
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