A MEMORANDUM OF THE PANEL OF CONSULTANTS ON DISARMAMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600030001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 150
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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toI
A >N t Or TUN PAM . OF 1 or' ~
ON DIEA A** T
4? Tim' A*TME T 01 STA '
10,63
STATE review(s) completed.
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AMMICAN POLICY AND ARMS UMMATION
A Msmoraadua of tbi. Panel of Consultants on Disarmumat
of the Depsrtsent of ttsto
*o eabar , 195*
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a a ; c?ur4t of a
eries 1;1
o 2
C. is,.., a ions held by r e :. ad rs i ;ned as 20400r"
Department of State's., anc'F Of Consul tarts c;Ei 1 art nieut
between 2fdiay and October,
uerationa 41iicb seems to gas to
contains a set of on..,"`
rcuyulatlon a genuine meaning for the ,Jirea:
National, Security no1i1-:y, an. it iudi
e:.ions of policy an
large undertaking,
ell beyo:eao the range of our
em of. arms
o'er
zouiLi ca_
tq be r:e/: ir-
hhas ri$k.ess
fly
al co lpet,n :o any
Q-onceru. Some of the matters which we have considered on
Laze way to our conclusions are the primary concern of pro-
fessional, soldiers and others, but this overlap is hardly
avoiuable in a study of the contra
The
Cts we have conai erect are only those to which we
have been forced by our inquiry into the place of arms
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regulation in natioaa3 poii y
to consider
rtes which lead il
tart' ano diploaatte policy
are realities which we have not been able to avoid.
this is so, indeed, is in our v
taut cone lusiofa we have reach
of the most impor-
re airs true, we thin., that the very size
the problems we have considered argues for a deep and
continued coiaeration of this problem, under the direct
authority of: the highest officers of the varn uent'.
think it evident that just as the responsibility for decigiOll
in these. large matter
fall to those in authority,
so the final thinking judgment must us theirs; consultants
cannot do more than help to
level Judgment.
clear the Iround for such top-
Our memorandum attempts to present, Then, not a
set of conclua ons, but rather a group of considerations
-which have seemed to us important, together with something
the course of discussion through which we have come.
e have made no effort to hiexe fact that we are often
uncertain and sometimes div'ijex clothing is gained oY a
pretense that all these, .natters are simple and clean-rcut ;
in teed the beginning of understanding, we have found,
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r i a z i urgent reie an e to the national:-' gaiety ,
e bey "em that be proble ai arms ra a Ott o
race-say 01 t zei.a= tan leo to
but we cannot shop
have given full va l u
that such regulation it iiapos;aible or meaningless or bootti.
Parv Cue of the a oran? sum 3ug ests first that there
are many ry a rc to oe a eaarf ul of any easpbasis upon the
objective of ari regulation, and seaon - that this objec-
tive has nev;:r t eiess acquired an importance which makes
i t urge
of Moderating the arm: 4-are. Part
Shape of the prese,
armaments and suggests,
aterriatitn&2 controi- of
hat the subject may not be quite
so intractable as the experience of recent years seems
to suggest. , Part Three deals with the (character of pos,
e approa= hem ' to the. Soviet Uni
cerneu with problems of the shape and di
believe American policy might take in re
considerations
ur is con-
panso to the
forth in the first three Pts.
'raa: outline these four parts correspond t
our own work anru thought; the polic:~y of caution aria
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hope
of t
Ich we try to outline in Part Your is not lxke1y
meaning except on the basis of sow aLc*ptance
na ysia in parts One, Two, and, Tree.
We should like to underscore this . %*&aing 0
unanimity i
this semorand . . We
came to the
work of this Panel from five different backgrounds of
interest and activity, and at first we had as Many appro
$0 the topic., What has emerged sad
a general view which no one of ua hel
no Member of the Panel who has not tearnad
and sup h conclusions an we have reached are
recorded I
There is
r at-its work.,
truly the
result of intensive Common effort. it is .true that for
technical jzfoXm*Iion.We have depended mattily, ' on . the re-
and we tae1 on
reasonably solid ground as to the aasc,rtainable fasts.
Our assessment of the meaning of these facts, whutover
it may be worth, is common and uns aOU5 it is also new,
in the sense that for us at least it has grown from the
work and thought of th Panel.
T - - --$s'
t i f i:? members, but we have had a
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S R, r Y 'I ff V
$ I A 'f fIFONA"N
PART ONE
the objective of arms regulation is important. This
ing is strung--btt it is quite different from that
of somas who believe that the virtue of disarmament is
self-evident . We thinMyx that there are many good reasons.
for Joubtiag the desirability of arms regulation, for we
do not take lightly the realities of, the present inter--
national scene--in parti. ular we strongly believe that
the coileeative defense of ,the United States and the non-
Soviet work requires at present a heavy seasure of re-
armament $o before urging the importance of arms regula
tion, we wish to note some of the obstacles to any such
undertaking,
Section 1. Some Reasons for Doubt in the. Present ktelevance
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T-O-P _L- .;- R -1 -T
This reputation was oarne4 by the unhappy result of the
prolonged efforts
years between 1919 znd
record briefly. and note
it taught.
Two
,At Ahich took place in the
usef ull, to review the
he present caning of the lessons
eat efforts at of sara ament occurred in
years. One was the effort at naval Iimitatiaf, entered
on the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan; it resulted in the
treaties signed at Washington in 1922 asd at London i
1930. The other effort was the prolonged discussion Of
general disarmament, ceutered in Europe, and mainly con-
cerned with ground and air forces, which never reached
any result at all. Both
vent war,. and it can be
obviously failed to pre-
that the naval treaties,
in the long run at least, did real damage to the ca
of peace. Their supposed success may have made the '**stern
nations slow An resisting the 'Japanese expansion which
eventually
avoidable.
at so far that war in the Pacific became un-
These two
achieve any l imitat
odes seem to teach that efforts to
of armaments can do no good unless
' ?--P s--c-a--T
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a-
lineal
vo.p
they are closely integrated with. the real
e of international' affairs .. eha.t
the I
tent was in
Treaties of hiugton and ,.I oa was directly
rp1-sted to a poi:iti.
Western Pacific was *On
is whtOh 'the Pie of the
ided to.the care of the
spire. 1o long a this trust was not abu *d , ther* was no
n the Naval' Treaties. When
rke down, under the. pressure of J
Whole . settleat became
i
tton was neither possible nor desirable where the poi
pr5*tsea on whi it rested laced validity
In Iurope, the sane basic point was,domonstrat
a oifferent way; tt
nsveT escaped frost
fact that the negotiatio
tical
disarmament
he futility of constantly expanding paper
plans was a direct result of the fact that they were never
ith the realities of European politics.
cry great down one path while the die--
ar ent negotiations ' ent down another.,Until at last when the
conference was ready to have its first full-fledged
meeting in 1933,Adol.f I'iitler was already is power,:and it had
a their thoughts from
part of ttLe arrangement
panes expansion,
Pption; ar'es limita-
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.the contr f ,
rivet by aeriid r l
of etrm" is to the court -
students argue that arm
= x r
ti?n ut ` soq*t only within arlr Able !
political tl.aent, but that it to hardly >wr seeking
Irk "Y case, p$let e . it is Visible only it is
ee"..s`. On this ,' lhoa , aft arms race to not the U
Cause UterV*tidua1 tension, as the id,$lt the
1020!s oft** tbWaght; it is not even a outing fict4',
.,.&a more woderste critics suggest; it is nothing a t - M
isters+ the heat generatat .? +ntb+er
a t~~t~ar w'h~-?lt r~
ways. If this heat is creases to the point ~- eysion-,
there w t1 . , ?etar if an the other hi11 , ' inter-
national ttsture sold ge dog, the hirmwWtvr of
la ow, 0, m
1-, and the axr-s race will lwr toc
fists will `fo-
ride t, a n y sold go* a d sane t r t + t atetroaae e. The impor-
tetst R r . e a this view, in t o i s the too* of statlr*-
e and aeai oni t ard the apttlsM*t of those *as -' which
~t1t
are eeyeat l less to pie int. -tia*al hest; di
should be lift to take, a of Itself.
Cher or not This extreew view As acourst? ,
this ztuc Art.l et sere a clear from the ezperiieOe of the
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,a 111+.7'! 30's; no 4-000 c a:a ;omse of eis.'crts to 'k?o isider
a problea of limitation of armament in a va :uus For
aeaAs s i&p I y. t bat
-this r s lam in t l;_'
free worlu and the U.
United States aRau
ential to c ider
`sitest now iemanda of
cost between the
aria friends a great etiort
to 4treii then their, t;olae:.tive defer, es. Any genuine re :la"
tion 01: armaments Oust scz eho : be uonne .ted with su,:.?h a
change in this general situation that the regulation has
a :Nance of survival.
uciet of relations between
and the Soviet union ustt
so deep-seated that no
ni'e their differences to be
uizue, large-s :aie political settle--
went seems likely within the present generation. The gu