NEW PROPOSALS FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: July 2, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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NEW PROPOSALS F'OR CONTR?L~ OF' AT?MIC WEAPONS ~UL ?~
This paper is bntended to be c~ont~?ove~?sial~ It is therefore one sided,
opinionated aaAd er~?oneo~asa Noted by D/DGI
~ ~ ,~{:
SUMMAR'K
The weste~?~s nations have several natu~?al disadvantages in atomic
warfare, these x~~eo
1) greate~~ vaall~eraY~ils~.ry bc~~:ause of more centralization and speciali-
zation, greatea? dependence on powe~? and transliort,
~) possibility of sneal~ attacl~~ and
3) dependeaace o~n o~rerseas transport and possibly beach-head land-
ings in warf~.ree
When the Russian stockp~.le ~?eaches a00, we cannot compensate for these
disadvantages even by aaa uaaflimited supply of bombs as a saturation effect
occursa
Consequently9 military cyefense plaaaning should not be based on atomic
weapons which we may not tiara to use9 we should attempt to minimize our
natural disadvantages an atomic warfare aid we should seek to eliminate
stockpiles of atomic weapor~sa
The previous plan fo~? control of atomic energy presented by the United
:hates was not accepted9 it left us in an unce~?tain mo~?al position and it is now
+~bsolete, Anew effort is needed to eliminate stockpiles which are now to our
disadvantageo
A new pleas is presented based ono
1) Accepting the Russiaa~ p~??posal fir inte~?national iabspectaon and
destruction of stockpilese
DBE re~ie~s~ completed.
state Dept. revievr completed
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2) Specifying the inspecti?n re~llired, sand
3) Progressive elimination of stockpiles during a period of
30 weeks
This plan is to our advaant~e if accepted or rejected It should be
negotiated in private to permit coancessioans~ No plan can more than postpone
the use of atomic weapons, so de~;es~trali~ation is still urgently neededa
IN~'Fi.?L~IJ~TI?N
Almost seven years hate passed since the 49~4greed Declaration?? of
November 15, 1945, was gssued by the President of the United States and the
l?rime Ministers of the United I~na~gdom sand Canadao Th1S declaratioan Which
committed tine United States to ?Aseek by all reasonable means to bring about
international arrangements to prevernt the use of atomic energy for destructive
purposes99 was based on three major consideratiommsa These wereo
1) The development of atomic energy has placed at the disposal of
maailciand means of destruction hitherto unlcrnown,
2) There can be no adequate military defense against atomic
weapons, and
3) These are weapons 94in the employment of which no single
nation Dean in fact have a monopoly??~
Shortly thereafter ~aanp 339 1946) a board of consultants begaan its work
on the formulation of a plan for the international control of atomic energy
This report, issued March l6, 19469 coapfirms the three points of the '?l~greed
l~eclaratiornP9 sand adds a fourtho 09Our p?BStACa1 ganstJStutIl?naS9 and the historically
established reluctance of the United States to take the initiative in agressive
warfare, both would wean to put us at a clisadvaantage with regard to surprise
use of atomic weapons This suggests that although our present position, in
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which we have a monopoly of tk~ese weapons9 ma,y appear st~?ong, this
advantage will disappear and. the situation may be reversed in a world in
which atomic armamexat is general?~o
Another point which was recognized. at an early date was that the
United States and the western mowers are more ~rulm~erable to atomic warfare
than Russia because of their higtaer deg~?ee of concentration in citx~s and
higher dependence on the pz:~pea2 fu~~ctioning of a complex tech~aology~
Accordingly9 the need. for a gradual decentralization. to reduce our vulnera-
x-ility was apparento
The developments of se~~en years have only confirmed these major
premises Present day think~;ing ~~s based on the utilizatio~a of hundreds or
thousands of bombs i~r.stead of tens or hua~d~?eds9 furthe~? emphasizing point
c-ne, General Vande~aberg estimated that even a conventioa~al attack by World
War II type bombea?s would be ~5 percent successful Sato Evea Post)o The
Russians have demonstrated the truth of point ~9 which was considered to be
the most controve~?sial ixa 1946
Unfortunately9 the ~?e~arkable foresight of 1946 did not lead to action
c-f equal merito Today9 ~ 195~D there is no decentralizatione no improvement
in international relations no adequate defe~nsey no control of atomic energy
a,nd the time has al~?eady a~?rived wJnen the Russia,~a stocl~pile could cause a
major catastrophe in this country het at this time the public appears satisfied
because the United States ha.s bu~,lt given more bombs and made some feeble
e>fforts toward organizing a Ci?ilian Oefe~ase group to clean up the debriso On
this basis a man would be pleased at the prospect of a duel because he had the
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foresight to buy ten pistols and the arrangements with his undertai~er~
It is apparent that the time is here whe~a the ea~istence of atomic weapons
is a decided milita~?y d~.sadvantage to the iJnited Stateso Consecluentlyy we should
direct our efforts towards formulating a new pro~sal for the control of
atomic weaponso Whatever the rnerz.t oi? the original proposals it is damned
b;y the simple fact that it was usoft a,ccepted~
1VIII.~~''AI`t~ D~SADiIA1mTTA0ES OF' ATOMIC WEAPONS
1.. American. use of atomp~c; weaf?ons~
a) Destruction, of I~uss~~.an cities Apart from considerations of
whether this method of war"~a~e ~s too evgl to be used the amount of damage is
limited not only by the number of
mbs available but also by the number of
targets and the means of transp~~?ting the bombs Where is a point of diminishing
returns and it seems hbgh.~y doubtful. wtl~etber it would be worth transporting the
1000th ~ bomb to Itussiao
b.) "Tactical use for defense of Eu~?opeo Targets which would merit use
ofc atomic weapons are ra~?e and would become even. more so if bombs were
used, consecluently9 1000 would appea~? more than ampleo
c) Submarines and submarine bases Submarines are more difficult
tc- detect than to dest~,Poy after detection., Consecguently atomic bombs would
only be useful in cases where a verbed ~?oxntac:t was made and losto Submarine
bases are limited ia~ ~~.nxmbex;, so o~ae thousand more bombs should surely be
ample for tactical use by the ivavy~
d) Hydrogen bombs ??nl~~ a few l~ussian, targets are large enough to
merit larger bombs Gonse~uentlys the hydrogen b?mb is a completely wasted
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effort. Worse still it will a~~.cele.~?ate the Russian development of a hydrogen
bomb.
Conclusion, Borgabs beyor^~d IoTo, 3000 are completely worthless and
can?t even be sold. as surplus 1/ Even worse, if
several ~~~s and k~ombs are used there may be some
widlespt ~~d ta~~ic effectsa
2. Russian uses
Consider? the n~xmb~;~. ~{ ~i~.ssian bombs required to overcompensate
even an unlimited Ame~~;:cs.:~ s~~.~pa~~
a) American aid Eu~~?o,~ean. cities 300 bori~bs deliverable to American
and European cities should lre su~fic~ient to deter the United States from starting
city bombing
b) Shipping and harbors Amy war with Russia :will require an enormous
overseas transport 200 bornbs reserved for shipping and harbors would more
than compensate for tactical ~,d,~, amtages of the United States side (anti-submarine
weapon).
c) Break through X00 bombs reserved fo~~ use in breaking through
strong positions should elnmF~,?uate the need of massed divisions
d) Beach =heads 50 bombs reserved for beach-heads should make
landing operations even wo~~se tfi~ax~ usualo
Conclusions 650 Russian. bombs are sufficient to put us at a military
disadvantage ever if we had an unlimited supply. We
1/ If intercontinental guided, mussiles are used, several thousand bombs may
-- be needed to hat a parti~?~1~.~? tar?get~
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ca~~,~vt w~~n ~~~ hav~~~,~g bigge~? stockpiles. Air defense must
be p~?ep~,~~~~~~ ~'~~~~ ail types of attack at all times and duickly
~~ea~~:he~ a ~~~%^~t of ~+.na~g~5~shn.~.g retu~?ns. As the Russian
st?~k}~ile is }r~,r~w ~aaot~;d i~ ties pape~?s at 150 we should
lose ~~o 'tt.iim~~: ~~F~ malz~~g eve~?~ effort to eliminate these
sto~~-kpll~~~~~
PR~~~tO?,~5 A~~ ~ ~~?~~ PTS ~.~ OO1?ITRO L
1a. Laliemthal-Ache~c~?s F~ilti.{,~~:,,
Thas plate ~v~~.Q~
;~~.~,, ~` ~~~~~ lie ~.s a~f~r tsght as ~ssible to prevent small
leaks which mAght ~.~~~~~.~,~~~?'~ ~;,~; ::r~;r~"..~~~i~~-L~" .at~~?ial to t'~,bri.cate a few bombs. It
overemphasized the ~?1~"f:u.c~.~~{~~1~ ~~' ref"tr~~'~ ~tellagent ~aspectors. This was
fallacious for the A~~ ha~~~ ~~;~~~~~~:~`~~?~ted thai$ people wrath physics training can
be hia?ed to do dull ~o~P~s? ~"fc a~~~~' ~~~~~ ~re~;ognize that a maaor attack utilizing
mbs is d: ~?~;~:~,~~:;~~? ~~~e.~ation and detectableo It demanded a
lot from the Russb~ a~~~~ ~>~t,;~,,,,~~,d, ~,_~ ba~lt flee n?1ow-how?? of atomic ear~ergy
which we now reaAize vva?i~ ~~~~ G.~ ~,tt~~?.r?~~nve to them as we thoughto Perhaps it
was a good offe~? at the tn~~e ~>>tt ~~ wars not a~?ceptable these and is even less
acceptable at presea~t wh~~s s~~:e ~~~~~e ~s pe~?haps ~.a00?100 instead of 20-0.
2. Russian Proposa~.~
Wester~a ot?~e~t~io~ss t~.~ t~~~e ~tussl.~n p~opos~,ls were
a) Outlaw bombs ~'l}gip y , ~.; ~~f~;~..~1 ~~e~or.d,
b) ~Teto in se~u7rIlf~~ ~?c~~~sx?f~.l.~
c) hio details on l~,spr~~??~a~r~~.r~ p~r~~~~;edu~e~s?
The fi~?st two ~fl~esti~z._~~ R~.~"~, me~,~^,~,~nglc~~~s ~R we~~?e f~all~ eox~ceded b~
the Russians an Y99k~~ The ~?~s:~~.~~s,~i~a~n~~ ~~e~re~? p~~?~ided ar~~ detabled mechanisms
for inspection9 beat ?r~ ?ua~ s~ca~ey ,~,~, 7~~ ~pe~;tioan p~?ocedures were proposed
based on the gene~?a.l. p~?r~~(~'~~~:~.~6'. ?, ~r~ ~~~.e .Russian pla~na
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~o
It seems clea~? that we had no ~?eal intention of giving up our only
n:iilitary advantage and, t~n?~ ~Fssians were willing to wait until they caught up
with their productiono ~urt~e~mo~?eU in the open forum debate neither side
was willing to comp~?omise "~o,~ ,~T~a.~ of appearing to "back down49~
DASIC A~~~T~v'i~`~Tl?liiS ~~' ~dE~ PIaAN
1) Any deg~?ee o'~ ~~~~;A;~~~~~. c~r~ given warning system which can be obtained
is better than the p~~es~~~~~ ~~;r,.~~~?
2) As recognised i~7~ t~~e fl.9~5 ?"Agreed Declaration" no control plan
can eliminate the use of ato~~~~~ v~~apons in a mayor wa~?o A country could start
f7rom scratch at the e~utb~?e~,.T~: ~~.d produc'e bombs in two years The best
possible plan can only e~~~Y~h~.~~,~~~-~ s~.~acl~:piles and postpo~ae for a while the use of
atomic weaponso
3) It is highly dout*ttf~~.~~ that the l~ussia~.s will accept any form of control
or elimination of stocl~piles as it would be to thei~? disadvantages Consequently
tlhe plan should be designed tee do 'gas g?od even if it is not accepted or if it is
accepted but broken later ono
4) Discussion of the plan should not be held in open sessions as this
prevents concessions and ~;ompromisee 'The plan should only be published after
i~t has been accepted or re~ected~
5) Even a plan that wo~atd only gn.ve one day? s warning would be
valuables Populations c?o~~ld~. m~~~r~ and the ai~? defe~ase would not be caught with
a Sunday morning hangove x?~
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6~ ~'he ~.~~'.,~r~,ri
t~~ c i~,:~~i~ate l~~~e stockpileso A few X10)
]zidden bombs a~~ ~~r~~~~~T_,,.;.;~ ~-~~;~, :~~?~~~~,-~. ~ pr~adu~tioan facility operatiang at a
capacity of 30~~0 peg ;~,,,:~:,~:~~, ~~ .~~~.h~~7;5,~ leis da~~e~?ous than aaa accumulated stock-
pileo Such a plat ~:~~4~'s~;l ~~~~;~--;~~~ ~s.~ `~~~;~ ~o~~~ed auto ~ wa~? broke out when we had
~~io stockpile brut ~~~, ~,~~~ ~~_~_ ~~~~,~ ~~~?~~~~~,t~ara~, the ? I~id~e sand snot our cities
would be the l~c~~ ~. ~~~ { ~;;<
7~ Atomic: ~r~,,~~~..~ ~~:.:, ~;_~ ,;,~;~? ~~~i{ ~~,t value ~.nd coin easily be sacrificed if
~.iecessary to elimi~~~~~.c~- 2; ~w, ;,:,':, ,:; ~~~,;~,~?s~
3~ b'nte~?r~lato~~= ~~ ~~.~1~ ~,~~.~: ?z~ G~~st ?f atomic eaner~y~, whether desirable or
riot, is clearly a~ot ~:c~a?e~~~~.'~~ ~__" sc?> ~~'~~~~~~i~, aan~~ ~hou~~~ ~.?t be cornsideredo
9~ A ana~o~? ~to$?.~,~.~: ~`~4~.~~:~ ~~ ~~~?ol~es thous~.~ds of people aaad could be
..:
c etected by tine sipa.eL;:~tt a.,.;~,;~~ 4 , :l ,:;~~i.~~,~,
10~ The pu?a~;ti~ e ~~~~~ ;~~~.?>> ;_:,~.~ :~~ ;~a?ts ~,~n~~ ~~oepian~ ~?ecox?ds is such adeep-
],rained humaan h~l~~L'~ f~~,ac: st?^, ;-~,. , ,-: uy ~~:c.~k~ile~ aid the locatioan of production
i:acilities can be ~~'~~E~,:C`;~Clt~.tr~ic~ "r;~~~1 `i~~~.~ ,~ c~~o~~~7s~
11~ A oanemd~.~r ~~,~_ ,vy ~ ;~~~~~~~ ~~~ a~ztnie~ed by simply locking up the
stockpile of fissia~n~i~:~ie ~,~z?~,,K.
~ln~,~cF~~ i~te~an~tioaaa.l coantrol~
1~~ A? ?ne?w~c~7'~s ~~~~~r~_>>~~~~ c~;~~~;~~~ be a~;in~e~e~, if tine same material was
alloyed with some ~t~~~7~ ;,;~,?:~;:~ ~I.
13~ Stockp~.l~e~ E,~~~~~.?~~I ;n.,, =; ~~~,~~irx~a~ted by de~~a:~u~? the fissionable material
with won-fissg?n~,bb~ i~~~~f~~~;~~~~~~, `~h~~~~ ~~,~ould rr~ot ~t~~fe~e with ~epeacefuh?
uses and is st~?esse~ ~.~~.~; tth~L:~ ~.~: ~~~,>-~~a~ ~ep~~?t~ ~~'
i;_/ It is not possible to ~~.~.~.~~;_?~?l~~~ ~~Y~?om aan~?lass~~ned data whether Plutoa~ium can be
a denatured If got ~t ~,t~f,~i1t?~;, "~.;;~~ to e duaanped. , the oeeaan~ ~ the Russians
use Plutoani~n e~ch~~~~+;~~ely ~~~~ ~~,~~.il~,~ t~?ade an e~ui~aleant ~uaaatity of denatured
Uraniumo
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14) A further delay of ?~leT tc-two ~ea~?s could be introduced b~
destruction of all piles and separ~atioa~ facilbtieso This would be nice but
not essentialo
15) We have more to ga~~.~ tl~,,~ lose ~ exchange of information
except about details of bombs
From the consideratlcizs a~ov~~ ~, plan r,atu~?all~r followso
1) Accept the Itussi~. ~ro~sal to outlaw ar~d destroy bombs and
simultaneously to est~,blist~ ~,o~trolso
2) Define the co~.trols aid lnspectiog~ ~~?e~ui~?edo For examplea
a) Access to all reco~?cls of production etco during phase 1 and
the~?eafter at n~onth.ly ~~~te~?vals plus three unscheduled visits
per year
b) Access to all ~,rodu~ti?~ facilities9 assembly facilities and
stockpiles d~~~~gng phase ~ and thereafter at weekly iz~.tervals,
plus teas ur~sch~d~~nle~, visits pe~? year
c) Continuous surve~.llaa~ce of stockpiles wader ianternatioa~al
co~.trol~
d) Inspection of eaatbre cou~atry by air beginning at stage 2 and
thereaftero
e) Outlawiaag aaaci dest~?uction of stockpiles by stageso
Stage to Deliver. ~.uclear anaterial of bombs to international
coaatr?.l l?catec~ wntha~rn coum~tr~ at rate of 10 percent
per we~k~ Also curre~at p~?oduction)e
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Stage ~? Aif~,~? r ~~~.T.s ~a~~~~~~i~al is del~l~re~ea to satisfaction of
ho~h ~~~~!~~~~ alloy l~ per~;~nt per weep with another
et~,~~ t .
Stage ~~. ~~~~.~s~ ~;:~t? ~~ ~.1. ;~at~~~i~,i ~.s allo~~ed9 denature 19 percent
Stage ~0 1~~~~:~~;;~.~?~'~;,-,
~~~~~~_u~,tio~ plantso
This plan would ~-~z~%~~r_;~~.:,tf. s~o~~~,~5~les zn ~~ weeds afte~? adoption It
could hardly ~e a,c~epte~~, ~ ~~~. ~,e, ,";, ?~.~~.a~s s months so ?ux~ stockpile would remain
intact duria~g the short t~~e :. ;ill k.~~;~.~; ~ that ~?eYna,ins wheys we have an advantage in
atomic weapor~s~ 'his ~la~~. L,~ ~~~:is;~z~ed, as a~ ea~ample oa~ly~ The details of
any actual plane would ~e ~~~z ~~:~~~~ e4~~ f~ra~c~ load, ~~. W.
yllas~kr~t>~n ~5, D. C.