LETTER TO MR. ALLEN W. DULLES FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010053-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: July 3, 1952
• Content Type: LETTER

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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE 39. MASSACHUSETTS
CONN ENTI
Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
Dear Allen:
clKijt,IA.trvai), 1- 6R
July 3, 1952
4 enclose herewith the minutes of the June meeting
of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament. As you will
see, they are somewhat cryptic in form; it seemed important
to us to protect the anonymity of our witnesses. I think
perhaps you already know who most of them were, but when
we next meet, I shall be happy to give you the information
personally. I should add, I think, that the minutes may
perhaps give a somewhat more definite picture of our dis-
cussions than is in fact accurate. I have found, in writing
them up, that somewhat more clarity emerges if I try to de-
fine positions sharply; but I should warn you that the
actual state of our deliberations is far from clear, and
I think it plain that the August meetings will, in essence,
start from scratch.
These August meetings will probably be those at which
the bulk of our work is done, and of course, we all hope
very much indeed that you may be able to come for at least
some of the sessions. Yet we all understand that your
relationship to the Panel must necessarily be limited by
your very heavy olpgations to your present agency, and
we are prepared te ba*eager to make matters as easy as
possible for you. In particular, I myself hope that you
will feel free to call me down to hear your views on any
part of this matter any time that suits you. I shall be
in Washington during the first days of next week (in
Washington and not in Chicago!), and I shall call you then
to see if we could get together briefly.
I hope that the gout is behaving better; I also hope
that you will forgive me for sending you so much paper.
State Dept. review completed
McGB:gw
Encl.
Yours,
McGeorge Bundy, Executive Secretary
C?NPDENT1
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CepeN-2-I-DeE-Z-T-Iee-L-
Panel_ f Connultnte on Dioarmement
Minuteo of Mooting of
Juno 19 - 21. 1952
at
Cambeid Masesehueatte
I. Members Present
Dr. Oppenheimer? Mr. Johneon, and tho Executive Secretary were present
throughout; M. Dickey tee preeent on June 19 and 20. Hr. Dulles and
Dr. th were unable to be preeent.
II. The Character of the Hooting
Thew meetinge MFG held mainly for the perpoce of diecussing gen ral
aspects of the problem of dlearrament with a number of visiting ex-
perts. The Panel made no offeet to :reach any conclusions, and the
following account of discussions le preoe ted purely for the use of
Panel membere. The subjects of diecuceion aro peepented the order
in which they were coneider d dun g the committee le meetings, with a
minimum of interpolation and oreanisation0
III. Attitudes of the Goveenment of the USSR
The first seezion of the meetinge eau devoted to a disenemion of
Soviet attitudee With a etudent of Soviet urebleme. This student
strongly advieed the Panel to appro eh its problem without immediate
reference to Soviet attitudee toward diearmament or to Soviet willing-
noes to accept any given dinarmament plan. Re felt strongly that the
comMittee should consider disarmament from 0a coldly t chnical point
of view"; it should try to formulate a diearmament plan which would
work without considering whether or not such a plan could be put into
immediate effect. Any other 00112639 in the view of thio guest, would
lead to a morass; efforts to satiefy prooent Soviet attitudes could
only produce an endless series of destructive conceseions.
While th panel should work from a technical base, it should neverthe-
less try to reduce the requirements of its plan to the minimum n cossary
for long-term effect/venous. This minimum might turn out to be well
below the point of total security. In response to questions, the
guest expert acknowledged that the technical minimum cbuld hardly be
designed without Sone reference to both th expansionist ambitions and
the defensive fears of the Soviet Union, but he maintained his basic
position that the central considerations in present disarmament plan-
ning were technical in character. He believed that it would be a
great contribution to national policy-making if the Panel should be
able to provide a basic plan which could offer not total security but
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co'
a meaeure of safety which would permit a real relaxation in the area
race. He further pointed out that this einimun level of safety
remained a very substantial goal, in view of the fact that it would
be necessary to include in any such minimum plan sone method for practi-
cal and self-eustaining =fore merit of any agreemente which might be
reached. In reeponoe to thio courant. a Panel member noted that this
problem of self-ouctaining enforcement wee one of the continuing
difficultiee I. all diearmament efforts; it was no eikale matter to
design a plan whic would be Innune to both irrational fear and com-
placent neglect.
If it should prove poceiblo to outline a reaeonablo and acceptable
basic plan for diearmament, the samt problem would be that of finding
a w y to produce agreement to such a plan on the part of the Soviet
Union. On thim point, the Panel'e cleat took the basic pooition that
"eeente are more important than propocalt." He believed that statenents
of policy, in and of themeelv o. could never persuade the Soviet Union
of the good intentions of the United Statos or the desirability of ?
disarmament. Sovi t leaden) would be prepared to bargain seriously
about the control of armamento only If they became persuaded that such
control was nocoseary in the interest of the USSR itcelf. The two
sets of facts which might conceivably poreuado them to such a conclu-
sion were first. "situations of otrongth" on the part of the Yost,
and second, the facto of modern physics. Ho thought it likely that
in the years immediately after the ending of the Second leorld tar,
the Soviet Union had serioualy underestimated both the strength of
the West and the power of atomic weapono. In particular, there have
been reports that high Soviet uthorities seriously regarded the atomic
bomb as merely a weapon for terrorizing civillana - a weapon not
having first-rate significance in the conduct of war. If it was a
major objective of Western diplomacy to bring the Soviet Union to a
willingness to consider in serious terms the problem of disarmament,
then this diplomacy should be energetically devoted to sharpening
Soviet aw reness of West rn strength and of the strength of the atom.
Judging from present appearances, a major effort of diplomacy would
be necessary both to bring the Soviet Union to an awareness of the
need, for disarmament and to work out an agreed plan for disarmament
on the basis of such a willingness. In this double task, the kanel's
guest recommended that the Western powors should resort to a kind of
"delegated diplomacy"; they should entrust their side of the negotia-
tions to a single individual. It seemed quite posrible, for example,
that some constructive result night come from conversations between
Ambassador Hannan and Generalissimo Stalin; but no one could feel
hopeful about conversations between a group of 1:estern dignitaries,
however capable, and any Russian authority, however exalted. Given
the very great power of the United Statesand its pre-eminent posi-
tion in the production of weapons of mass destruction, it seemed
obvious that the chosen instrument of negotiation must be an American;
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this requirement posed a problem for American diplomats in dealing with
other great w otern peelers.
In summary, the proposals of the Panel'e guest expert on the Soviet
Union were three: first, prepare disarmament proposals technically
adequate to give a basic level of international safety; second, bring
to th attention of the rulers of the Soviet Union facts sufficient to
persuade them that the acceptance of a diearmam nt plan is in their
interest; third, negotiate an agreement on dicarmament through a single
diplomatic agent, an American acting for all the major Western powers.
When questioned about the dan r of an international explosion in the
period before any international agreement on disarmament is reached,
the Panel's Soviet expert stated that in his opinion the gravest dan-
gers would come from yoints of friction like Berlin and Korea; he was
not unduly alarmed by the pos ibility that developments in the field
of weapons might so terrify the Soviet Union that it would start a
*preventive war" of its own. Ho felt that war was always a very heavy
risk to the Soviet Regime, because of the social tensions of the police
state. Soviet rulers were well aware of the danger of war, in his
opinion, and he thought on the whole that "they will not commit suicide
for fear of death". Be could see o reason for postponing or delaying
the American development of new and even larger weapons of mass destruc-
tion; he did not believe that these developments would drive the Soviet
leaders to desperate measures:, and ho thought it clear that the Soviet
Union would itself proceed toward such weapons in any case.*
In response to another question, the Panelle guest agreed that it would
be necessary for any disarmament agreement to be accompanied by a cer-
tain political stabilization. He thought that with the exception of
Berlin, the basic outlines of a stable eituation were developing in
Western Europe, but he was much less certain obott the character of
the situation in Asia, el arly, any agreement to limit the production
and use of weapons would involve an understanding that the inevitable
hostility between the USSR and the Vest should be transferred to other
fields of contest, and it would be of great importance to have a clear
understanding of loth the limits of the new area and the rules of the
new contest.
IV. U.S. Attitudes
The-second witness to appear before the Panel turned out to be con-
cerned primarily with the American response to the developing situa-
tion in weapons. He thought it of particular importance to find some
way of bringing home to the American people the fact that the United
States is most unusually vulnerable to atomic weapons. Leaving aside
*Per a different view, see part VII below.
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the possibility of a thermo-nuclear weapon, be remarked that developments
in the field of fission weapons had co multiplied the power of the
atomic bomb since 1945 as to maks a single bomb capable of the total
destruction of all but a very few of the largest American cities. In
considering these veapons, the ordinary American seemed to believe that
the major point was the capacity of Americans to deliver such a blow
an others, while the more significant fact was that now and in the
future such blows could be delivered by others on the United States.
The Panel's guest felt that an adequate American awareness of this
second point was a neceeeary condition for the kind of development in
policy which might make it possible for t e United States to partici-
pate effectively in disarmament planning and in disarmament itself.
Once the danger of atomic weapons was sufficiently widely recognised,
it might become poisible to get a farther development of American
strength in conventional weapons, and If this strength should become
sufficient to balance the Soviet strength in.the same kind of weapons,
it would become possible for the United States to dispense with its
present reliance on atomic bombs. Under questioning from members of
the Panel, the Panel's guest agreed that It nightie) longer be possible
to make a sharp distinction between conventional and atomic weapons.
He nevertheless believed that an awareness of the character of atomic
weapons and the threat to the United States which they represented was
a necessary first step toward effective thinking about the problem of
control of armaments. Be hoped that the Panel would be able to give
some attention to the question of public ucation which was posed by
this problem.
Almost more important than the problem of public attitudes, however,
was that of the attitude of the leaders of the American military
establishment. It was unfortunate, in his view, that earlier proposals
had been made without full coordination between civil and military
authorities. It would be very difficult for the United States to give
energetic and genuine support to proposals for disarmament in the field
of atomic weapons as long as the chiefs of the American military
establishment relied almost exclusively upon. the atomic weapon as their
principal means of retaliation against major aggression and as their
.principal hope of victory in the event of all-out var. And if American
military leaders rare to b induced to look toward a time when they
might give up this Sunday punch, they must be persuaded that atomic
weapons in the long run are on balance a danger to the United States.
The Panel's guest therefore hoped that it might be willing to lend
its support to a proposal for the establishment of a high-level com-
mittee, with competent military representation, which might have the
duty of maintaining a continuous and effective *estimate ef the over-
all weapons position. Such a committee, he hoped, might be useful in
developing an awareness, throughout the defense establishment, of theekleyeeS
dessesping character of the race in weapons of mass destruction. It
might also be desirable to rake certain that the military leaders of
the nation felt equally responsible for both overseas attacks and the
domestic defense of the United States; at the present, it seemed as if
many of those having high authority were more concerned about what they
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could do to. the follow than they were about what the other
follow could do to um.
The .Panel's guest was sort in that there should be an increase in
American awareness of the character of the atonic arms e, and its
meaning for the United State. When it cane to more specific recommen-
dations and suggestions, he was MOTO retic,nt and mor tentative. He
suggested tho possibility that it night bo desirable to obtain press
cooperation in commenting upon prospective t nic developm nts. He
also thought that it might be a good sign 10 the United States could
roach a stage in its military position in which it would become possible
for us to announco offiel lly that we would not be the first to use
atonic weapons in any now war. Yet he recognised that such a state-
ment, in and of itself, might well be unwise. What he wished to indi-
cate as his belief that it night stili be possible to separate atomic
weapons from "bayonets".
V. .Deterrents
During the Panel's discussion with the third end fourth guest during
this series of meetings, two problems were of contr 1 inportancee and
it seems best to treat each one fully In one plac incorporating in
the discussion comments made duri*g the questioning of both guests.
The first probl m is that of "Deterrents", and the second Is that of
"Control".
The Panel's discussion of "Deterrents" protsced two major lines of
argument. On the one hand it was claimed that the prospective develop-
ment of largo atonic stockpiles in both the Soviet Union and the
United States made agreement on the control of atonic weapons impera-
tive, in order to avoid the destruction of el ills t:ton itself. On
the other hand, it was argued that perhaps it is the very existence
of these atomic stockpiles which stays the hand of statesmen who
might otherwise resort to major war.
Those who argued the necessity for controlling atomic weapons were of
the opinion that large stockpiles of atomic bombs would almost inevit-
ably create a state of nervoueness in the world such that sooner or
later some ruling group would find it intolerable to continue inactive
in web a state of tension and would unl aeh atomic war, hoping against
hope that to Strike first might be to insure the survival of its own
society. Even though perhaps rational men might not be entitledstee
reach any such optimimtic conclusion, It seemed too much to hops that
in a world of stockpiled devilment, those In control of the weapons
would always be rational as they faced these options. It was important
to observe that in the case of large stockpiles, it was necessary for
statesmen to reach the pacific conclusion not once, nor twice, but
evert time they considered the problem. Whatever might be the behavior
of two scorpions in a can, it seemed to some members of the Panel and
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to ome of ito gueoto that tho pictuee of two goat Groupe of ,7!?0UcTO.
facing each ()thee teanquilly, with ouch weeps atheed, wao fancafal.
It mIght be fW-12.0 that in tha peoeent oituatioe the exiotence of atomic
weapono oomewhat inhibited the willineneeo of the mee;'oe poweec to
contest by force relatively email problems, a2thceele the case of Korea
reneeeed thio judgment aemesoiset doubtful. Eat any poocible minoa
utability in a world full of atomic weapons Deemed of mall impoetaece
compaeed to ite very high daegere, especially as time paseed.
To one member of Who Panel, howevee, these argeneets '3020 eot wholly
peeouaeive. Without committing himeelf as to hie final view of the .)
problem, he eugge tedthat it would to wioe to eone:der whether it
might not prove to that atomic umpone were the only oufficiont
deterrent to uae in p000nt cleeumotaneso. :light it nit be true,
this member aoked, that the atoeic weapon in itself wac a damper upon
aggreesive action? Might At not be teue, ferthee, that the real in-
centive to war lay in large euppliee of conventional weapon?, and
might It not be wice, then, to begin In dieeeeameet with thece con-
ventional weapons? Thooa hypotheooc ocomed to Wm worth =wining
for, after all, the major aroblem was to prevent war, and not cpecific-
ally to prevent atomic war. Atomic stoc!epilee might be destroyed, but
there was no way to destroy the knewlodeo in human minds that atomic
bombs could be constractod. Therefore an the ovont of major war,
should it last long enough, atomic bombs would certainly be made and
used. So all large warewould be atomic usee and the problem was to
avoid war itself. If atomic weapons themselves constituted a deterrent
againet war, they might be more useful in existeece than in long-range
potential only.
A somewhat different but related line of argument in defenee of atomic
weapons was Tut fOeweed in tentative fashion by another member of .the
Panel, who asked whether the atomic weapon wao not an essential element
in the willingness of the United States to act responsibly and posi-
tively in international affairs beyond the boundarieo of the American
continent. Would we, for example, have intervened in Korea if we had
not had the atomic bomb? end if we accepted come control of atomic
weapons today, might we not find oueeelvec driven back on the defensive
in the international contest, short of war, which 9.0 certain to con-
tinue between us and the Soviet Union? as there not a sense, in
short, in which the atomic weapon wan' the most natural one to American
policy?
The suggestion that it might be unwise to accept or seek atomicrcon-
trols brought forth a critical responoe from others In the discussion.
Such deterrent effect as atomic bombs might An fact have, it was argued,
would be maintained even if they should be brought under control and
existing stockpiles destroyed. All parties would know that any major
war, if long continued, would become, atomic in character, and a poten-
tial Soviet aggreceor, in particular, would know that in a start from
scratch the United States would almost certainly have a major advantage.
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To the Soviet mind, it was ug tad the'priacipal deterrent otnength
of the United States ba e not been atomic bombe, even in recent years;
it has boon, rather, tho enormous industrial capacity of the United
Statee, which guarantees its ability to reit and retaliate in any
major war. This detennent capacity would be maintained, and indeed
groatly increaood, in a oituation in which atcmic stockpilec no longer
existed, for in ouch a oituation there would be no possibility that a
determined blow struck with ourpriee by the Soviet Union might destroy
American productive capacity. While no claim was made that the Soviet'
Union has at present this overuhelming capability, it ooemed clear,
simPly as a matter of arithnetic and time, that in a world without
limitation on weapons of maze destruction the day would come when it
would be wholly P oceible for a Soviet ruler to suppose that he had it
in his power to strike such a decioive blau at the American economy9
X% response to theneuggestion that the atomic bomb might be a
neceeeary underpinning for present American policy, it was remarked
that while it might be true that the bomb had played an essential part
in permitting American activity in recent yeaae, it could hardly con-
tinuo to play ths came role in the approaching period of high Soviet
atomic capability. ?Here perhaps the arguments made by others about
American vulnerability are pertinent.
The exchange or views on the subject of deterrents did not
result in any final agreement on the major propositions involved,
but certain lesser points were in fact settled. It was agreed, for
example, that any international agreement on the lieitation of weapons
would presuppose COM limited internatienal political understanding.
It was also agreed that a number of wars which can to fought in the
atomic ora is finite; this conclusion has considerable implications
which were not fully explored by the Panel in these meetings. Finally,
it was agreed that the character of an effective deterrent changes as
one moves from Voscow to Western Europe to the United States. The
significance of this change was, again, not fully explored.
VI. The Problem of Control
With only brief discussion and with no anparent disagreement,
the Panel concentrated it attention, in so far as it considered con-
trols in any disarmament scheme, upon the problem of controlling both
atomic and conventional weapons. It seemed plain that no stable
balance of power could readily be obtained if only atomic weapons were
controlled or limited, and at the same tine, it was believed that it
would be more readily possible to operate a cystem of minimum controls
over conventional than over atomic tampons. Large quantities of con-
ventional armaments are highly visible.
It was also agreed that it was not the function of the panel
to try to devise a water-tight scheme of total control. What was
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needed wee rather a plan under which it would be impoecable for any
one nation or group of nations to achieve in eecret a level of arma-
ment, atomic or conventional, oufficient to peessita suceecsful MY-
prise aesault upon other major powere. Even if a higher degree of
completeness in control were desieable, it must now be recognieed to
be impeoeible. 7t will not be p000lble for any system of inspection
after the event to determine with complete accuracy the =act number
of Soviet atomic bombs. Even if poet-facto inspection should be accur-
ate within perhaps 10% - and this is not impossible - some fissionable
material could be concealed.
Five y=ars ago the prospect of four or five or perhaps even a dozen
undetected atomic bombs would have made men believe that no effective
scheme of disarmament was possable. In that period it was customary
to think of the atomic bomb as aa ?absolute syeapon", such that two or
three bombs might detevaine a war between major powers. In 1952, no
responsible American military leader takes this position. So long as
atomic weapons can be numbered in unite - and perhaps even as long as
they can be numbered an two figures - they Zan in the category of
enormously destructive irritants, but not in that of "absolute weapons".
And in these circumstances, the motive for cheating a system of in-
spection and control in drastically reduced. The consequences of such
cheating, in terms of international retaliation and general world
opinion, might well be eo great as to discourage even the most cynical
from attempting a course which by itself would not be decisive in any
case.
Given the problem of operating a scheme designed to erevent the secret
achievement of a capacity to destroy a hostile society, the Panel gave
some attention to the basic requieenente for such a system. It seemed
to be the general view that such a eystem should have at least the
following elements: disclosure, verification, and agreed limits of
armament in various categories. There also seemed to be agreement that
the objective in each component of thin eyotem should be not to obtain
a rigorous accuracy, but rather to maks certain that nothing of de-
cisive significance was being overlooked. Thin difference of attitude
permits a considerably less rigid scheme of disclosure and control
than that which is contemplated i, the current United Lations Atomic
Energy Plan. This lack of rigor might permit a cyst= of inspection
which would be 1=es galling to the rulers of the Soviet Union than the
systems which have been suggested in connection with other disarmament
proposals. The two expert guests whom the Panel consulted were in
agreement that a few hundred qualified observers could quite easily in-
sure that no major clandestine armament effort was undertaken in the
Soviet Union if they had the following rights: (1) To go anywhere
they chose upon a show of cause, (2) To inspect all acknowledged
armaments establishments at any time, and (3) To require answers to
their questions from authorized supervisory personnel. The significant
point about these three conditions is that none of them requires that
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the impectoes te permitted to conduct conveleatioee with the ordinary
Soviet citizen; no dcou any ono of them eequiee that he be permitted
to peoceed without the ueual MVD eocort. These coneideeatieno are
impoetant in view of the teetimony given to tLe) Panel by it Soviet
opeciallot to the effect that the peinepal Soviet fear of inspectien
ar000 from the feeling that the impactor miget contaminate or Snfeet
Soviet citisene with the ideao of the non-Soviet meld. It 'Should
porhaps be notod, houovoe, that this estimate of a fou hundred impac-
tors ie predicated on two aueumptione; nrot that it io only a rajor
effort which needs to be detected, and eocond, that in Sts initial
establiohment, the diea7nanent voter) uould be founded upon a much
more extensive and eigorouo coamination of the incluotey of the Soviet
Union. But noithoe thio neee esteneive initial inspection or the
impaction problem ao a whole, wae Smpezeolve to the committee' two
technical gueote; both of nem were of the opinion that if any cyst=
of control of arm ehould become peoonle, the matter of inspection
would become trivial, ence they believed that the soviet Union would
be far more insistent on a detailed and ezteneive systen of dioclosure
and verification than the United Ctatec. 2he Reasians, in their
opinion, would be much more fearfut than the ?moricaes of entering
any oystem not iron-clad in its peotectiono.
After thie diocusoion of control?, one member of the Panel aeked,
"Zs a controlled world rea17? To thin a guest oFport zemarked that
it me not unreal, that in eoecnce what was peoposed was an entension
of the traditional oystem of military attach; it might be bettor,
indood, to consider the eyetem of inopection as one of facilitated
intelligence, and not as a fully developed inepeetorate. It was not
unreasonable to supyoze that a cyst= of fac:litated intelligence
could be developed, or that mall of ability and eneegy could be found
to staff such a system both in terns of allegiance to their individual
nations and in terms of loyalty to the United Kations an a whole.
Moreover, given the fragmentary and incomplete character of the system
of inspection here set forth, it seemed likely that it night prove
fle2ible, and certainly flemibility in any ouch system would be a
first requirement, if indeed it were to be real.
VII. Norality
One last set of considerations was posed under the general heading of
the word "morality". Here the Panel requested information as to the
feelings of its two scientific guests on the problem of the impact of
bomb development upon the conscience of mankind. Both -of these
guests took the view that this was not a meaningless consideration,
that the character of atomic war was indeed different in some sig-
nificant sense from that of veer conducted by conventional weapons,
even though conventional weapons, too, could be used in fire raids.
One of the guest consultants strongly resisted the notion that there
could be any great gain in developing the concept of the different
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hinds of uao to utich atomic bombs might be put; nomarabiliV of UDOS
seems meaningless to men, hs said. Oao member of the Panel, on tho
other hand, took the view that the was &real difference botygeon the
kind of plan in which you undertakm to use the atomic bomb to de nt an
aroa, 02 a given set of positions, and the hind of viola uhich you
develop in order to achieve COMG 002t Of strategic decision. Not only
the plan, but its effects uould be demonstrably and recognisably dif-
fonent in the oyes of our our! people and of mankind,
Zn this cam connection, ore member of the group of guests pointed
out that the development of nsw SLA larger atomic weapons carried with
it a certain stigma ,in tervs of morality. To those between the United
States :*Ad the USSR it mast seem that th-1 Amoricans WCY0 dalberatoly
taking the load in thio kind of warfare, and they uould not be per-
suaded by the argument advsnasci by the Panel6s Soviet =pert, to the
effect that if wo dOnot to it first, the other, ram would. The
scientific =pert =pressed his oua feeling t):et this argament was,
in any case, not valid; he took the view that the ff'aCC00000 the Uaitod
States might achieve An developing thormo-auclear weapons could not
but be a 4A:eat stimulus to Soviet development in the same field. Nor
did he believe that the Soviet Union would necessarily have proceeded
on its oun without such a stimulus. Per what was not true of atomic
ueapone might possibly be true of the therno-nuclear ueapon. namely,
that it was not primarily a weapon suitable for decision in war but
rather * weapon of horr r.
VIII. Plans for Later Meetiw,g
11 It was agreed that the Panel would try to spend the four weeks between
August 11 and September 5 in company together. During this period it
would attempt to formulate its thoughts and to determine 1* what form
they should be finally orgaaised pnd presented. It was tentatively
agr4ed that the meetings of the first weekuould be held at Princeton,
those of the second week in LOVOT, NGW Fampshiro. and those of the
third week in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Respectfully submitted
Alec 614,41
McGeorge Atndy
Rxecutive Secretary
10
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