COMMENTS ON STASSEN MEMORANDUM TO NSC OF 29 JUNE 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010032-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 17, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of National Estimates
17 July 1956 .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Stassen Memorandum to NSC
of 29 June 1956
1. The subjects covered by the Stassen memorandum are
so broad and general, extending far beyond the disarmament
field alone, as to make detailed comment difficult. More-
over, the courses of action in Section III are given only in
brief summary form; the feasibility or desirability of a
number of them cannot be weighed adequately without a
more detailed statement of the implementing steps involved.
General Comments
It is obscure as to whether the various disarmament
proposals (III - A. B, E, F. G. and H) are thought of as
having a serious possibility of Soviet acceptance or are re-
garded primarily as a propaganda "initiative" likely to win
plaudits in the free world. We believe, and have underscored
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this in all our previous comment on proposed US positions,
that the disarmament negotiations involve primarily a
struggle to influence world opinion and to preserve Western
unity rather than an advance toward agreements with the
USSR. We believe that the present group of proposals taken
as a whole are sound from this point of view. especially
since their underlying thought of moving toward comprehen-
sive inspection by stages rather than demanding a complete
and airtight system in one package would be viewed abroad
as giving a desirable flexibility to the US position. Our
principal serious reservation concerns the effect in West
Germany of the course of action proposed in Paragraph III, K,
which as pointed out in Paragraph 18 below, we think could
be seriously adverse to US policy in Germany.
3. While we believe that the proposed revision of the
US position formulated prior to the London talks would be
tactically effective from a propaganda point of view, we do
not believe that it should be undertaken in any expectation
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that the USSR can be induced by this new approach to move
step by step toward a comprehensive plan of disarmament
and inspection. In our NI:E on the USSR now nearing completion
(NIE 11-4-56) we estimate that the Soviet leaders have con-
cluded that no such comprehensive agreement is possible
without making concessions to the West which they would re-
gard as unacceptable. In particular, we think it unlikely
that the USSR will ever accept the feature of aerial inspection.
even as an ingredient of a partial system. The USSR might
accept certain limited steps (such as III F. the ban on
nuclear tests, which it has already advocated) but it would
not permit "effective inspection to verify fulfillment of the
commitment. "
Comments on Section I: "T he Situation"
4. Paragraph I. B.1. With respect to the "Fourth
Country Problem" which Mr. Stassen emphasizes, we believe
his prediction that in the "relatively near future" fifteen or
twenty nations will have nuclear bombs to be an exaggeration.
In our view the requirement for effective means to deliver
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nuclear weapons, in addition to possession of the weapons
themselves, militates against the development of nuclear
weapons capabilities by any but a few nations in the foreseeable
future. Moreover, any nation developing and producing atomic
weapons would itself probably require at least limited nuclear
weapons tests. Considering all the appurtenances required
for nuclear warfare, we believe only two or three more than
the present three nations would embark on a native weapons
program. (The Fourth Country problem could arise in another
way from that mentioned in the paper. In addition to indepen-
dent manufacture there is the possibility of transfer to other
states by the principal producers. The US and USSR might
under certain political compulsions or on purely military
grounds make nuclear weapons available to their allies and
associates.)
5. However, even if some "fourth countries" acquired
limited nuclear capabilities, we estimate that they would be
reluctant to use them even in local situations for fear of risk-
ing US or Soviet intervention with far greater nuclear
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capabilities. Therefore, we do not accept the argument, also
made in the previous Stassen papers, that the advent of
limited "fourth country" capabilities or of ICBM's will ne-
cessarily magnify the "potential for igniting a world war. "
Without discounting the dangers inherent in such a situation,
the restraints on all states against courses of action involving
risk of world war would nevertheless be real. Prospective
weapons developments do indeed make world war more des-
tructive, but they do not necessarily make it more likely.
Thus far at least, the growth of nuclear weapons and delivery
capabilities in the US and USSR seems to have been one of the
factors contributing to a decreased likelihood of war.
6. Paragraph I. B.L. We agree that the USSR's current
political and economic offensive in underdeveloped areas poses
"a major threat to the longer term security of the US, " but we
do not believe that the threat is primarily one of Communist
"takeover." The more immediate danger is a movement of
non-Communist states toward closer association with the Bloc
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and away from the US. This particular danger would tend
to be dissipated were the Communists to revert to a pri-
mary emphasis on subversive activities intended to effect
"takeovers." In our view the principal threat to US in-
terests arises from the fact that enlarged Soviet and Bloc
trade and credits might jeopardize sources of supplies for
certain US and Western industries and impair markets for
their products, but more importantly from the fact that the
Soviet economic offensive might alter the climate of opinion
in such a fashion that free world nations may become neutral
or hostile toward the US.
7. Paragraph I. C.1. We believe that Communist China
will wish to acquire nuclear capabilities whether or not
various free world nations do so. China's acquisition of
such weapons will depend for some time to come on the USSR's
willingness to provide them, and we think that Soviet willing-
ness would not depend particularly on acquisition of nuclear
weapons by other countries. On the other hand, we do not
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think that Communist China's acquisition of nuclear weapons
would automatically be followed by similar action by Japan.
Leaving aside capabilities, the political inhibitions in Japan
are formidable. These might or might not diminish if China
had nuclear weapons. Similarly, the German case seems to
us unlikely to be affected by China's acquisition of nuclear
weapons. These weapons are now barred to West Germany by
treaty, and any change in this situation would raise such
serious opposition in Western Europe and be so disruptive to
NATO that the Germans themselves would be unlikely to
suggest it for some time to come.
8. Paragraph 1. C. 4. The problems raised in this para-
graph concerning US relationships with its allies are real.
However, there are a number of possibly misleading implica-
tions: (a) that US allies will not have a continuing interest in
mutual security relationships with the US despite apparent
reduction of the Soviet threat; (b) that cooperation with the US
necessarily requires either an extra heavy defense burden to
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carry "semi-obsolete arms" or "extreme" restrictions on
trade with the Bloc, especially since those restrictions are
not now "extreme"; (c) that cooperation with the US should in-
volve special trade and payments benefits.
Comments on Section II: "The Concept"
9. Paragraph II. B.1 . Still "greater reliance" on nuclear
weapons raises the question of whether the US should further
reduce its capabilities for contingencies in which reliance on
conventional weapons might seem preferable. We cannot exclude
the possibility that, if nuclear stalemate becomes complete, the
Bloc might resort to large-scale conventional warfare, as is
pointed out in draft NIE 11-4-56. This comment would also bear
on Paragraph II. B. 4, which implies that the US can count on
not being confronted with situations which require more than
small-scale conventional capabilities.
10. Paragraph U. B. 5. From an intelligence point of view
we would question whether "graduated economic penalties" for
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nations which take action "seriously adverse to US interests"
would not in many cases be counterproductive. Sanctions or
other economic reprisals against Burma or Afghanistan because
they develop economic ties with the Bloc, for example, would
be as likely as not to drive them even closer to the Bloc and
would result in widespread, criticism of the US.
Comments on Section III: "Courses of Action"
11. Paragraph III.A. This revival of the President's pro-
posal to Bulganin of 1 March 1956 to control future production of
fissionable material would probably have an effective propaganda
impact, especially the new feature of a specific date (1 July
1957) for implementation. However, there is little chance that
the USSR would accept the requirement for "effective inter-
national inspection. "
12. Paragraph III. U. The proposal to provide a nuclear-
armed UN force is presumably intended to appeal to nations
which have no nuclear weapons and to discourage their desire
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to acquire them by providing an international sanction against
nuclear aggression. This would not be an effective sanction
against the three powers which now have nuclear weapons and
would be theoretically effective only against fourth countries
which might enter the field, and only then if the Great Powers
agreed on joint action against such an aggression. We think
this proposal would not be effective even as a propaganda move
because: (a) the prolonged and futile UN discussion of an inter-
national force has left this idea with little credit among UN
members, who have long since concluded that in the absence of
agreement among the Great Powers it is not a realistic pro-
position; and (b) the idea of legitimizing nuclear weapons by
making them a means of enforcement would run counter to the
widespread sentiment that they sould be outlawed altogether.
Soviet agreement would be entirely out of the question since
the USSR has consistently refused to abandon its veto right
by acknowledging the legitimacy of procedures under the 1950
"Uniting for Peace" resolution.
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13. Paragraph III. E. This proposal would reverse the
trend toward larger weapons stockpiles only if combined. with
the proposal in III A. for devoting future production to non-
weapons purposes. Since, however, each power would still
retain a "substantial nuclear weapons capability, " and each
would be the judge of its own requirements, the reversal of
trend would not significantly reduce the threat of nuclear weapons
from the point of view of non-nuclear powers.
14. Paragraph III. F. As we have indicated in Paragraph
3 above, the USSR would be likely to accept this proposition,
though without inspection to verify fulfillment of the commitment.
We observe, however, that (a) we have estimated in NIE 11-2-56
that the Soviets could satisfy, with acceptable but not optimized
nuclear assemblies, their major military requirements for
weapons, including warheads for all types of missiles, without
further nuclear weapons tests; and (b) since we now rely upon
test detection systems as a primary source of data on Soviet
nuclear weapons development, a suspension of tests would de-
prive the US of critical intelligence.
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15. Paragraph III. G. Control of guided missile research
and development, even if restricted to long or medium-range
missiles and outer space vehicles, would require a degree
of inspection the USSR would be most unlikely to accept. This
proposal would probably receive wide support in other nations,
however, and should be a very effective propaganda move.
16. Paragraph III. H. The Stassen proposal can be read
to mean that, given Soviet acceptance of the US aerial in-
spection scheme, the US could accept the limited type of
ground inspection proposed by bulganin. We should point out
that this ground inspection as outlined in Soviet proposals has
hitherto been considered inadequate to meet US requirements,
especially with respect to the objects to be controlled and
freedom of movement, access, and communication for in-
spection teams.
17. Paragraph III. J. Without more details on the features
of a partial inspection system it is impossible to judge whether
it would in fact be capable of "progressive development" or
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avoid the danger of "providing a false sense of security."
We believe that the idea of moving toward comprehensive
inspection by stages would be viewed abroad as giving de-
sirable flexibility to the US position. As we pointed out in
an earlier comment on the comprehensive plan, its scale
was so vast and its requirements so sweeping as to create
suspicion, even among US allies and certainly among neutrals,
that the US was intentionally setting standards impossible to
accept. On the other hand, there would be risks in any par-
tial system since it would presumably not prevent the USSR
from developing weapons and deploying forces which could
launch surprise attack without detectable prior preparations.
These risks would of course exist in the absence of any in-
spection system at all, and are therefore an argument against
a partial system only if the latter was allowed to provide a
"false sense of security. " In any event, we believe that the
USSR would be unlikely to accept a partial system which in-
cluded any aerial inspection, on the ground that it would then
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have no basis in principle for opposing extension of the
system. We believe, in fact, that the USSR would be
embarrassed if it were asked to spell out and implement
the vague proposals for ground inspection which it has al-
ready made.
18. Paragraph III. K. It seems to us that the course
proposed would have very serious disadvantages at this time
in respect of our relations with the Adenauer government.
Adenauer has taken heavy political risks in pledging a
500, 000-man contribution to NATO and the proposed move
might undercut his position by seeming to concede the argu-
ment his opposition has been making that a West German
force on this scale is unnecessary. It would also almost
certainly be interpreted in Germany as a step toward a com-
plete withdrawal of US forces. This would give great im-
petus to political forces which would be willing to ezrtertain
a unilateral German deal with the USSR. Although this course
of action is described as "part of a move toward the
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25X1
reunification and freedom of all of Germany, " we do not be-
lieve that the inducement offered (mutual limitations on forces
and armaments in Germany) would lead the USSR to negotiate
an acceptable settlement, and therefore consider that the
disadvantages of the proposed course of action outweigh the
advantages.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
H. R. BULL
Lt. General, USA (Ret.)
Acting Chairman
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