MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FROM THE ACTING SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS (

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 15, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SECRET
August 15, 1956
MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FROM: The Acting Special Assistant to the President on
Disarmament Problems (Peaslee)
For your information a copy is enclosed of a memorandum which
is being distributed to members of the Presidentts Special Committee
on Disarmament Problems.
This has been prepared in the light of written and oral comments
'ihich have been received in response to the memoranda of June 29 and
July 10 sent to members of the National Security Council.
The immediate present purpose is to try to ascertain the area
of dCptmental agreement within existing policy, but as applied to
possible specific action and documents.
0-10-A - - VQ41"Z-A...
DOE review
Amos J. Peaslee
Acting.Special Assistant
to the President
NSC review(s)
TOP SECRET
When separated from
enclosure handle as
Confidential..
State Dept. review c l / / 2 321
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 1W?-2('9'-55)
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TOP SECRET COVER SHEET
THE WHITE HOUSE
DISARMAMENT STAFF
wA
Identification No.
The attached TOP SECRET material contains information, the security aspect of which is paramount
and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave danger to the nation. Special care
in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached material must be exercised in accordance with secu-
rity regulations.
Return TOP SECRET documents to the Document Control Officer, Disarmament Staff.
Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET material shall sign, indicate organization and date
below.
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
This document consists of 28 pages,
copy. l- of 100 copies, Series A.
August 15, 1956
Memorandum to Members of the President's Special Committee og
Disarmament Problems
A meeting of the President's Special Committee on Disarma-
ment Problems will be held in the Chart Room (272- Executive
Office Building) Monday,.-August 27, at 11:00 a.m.,, to discuss
the attached memorandum respecting the armament regulation program.
Departmental views are requested at that time regarding the
subject matter of the memorandum, including comments upon the
drafts of proposed possible documents included in the memorandum,
which have now been substantially modified in the light of previous
departmental comments..
The purpose is to ascertain if possible what area of agree-
ment can be found as a basis for guidance of U.S. representatives
at the next inter-governmental discussions on this subject.
The discussion at the meeting on August 27 will be limited to
consideration of the area of possible agreement within existing
U.S. policy, as applied to specific draft documents.
Insofar as our governmental representatives may also need
instructions involving any new policy decisions, such discussion
will not be undertaken at the meeting on August 27.
Amos J. Peaslee
Deputy Special Assistant
to the President
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August 15, 1956
ARMAMENT REGULATION PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM
I.
Present Considerations
1. The explosive Middle East - Suez.
2. Uncertainty whether the Soviets will ever learn except the hard
way,
3. The grim prospect if it must be the hard way.
4. Tactical advantages to any fanatical leader in a surprise attack.
5. U.S. official policy under existing N.S.C. decisions (see attached
Annex A).
6. Reactions to Governor Stassents memorandum of June 29, 1956 - the
strong views of Defense and A.E.C. that an actual inspection and
"control" organization'is a prerequisite to safe reductions and
restrictions (Annex B).
7. Pressures upon the U.S. - the Disarmament Commissionts resolution
of July 16, 1956; the requests of the U.K. and Canada for early
four-power talks; the joint four-power resolution offered to the
IDLsarmament Commission by the U.S., U.K., France and Canada
July 3, 1956; the irritations of our friends preceding the Sub-
committee meetings in March 1956 because of our delay in producing
concrete suggestions; the probability of early U.K. unilateral
manpower reductions; Eden's statement in Parliament on July 23
that the U.K. would, if necessary, be "quite ready now" to discuss
limitation on nuclear tests separately from a disarmament con-
vention; Soviet circular letters of June 6, and July 2)4; Krishna
Menonts speech at the "Disarmament Commission of July 12; and the
Indian note verbal of July 25, 1956; Japanese and other restless-
ness respecting tests.
8. The President's desires that we ascertain the area of Departmental
agreement as a basis for then ascertaining the area of possible
inter-governmental agreement (Conference of July 31, 1956).
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9, The activities of Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 hearings, 3 staff studies and
a large volume of documents.
10. The unfinished business from the Geneva Conference a year ago.
11. The success of the I.A.E.A. negotiations.
12. Present general commitments of the United States regarding the use
of armaments; unused procedures contemplated by the U. N. Charter;
inadequate use of the International Court of Justice.
13. The. desirability of maintaining U.S independence of judgment and
action, consistent with our general commitments -- pros and cons
of the "veto" in the Security Council.
14. Pros and cons of either (a) a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council, or (b) a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, or
(c) a detached inspection and "control" body.
15. Possible. usefulness of reaching some agreement on the subject
of armament regulation even though it be assumed that the Soviets
will probably breach the agreement or abuse it -- (cf. A. J. P.
experience with Nazi Germany).
16. Time factors - undesirability of attempting just another Subcom-
mittee session without knowing how it is likely to come out -
Canadats recommendation to us privately at London several months
ago of bilaterals - other suggestions of bilaterals.
17. Desirability that the next discussions be quiet ones, devoid of
any glare of publicity; that they be exploratory, with a view to
ascertaining maximum and minimum positions; and that they be
without U.S. commitment until we know what is possible.
18. Possible desirability of a unilateral statement of U.S. position
(a) if reasonable agreement seems possible or (b) if it does not
seem possible. Question of the timing of such a statement.
II.
Possible U.S. Proposals
1. A U.S. policy declaration (rough draft attached, Annex C).
2. A resolution of the United Nations Security Council to set up
the proposed Agency as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council
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(rough draft attached, Annex D). If the indications are that
the Soviets will block that, then consider adapting it to become
a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, or a detached Agency.
3. A multipartite treaty or agreement providing for an Armament
Regulation Agency or Organization - as the organization through
which reasonably satisfactory inspection procedures might develop
(rough t-t- attached,, Annex E).
4. A Statute providing bylaws governing the Agency's powers and
procedures, following the general lines of the I.A.E.A. Statute
(rough draft attached, Annex F).
III.
Questions
In what respects are these suggestions desirable or undesirable?
2. If and where they are undesirable, what alternate action or
documents are desirable?
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UNITED STATES OFFICIAL POLICY ON "DISARMAMENT" UNDER
EXISTING NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS
In Action No. 1419 of June 30, 1955, the National Security Council:
"b. agreed that the United States in its own interest, should as
interrelated parts of our national policy:
(1) actively seek an international system for the regulation
and reduction of armed forces and armaments.
"c. Agreed that the acceptability and character of any inter-
national system for the regulation and reduction of armed
forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and
effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and
evasions, and especially the inspection system."
An Annex to NSC Action No. 1513 approved by the President on
March 1, 1956, provides:
"If the Eisenhower, aerial inspection and blue print exchange
proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and
if such a system is proven to the United States to be satis-
factorily installed and operating, and assuming the political
situation is reasonably stable, the United States, with the other
nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal
safeguarded reduction of armaments, armed forces and military
expenditures."
The President also approved on Match 15, 1956, in Paragraph 38 of
NSC No. 56021, "Basic National Security Policy", the following:
"The United States in its own interest should, as interrelated
parts of its national policy, actively seek a comprehensive, phased
and safeguarded international system for the regulation and reduc-
tion of armed forces and armaments; concurrently, in related,
parallel steps, make intensive efforts to resolve other major inter-
national issues; and meanwhile continue the steady development of
strength in the United States and in the free world coalition
required for U.S. security. As the initial step in this inter-
national arms system, the United States should give priority to
early agreement on and implementation of (a) such confidence-
building measures as the exchange of military blueprints,
- 1 - Annex A
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mutual aerial inspection and establishment of ground control
posts at strategic centers; and (b) all such measures of
adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible. The
acceptability and character of any international system for
the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments
depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safe-
guards against violations and evasions, and especially the
inspection system."
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Annex A
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REACTIONS TO THE MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 29, 1956 -- EMPHASIS ON
INSPECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM.
A. The Atomic Energy Commission -- (Comments of July 26, 1956)--
disagrees in the following respects:
(1) AEC believes that Governor Stassen's aestimate.of
the situation with respect to the intentions and
capabilities of the other nations to build nuclear
weapons is stated in more positive terms than is
warranted by the information available to us."
(2) "Strongly opposes the fixing of such an early date
as July 1, 1957, for the cut off of all future
production of fissionable material for weapons
purposes."
(3)
(u)
(5)
(a) emphasizes that an "effective inspection system
is an essential pre-requisite to such action....
we believe that it would be impossible to
install such a system and adequately test it
within a period much under three years from the
date of agreement."
(b) AEC believes that the "relative adequacy of
the United States nuclear weapons stockpile as
of July 1, 1957 or a date one, two or three
years later must be measured against estimated
Soviet capabilities as of those dates."
United States could not give weapons to UK anyway
without an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.
Believes that the United States should determine
"the earliest date at which we could attain a
weapons stockpile goal sufficient to meet our
requirements for defense..... before proposing a
date for the cessation of the production of fission-
able materials."
Opposes any "international agreement for a cessation
or moratorium in the matter of testing nuclear
weapons apart from a general disarmament agreement
which includes an effective and proven inspection
system."
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(6) "Believes it to be possible to devise and install
an inspection system to effectively monitor outer-
space missile test violations, but it would be
more difficult to achieve than a system for the
detection of low yield nuclear test explosions.
An effective inspection system would require
periodic and continued surveys, preferably aerials
of a major portion of the territory of the nations
concerned in order to detect the establishment of
test sites other than those declared open for
international participation. Although monitoring
could be conducted at some distance from known test
sites, some of the monitoring stations would have
to be located within the territory of the larger
nations inspected."
(7) AEC "agrees that continuation of negotiations is a
desirable and necessary approach, provided that it
is clearly recognized as only a preliminary step
to actual disarmament. Assurance against surprise
attack does not rest upon negotiations, buts rather.,
upon the demonstrated workability of an inspection
system. Only when accumulated experience has shown
that the inspection system is operative in terms
of its ability to provide satisfactory advance
warning of a planned surprise attack, can disarm-
ament be undertaken without the risk of irreparable
damage to our nation. The activities necessary
to an adequate system -.e whether aerial inspection,
nuclear inspection, or ground post control inspec-
tion - are not properly items for negotiation after
disarmament, but should be viewed as indispensable
pre-requisites to disarmament."
(8) AEC "believes that the Eisenhower Aerial Inspection
Plan proposed at Geneva last year scored the most
telling victory yet achieved by the United States
in the cold war against the Soviet Union. We
believe that it won worldwide support outside the
red orbit, and we should not retreat from this
position simply because the Soviets have waged
strong objections to the proposal."
(9) The AEC says "in the absence of an aerial inspection
over the Soviet Union and Red China, we do not
believe that we could safely rely upon Soviet
agreement" respecting reductions.
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The Defense Department (Comments of July 12, 1956) objects to
the memorandum of June 29, 1956 on the ground:
"that the proposed courses of action submerge the require-
ments for an adequate control and inspection system to the
desirability of reaching early agreement,:"
"Until we are ready to accept Soviet protestation of good
faith at face value, our security requirements demand that
we reject any agreement limiting our ability to use all
our resources for defense as we see fit unless we can be
assured through actual observation that all subscribing
nations are fully complying with the agreed limitations."
The Secretary of Defense concludes:
"In short, it is my belief that progress toward disarmament
and our national security interests can be compatible only
so long as we insist that any limitations be continued on
prior acceptance of the specifics of an effective control
system....."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense dated July 7, 1956, comment on the June 29 memorandum as
follows :
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are mindful of the current
basic national policy of the United States which, inter
alia, is to tactively seek a comprehensive phased and
safeguarded international system for the regulation and
reduction of armed forces and armaments' and of the
commendable efforts which the Special Assistant to the
President has made to break the deadlock which has for
ten years prevented effective progress. It is also clear
that the principal stumbling block to an agreement on
disarmament has been and continues to be the refusal of
the USSR to entertain any proposal for international
inspection which, in the opinion of the United States
and other Western Powers would provide real safeguards
against violations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge adher-
ence to the principle which they have repeatedly sponsored,
namely, that an acceptable and proven procedure for
inspection and verification of armaments should be a
pre-requisite of an international agreement on disarmament."
Specific comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff include these:
(a) The JCS opposes the establishment of "a small United
Nations atomic force and a like force in NATO" as
- 3 - Annex B,.
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"unduly restricting the freedom of the United States
decision respecting the use of nuclear weapons."
(b) The JCS make the same points made by the AEC regard-
ing the sharing of information with'the UK, the
necessity for "inspection and control system" before
"the transfer of fissionable material from past
production to peaceful purposes as a means of reduc-
ing weapons stockpiles until they have ha4 apple
proof that an inspection and control system can be
implemented which will verify compliance with
agreements"(sic).
(c) The JCS believes that "as long as nuclear weapons
stockpiles exist., nuclear and thermonuclear tests
are necessary to ensure the development and maintenance
of our nuclear weapons capability."
(d) As to research, development and testing of long-
missiles and outerspace vehicles for milit range
ary purposes,
the JCS Opposes this "in the absence of a co
mprehensive
and effective inspection system." The JCS suggests
that proposals regarding inspection and control
"should be reworded so as to make it clear that the
Eisenhower proposal, combined with the Bulganin ground
post control system,, would require considerable
,expansion to verify adequately subsequent agreements
on the reduction of armaments and armed forces.."
(e) The JCS opposes any "inadequately verified disarmament
agreement."
(f) The JCS considers it "undesirable to associate the
German Federal Republic with current disarmament
discussions."
(g) The JCS believes that "United States security
interests would require, in case of any disarmament
agreement with the USSR, inspection not only of the
USSR but also of Communist China."
Annex B,
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Draft - August 15, 1956
ANNEX C
Policy Declaration by the President or the Secretary of State'
Members of the United Nations when they signed the Charter
of that body, agreed to unite their "strength to maintain inter-
national peace and security".2 They also agreed to ensure by the
"institution of methods" that armed force "shall not be used, save
in the common interest".3 The Charter also reserves the "inherent
right of individual or collective self defense" under conditions
which it prescribes,4
The Charter of the United Nations, in provisions which, up
to now, have not been implemented, places upon the Security Coun-
cil of that body certain obligations with respect to the mainte-
nance of international peace. It specifies that members of the
United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council
on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights
of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.5
It specifies that the agreement or agreements shall be con-
cluded between the Security Council and members, or between the
Security Council and groups of members, and shall be subject to
ratification by the signatory statgs in accordance with their re-
spective constitutional processes.
'As a precedent see the "Policy Declaration by the President of the
United States on Western European Union" of March 10, 1955, Depart-
ment of State Bulletin March 21, 1955. See also the Stimson Non-
Recognition Doctrine originally set forth in identic notes addressed
to the Chinese and Japanese Governments on January 7, 1932, and the
Monroe Doctrine declared in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823.
2Preamble of the Charter. 31d.
5Art. 43 of the U.N. Charter
61d.
4A t.51.
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The United Nations Charter also provides that the Security
Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems neces-
sary for the performance of its functions.
With a view to making progress toward the implementation of
these provisions of the United Nations Charter, our Chief Dele-
gate to the United Nations is proposing to the Security Council2,
subject to our constitutional processes, the execution of an
agreement or agreements with the Security Council and such members
of the United Nations as may wish to become parties, whereby:
(a) all of the nations which become parties to the
agreement or agreements will approve the crea-
tion of an armament regulation agency or organi-
zation as a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council of the United Nations, to exercise
inspection and control functions to be defined
in its statute with a view to ensuring that all
armaments shall be used only in the common
interest or in legitimate self defense under
the conditions prescribed in the Charter, and
with a view to facilitating the performance by
the Security Council of its responsibilities.
(b) Upon the installation and proved effectiveness
to the satisfaction of the principal nations
concerned, of an inspection system capable of
exercising such inspection and control functions,
the nations possessing nuclear weapons will
renounce and discontinue all future production
of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials
for the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and
thereupon, all tests of nuclear and thermonuclear
explosions shall forthwith be discontinued.
(c) Upon the installation and proved effectiveness,
to the satisfaction of the nations principally
concerned, of such an inspection system, all
nations then possessing nuclear weapons shall be-
gin to make equitable transfers of fissionable
materials in successive increments from their
previous production over to supervised peaceful
purposes.
lArt, 29 of U.N. Charter, 2See alternate suggestion respecting
the General Assembly if it seems probable that the Soviets would
block this.
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(d) Upon the installation and proved effectiveness
to the satisfaction of the nations principally
concerned, of such an inspection system, any
research or development activity by any of the
parties to the agreement directed toward send-
ing objects through outer space or travelling
in outer space shall thereafter be devoted ex-
clusively to peaceful and scientific purposes
and shall be open to international participation
on a reciprocal basis; and no outer space or
long-range missile tests shall be conducted with-
out appropriate international participation and
under an effective inspection system.
If these proposals are accepted by the nations principally
concerned and by the United Nations, a recommendation will be
sent to the Congress of the United States, in accordance with
our constitutional processes that it render effective, insofar
as the United States is concerned, the proposed agreement or
agreements and other action mentioned in this policy declaration.
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Draft - August 15, 1956
ANNEX D
Resolution of the Security Councill of the United Nations
Establishing an Armament Regulation 0r anization
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
Having in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter
of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and
Considering the provisions of the agreement entered into on
, 195__, between it and certain nations regard-
ing the establishment of an armaments regulation organization as
a subsidiary organ of the Security Council
Hereby authorizes the establishment, as a subsidiary organ
of the Security Council, pursuant to Article 29 of the Charter,
an Armaments Regulation Organization, which shall have and.exer-
cise the rights, powers and functions set forth in the Statute
annexed to the said agreement; and hereby authorizes the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations to enter into such a treaty
or agreement on its behalf,
'Consider adapting this to the General Assembly under Article 22
of the Charter or as a detached agency, if it becomes evident that
the Soviets would block it as a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council.
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AGREEMENT RELATING TO ARMAMENTS AND
ARMED FORCES, AND PROVIDING FOR THE CREATION
OF AN ARMAMENT REGULATION ORGANIZATION AS A
SUBSIDIARY ORGAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL_L
Signed at , , 1956.
The President of the United States of America, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the Security 'Council of the United
Nations.
Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to reduce the burdens, the
tensions and the fears arising from the maintenance of large armies
and armaments;
Mindful of objectives stated in the Charter of the United Nations,
(a) to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war
and to practice tolerance and to live together in peace
with one another as good neighbors, and
(b) to promote the establishment and maintenance of inter-
national peace and security with the least diversion
for armaments of the world's human and economic resources;
Mindful too, of the enlarged destructive power of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and of the responsibilities
of all nations to unite in effective action to preserve the public peace;
Hopeful that other nations of the world will join with them in
developing effectively the purposes of this agreement;
Have decided to conclude an agreement and for that purpose have
appointed as-their respective plenipotentiaries:
1Consider adapting this to the General Assembly under Article 22 of
the Charter, or as a detached agency if it becomes evident that the
Soviets would block it as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.
-1- Annex E
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I
The Honorable , on behalf of the Security Council
of the United Nations; The Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of
State for the United States. of America;
and
Who having communicated to one another their full powers found
in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:
The parties approve the creation of an armament regulation agency
or organ as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council of the United
Nations, to exercise inspection and control functions to be defined
in its statute with a view to insuring that all armaments shall be used
only in the common interest or in legitimate self defense under the
conditions prescribed in the Charter, and with a view to facilitating
the performance by the Security Council of its responsibilities.
Upon the installation and proved,effectiveness to the satisfaction
of the nations principally concerned, of an inspection system capable
of exercising such inspection and control functions, all of the parties
hereto will renounce and discontinue all future production of nuclear
weapons and of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear
weapons; and thereupon all tests of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions
shall forthwith be discontinued.
Upon the installation and proved effectiveness to the satisfaction
of the nations principally concerned of such an inspection system, all
nations then possessing nuclear weapons shall begin to make equitable
transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from their
previous production over to supervised peaceful purposes.
Upon the installation and proved effectiveness to the satisfaction
of the nations principally concerned of such an inspection system, any
research or development activity by any of the parties hereto directed
towards sending objects through outer space or travelling in outer
space shall thereafter be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific
purposes and shall be open to international participation on a reciprocal
-2- Annex E
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k
basis; and no outer space or long range missile tests shall be conducted
without appropriate international participation and under an effective
inspection system.
Members of the United Nations, and nations or states not members
of the United Nations which are not signatories to this agreement may
become parties to it upon the approval of the Security Council of the
United Nations respecting the terms of their accession-to it*
Any party to this agreement may withdraw from it upon one year's
notice to the Secretary General of the United Nations; and any party to
this agreement may withdraw from it, or suspend its participation in it,
in whole or in part forthwith upon filing,; with the Secretary General a
written notice specifying that any other party is in default respecting
its obligations.
Ratification of acceptance of this agreement shall be effected
by nations in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
This agreement shall come into force when nations, including
the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and have deposited instruments of ratification in-accord
ance with this Article.
In witness thereof the undersigned, have executed this agreement
this ___ day of one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.
-3- Annex E
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ANNEX F
Statute Of The Armament Regulation Organizationy
ARTICLE I
Establishment of the Organization
The parties hereby approve the establishment b
of an armament regulation organization (herein referred to as
the "Organization") upon the terms and conditions herein set
forth.
Resolution of the Security Council of the United Natio
Membership
(1) The initial members of the organization shall be
those nations, members of the United Nations, which shall have
signed this statute within ninety days after it is opened for
signature and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification,
(2) Other members of the organization shall be those
nations, states, or regimes, whether or not members of the United
Nations, which deposit an instrument of acceptance of this statute
after their membership in this organization has been approved by
the General Conference upon the recommendation of the Board of
Governors. In recommending and approving'a nation, state or
regime for membership, the Board of Governors and the General
Conference shall determine that the nation,,state or regime is
able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in
the organization, giving due consideration to its ability and
willingness to, act in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.
For precedents as to format,, see Draft Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency,as adopted by the working
level meeting at Washington, April 18, 1956.
Consider adapting this to the General Assembly under
Article 22 of the Charter, or as a detached agency if-it
becomes evident that the Soviets would block it as a
subsidiary organ of the Security Council.
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Rights and Powers
With a view to the establishment of effective inter-
national control over the fulfillment of the obligations under-
taken in the agreement of among the
members of the organization and with the Security Council of the
United Nations, the organization shall have the following rights
and powers:
(1) In order to prevent a surprise .attack by one
member upon another member of the organization, the organization
shall, at the request of any member (herein referred to as a
"requesting member") establish on the territory of. any other
member (herein referred to as the "inspected member") on a basis
of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions,
on main motor highways and at the airdromes and other inspection
facilities, including mobile units and equipment for aerial
photographs.
(2) The system of supervision provided for in this
statute shall be applied also to such armed forces and material
as an inspected member may possess outside its own borders,,.
subject to the consent of the nation or nation where such armed
forces or materiel may be located.
(3) The organization shall exercise control, including
inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to
insure implementation of and compliance with this statute and
the agreement to which it is annexed.
(4) The staff of inspectors performing any requested
inspection shall have within the bounds of the control functions
which they exercise, unimpeded access at all times to all objects
of control, Any member may, on a basis of reciprocity-require
that the inspectors conducting any inspection requested by it
shall to the extent of up to 60% thereof be of the nationality
of the requesting member,
(5) The objects of control include military, naval
and aerial units; stores of military,' naval and aerial equipment
and ammunition; land, naval and air-bases; and factories manu-
facturing armaments and ammunition. Any inspected member, upon
a reciprocal basis, may exempt from inspection any particular
objects or information of such a sensitive nature that the
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inspection thereof would, in the opinion of
the inspected.-member-, endanger the national security of the
inspected member. Such exemption shall be accomplished by
filing a notice thereof with the Ditoctor General of the
organization specifying generally the objects or information
excluded. Such notice of exemption shall, however, exclude
all right by the member availing itself of this privilege,
of inspecting similar or comparable objects or information of
the requesting member.
(6) The organization shall have unimpeded access to
records relating to budgetary appropriations of member nations
for military needs.
(7) All inspection posts and mobile units of the
organization may maintain constant communications with head-
quarters of the organization,
(8) All members will (subject to the right of
exemption of sensitive objects and information above mentioned)
report to the headquarters of the organization? the location
of.'every unit within its territory or under its control producing
fissionable materials, of every unit under construction designed
to produce fissionable materials, and shall file with the head-
quarters b-f the organization certified copies of all plans and
blueprints for the construction of facilities to produce
fissionable materials, prior to the initiation on construction
of such planned units,
(9) Full and complete records shall be maintained
and kept current by the organization at its headquarters and
shall be available to duly authorized representatives of the
members of the organization,
(10) The inspectors who are to conduct inspections
of members-which have mutually requested inspections of each
other, shall enter the territory of such members simultaneously,,
and the inspection system affecting such members will be installed
simultaneously and reciprocally.
(11) The Organization shall cooperate and exchange
information with the International Atomic Energy Agency, when
and if it shall come into being, and shall coordinate its efforts
so as to maintain comprehensive records respecting all fissionable
material located in all parts of the world whether designed
for purposes of weapons or for purposes of producing power
and other peaceful objectives. It may enter. into an agreement
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or agreements with International Atomic Energy Agency or
similar body for the joint conduct of inspections, control
and maintenance of records,
(12) In the event of noncompliance or failure by
any member or members in the obligations undertaken in this
statute or in the taking of any requested corrective steps
within a reasonable time as may be directed by the headquarters
of the organization, the headquarters shall promptly notify the
United Nations Security Council of such failure; and in addition
any member of the organization shall have the right to notify
the Security Council of the United Nations of any such failure
or violation of this Statute which may come to its attention.
(13) Any inspected member shall have the right to
expell from its territory any inspector who shall exceed or
abuse the honest purpose of the inspections authorized by
this Statute.
The Headquarters and Staff of the Organization
(1) The Headquarters of the Organization shall be
under the direction of a Director General who shall be appointed
by the Board of Governors for a term of years. The
Director General shall be the chief administrative officer
of the organization.
(2) The Director General shall, within the limits
herein, specified, be responsible for the appointment, organi-
zation and functioning of the staff including the inspectors,
and shall be under the authority of and subject to the control
of the Board-of Governors, He shall perform his duties in
accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.
(3) The Staff shall include such qualified technical
personnel as may be required to fulfill the objectives and
functions of the organization.
Language of this and other articles parallels language
of the Statute of the IAEA.
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(4) The terms and conditions on which the staff shall
be appointed, remunerated and dismissed shall be in accord with
the regulations made by the Board of Governors, subject to
provisions of this statute and to general rules approved by
the General Conference on the recommendation of the Board of
Governors...
(5) In the performance of their duties, the-Director
General and the Staff shall not seek or receive instructions
from any source external to the organization, They shall
refrain from any action which might reflect on their position
as officials of the organization. Each member undertakes to
respect the international character of the responsibilities
of the Director General and the Staff and shall not seek to
influence them in the discharge of their duties.
(1) The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:
(a) permanent members which shall include
the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and such
other nations as they may jointly from
time to time designate.
(b) The outgoing Board of Governors (or in
the case of the first Board, the Pre-
paratory Commission referred to in
Article ) shall designate for
membership on the Board, members.
(c) The General Conference shall elect
members to membership on the Board of
Governors and shall be guided in its
selection by regard for the makeup, the
responsibilities"and the geographical
distribution of the members of the
Organization.
(2) The designation provided for in Subparagraph 1 (a)
of this article shall take place not less than 60 days before each
regular annual session of the General Conference. The election
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provided for in Subparagraph 1 (c) of this article shall take
place at the regular annual session of the General Conference,
(3) Members of the Board of Governors shall hold
office from the end of the next regular annual session of the
General Conference after their designation until the end of the
fbll.owing regular annual session of the General Conference.
(Li) Each member of the Board of Governors shall have
one vote and decision shall, except as otherwise provided in
this statute, be made by a majority of those present and voting,
including the affirmative votes of the permnt members. A
majority of the permanent members plus two-thirds of all other
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
(5) The Board of Governors shall meet at such times
and places as it,may determine. The meetings shall be at the
headquarters of the organization unless otherwise specified in
the call.
(6) The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman
and other officers from among its members and, subject to the
provisions of this statute shall adopt its-own rules and
procedure.
(7) The Board of Governors shall prepare and submit
an annual report to the General Conference concerning the
affairs of the organization.
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 The General Conference
(1) A General Conference consisting of representatives of all
members shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special
sessions as may be convened by the Director General at the request
of the Board of Governors or of a majority of the members of the
organization.
(2) At such sessions each member shall be represented'by one
delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisors. The
cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the members
concerned.
(3) The General Conference shall elect a president and such
other officers as it may deem desirable at the beginning of each
session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session.
The General Conference, subject to the provisions of this statute,
shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each member shall have one
vote and except as otherwise provided in this statute, decisions
shall be adopted by majority of those present and voting. The
majority of members shall constitute a quorum.
(4) The functions of a General Conference shall be limited to
the following:
(a) To elect members of the Board of Governors in
compliance with the provisions of Article V of
this statute,
(b) To admit new members in compliance with provisions
of Article II of this statute,
(c) To suspend a member from the privileges and right
of membership in accordance with the provisions
of this statute.
(d) To consider the annual report of the Board.of
Governors.
(e) To approve the budget of the organization recom-
mended by the Board of Governors or return it with
recommendations as to its entirety or in parts to the
Board, for resubmission to the General Conference.
(f) To approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise
of borrowing power by the Board of Governors.
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To make recommendations to the Board of Governors
on any matter relating to the functions of the
organization.
(h) To request from the Board of Governors reports on
any matter relating to the functions of the organiza-
tion.
(1) The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Confer-
ence the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the organization.
To facilitate the work of the Board in this regard the Director Gen-
eral shall initially prepare the budget estimates, If the General
Conference does not approve the estimates it shall return them to-
gether with its recommendations to the Board. The Board shall then
submit further estimates to the General Conference for its approval.
(2) The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses author-
ized by the budget among members in accordance with a scale to be
fixed by the Board.
(3) Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General
Conference, the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exer-
cise borrowing powers on behalf of the organization.
Privileges and Immunities
(1) The organization and its officials, including inspectors and
other employees,: shall, subject to the rights of inspected members
herein described, enjoy in the territory of each member such legal
capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
exercise of its functions.
ARTICLE IX
Relationship with other Organizations
This Organization is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.
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Settlement of Disputes
(1) Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this statute or of the agreement or resolution to
which it is an armex which is not settled by negotiation may be
referred by any member of the Organization or by the Security
Council of the United Nations to the International Court of Justice
which shall have jurisdiction to determine the issues thereof, un-
less the. parties concerned agree upon another mode of settlement.
(2) The Board of Governors is empowered, subject to authoriza-
tion from the Security Council of the United Nations, to request the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any
legal question arising within the scope of the organization's ac-
tivities.
ARTICLE XI
Arm ndments and Withdrawals
(1) Amendments to this statute may be proposed by any member.
Certified copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be pre-
pared by the Director General and communicated by him to all members.
(2) Amendments shall come into force for all members when
(a) Approved by the Board of Governors,
(b) Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds
majority of those present and voting, and
(c) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members, includ-
ing the original members possessing nuclear weapons
at the time of the, establishment of the organiza-
tion, in accordance with their respective constitu-
tional processes. Acceptance by a member shall be
effected by the deposit of an instrument of aoeeptance
with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
(3) Any party to this statute may withdraw from membership in
the organization upon one year's notice to the Secretary General of
the United Nations; and any party to this agreement may withdraw from
it, or suspend its participation in it in whole or in part forthwith
upon filing with the Secretary General a written notice specifying
that any other party is in default respecting its obligations.
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(4) Withdrawal by a member from the organization shall not
affect its prior obligations entered into hereunder or its budgetary
obligations for the year in which it withdraws.
Suspension of Privileges
(1) A member of the organization which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the organization shall have
no vote in any organ of the organization if the amount of its arrears
equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the
preceding two years. The General Conference may nevertheless permit
such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is
due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
(2) A member which is in default respecting its obligations
under this statute or under the agreement to which it is an annex,
as determined by a decision or advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice under the procedure specified in Article X of this
statute, may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and
rights of membership by the Board of Governors acting by two-thirds
majority of the members present and voting.
I ARTICLE XIII
Signature Acceptance and Entry Into Force
(1) This statute shall be opened for signature on , 1956
by all nations which are members of the United Nations, and shall
remain open for signature by those nations for a period of days.
(2) The signatory nations shall become parties to, this treaty
by deposit of an instrument of ratification.
(3) Instruments of ratification by signatory nations and in-
struments of acceptance by those whose membership in the organiza-
tion has been approved under Article II of this statute shall be de-
posited with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
(4) Ratification of acceptance of this treaty shall be effected
by nations in accordance with their respective constitutional pro-
cesses.
(5) This treaty shall come into force when five nations, in-
cluding the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
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Ireland, which are nations which now possess nuclear weapons, have
deposited instruments of ratification with the Secretary General of
the United Nations.
ARTICLE XIV
Preparatory Commission
(1) A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the
first day that this treaty is open for signature. It shall be composed
of one representative from the United States of America, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and one representative each from each of two other
nations selected by the Security Council of the United Nations provided
the Security Council agrees to such designation within 60 days from
the first date that the treaty became open for signature. In the
absence of such selection by the Security Council., the Preparatory
Commission shall consist of the representatives of the three specifi-
cally designated nations mentioned above.
(2) The Preparatory Commission shall
(a) Make arrangements for the immediate installation of
the inspection system provided for in this statute,
including arrangements for a temporary headquarters
and provisional officers and personnel;
(b) Make arrangements for the first session of the
General Conference.
(c) Make designation for membership on the first Board of
Governors.
ARTICLE XV
Authentic Text and Certified Copies
This statute signed in the English, Russian, and French languages,
each being duly authorized, shall be deposited with the Secretary General
of the United Nations. Duly certified copies of this statute shall be
transmitted by the Secretary General to any member or in response to any
other request upon payment of costs thereof as determined by the Secretary
General.
In witness whereof the undersigned duly authorized have signed this
statute at this day of , one thousand
nine hundred and fifty-six.
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