MINUTES OF MEETING OF SECRETARY OF STATE WITH PANEL OF CONSULTANTS ON DISARMANENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010014-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: MIN

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
Dear Allen:
June 29, 1954
I promised to return the enclosed
to you when the Oppenheimer case hadlbeendco
pleted and I am accordingly sending
together with a copy of the release which we
have just made to the press.
Sincerely,
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
The Central Intelligence Agency
State Dept. review completed
21
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=LA
eh in tiler a
be us we vore + t
habi
erforu to out
and bU
Of )ef enae eon r Of : tattm a Ons
in our attitude to gat,.
TO ooh with the work of the
diff ,c it An" they into
of
let=tr
acs In the derv p nt of the ato 1e enera plan. r r. ac mmm
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ad
 rL
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arts are being made, to obtain the serviea es of a qualified person
.sin and that in the meantime W Allen had been leaned from FUR
to Pj-hit.
In describing the job to be dare the
on a peznmi
re orte d t' at
asnaecte ss
sanity of making sorAe p eals
(2)
{3}
The 3.cretary rotated out that this seo
previous initiett
t. 9
next GA. Ftttlt a to do so would subject us to eriticie
in the rX and would forfeit the advanta e g need by
ate- r in vle ritsarmameut OwmisslLso better
state said Defense D . a is and the AEC*
he best bed to do that if it bas fUll srar port i then
The longer task of W ctng out a ro ssive
plan for armed formes and non-atomic etsts oomparabli
to the '1U' plan in the atomic enenr ' field. This panel i$
The additional task o
fall it should in effect be a coat
enerff, Although this weas
of relations with the DS x.
he other elesm eats in a overai l settlement with the Sovlet Union, one
essential element is the wi thdraval of their forme ,-not the center of Varope.
The difficulty arises not so mach frm the size of soviet forces (Soviet armed
ore world 'war 11 but did not then cause
great concern) but frow the fact that now Russian forces area closer to western
tordera and t' ere is no longer a strong Qcrma t' and a strong Japan on either side,
:loviet justification for the presence of their troops is a legitimate conc+r to
preventing the repe-tititica of attacks again
here is to
it could be most
clear that this in impossible because of the cynical Soviet attitude toward treaties
and be causes ve'd ds 3l'!1 / ' 1 ~ ~ 6 U01~4-z as
tw
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1=
that would "ehort
ps out of rope wl'
should be possible for
SwLet c ceara *
Thus the dis
Of US tromm tihAch
rikiing poor it
Geive
a di
which tertali1 a"-cart ed the r ch Of the n3oarr powers would 'n%'74 'ar reaehi vW
effects. it would of course in ase the likelihood of the emergence of Iota).
Corar mtat-led norvmemts that would not and could not be net by IS or tiff forces.
it night be possible end nacesssY7 to find other
in that PaA of the world.
esident ti;
sta
the hard roam of building
+soasizod
a sentence caaitted from the President'
balaln reduction of s nts or
stressed the
be pess.ble for the
ethods for building strength
referred to
Beech that "we will a Itch the USSR in honest
ath theca in atlitex7 strrngth"?
work in helping
,;wee of am bt -l and the
to dispel su tci at h0m and abroad as to the
intended use of
hie last NATO report
thought it vital that we etormince the world tie
Ap orV 3~+ F~ l i S t -- pddil0 t0' + ibl.+IR, The
are P'+ari'
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his 0
as added de sirabi.l.ity 'because of the f
W
sh desires for
franca that the US has adopted the attitude that this plan
w in the field. The Fronoh, it is PS
eef the IN control plan and both the Pr
th+
j)oustering French
ambassador Cohen
only after tborot
what they would '
date nesintained the position
eev of the ateice eenergT
of the UK and
the timing
pians
a i.vee a clear indication of
i1 lins to do.
BE, tto*.ox . am referroll Is Passing
relationship between the diet n
atomic
,the ^.'on ssion al
necessity in a very unsettled world and he
requested any guidance that might be offered in order
undo the, disarsament efforts
is of
roblem with which he
to Congress in the near future a request for a much
program. He felt it important that this be
ans"r and pogo
he 'work in the disarmament field. The basis of
In the dim. t
the pry but that until that time oams it is
recognised that there
et be careful to indicate that
out that the panel is atpproaching the problem today in
plan was
e Of keeping in mtTk the effect on
US public this. `Te suggested the possibility or fudug am* Umm or syra
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a .> rm?"rs't =,ai elect
hi different "work from the fra mweoerk in which the Acheson -Lilientbal
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slam nt In a nation's armed strength,
be relatively easy bast
ecurity. For esaspie, heavy
axe now gradually becoming obsolete
on the control of which would be
c would not jeopasatdims
of war, or possibly even long.
range bombers would fall in this category as an es p i
on its abolition might grove an ent
effect would be salutary ev
were not forthcoming,
*~ &basn desired to undersct the
of the Initiative In this field of the US
informed TUropenns last fall of the introdu
citing agreement
was electric and did ss wth to dispel the feeling t .at US with its dravift
strength was i s n s e t u s a u s l y p r e p a r e d to f b t h e i - with Vi
on LDr. Rush's suggestion of
that
apply It
control of atomic energy.
Mr2 later I dicated
fruitless di
won the importance of present
agreed that our disarmament work should hal
whether it would not be osaible
greater informtion on
the concept of abolition wi
eid, thus undermining our own po it
seek to
'.a hesitation and skeptieima of any success In the
that the of
ld gar It' but
Lh trivi
found agreement
more important
eat
lition of a relatively
as defensive in character and
He wandered
posals to try to obtain
actual military strength. T1e remarked in passing
that so to ppsut F etsasmaltffis /" ntl Bid E i:(~id~0 in thidx
of the few living relics of the extensive and
d W -re I and II. However he agreed
eosin
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'G 15es and not on TV 4's (1+ -range babe"
6t intentions ar+r defensive and not offensive
In answer to . t l1es a question
working proposals on disclosure w A verificat
al inforr tion on 'Auseiaes milttrsrf
plans could not
Co itssi on Ambassador Cohen urge
an enrly stage. This would of cc*
as to bow the 3eeretary destirea the
en but that for the I mediate job of initial proposals in the
ourselves since their large armies are believed to coel hate a
their strewth. At the s V MO proposals for reducti ern of
.
reduction or would work out agreement on both glogja
a system of disclosure and verification b proceeding to ngreein mt an actual
tai y stated it in x .,rig,, i.e., that way would either work out agreement on and I MI
disclosure and verii'ication, it was agreed that our position is still as the
In response to 11r. c hngan l question as to the priority of agreement
our sincerity in desiring actual reduction and limitation.
having the effect of o
without which as
Lt was e,cpecte that like the Acheson. til ieaxthal
group the p=91 would produce its own
her it is to serve as a critic
in the development by the goverimment of Its owe plan which the government would
then put ford as a govert position. 'tea Wick eo said in effect that this
he expel the panel would act core in the role of critics*
cheen suggested that for the I
coaepreheansive plan be, thought it would be best for the panel to act as a senaarate
slop the prIncipal.:lines or the program. Ytee could tx.ea consider
how the or kq-P. I F P-@*V%?0 3 I~t ~ gO a Plaea.
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It thet point it
thrt we uuould ant to
together with some or all of the pro, scot group wu
lion of a concrete plan.
Pr. Q~2t+enheimcr expressed the view that
cific disart;at a nt plan, there was a third objective in our work which is the
additional persel which
ver ti,e actual formula..
objective
strengthening the defense of the '.teat and the objective of eventual awe t on a
c;antinuance of a really secure U'? in the, sense of a U;`3 that cannot be shattered as
rllitary power.
In closing the discussion
gest.d that the long-range
task of developtng a prehensive plan win probably prove to be more Jiff ii
than the task Paced by the 1c:,eson-ii1icnthal gam; since the fact that ate
energy Can be controlled through control of only two haste elements providee a
range able framework for that work. He anoke again of the major p
is the relationship between disarneot and other major world probi
that in that connection the panel would tsnt to look at our current armament
program to see where it is head and the consequences, We are moving faster in
the atonic energy field than in other fields but in our general buildup effort it is
very nossaible that ve
breaking vureelves in an effort to do what really canat
be done. In short, can we accomplish what we are now undertaking? If not what
alternative roads nre open to us? In that sense it may be that disarmament will
re to be an essential part of our program and of our goals for the future.
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 STANDARD FORM NO. e4 Approved For Release 200 GBE II-RDP80B01676R000600010014-2
SECURITY INFORMATION
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Acting Chief, D/A
DATE: 28 August 1952
IUB ECT: Assistance to Mr. Dulles on disarmament proposal, re office
memorandum of 20 August from Mr. Amory.
1. This proposal consists basically of an offer to substitute
"plowshares for swords" in the production structure of the U.S.,
provided that the USSR will do likewise. The proposal has the twin ob-
jectives of increasing relative free world military strength and of
demonstrating our desire to assist under-developed areas in building
up their economies.
2. The first objective would be satisfied if both the U.S. and
the USSR contributed materials of a type and quantity such that our
military and industrial strength was decreased relatively less than
theirs. The second objective would be satisfied if the non-Bloc-non-
NATO world had reason to believe that our suggestion was both practical
and sincere.
3. Brief study of the Paley commission report and of ORR research
papers on the USSR does not indicate that ORR could draw up a set of
commodities such that an equal contribution of these particular goods
by both countries would reduce USSR military production relative to
that of the U.S. more than an equal contribution of any set of indus-
trial commodities selected at random. It is not certain that even
detailed study of available information would yield better results.
On the other hand, it is practically certain that equal contributions
of any randomly selected set of industrial commodities would reduce
USSR military production relative to that of the U.S.
4. If this plan is to stir up real enthusiasm in the non-Bloc-
non-NATO world, it is essential that the composition of the "plowshares"
be such that it fits the specific needs of the under-developed countries.
This requirement could be met by a proposal that took the form of
offering to supply an given sum of money, provided that the USSR would
match the offer (see paragraph 7a. below). The receiving country would
thus be free to determine the precise composition of the bundle of goods.
Such an offer would clearly represent an attempt to meet the problems
connected with aid to under-developed countries, and would not be open
to the charge of being purely propagandistic.
5. Acceptance of such an offer by the USSR would be entirely
compatable with both of the objectives. Armament production in both
countries would be reduced by roughly the amount of goods offered.
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