BACKGROUND OF THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010013-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

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BaSERO'iTNi `T'HE DISA MENT PROBLEM
1. Prior to World War I no real progress was suds toward the
limitation of armaments. The Hague @nferences tried to "humanise"
war by attempting to ban the use of certain types of vesponsq dumdum
bullets, poison gas, projectiles thrown from balloons, etc., etc.
Such agreements proved to be unenforceable and a more trap for the
trusting.
2. After World :gar I conditions seemed ideal for a renewed
effort to limit armaments. The victorious Allied coalition was
supreme. Germany was disarmed in fact, and limited by Treaty.
Russia was as yet no menace and was preaching total disarmsiasn't?
Yet, even under these conditions the attempt to reach international
agreement on the limitation of armaments was a failure, except in
the very limited field--limited both as to time and types--of Naval
armaments.
Even friendly former allies could not agree on satisfactory
definitions of military manpower or of various types of weapons as
a basis for limitation. The United States and Britain had profound
disagreements in their attempts to equate a 100000 ton, 8 inch gun
cruiser against a 6,000 ton, 6 inch gun cruiser. In the field of
aircraft there was no clear common denominator* Thousands of man
hours were spent in arguing how to evaluate trained reserved against
standing armies and paramilitary units against regular soldiers.
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The argument as to what arms were distinctly defensive an
hence peretssable as against those arms which were offen and
subject to limitation were totally inconclusive over the decade
prooseding 1933 and Hitler's accession to power.
While Masi maneuvers were the ostensible cause for the
failure of the disarmament conferences of this decade, the real
reasons were deeper. We were trying to force into the pattern of
an international agreement, elements too complicated to be the
subject of such agreements. To be effective international aree-
ments must not be so complicated that their enforcement breeds
controversy and suspicion. Most of the agreements attempted dwring
the pro-Hitler decade failed to met this test.
3. Since World War II the technical side of disarmament has
become vastly more complicated than it was even after World War I.
Weapons have assumed new intricacy, new elements of secrecy,, and
vastly increased power. At the same time the political s ituatie
has worsened to a point where little, if any, trust can be placed
in the good faith of the Communists to carry out written agreem eats.
As a result, we now demand complete inspection of performance or the
type of agreements which provide for mutual and simultaneous perform-
ance. The latter type is well nigh excluded by the very nature of
the disarmament problem and control and inspection, as we mean it,
is excluded by Soviet objection.
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For some five years no international agreements of even
the most simple character have bow reached between the U. S. and
the soviet. Those reached with then during the period 1945 - 1917
are today largely dead letters. In the present political situation
it is unthinkable that we could now negotiate an understanding of
broad scope in this most intricate field of negotiation, namely arms
limitation, a field where, in the past, even dose international
friends have failed of agreement. At best political agreements must
proceed disarmament agreements and the latter, even if the proper
political atmosphere is established, want be kept simple and, as far
as possible, self-executory and self-policing.
5. From the above it is fair to conclude that any disarmament
agreements of the conventional type - i.e., as discussed in the World
War II period are not within the realm of practicaal.ity. Sven proposals
like the Baruch Plan or along the lines recently suggested in the UN
for the limitation of armed forces are not attainable.
6. In view of the popular yearning in the free countries--probably
reflected also by the peoples even in Soviet Russia and the Satellites--
it may be necessary, as a measure of psychological warfare, to adopt
a posture of willingness - and possibly even of inventiveness - in
proposing new schemes for disarmament. It is possible, howwor,
that in what we have already done in the UN we have pushed psycho-
logical warfare in this field as far as it can go. Further public
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debat" asy lead to the corsion that our proposals are propaganda
aotiv4W. It may be therefore that the time has omens, in the tilt
debates, to smmmarise our efforts, to endeavor to fix responsittl tlr'
for failure to make progress, and to bring to an end a wholly tide
and almost stultifying argument that no longer fools agfb . This
however is a psyaehological warfare matter. The Panel was not chosen
for expert advice in this field and has no particular comretonee to
give such advice. We can only express our own opinion that further
public debate of the disarmament problem in the UN is likely to be
mere propaganda and that those who are coupetsnt to deal with the
international effect of propaganda should advise on the proceedures.
7. The fact that the somewhat formalized, publicised and
conventional approach to the disarmament problem has proved futile
and should be left to the psychological warfare experts does not
necessarily lase! and should not lead, to the abandonment of all
efforts in this field. The issues are far too grave and the stakes
too high to leave any avenues unexplored.' This review of the past,
however, fairly justifies the conclusion that the old approaches
are shopworn; that now ones are necessary.
8. If we are to attack the armaments problem with any hope of
making real progress, the focal point to attack is of course atomic
weapons. It would be relatively futile, as indicated above, to
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resume the debate on limiting conventional, armaments even if the
unreality of this approach were rot highli;hted by the fact that if
war breaks out atomic and possibly thermonuclear weapons are likely
to be the most important weapons in the arsenal of each opposing
came
Theoretically of course one eowmU concentrate a disarm lest
study on the means of deli
atomic and therm clear weapons.
This however seems a roundabout and ineffective method of approach.
Obviously no one is going to spend billions on atomic and therms-
nuclear weapons and not attempt to deliver them vhatever restrictions
are placed on the instruments of delivery. Furthermore, those
instruments are varied and numerous and not in all cases necessarily
military instruments, vie cargo ships.
Another important reason for concentrating our attention
on the atonic-thermonuclear field is the fast that these weapons
present a peculiar threat to the free world. This reality has
possibly been obscured by the present public obsession with the
view, real but transitory, that our atomic superiority is the best
insurance of peace.
Finally, the atomic field introduces certain new factors
which were not considered by the disarmers of the post World War I
era and it may be that there are fresh elements, despite the study
by the Baruch Committee, which present a new handle to the dis-
armament problem.
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In connection with the above the following seen to be
reasonable assn ptions to makes
a. Today the U.S. has a substantial numerical superiority
in atomic weapons over the 'oviet and a superior ability over
the Soviet to deliver these bombs, leaving. aside for the moment
the question of the respective air defense of the two areas*
b. We have the ability to keep a numerical superiority
over the Soviet in A. and if bombs for a considerable period
but the practical value of this superiority will decrease and
approach the vanishing point as the numbers of Soviet bombs
and means of conveyance reaches adequacy in terms of their
appropriate targets*
c. In the light of our present progress and the limited
number of appropriate Soviet A & g bomb targets we will reach
the adequacy point well before the Soviet and until the Soviet
reaches that point we nay have a period of relative immmodty
from the danger of atomic war. Of course the determination
of the adequacy point is a very finite determination open to
error as neither can accurately assess the stockpiles or
defenses of the other party. Neither can either side compute
to what extent a surprise all-out attack by one side if directed
against the other's bases of atomic, as well as against industrial
gets, might cripple the retort of the other.
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d. Once each side has reached the adequacy point there
may be a period of uneasy stability - of uncertain duration
buy if political and other agreements are not reached in the
moantiaae then a spark might set off a war of mutual suieidt.
e. It is in our interest to prolong as far as possible
the period during which we are closer to adequacy than the
Soviet in the hope that in the intervening period political
changes in the Soviet will load to the political agreements
necessary to real disarmament discussions*
f. This period of free world supremacy will be prolonged
substantially if the race could be limited to atomic bombs and
the Soviet do not acquire thermonuclear weapons. With the latter
the Soviet W uld more quickly reach the goal of adequacy and
would then enjoy a relative advantage since thagr would have
at their disposal many more thermonuclear targets in the free
world than we would have of such targets in the Soviet world.
9. GENMAL CONCLUSIONS
What has been said above both with regard to the field of
conventional and atomicsnuclear weapons leads to the following
conclusions
a. Both past history and recent performance show that
public discussion and public negotiation for agreements on
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aonvention&1 disarmament will lead nowhere in the present
political climate and if pursued at all should be pursued from
the point of view of psychological warfare and world public
opinion.
be Our lead in the atomic race is a temporary advantage
to be prolonged in any way possible but is an advantage which
will be wiped out at soes future date, probably not too far
distant, when the Soviet have "enough" bombs*
c. An B bomb race will be stiil more to our disadvantage
than the A bomb race as it will narrow the tima before the
Soviet has "enough" weapons of mass destruction*
d. Accordingly, all efforts should be bent to preventing
an H bomb race if there is any way of doing it.
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