THE USSR AND DISARMAMENT 1921 - 1932

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010011-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 1, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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Prepared from public documents by the RESTRICTED
Regulation of Armaments Branch, SD A/C.1 366
Division of International Security Affairs, RAC Ref 1/2
Department of State, August 1946
THE USSR AND DISARMAMENT
The Soviet Government from 1921 to 1932 by declaration and
participation in international conferences indicated a great
interest in the problem of disarmament. At the Moscow Disarma-
ent Conference in 1922, the Fourth and Fifth sessions of the
m
Preparatory Commission for the General Disarmament Conference
? in 1927-28, and at the First session of the General Disarmament
Conference in 1932, the Soviets, led by M. Litvinoff, presented
concrete proposals for immediate and partial disarmament.
In the. area of political action the Soviet record appears
clear and consistent. On every possible occasion, from the
Genoa Conference to the Geneva Arms Conference, the Soviets
energetically stressed the urgent need for total disarmament.
In the area of political thought, however, where one finds those
presumed highly inflexible guides and justifications for political
action, derived from the dogma of Marx and Lenin, the Soviet Govern-
ment appears in a different light in respect to disarmament. The
Communists state that disarmament is possible only in a socialized
world. Thus they say that. all proposals stemming from non-Soviet
countries should be viewed as hypocritical gestures for the oppressed
masses of the capitalistic states, insincere and meaningless. The
Communists state further that any Soviet proposal for disarmament
should be considered as a sharp weapon to cut away the camouflage
and disclose to the world the insincerity of the capitalist states.
All of this is clearly presented in the Resolutions of the Sixth
Congress of the Communist International meeting in Moscow in
August, 1928.
Without dwelling on the close connection between Soviet poli-
tical action and Soviet political thought, and to what extent action
rather often deviates pragmatically from the established and .
approved Party line under a given series of events, the following
~! . record is clear.
The Washington Disarmament Conference
On July 19, 1921, the Russian Government voiced its first
opinion on disarmament. Chagrined becaused the proposed Washington
Conference on disarmament would exclude the Soviets, M. Chitcherin,
the Commissar for Foreign .Affairs, addressed a telegram to the
several governments invited to the Conference stating, "The Russian
Government has learned that a more general question, that of disarmament,
at least of Naval disarmament will be considered at a future conference.
The Russian Government will be happy to welcome any disarmament or
reduction of military forces which burden the workers of all
countries".
Protocol of Riga - March 30, 1922
Prior to their arrival at the Genoa Conference, the Soviet
Latvian, Estonian and Polish Delegates signed the Protocol of
Riga which established the principle of working in collaboration
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at the Conference. Among other things the Protocol concluded by
stating that in view of their desire for universal peace. '"they
would support the principle of reduction of armaments in all
states."
Genoa conference -? 19
When the Genoa Conference opened on April 10, 1922, the dele-
gates awaited with great interest and some curiosity the first
address of the Soviet Foreign Minister. This Conference marked
the first appearance of a representative of the new Soviet Govern-
ment before an international group. The Conference had been called
to discuss reparations and certain commercial questions. This
Conference also marked the implementation of the thesis pronounced
at Cannes in January of that year that the West and the Soviets
could live side by side and come to mutually satisfactory terms.
M. Chitcherin, in his opening address, at once brought the
Conference to attention by stating that because economic recon-
struction would be handicapped by the menace of new wars the
Soviet Delegation, " . . . . intended to propose, in the course
of the Conference, the general limitation of armaments and the
outlawry of the most barbarous forms of fighting, such as poisonous
gases and aerial warfare, as well as the means of terrorizing
peaceful populations."
This view of the enlarged scope of the Conference at once
brought protests from the French Delegation and Lloyd George,
with some effort, was able to hold the Conference together. The
technical reason that disarmament was not further mentioned was
thet it did not appear on the agenda.
The Moscow Disarmament Conference - 1922
In June, 1922, and after the Genoa Conference the Soviet
Government invited the signatories of the Riga Protocol and
Finland to attend a conference at Moscow on the subject of dis-
armament. This conference opened in December, 1922 with the
Soviet Delegation led by M. Litvinoff. M. Litvinoff immediately
proposed in his first speech that if the other states would agree
to such a proportional reduction, the Soviet Government would make
a twenty-five percent reduction in armaments. However, agreement
could not be reached on the actual reduction in terms of the exist-
ing army strength because the Soviet Representative accused each
state of putting forth an exaggerated figure of existing strength
in order that the actual reduction would be smaller than the pro-
posed twenty-five percent. The Conference broke up with no agree-
ments reached.
The League of Nations Committee of Experts
1923 - 1924
In February 1923 the Secretary General of the League of
Nations invited the Soviet Government to attend a meeting on the
limitation of Naval armamentso primarily called to study the
application of the Washington Agreements on the nonparticipating
states.
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states. The Soviet Governmentreplied that "it was interested in
any Conference which would contribute to the reduction of armaments."
The Conference met in October, 1923 and with its adjournment the
Russians accepted in principle certain minor adjustments in fleet
tonnage and shore installations.
The Draft Treats of Mutual Assistance
In 1924 the Soviet Government was asked by the League of
Nations to comment on the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This
proposed treaty was an attempt to take care of security as a pre-
liminary step to disarmament. The Soviet Government replied in
detail and. concluded by stating, "The reduction of armaments is the
most serious and immediate task of all governments."
The Preparatory Commission for the Genera Disarmament
Co erence 1 - 28
The various diaarmament statements made by the Soviet Govern-
ment up to the arrival of the Russian Delegation in Geneva for the
Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission in 1927 are vague.
No statesman in 1927 would have denied the validity of the principle
of disarmament. The central question, however, was how to implement
the principle. The reciprocal proportionate reduction principle
proposed by M. Litvinoff at the Moscow disarmament conference was
the only substantial suggestion brought forth by the Soviet Govern-
ment. All their declarations had simply reflected the popular
sentiment of that ?oe riod.
The Preparatory Commission was established by the League of Nations
to prepare a draft convention to be studied by a general disarmament con-
ference. The United States and the Soviet Union, while not members of the
League, had been invited because of the vital importance of the subject.
The Soviet Delegation however did not arrive in Geneva until the Fourth
Session in November, 1927, because of a local disagreement with the Swiss
Government. M. Litvinoff led the Soviet Delegation and on November 30
made his first speech before the Commission. He reviewed the failures
of the.Commission and of the League of Nations up to that time and then
declared that the only way to disarm was to disarm totally. He there-
fore proposed a general and complete disarmament plan which envisaged
over a period of four years the abolition of all armies, navies, air forces,
fortresses, etc* by all countries. The general reaction of the Commission
to the Litvincff total disarmament plan was that the Russians were not
serious but had presented an impractical plan for propaganda reasons.
There was some discussion of the Russian plan but a decision was not made
until the spring of 1928 in the Fifth Session. At that time the Soviet
Delegation presented a Draft Convention incorporating the ideas expressed
by Litvinoff. He vigorously defended the Draft Convention but it was re-
jected by the Commission as being contrary to and not compatible with the
security responsibilities of the League members. At once M. Litvinoff
submitted another Draft Convention vh ich incorporated the principle of
proportionate reduction. This plan was discussed and was rejected in the
Sixth Session in 1929.
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he Soviet Plan for Total Disarmament
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S cope
The Draft Convention for "immediate, complete and general
disarmament" containing the principles of the Litvinoff declara-
tion of November 30, 1927, was a comparatively short document
of sixty-three articles. It proposed to disband all effectives
on land, sea and in the air within four years. Ministries
of War, Navy and Air, as well as associated military schools
were to be abolished. Military budgets were to be abolished.
All scientific research directed towards military devices
was to be abolished. Certain small arms would be retained
for internal police work and certain small craft for p641rolling
areas of the sea for custom purposes.
The controls over the disarmament were to be exercised
by a Permanent International Commission of Control, Commissions
of Control in each contracting State, and local Commissions of
Control. The permanent International Commission of Control
was to consist of "an equal number of representatives of the
legislative bodies and of the trade unions and other workingmens,
organizations of all states participating in the present
Convention."
Punitive Action
The International Control Commission was entrusted with
"bringing pressure by non-military measures upon any state
which disturbed the normal progress of disarmament."
In woe at ion
Article 55 of the Convention was the most far-reaching
procedure proposed by the Soviets, Article 55 allowed the
International Commission the complete right to inspect the
progress of disarmament in all states:
"All the contracting States shall seek to give the
widest publicity to the progress of disarmament, and shall
afford the organs at the Permanent International Commission
of Control every facility for the full investigation of all
activities of the State, of public associations and of
private persons which are connected with the application of
disarmament, or which, in the view of the Permanent Inter-
national Commission of Control or its organs, give rise to
doubts concerning the observance of the undertakings
solemnly entered into with regard to disarmament and the
discontinuance of all military preparations."
ti Procedure ii the Control Authority
Article 56 stated that the decisions of the International
Control Commission were to be by a majority vote and binding on
all states. Article 56 gave the International Commission the
right to settle all disputes between the contracting states.
Relationship
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RAlatienghip with the Exiatina Security System -
(League of Nations)
It is clear that the above Soviet proposals would have
established a completely new and radical inter-state relation-
ship. The right to inspect would have delimited the Sovereign
authority of rill contracting States and the right to take action
by a majority vote would have established a parliamentary pro-
cedure to achieve a decision unknown in the modern interstate
system. As a point of fact, the Soviet proposals would establish
an authority which would have transcended the League structure.
This was pointed out by the British Delegation in the course of
the discussion.
The Soviet Draft gn Partial Disarmament
0
Scope
The Second Draft Convention presented by the Soviet Dele-
gation was considered as partial disarmament preliminary to
total disarmament. This draft was based on the proportionate
reduction principle proposed in the earlier Moscow Conference.
All states were divided into groups. Group A maintaining
armed land forces over 200,000 men, Group B maintaining armed
forces of over 40,000 and Group C consisting of States inferior
to Group B, and Group D consisting of states disarmed after
World War I. The Convention then fixed the co-efficient of
reduction by requiring Group A to reduce by one-half, Group B
by one-third, Group C by one-fourth and Group D would be
treated separately by the Conference.
Qt of and angpg rtion
The control measures were similar to the total disarmament
Convention and were in fact more rigid. Article 43 states:
With a view to ensuring genuine control, the
Permanent International Commission of Control shall
be entitled to carry out investigations on the spot
in the event of reasonable suspicion of a breach of
the present Convention and of the subsequent supple-
mentary Agreements on the reduction and limitation of
armaments, and to appoint for this purpose special
commissions of enquiry."
It should be pointed out that both Draft Conventions
establish a theory of representation on the Control Commission
quite different from the conventional Western conception of
geographic and population representation. The Control Com-
mission contained representatives of functional groups, workers
organizations, trade unions, and certain legislative representa-
tives from the various states, This type of representation,
of course, was the Soviet theory as applied in Russia,
The Second Draft Convention was rejected, as mentioned
above, by the Commission on April 20, 1929 when it was de-
cided that the criterion of reduction should be related to the
security of each state and not based purely on an objective
and proportionate reduction principle.
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The General Disarmament Conference 1932
The General Conference for Disarmament opened in Geneva on the
11th of February 1932. A Draft Convention had been prepared by the
Preparatory Commission and was submitted to the General Conference
as a basis of discussion. M. Litvinoff.again led the Soviet Dele-
gation and after criticizing the tentative Draft before the Conference,
presented the Soviet general and complete disarmament,plan. This was
the same Draft Convention that was rejected by the Preparatory
Commission. The Soviet Convention again was rejected as being im-
practical and contrary to the principles of the League of Nations.
On April 11, 1932 Litvinoff introduced the Second Draft Convention
on partial disarmament. This Draft was the same as the earlier
partial disarmament plan with a few minor modifications. On the
20th of April the Conference rejected this plan, and the principle
of proportionate disarmament as contained in the plan, with the
decision that the subjective, rather than the objective, principle
should be used in the reduction of armaments; that is, the principle
of reduction "consistent with national security."
The First Session closed on July 23, 1932 with no part of a
Soviet proposal accepted by the Conference, The. contribution of the
Soviet Government in the following Session was mainly that of per-
sistent criticism of the fruitless efforts of the Conference. M.
Litvinoff summed up the Soviet position in both the Preparatory
Commission and the General Disarmament Conference in a speech
before the Conference on February 11, 1932:
"The political and economic differences existing between
various States, which have become considerably intensified
since the great war and owing to the crisis, are inevitably
and rapidly leading to a new armed conflict between nations.
This conflict,. owing to modern improvements in.the weapons
of destruction, threatens humanity with incredible disasters,
unprecedented devastation. The impending menace of war is
causing universal alarm and arousing universal suspicion.
"This alarm and suspicion,. together with the burden of
taxation imposed upon the people for the maintenance by
States of huge armed forces, are nourishing and intensify-
ing the present economicerisis, which is felt in all its
weight first and foremost by the working classes. In these
circumstances, the task of the hour is not the repetition
of any attempt to achieve some reduction of armaments or
war budgets, the realization of which is bound to come up
against tremendous obstacles, but the actual prevention of
war, through the creation of effective security against
war. This task can only be carried out by means of total
and general disarmament.
"The Soviet delegation will move a resolution to this
effect, convinced as it is that there would be no ex-
ternal obstacle to the carrying out of general disarma-
ment if the Governments here rer esented show their
readiness for it."
Communism and Disarmament
The appearance of Litvinoff at the General Disarmament Con-
ference and the rejection of the Soviet proposals closes the
period
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period covering the USSR interest in disarmament. From 1921 to
1932 the record of the Soviet Government appears clear snd the
Soviet proposals forthright. This period must be examined, however,
in the context of the Communist ideology. The relationship between
the Soviet Government and the Communist International in this
period is well known. The Communist International which met in
Moscow up to its last formal Congress in 1935 examined all inter-
national problems and then passed resolutions which established
the Party line of action. The Sixth Congress of the Communist
International met in the summer of 1928 only four months after the
Litvinoff proposals were made in the Preparatory Commission. This
Congress is of particular importance because by Thesis 58 in Chapter
4 of the Final Report of the Congress, the question of "the pro-
letariat's attitude toward the question of disarmament and the
fight against pacifism" was discussed.
The above resolution is a literal interpretation of Lenin's
definition of the modern state as presented in his book "The State
and Revolution". The modern state, according to Lenin, is an
instrument of the Capitalist class. The organs of the state exist to
maintain the Capitalist class. Therefore the armed services are
instruments devised. and used by the Capitalists to maintain their
domination and, in this imperialistic age, to implement their
deterministic need for foreign markets. The future Socialist state,
according to Lenin, will need no armies, navies, or any state organ
which exists now only to oppress the proletariat. Thus, with the
advent of the Socialist classless society, the state and its organs
of oppression will no longer be needed and therefore will "wither
away".
However, Lenin states further that the first step in this pro-
cess toward a Socialist world comes with the Communists establishing
a dictatorship of the proletariat. This is necessary in order to
break by violence the hold that the Capitalists have on Society.
To do that many of the existing state organs can be turned against
the oppressors and utilized to protect the proletarian revolution
and the proletarian state against the remaining Capitalistic world.
But until the internal contradictions of the remaining Capitalistic
states provoke imperialist war and violent revolution and eventual
world socialism, the Soviet state must remain strong and use the
"Communized" armies to defend the Socialist Fatherland.
The above dogma is well known and appears basic.in Communist thinking
on war and peace, and is the essence of the resolution approved by the
Sixth Congress of the Communist International to answer the specific
questions on disarmament, the League of Nations, and pacifism. This Con-
gress, in Thesis 58, insisted that the capitalistic-imperialist realizes
that the masses are instinctively hostile to war and for that reason im-
perialism is compelled to make its preparation for war under the cloak
of pacifism.
"Herein lies the objective significance and the fundamental
aim of the disarmament proposals and conferences initiated by
the imperialist states and particularly of the work of the League
of Nations in this sphere; the discussion on 'security'; the pro-
posal to establish arbitration courts; the pacts for the out-
lawry of war. The purposes of all these pacifist schemes,,
treaties and conferences are: (a) to camouflage
imperialist
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imperialist armament; (b) to enable certain great powers to
maneuver against each other for the purpose of securing,
by treaties, a reduction in their rivals armaments, while
at the same time increasing their own military power; (c)
to enable the great powers to reach temporary agreements
guaranteein their domination over the weak and oppressed
countries; (d) to carry out ideological and political mobi-
lization against the Soviet Uni-~n under the cloak of pacifist
slogans, or a direct preparation for war."
Referring specifically to the Soviet participation in the
Preiaratory Commission in Geneva, the report states:
"The aim of the Soviet proposals was not to spread
pacifist illusions, but to destroy them; not to support
capitalism by ignoring or toning down its shady sides,
but to propagate the'fundamental Marxian postulate, that
disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with
the fall of capitalism ... it goes without saying, that
not a single Communist thought for a moment that the
imperialist world would accept the Soviet disarmament
proposals ... after the Soviet proposals for complete
disarmament were rejected the Soviet Delegation in March
1928 submitted a second scheme which provided for partial
disarmament and for a gradual reduction of land and naval
forces. This was not a concession to pacifism, on the con-
trary, it served to expose more completely the attitude of the
great powers toward the small and oppressed nations. The
Soviet Government's position on the question of disarmament
is a continuation of Lenin's policy and a consistent appli-
cation of his percepts."
The Communist Party line on disarmament as clearly stated in
the above quoted thesis has never been repudiated. It can be
summarized briefly. Disarmament is only possible in a Socialist
world. The existence of Capitalistic states makes war inevitable.
Disarmament proposals stemming from Capitalistic states are purely
gestures to satisfy the oppressed proletariat in those states and
actually conceal the maneuvering of the Capitalistic powers in
preparation for war. The Soviet suggestions and proposals on dis-
armament are sincere, insofar as they hope to expose by their pre-
sentation the hypocrisy of the Capitalistic states, but were never
proposed with a serious belief that they would-be accepted. The
Communists, therefore, believe that the Capitalistic states of
necessity need arms and therefore any proposal to reduce total
armaments radically would never be accepted.
The above statement should be supplemented by Lenints Thesis
that the Communists must use certain arms themselves against the
Capitalistic class in order to bring about the revolution. The
proletariat required to bear arms for the Capitalist must be in
a position to use these arms at the proper time against their
"masters". The Communists therefore need arms to establish the
dictatorship of the proletariat and to maintain. and defend it
against the Capitalistic world.
Thus in light of the Communist viewpoint on disarmament, the
political action of the Soviet Government from 1921 to 1932 should
be viewed as a series of tactical moves in order to (1) place
non-Soviet countries in an embarrassing, psychologically difficult
position, and (2) emphasize their belief that disarmament is possible
only in a socialist world.
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