ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500090011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 17, 1964
• Content Type: MF

f r117-7.:
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UM iOR
17 July 1964
actor of Central Intelltgsnce
ole of the Director of Central Intelligence
1. This enemorarrium is
or
Z. In telling us of your talk with Mr. Clifford. you mentioned
the phrase 'executive agent in connection with the role of the Lirector
of Central Intelligence. A historical note on this might be of interest.
3. The first Director under the Truman Directive establishing
the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 was Admiral aotters, who eacv
his role as that of a coordinator only, and CIG was in effect a small
committee of representatives of the intelligence components to achieve
coordination but was without any operating body. Little progress was
made by the time General Vandenberg became Director on 10 June 1746.
He immediately decided that he needed an operating arm, and by
September 1946 CIG had absorbed the element* of the Strategic Services
Unit, Department of the Army, which emulated of the remaining operat-
ing element* of OSS. Meanwhile, a series of Directives were being
handed down by the National Intelligence Authority, which was the
predeceseor to the National Security Council in the intelligence field.
It consisted of the Secretaries of State, Array, and Navy and Admiral
Leaky as the President's personal representative.
4. General Vandenberg vigorously pursued Ms aim of bringing
the other intelligence components into a cohesive group, with CIG as
the controlling element. Dismayed by the lack of progress he was
achieving through persuasion and referral of issues to the National
Intelligence Authority, he repeatedly briefed the members of NIA on
his difficulties and frustrations. Finally, the NM issued a Directive
in the spring of 1947 designating the DCI as its executive agent in all
nutters pertaining to intelligence. General Vandenberg proposed to
use this to exert command authority to achieve his aims. The con-
sternatiorz this caused in the other intelligence elements in the Govern-
ment brought a most violent reaction, particularly in the military
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services, who saw it as a violation of the integrity of command
channels.
5. During the summer of 1947 the NationalSecurity Act
creating CIA came into effect and with it the new Director, Admiral
Hillenkoetter, who was well aware of the antagonisn to the executive-
agent concept and, therefore, went into negotiation on Nsca) No. I
without any reference to the executive?egent paper. Consequently,
while formally approved by the NIA it was never in fact made
operative.
cc:DDCI
Ead)ir-Comp
DIDCUMPE
ror k
sl iTiE2 R. Houston
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
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15 July 1964
MEMORANtlThi FOR: IDirectar of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Position of the Central Intelligence P.
in the Executive Branch
riettnx is for information.
CT
Z. I was most interested in your comments on your talk with
Mr. Clifford about the rola of the Agency and the Lirector. A
historical note on this might be of interest.
3. The two functions have gone in almost opposite dire times.
starting in 1947 there was a determined effort, particularly by the
military services, to establish the concept that the Director was
merely one among equals. It was not until the rewrite of N13CID
No. I in 1958 that this struggle was finally abandoned and the pre-
eminence of the IDCI accepted by the other intelligence components
of the Goverament. I believe his role as the intelligence adviser to
the President has now been well established by you.
4. The Agency In 1147 started with the concept that it had
responsibility for the production of National Estimates.
old Office of Reports and Evaluations proceeded with the
It should have the competence to take the raw intelligence,
*ace data in all fields of interest analyze it, correlate
to it for the ?reduction of National Estimates. This
wais bitterly*wooed, particularly by the military intelligence
services. As an example, they asserted that the Agency had loather
the competence nor the responsibility to produce finished intelligence
relating to weapons. Towards the end of Admiral Hillseakoetter's
regime this dispute broke down the estimative procoms ho where
literally a National Estimate could not be produced. I participated
in the negotiations between Admiral Hillenkeetter and General John
IvIcOrnaler, trying to resolve this Inv's**, but no solution was in
sight. Safer* General Smith arrived he asked me what I saw as the
primary problems with which he would be faced. and I told him I
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thought this weeNo. 1. Tie assigned this problem to his first replay,
William H.. Jackson, who proposed a concept that the ?nal'fr,Zsti.
mates were the common responsibility of all the intelligence corn nautity.
objected strongly, and Genersl Smith modified this to say, in effect,
that the responeibility was in the Agency under the DCI and required
the combined effort of the intelligence community. This led to the
establishment of the present system of contributions by other intel.
ligince components in their assigned fields with the correlation and
evaluation done through ONE and the US1.11 structure.
S. There is no qui stion of the statutory responsibility. Thi
is the only specific function assigned to the Agency by the National
Security Act of 1947, and the legislative history makes it quite clear
that the Congress intended to look to one place and one place only for
Intelligence success or failure and would hold the Agency responsible.
The Director, RA bead of the Agency, is of course the focal point for
this responsibility, to which is added his over-all responsibilities
as Director of Central Intelligence.
?
6. The present concept tends to downgrade ligence
function of the Agency to the position of one among equals ndt
widen the split between the Agency's intelligence functions and-the
Da, which cannot, of course, he completely separated Preiht
organisation with the Office of National Estimates in rather an
Ainernalous position under the DDII but processing its material
,3rough USW, contributes to the problem, and the emergence ckt-
' -DIA tends to underline the situation. Some move to upgrade ONE
?and tie it in more closely organisationally with the Director znight
one rnovo that could be considered in the near future.
cc DDCI
fraDir -Comp
iDCl/14.11PE
LL,
kad
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
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Appro
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1RD 4: k :14' i.iii.42 :4,111414J ? II
- UNCLASSIFIED jj CO'neolDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
Iit(
INITIALS
WV ittl
DDCI
ne
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
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INFORMATION
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
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