(U) DIA/CIIC BRIEFINGS BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY RESERVE GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500080054-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: February 6, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
% xecuVe tegiei*_y
6 February 1964
Approyed For Release 2003/0 T RDP80B01676R0005
S-154/AP-3
SUBJECT: (U) DIA/CIIC Briefings Before Congressional Military
Reserve Groups
TO: Brig. Gen. Ernest C. Hardin
Office of Secretary of Defense
1. In response to your request with respect to frequency and
content of briefings presented to Congressional Military Re-
serve Groups by the DIA Current Intelligence and Indications
Center, the following information is supplied:
a. DIA/CIIC presents 15-20 minute current intelligence
briefings to three military reserve groups on Capitol Hill as
follows:
(1) 9999th Air Reserve Squadron. Each Tuesday at
0800 for the period January through August.
(2) The Army Reserve Group. Each Tuesday at 0830
for the period January through August.
(3) Naval Reserve Group. Intermittently. No regular
schedule. Briefings, when given, are usually of 30 to 40
minutes duration.
2. Briefings to the 9999th Air Reserve Group were commenced
under ACSI/USAF jurisdiction in 1960. Upon the establishment
of DIA and the centralization of all current intelligence re-
sources the responsibility was assumed by DIA*s Current Intel-
ligence and Indications Center. 25X1
Chief of the CIIC, has been the normal briefer over this entire
period. DIA, in the instance of this and other reserve group
briefings, is merely providing current intelligence support to
a departmental program. Briefings for the Army Reserve Group
were commenced late in 1962 while presentations have been made
before the Navy Reserve Group beginning in 1962.
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
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3. All briefings are provided as part of the readiness train-
ing of the reserve officers enrolled and at the SECRET level.
No sensitive intelligence is used.
4. Insofar as the briefings for the 9999th Air Reserve Squad-
ron are concerned (and this applies equally to similar brief-
ings provided to the Army and Navy reserve groups), only rou-
tine intelligence items classified up to include SECRET levels
are used. Some effort is made to tailor the briefings to re-
flect the weapons systems orientation of the particular group
being briefed. However, major developments on the world scene
at any particular time are covered insofar as routine, non-
sensitive intelligence availability will permit.
5. In the recent briefings before the 9999th Air Reserve
Squadron (specifically those presented on 4 February; 28, 21
and 14 January) some references to routine intelligence pro-
vided U.S. Ambassadors on various current intelligence subjects
(as normal content of intelligence produced) were used as in
the past. On 4 February the following extract was used from
a CONFIDENTIAL report from the American Embassy in Leopoldville:
"The Kwilu crisis has been threatening since last August
when it was first reported that Pierre Mulele, Parti-Soldaire
African Deputy and strong supporter of Antoine Gizenga and
later Gizenga Stanleyville Regime's Foreign Representative at
Cairo, had returned from Peking. Concern increased through
succeeding months in GOC and Leopoldville western diplomatic
circles. With New Year reports that Mulele forces, generally
known as "JEUNESSE" because of adolescent age range of ranks,
had opened reign of terror against provincial authorities in
Eastern and Southern Kwilu by increased attacking and burning
administrative posts, cutting bridges and sinking ferries.
However, it was murder of three Catholic priests at Kelembe
and appeals by Belgian Embassy and American Protestant mis-
sionaries to UNOC for help in evacuating mission stations
under attack which brought current crisis to head and to world
attention.
UNOC and missionary sources with whom Embassy is maintaining
close contact, both in field and Leopoldville, report situa-
tion roughly as follows as of early Jan. 30 before impending
large-scale and counter-attack has been mounted.
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"JEUNESSE forces are operating over area approximately
15,000 sq. kilometers (Kikwit, Kintshua, Loanji River and
Kisanji). They are armed with spears, bows and home-made
steel head arrows capable of killing. Unknown number captured
weapons are in their possession and on one occasion automatic
weapon-was used against UNOC reconnaissance plane and rifle
was fired at ANC plane. At Kisanji, JEUNESSE made first re-
ported use of truck to haul away mission furnishings. There
are reports from varied sources that weapons are being moved
into area via river and overland routes.
"JEUNESSE are presently convinced by teaching of Mulele
himself that they are invulnerable to bullets shot at them
from ground by ANC and others. Using standard Bantu philosophy
Mulele teaches that his forces come from land on which they are
fighting and receive support from vital force of that land;
that mercenary ANC does not benefit from vital force and will
soon run out of foreign manufactured bullets and be vanquished.
Occasional youth who is actually killed by bullets is, they
say, not following all the rules. One taboo which if broken
will remove invulnerability is eating peanuts and water. They
do believe, however, that bullets shot from air will kill them,
peanuts or not. Although bulk of JEUNESSE range from 14-19 or
20, some are as young as 11 and leaders range from around 25
to 40."
On 28 January another extract from a State Department report
from Leopoldville was used. It related to an earlier CONFI-
DENTIAL description on the same subject--the Kwilu Province
uprising.
While notes used for the 21 and 14 January presentations have
been discarded, it is quite likely that items used had some
reference to routine non-sensitive information supplied by the
Department of State which had been incorporated in DIA/CIIC
published material.
6. A copy of the briefing used on 4 February is inclosed.
7. All briefings before these groups employ graphic aids
and the lead graphic (used just prior to commencement and
upon conclusion of the briefings) points out that the top
level of the briefing is SECRET, and the Commanders, in in-
troducing the intelligence briefers, point out that the
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information provided in the briefings is given to the reservists
only in their capacity as Reserve officers in a training readi-
ness program and is governed by pertinent military security
regulations. No notes are made by any of the attendees at the
reserve meetings and no recording is made of the briefing.
8. Intermittent "one-time" current intelligence briefings
are given to other Reserve Groups such as the Armed Forces
Reserve Policy Council. Similar rules relating to security
levels apply, except on occasion a specific group may be
cleared for TOP SECRET. DIA/CIIC has never presented a TOP
SECRET briefing, however, to any of these groups.
1 Atch:
Colonel, USAF 4 Feb Text - 9999th Air Res
Chief, Current Intelligence Sq, SECRET
and Indications Center
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
7 February 1964
5-160/AP-3
SUBJECT: (U) DIA/CIIC Briefings Before Congressional Military
Reserve Groups
TO: Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll
Director, DIA
Brig. Gen. Ernest C. Hardin
Office of Secretary of Defense
1. Reference is made to memorandum, subject as above, dated
6 February 1964, and forwarded as original to Brig. Gen.
Hardin and as info copy to Lt. Gen. Carroll.
2. I have conducted further research into the material which
I have used in current intelligence briefings before the
9999th Air Reserve Squadron in an effort to ascertain pre-
cisely what may have been extracted from State Department
non-sensitive cables at the SECRET or lesser classification
levels. Other than the two citations mentioned in the memo-
randum referenced in paragraph 1 above, the only other in-
stance in which such material was used or in which specific
reference was made to a U. S. Ambassador occurred during the
presentation on 21 January. On that date, in connection with
a discourse on the Soviet arms reduction, I cited some points
relating to the relationship of arms reduction to the state
of the Soviet economy. I used a few extracts from a State
Department CONFIDENTIAL message from the U. S. Ambassador in
Moscow, a copy of which is inclosed.
3. As I have reconstructed the pertinent portion of the
briefing and the use of this information, I believe it was
developed as follows;;;
IFT
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"Relative to the question as to whether or not there is
any sincerity in the Khrushchev remarks relative to reduc-
tion of the USSR's armed strength, I would like to bring you
the view of our Ambassador in Moscow who has reported that
Western economic counselors have shown surprising unanimity
with respect to the CIA analysis of the current status of the
Soviet economy. The most generally held view is that the
Soviets have too long hypnotized the world including own citi-
zens with space accomplishments and industrial growth figures
which avoid realities of backward agriculture, antiquated
factories, planning inadequacies, 19th century services, and
eastern living conditions.
"The optimistic believe that Khrushchev's program to
shift to more balanced and progressive economy may this year
reverse abrupt deceleration of past two years, particularly
since plans call for reallocations of resources rather than
usual shifts in organization.
"Majority, however, foresees 1964 as extension of economic
recession which has apparently hit most of Soviet bloc. Rea-
sons include:
a. repetition of freeze-thaw cycle which struck
Soviet agriculture last winter;
b. time required to introduce fertilized program
and overcome dust-bowl problems;
c. impracticalities of fertilized program;
d. depletion gold surplus for grain purchases;
e. complications of crash shift to progressive in-
dustry in Soviet Union;
f. continuation of internal competition for scarce
resources;
cut-back in most productive industrial sectors;
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p_a
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h. anticipated fall-off in normal trade due wheat-
chemicals priority;
i. apparent absence to date of resurgence of re-
visionism which essential to produce growth of incentives."
3. It is pointed out that the attached cable does not bear
any extraordinary security controls, receives extensive dis-
tribution within State and Defense and related to a subject
broadly discussed in the public press with major portions
used already in the public domain. It is the type of infor-
mation which DIA/CIIC would use in any normal intelligence
reporting.
4. DIA/CIIC pursues a vigorous policy of extremely close
control of all State Department and other intelligence which
is even suggestive of sensitivity. No significant or sensi-
tive State traffic is ever used in DIA/CIIC briefings or cur-
rent intelligence publications without the specific permission
of appropriate authority in the Department of State.
5. I do not question the propriety of other judgments that
use of this information with attribution to Mr. Kolher before
the USAF Congressional Reserve Group was improper. However,
I do not feel that the information had a direct bearing to
U.S. foreign policy.
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Current Intelligence
and Indications Center
1 Atch:
Msg 17Jan64, fr Moscow to
Paris for USRO and Embassy
CONFIDENTIAL
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3
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TAB
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 F,.ROM:
ACTION:
I NFO :
DATE:
AnnrnvPii For RPIPanp 2003/02/27 - Ct+4-RnP.SOR0167RR000500(Yf~&n5d,~ -~I- "
Moscow
Sec'state, 2221
Bonn .157
Brussels. 32
London 265
._,;Paris 278
Stockholm '..'19
Tokyo 44
Control:. 12418
.Rec'd:. January 17. 1964
January 17, 7'.p,m.
PARIS FOR USRO AND EMBASSY
PASS TO
GEN CARROLL
;25X1
Western Economic counselors it surprising show of unanimity
endorse conclusions CIA analysis of current status Soviet
.economy, except for gold figures about which little known here.'
Most ,generally held view is that Soviets have too._J,.gnlhy_pno-
tized.world includin own citizens with`space accomplishments ?
anindustrial growth figures which avoid realities of backward
agriculture. antiquated factories,
planning inadequacies. 19t
_cer~
..
y services aid c1atorri 1d
3
'
,
.
v
n
conditions.
Optimistic believe that Khrushchev's--.program) to shift td more-
balanced and',progressive economy may this year reverse abrupt
deceleration, of past two years,"particularly?since plans call-_
for reallocations of resources rather0than usual shifts in.
organization.
Majority, however, foresees 1964 as extensio
f
n o
economic re-
cession which has apparently hit most of'So'viet bloc; Reasons
include, (A)-repetition of freeze-thaw Cycle which struck
Soviet agriculture'last winter, (B) time required.to introduce
fertilized program'and"overcome dust'bow1'?problems, (C}. ~,
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CONFIDENTIAL
2221, January 17, 7 p.m. from: Moscow.
impracticalities of fertilized program, (D) depletion gold
surplus for grain purchases, (E) complications of crash shift
to progressive industry in Soviet Union, (F) continuation of
into" nal c3i'ipctitiofl fov seat`Ce 'L''C$Ources, (0) cut-back in
most productive industrial sectors, (H) anticipated fall-off'
in normal. trade due wheat-chemicals priority, (I) apparent
absence to date. of resurgence of revisionism which essential
to produce growth of incentives.,
0
All believe that economic problems, primarily billion-dollar
wheat disaster, have had and.will continue to have profound
(and to da'te.moderating) influence "on Soviet internal and ex-
ternal policy. As consequence, most recommend closest coot
dination western economic policy at this critical stage.
most deplore possibility of credit race on commercial and
other grounds, e.g., "credits would force western taxpayer to
subsidize Soviet economic aid to third countries". Because
of seriousness Soviet economic situation and poor 1964 pros-
pects forfimprovement, minority rationalizes that some liberal-
ization credittiterms could prevent serious cut-back normal
trade and contribute to current east-west detente. Some
believe economic situation so bad that Soviets may have to
adopt some form of increased incentive system. None are
c:uphotic" about possibilities: of. trade ..'incr'ease with or
without credits (Paris' 120).?i
GP-3.
ba:19.
CONFIDENTIAL.
)+KOHLER-
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Gene arter
The attached package was nded to DC
C
arroll or Fitch before a recent USIB me
Y
ou will recall that Secretary Rusk has
very unhappy about DIA briefings given
milit
ary reserve units which include C
and even talked at one point about res
The package as it relates to a hassle
State Department and Defense is pa
th
D
e
CI for your info. The DCI di
Elder, however, whether you ha
Joe Carroll to find out how C
handled by the DLA briefers.
0
ping.
`between
sed to you by
ask Walt
ever talked to
information is
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I FORM
AUGN 54 IQI WHIICH REPLACES
MAY FORM
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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter
DCI noted your note without further
comment.
/y SECT
FORM I NO '
US10-101
54 IvI WHICH RELACES FORM
ED.
3 Mar 64
(DATE)
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