DCI MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 29 SEPEMBER 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500010070-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: October 4, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

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4 October 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
.;UBJECT: DCI Meeting with the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, 29 September 1966
1. The DCI met with the PFIAB in room 297 of the Executive
Office Building at 1430 hours. 29 September. Mr. Clifford presided
and General Taylor, Messrs. Langer, Gray, Pace, Ambassador
Murphy, Admiral Sides and Dr. Baker were present, in addition to
Messrs. Coyne. Bross and Ash.
2. The first item discussed were the reports from the
Secretaries of Aate and Defense concerning gaps and deficiencies in
coverage of intelligence in their respective areas of interest. Mr. Helms
talked briefly about these papers which he said had been closely held in
the Agency but discussed with a few senior officials responsible for
intelligence guidance and requirements. He said that the community had
little difficulty in identifying gaps and deficiencies. The problem is how
best to eliminate these gaps and deficiencies and develop facilities and
coverage required to resolve the more difficult intelligence problems.
He said that he did not intend to attempt a lengthy analysis of the process
by which requirements are identified and served on collection agencies.
In essence, this process involves components of CIA, such as the Collection
Guidance Staff, which serves as an intermediary between analytical compo-
nents and collection agencies, and USIB committees such as JAEIC and
GMAIC, which are concerned with high priority problem areas and are
supposed to marshal the resources of the community in an effort to resolve
questions relating to developments in the missile and nuclear energy
fields. He said that he was prepared to leave with the Board a copy of
the briefing paper which had been prepared by way of comment on the
memoranda from the Secretaries of State and Defense. He offered the
1- "
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suggestion that the Board address itself either through panels or
individual members to an examination of how the USIB committees
function in the requirements area. He felt that this might be the
most constructive approach to the problem of the adequacy of
existing procedures and arrangements for determining the needs
of the Government for information and translating these needs into
action designed to develop collection or analytical activity calculated
to meet these needs.
3. The Chairman thought that this was a good suggestion. He
said that the Board was divided into panels and that it might be helpful
to have the panel charged with a particular area or function examine
the USIB committee having jurisdiction over some problem identified as
a gap. For example, deficiencies in our understanding of Chinese nuclear
capabilities would be discussed with JAEIC. General Taylor said that
the Board panels were organized on a geographic basis and would want
to examine problems from a geographic perspective. It was left that
specific arrangements for panel investigations would be discussed with
Mr. Coyne.
4. The Chairman then brought up the DCI's letter of 20 Septem-
ber and asked the DCI to elaborate on some of the points made in that
letter. (Mr. Coyne had left me with the impression that this letter would
not be discussed and indeed the letter itself suggests that further con-
sideration of the matters enumerated in the letter be postponed until
later in the year.)
5. The first matter discussed related to the revision of NSCIDs,
etc. The Chairman agreed that the course outlined in the letter was
appropriate. The Director undertook, at General Taylor's suggestion,
to put the NSCID relating to the allocation of responsibility in the economic
field on the list for relatively early consideration and review.
6. The problem of the DCI's authority was then discussed at
considerable length. Mr. Clifford initiated the discussion with a rather
full analysis of the dilemma posed by the conflicting authorities and
responsibilities of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. The Director
referred to his discussion with Senators Saltonstall and Russell and to
Senator Russell's concluding remark that anybody who undertook to reduce
and rationalize the intelligence budgets and prevent duplication would need
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lot of help. The CI expressed his deep concern about the size
of the intelligence budgets, which he estimated at
2.1eirbere of the Board apparently had been given a higher tigure of
which appears to have included 11017111 tactical intelligence
activities.
7. There was considerable discussion about the appropriate
allocation of authority to control expenditures. Mr. Clifford seemed
to regard the dichotomy between the DCI and Secretary of Defense as
perhaps inevitable. He thought that the President would probably turn
to the DCI as responsible for decisions relating to intelligence programs
but recognized that the DCI did not have the authority necessary to make
final decisions concerning the level of funding of DoD programs which
would require at least the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.
8. General Taylor advanced the idea that it was really the
recretary of State who should be responsible for rationalizing the foreign
intelligence effort as he is responsible for overseas activities and, under
the new SIG, for coordinating and improving all foreign programs. The
pointed out that this might be true in certain areas but had no
particular relevance to the big problems of SIGINT and overhead recon-
naissance. Mr. Gray endorsed this thought and said that he was glad
to get the conversation back to the problem of control of national intelli-
gence at a governmental level.
9. As regards the necessity for a new letter of authority from
the President, the Dm commented that while a new letter might not
resolve any problems, the absence of a letter might have serious negative
implications. Discussion followed about the differences between the
Kennedy letter and the Johnson letter and it was agreed that the Kennedy
letter was stronger. General Taylor had two suggestions which he
thought might be helpful. One was to make tW lesponsible for the
coordination of all intelligence in a given diplomatic mission. The other
sensus of agreement. He referred to the SIG as the example of what he h&c
in mind. (He did not refer to the Communications Board where the concept
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10. It we.. agreed that the DCI would undertake to draft a new
letter of authority for review and consideration by the Board.
11. The DCI undertook to give further consideration and try to
develop a practical plan to implement the recommendation of the Board
relating to overseas inspection of various areas.
12. The DCI then reverted to the problem of his relations with
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He said that he had no
hesitation about appearances before the full Committee for the purpose of
briefings on substantive intelligence. etc. He was. however, concerned
by the proposal that a small subcommittee be established to hold frequent
regular meetings as these could very well infringe, or appear to infringe.
on the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. On this issue
Mr. Clifford's conclusion was that the DCI should solicit Senator Russell's
advice as regards appropriate action in the event of a proposal to create
a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations to deal with CIA.
Mr. Clifford agreed that the DCI should appear to brief the Committee
as a whole. Ii asked to do so.
JOHN A. BOSS
D/DCl/NIPE
Listribution:
Orig
lixDrtatitoller
NIPE/Chr ono
1 - NIPE/PF1AB
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.C)VedPTIT
i I,ASSttIED' CONFIDENTIAL
I I SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND
ADDRESS
DATE
fot7
INITIA
1
Executive Director-Comatroller
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
John A. Bross D/DCl/NIPE 7 E 22
676R)040C
4/10/66
1
ovel-RMEMFRO210812-11-:
1 CONFIDENTIAL
FORM NO.
2-61 .137 Use previous editions
(40)
11.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
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able Clark t.m. Clifford
The Vresidenti a Torok** InteLlige ce
Advisory Beard
cxecutive Office Building
cis k;
20 SEP ?
gto report on the status of a namber of
ratters which we discussed during the coarse of my n:seeting with the
PFMB o* Z9 July and tO which I undertook to give further consider-
ation or which otherwise involved forther action on my part. I thought
that a etaternent of what has been done on these iten-,a would be helpful
before the next meeting of the Board. which I lunderstand is scheduled
or 21 and 30 September.
/-
Item I of the last agenda wkith concerned possible -odi-
fication he procedures governing the production of current and long
rang. intelligence. has been disposed of. You have received a report
describing new arrangen este iehich have been completed for the purpose
of zrore clearly identifying the component of the community originating
a.given intelligence issuance end indicating with mere precision the
degree of forn?al coordination which the isseance has received.
Item Za of the agenda raised the question whether assign-
masts of authority to the DC! are adequate to provide a basis for
effective guidance, direction and coordination of the foreign intelligence
activities of the Goveriament. I asked for further time to consider this
question. I also suggested that it would be very helpful to me to have
the views of the Board as to what my authority should be and what further
specific attempts, if any, it would seem profitable to make at this time
to resolve the organisational dilemma created by the fact that something
In excess of 40% of the resources devoted to foreign intelligence purnoseta
are not under my direct managerial control.
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The letters from
iron. Pre *dent Johnson to . Antdral Rabor
for the isseaace of an express Presidential
LCI. I helieve these Letters have helped to
to Mr. McConst and
created a. precedent
rective to each individua
larify the Tele of the OCI
as a coordinator and have served a generally ameba' purpose. bignifica cs
has been attached in some quarters to differences in the language as
betweea the letters blamed by President Kennedy and President Johnson.
This suggests the need for considerable care in drafting the language of
a new letter. if it is decided that a new letter is desirable.
at important question to decide is the extent and
natation* of the re.penslbWties of the DCI. part elderly insofar as
they have managerial implications for programs functioning under
agencies Of the Government other than CIA. particularly under the
Department of Defense. Specifically the queetions are to what extent
the DCI rheuld be held r *possible and accountable and given authority:
a. To detertniee the needs of the Goveran eat for
information derived from intelligence channels;
b. To determine the scope character and level
of collection and analytical programs and facilities required
to meet these needs; and
c. For the efficiency and econerry of these progra
now costing in excess oil Ia year).
25X1
Under existing arrangements the DCI. supported and advised
by USIB. tends to be regarded as primarily responsible for validating
and determining the needs of the Government for intelligenco. and the
Secretary of Defeo** to be responsible for the control and management of ,a
very large preponderance of programs and facilities calculated to meet
these needs. The precise delimitations of authority and responsibility
as between the Secretary of tufense and the DCI remain vague and
ill-defined although practical working relationships are satisfactory.
It may very well be that there is no practical alternative to the present
dichotomy and that we should continue to work under current authority.
recognising the sominarhat nebulous nature of the DC1's commitment "to
provide effective guidance and coordination." but recogniain also that
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there has been a very considerable limprove eat in the coo &nation
of the national intelligence effort and that further progress under
something comparable to the existing authority can be reasonably
anticipated.
Before expressing my final views oe this sisbject, however,
should eppreciate further time for reflection and suggest that this
matter be scheduled for farther discussion some titre towards the ond
of this year. I am attaching a memorandum on the subject which may
help further to clarify the issue.
Under agenda item Zio. I undertook to .zazrIn. the NSCU)a
and riCitis and report my views as to whether a general rview of these
directives, or any of thorn. would be desirable at this time.
?&It general tertatilleiti on this score is that, for the most
existing directives make adequate provision for coordination and
nco of the commueityts efforts and resources. The understanding
rrangesuento for the allocation and discharge of responsibilities
under current authorisations are realistic and provide a satisfactory
basis for the cotrressnity effort for at least the immediate future. There
(ore, the relatively minor changes of an editing or updating nature that
could be made might have a more disruptive than helpful effect.
Reviews of twe NSCIDs and No. 8 photo- 25X1
graphicinterpretation) and related rang are fact scheduled, although
specific proposals for the amendment of these directives will have to
await the completion of pending studies. A is will press forward with
these as dili *Idly as possible.
I will keep the balance of N s and bCW. wider continuing
scrutiny with a view to ensuring that they are reviewed and amended at
appropriate intervals. In the foreseeable future it will probably be
desirable to re-examine the allocations of responsibility for the production
of intelligence as presently provided for by NSCID 3.
I also undertook to give further consideration to the subject
of item 2 h of the agenda, which concerns the practicality of establishing
a mechanism for comprehensive field inspection of significant intelligence
activities on a regional basis. I believe that there is much to be said for
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this proposal. Among other things. I
r-Cle coorinatbzg authority and expand his
and interre/ationsisipa of intelligence activities
Implementation of the proposal, however, poses is
problems which require further consideration. Also. I believe that
this proposal is closely related to some of the problems discussed in
connection with consideration of the adequacy of the DCVs coordinating
authority. Accordingly. I again suggest that this 'natter be deferred
until it can he considered as part of the infer...all question of the authority
appropriate for the DCI and the institutional arrangements best slated
to implement this authority.
One final matter which was not included in the formal agenda
of the last wasting of the Board was your suggestion that I bring myself
p to date with the status of the Knox Passel. Since our last meeting.
epreseatatives of my office and I myself personally have had the benefit
of a number of very helpful discussions with Mr. Knox. *ad I look forward
to the issuance of his report which I believe is now scheduled for sorre
irra in the late fall.
Sincerely,
qq, Richard Helms
_Richard Helms
Director
Attockuneld
JABROSS:ag (1919/66)
Distribution:
Orig & I - Addressee
I - DCI
1 - ER
1 - NIPE / Chron
I - NIPE/PFIAB
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CUSSICIPA of !Waluse of PCI Authority to
Coordinate the U. S. Intelligente. ffort
As a minimum, the DCI mast have the authority to find
out anything he wants to know MINNA all activities which contribtste
to national intelligence. He must have the ability to form an independent
ucigment as to whether intelligence programs are generally responsive
to national needs. Institutional arrangements must exist which ensnare
that be can communicate an authoritative view, if necessary to the
'resident and the President's immediate advisers. as is which programs
of the Government are redlandant er marginal end what shonld be dont to
1 intelligence gaps.
The law and NSCIL No. I provide, a general way, this
authority and institutional arrangement. The law provides that the
Agency, of which the DCL is the head, shall advise the MSC on intelli-
gence matters and recommend ways to improve intelligence coordination.
Asap No. I provides that the DC1"shall coordinate the foreign intelli-
gence activate* of the United states in accordance with existing Isar and
titiCIDs." NS= No. 1 confers other authority on the DCI, generally
3ubject to consultation with U.SI15. to do various things. For example,
the TIG1 or his representatives In consultation with the head of the
intelligence agency concerned" is authorised to make surveys of depart-
mental intelligence activities.
rho two presidontial letters. respectivelyMcCone
and Admiral /tabor*. constitute at least a clarification and probably an
extension of the vcr s authority. Certainly the I.Canstedy letter constitutes
a mandate to the DCI. acting jointly with the heads of departments, to
review the activities of all U.S. agencies with a view to
efficiency and effectiveness . ?." It has been argued that the Johnson
letter is weaker because it directs the DCI to coordinate and guide the
total United States intelligence effort "in accordance with NSC1D No. 1.
Certain of the provisions of NbC11. No. 1 imply a certain obligation on
the part of the DCI to act, in some respects at least, with the advice and
consent of US1B and to deal with heads of agencies and departments through
heir intelligence representatives. The Johnson letter also uses language
which appears to emphasise the DCV s responsibility for coordinating
intelligence output rather than intelligence programs and activities.
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In view of the practice that has developed of giving the
L:CI a personal mandate from the President a new letter of authority.
emphasising the President's concern with the reed for effective guidance
to the over-all intelligence effort and directing the new DCI to ensure
the provision of this guidance, may be desirable.
It remains to be asked whether the Board expects the DCI
to be responsible for more than general guidance and coordination for
intelligence activities. Do they expect to hold him accountable for the
efficiency of all intelligence activities. Do they expect him to be
responsible for the elimination of all waste and extravagance in any
intelligence program run by the Government.
As of today, is no central mechanism in the Government
over-all budgetary or program review of all intelligence activities
hole. The four basic programs: CIA, the CCP (SWINT). the
writ and the Service intelligence programs), sad the National
Reconnaissance Program are all reviewed separately with somewhat
different represeatation 'through somewhat different channels. It should
be recognised, however, that the DCI' a right to participate in the review
and have a say in the formulation of all three DOD programs is now firmly
established.
Consideration has been given in the past to the desirability
of establishing a National Intelligence Resource 3oard, to be chaired
by the DCI or jointly by him and the Secretary of Defense which would be
responsible for the consolidated review and approval of all intelligence
programs. There are many practical considerations, however, which
suggest that such an arrangement may be unwise or. in any event, prematare.
basic factor affecting the coordination of intelligence
activities I. the necessary division of authority amongst individual
departments and agencies of Government. It is inevitable and appropriate
that head* of departments having responsibilities in the foreign policy
fields and commanders af major military commands should have the
ersonnel and facilities required to assemble and analyse the information
needed for their parochial and departmental purposes. Information which
they legitimately require is also, Lit meet cases, relevant to national
SECREC
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cietingiOn$ which affect "national security. 111
data of national significance is collected by individuals,
nample, as part of their official responsibility for carrying out :tonna
oepartrnental activities. Intelligence, whether national or departmental,
is very often a by-product of some essentially non-intelligence activity
controlled and conducted by non-intelligence components of the Government.
It follows that all of the activities and components of the
Governn ant which serve national intelligence purposes can never be
totally subordinated to the direction, control and management of a single
central authority. Added efficiency would be given to the DCI as a
coordinator by subordinating NSA and, through NSA, the cryptologic
military services, to the DCL This was the original recommendation
of the Brownell report. but was rejected as impractical by the then rca
(General Bedell Smith). Exhaustive reviews of the constituent responsi-
bilities of the NRO served to emphasise the impracticability of totally
subordinating reconnaissance programs, including their support facilities.
launch pads, tracking and recovery facilities, etc., to the managerial
authority of the DCL Even U these two large and probably indigestible
ingredients were added to the bcre personal command, he would still
have to cope with the problem of coordinating a number of activities
which cannot, ander any circumstances, ever be placed *oder his direct
anagerial supervision.
The net result of all this .isggest. that we are stuck with
the present concept under which the DCI guides and coordinates" the
community but does not manage or command it. U so, the various
institutional arrangements through which the DCI provides guidance and
coordination Ulna, intelligence agency program and Midget reviews, the
NRC), etc.) should be examined to *near* that they provide an adequate
basis for the assertion of his Influence but do not imply responsibilities
which extend beyond the limitations on his authority.
5ECRETi
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0070.1
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CIENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DCI
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
The annexed is a proposed letter to
Clifford by way of a status report on outstanding
agenda items. I talked to Pat Coyne about this
and told him that it would be forthcoming shortly.
You may not wish to send the memorandum dis-
cussing the problem of DCI authority, which is
annexed to the letter. It may, however, be
helpful to give the PFIAB something to chew on.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
k 0
4 - e
? ?
e e em Le
? ?
:
______________ .-"e
UNCLASSIFIED I CONFIDEN -AL
,,?
FORM NO. 037 Use previous editions
2-61 z.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 0-587262