LETTER TO MR. J. PATRICK COYNE FROM JOHN A. BROSS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500010057-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: November 3, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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3 November 1,965
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
Executive Secretary
The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Room 297
Executive Office Building
In the light of his conversation with you
yesterday, the Director thought you might be interested
in the attached estimate of the situation in South Vietnam
which we received this morning from one of our repre-
sentatives in Saigon.
Sincerely.
John A. Bross
D/DCI/NIPE (3/1.1/65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1
Addr,,ssee w/1 att.
cY
ER w/o att.
1
.. NIPE Chrono w/o att.
1
_ NIPE PFLAB w/o att.
"Executive Registry-1
Approved For Release 2002/08/2" CIA""-RDP8 ;, 00 57 6-;
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DIP CITE SA I G 7644
A STATION DRAFT ESTIMATE OF THE VC SITUATION WAS COMPLETED BY
SECTION ONE OF FOUR
FOR HQS INTERNAL USE ONLY
ON 29 OCTOBER AND IS NOW BEING COORDINATED WITH
POLITICAL SECTION OF EMBASSY AND MACV J2. WE UNDERSTAND INFOR-
MALLY THERE WILL PROBABLY BE NO SUBSTANTIAL D ISA (REEMENT WITH THE
CONCLUSIONS OF THIS ESTIMATE ALTHOUGH SOME REWORDING MAY TAKE PLACE.
AS SOON AS ESTIMATE IS FINALLY APPROVED IT WILL BE SENT WASH AS
EwSS I t)N COUNCIL INTEL ESTIMATE. THIS ESTIMATE HAS
CONSIDERABLE
PELEVANCE TO QUESTION RAISED SAG 7643
ARRIVING HQS 4 NOVEMBER.
TIME
1. THE BASIC TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN THE SITUATION NOTED IN
OUR LAST ESTIMATE (19U GUST 1965) HAVE CONTINUED THROUGH OCTOBER.
ROTH HANOI AND LIBERATION FRONT BROADCASTS REFLECT DETERMINATION TO
CONTINUE THE WAR, AND VIET CONG FORCES ARE MAINTAINING RELAT-
IVELY STRONG MILITARY PRESSURE. FOLLOWING A BRIEF DECLINE IN VIET CONG
ACTIVITY IN SEPTEMBER, WHICH MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM THE TRANSITION
FROM THE LAR CF'LY FRUSTRATED SUMMER CAMPAIGN T O THE CU!RRENNT_ AUTUMN-
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WINTER CAMPAI C-Mv THE TEMPO. OF VIET CON G ACT IONS HAS RISEN TO THE
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HIGHEST LEVELS IN ALMOST A' YEAR. THE SCENE OF MAJOR OPERATIONS
APPEARS TO HAVE SHIFTED WITH THE RAINY SEASON FROM THE HIGHLANDS
TO THE COASTAL PLAIN, WITH' LAR GE-SCALE ATTACKS RECORDED IN QUANG
TRI, PHU YEN, AND. BINH DINH PROVINCES. NEVERTHELESS, CURRENT
ACTIVITY IN PLEIKU PROVINCE INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY RETAINS
SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITIES IN THE HIGHLANDS.
2. NO RE GIMENTAL-SIZE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN MOUNTED BY THE
VIET CON (3 SINCE JUNE IN THE III CORPS AREA. VIET CON G MAIN FORCE
UNITS IN THIS REGION 'APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN KEPT OFF BALANCE TO SOME
FX
19TENT BY US- (AIN GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS, WHICH HAVE INFLICTED.
SURSTANTIAL LOSSES IN TERMS O; { EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. VIET CONG
CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA EVIDENTLY ARE BEIN( RE_INFORCED.. HQLWEVER,
BY THE MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE: ARMY ELEMENTS FROM THE HIGHLANDS
AND THHiE CONTINUING FLOW OF VIET CONG ELEMENTS COMING FROM THE DELTA.
3. ACTIVITY IN THR-DELTA HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY DURING THE
PAST TWO MONTHS, BUT. CONSISTS LARGELY OF SMALL-SCALE HARASSMENTS
AND SABOTAGE ACTI=TIES. THE LACK OF AGGRESSIVE LARGE-SCALE
ATT. AC1;S IN THIS AREA' SUGGESTS THAT THE CAPABILITIES OF MAIN FORCE
UNITS HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE TRANSFER OF CADRES AND
TROO"S TO OTHER AREAS. NEVERTHELESS, THE SIZEABLE VIE-T---C-OVFORCES
REMAINING IN THE DELTA APPEAR CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THEIR HOLD ON
WIDE AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE.
4. THE BUILD-UP OF VIET CONG CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES
IS CONTINUING, DESPITE THE HEAVY LOSSES SUFFERED IN LARGE-SCALE ENGAGE-
ME NTSo DOCUMENTS CAPTURED. IN THE DELTA IN AUGUST DIRECTED THE UPGRAD
IN G OF HALF OF THE VILLAGE GUERRILLAS T O PERMIT THE BUILD-UP OF MAIN
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FORCE UNITIS. THIS EXTRAORDINARY MEASURE, WHICH COULD PRODUCE: ENOUGH
MANPOWER TO FORM TWO OR THREE NEW R1 GIMENTS, WAS RATIONALIZED_ IN THE
DOCUMENTS AS NECESSARY TO RESTCRE THE BALANCE OF FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN
U;SET BY THE INTRODUCTION OF U. S. AND ALLIED MOUND COMBAT UNITS.
5. PARALLELING THIS INTERNAL REINFORCEMENT, THE ENEMY HAS
INFILTRATED A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL 'NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY ELEMENTS I N
RECENT MONTHS. TWO ADDITIONAL RE GIMENTAL-SIZED UNITS, NORTH VIETNA-
MESE ARMY UNITS, HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT
AT LEAST TWO OTHERS MAY ALSO HAVE ARRIVED. WHILE SOME OF THESE MAY
COMPRISE CADRE GROUPS T O PERMIT THE CREATION OF NEW rIET CON G MAIN
FORCE' UNITS, OTHERS APPARENTLY ARE INTEGRAL NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
COMPAT UNITS. IN EITHER CASE, THESE ELEMENTS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT
REINFORCEMENT OF VIET CONG CAPABILITIES.
c3. PARALLELING THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF VIET CONG FORCES IS
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MOTORABLE ROAD FROM NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH THE
LAOS PANHANDLE TO A POINT AT LEAST AS FAR SOUTH AS KONTUM PROVINCE.
THIS MAIN ROUTE, WHICH IS NEARING COMPLETION, TOGETHER WITH LATERAL
ROADS LEADING INTO SOUTH VIETNAM AT SEVERAL POINTS, WILL, PERMIT A
SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT THROUGH LAOS,
AND MAY REPLACE THE NOO,J INSECURE SEA INFILTRATION ROUTE AS THE PRINCI-
PAL AXIS FOR VIET CONG LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. WITH A DEPENDABLE SUPPLY
ROUTE CAPABLE OF MOVING AMMUNITION I N QUANTITIES, THE CAPABILITIES OF
VIET CONG FORCES IN THE HIGHLANDS TO SUSTAIN LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS WILL
Ew ENHANCED. THEIR FORCES IN THE DELTA WILL REMAIN LAR (ELY DEPENDENT
ON SHIPMENTS BY
III,
SEA OR VIA CAMBODIA.
S E C R E T
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CFM 7644 HQS INTERNAL, USE.- ONLY A STATION VC
OCTO9 R MACV J2 NO SUBSTANTIAL WASH INTEL SAIG 7643
HOS 4 NOVEML'R 19 AUGUST 1965 OCTOBER HANOI LIBERATION FRONT
VIET CONG A BRIEF VIET CONG SEPTEMBER AUTUMN-WINTER TEMPO VIET CONG
A YEAR RAINY SEASON HIGHLANDS
qUAN G TR I PHU YEN BINH D INH PLE IKU ?HrGHLAND S N 0 RE GIMENTAL VIET CON G
JUNE III CORPS VIET CON G US- GVN VIET CONG NORfiH VIETNAMESE- ARMY ,
HI G1-LANDS VIET '?C040?DELTA-PELTA CALIES-VIET CON G' DELTA--VIE1 CON G
DELTA AUGUST VILLAGE GUERRILLAS U. S. ALLIED GROUND COMBAT UNITS A
NUMBER NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY CADRE VIET CONG
IN.TE GRAL NORTH VIETNAMESE A SPGNIFICANT VIET CON G VIET CON G A
MOT ORA ?LE NORTH VIETNAM LAOS PANHANDLE A POINT FAR SOUTH KONTUM
PROVINCE MAIN ROUTE LATERAL ROADS SOUTH VIETNAM A SUBSTANTIAL LAOS
SEA AXIS VIET CON G'LOGISTICAL A DEPENDABLE VIET CON G ENHANCED DELTA
SEA VIA CAMBODIA
SECTION TWO 0 F .FOUR
FOR NOS INTERNAL USE ONLY
7. POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY, THE VIET CONG POSITION IS
LESS FAVORABLE. ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE BASIC FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED
TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN SAIGON LAST YEAR REMAIN UNRESOLVED, THE
REBUFF OF THE VIET CONG SUMMER CAMPAIGN AND THE U. S ALLVD MIL ITARY
BUILD-UP HAS REMOVED POPULAR FEARS OF AN EARLY VIET CONG VICTORY AND
THEREBY ENHANCED THE PROSPECTS FOR GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY. THE ABSENCE
OF OPEN HOSTILITY TO THE KY GOVERNIEN.T BY NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS HAS
OPPORTUNITIES FOR EFFECTIVE
POLITICAL AGITATION.
FIA EJ SUCCESSES BY SECURITY FORCES IN UNCOVERING TERRORIST AND PRO-
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PAGAN:DA RINGS IN URBAN AREAS HAVE DISRUPTED VIET CONE CAPABILITIES
THIS FIELD AND SHAKEN THE CONFIDENCE OF THEIR CLANDESTINE AGENTS. T1-:
THE
LI3E':'ANION FRONT SUFFERED A SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL SETBACK WHEN
POPULACE GENERALLY IGNORED THE FRONT'S UNPRECEDENTED PROPAGANDA ARPUAL
FOR A GENERAL STRIKE AND HOUR OF SILENCE ON 15 OCTOBER TO COMMEMORATE
THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE EXECUTION OF, A VIET..CONG TERRORIST. THE FAILURE
THIS APPEAL, AND THE ABSENCE-THUS FAR OF ANY SPECTACULAR TERRORIST
AIT `,> DURING THE MUCH-HERALDED, MONTH-LONG "HATE AMERICA" CAMPAIGN
REPRESENT A SERIOUS SLOW TO VIET CONE PRESTIGE AMONG THE, POPULACE.
THERE ARE ,GROWING SIGNS OF DECLINING MORALE AMONG VIET LONG
MIL1:TARY UNITS AS.WELL AS IN THE POPULATION IN VIET CONG-DOMINATED
AREAS. THIS DECLINE APPEARS TO BE THE RESULT OF TACTICAL SETBACKS AND .
THE IMPACT OF SUSTAINED U.S.?-GVN AIR ATTACKS ON VIET CONG AREAS. IT
IS REFLECTED IN THE GROWING RATE OF DEFECTIONS AND CHIEU HOI RALLIERS
AS WELL AS IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, STATEMENTS OF CAPTIVES, AND THE
DEFENSIVE TONE OF FRONT PRPOPAGANDA. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS HAVE OVER-
CONE MORALE SETBACKS BEFORE THROUGH EXTENSIVE INDOCTRINATION PROGRAMS,
NO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN VIET CONG MORALE IS LIKELY IN THE
ABSENCE OF SOME SUCCESSES O N THE BATTLEFIELD.
9. VIET CONG ECONOMIC FORTUNES HAVE BEEN MIXED. THEIR PROPAGANDA
IS ACTIVELY. EXPLOITING THE RISING COST OF LIVING THROUGHOUT VIETNAM.
VIET CON EFFORTS TO DISRUPT THE ECONOMY FURTHER AND THEREBY ADD TO
INFLATIONARY TRENDS ARE REFLECTED IN THEIR CONTINUING'030TAGE OF
C?'." THEIR IMPOSITION OF AN EMBARGO ON THE FLO:;
,~ I.~-~~~iO~S LIi:ES AND Th
OF GOODS TO QA;KETS IN SOME GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS. ON THE OTHER HANG,
ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS ARE INCREASING IN VIET CONG-DOMINATED AREAS. THERE
APE INDICATIONS THAT THEIR TAX COLLECTIONS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET
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SUSTAIN SUCH A COURSE.
SECRET
IN %: PAGE ''.
THEIR FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS DESPITE INCREASINGLY HEAVY TAX RATS.
HAS 3Z EN FURTHER TEE
uP::GVZ q .~ T: INCO.;^r OF FARMERS THER REDUCED D E
RESTRICTIONS ON DELIVERY OF GOODS TO MARKETS.
0. iii VIES! OF THEIR MIXED PROSPECTS, IT IS PERTINENT TO REVIEW
THE ALEP NAT IVES WHICH THE VIET COG MAY ADOPT IN PURSUING THEIR
AIMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE BROAD ALTERdAT APPROACHES OPEN TO THE
AQY 0) MAJOR ESCALATION IN ORDER "TO SEEK AN EARLY MILITARY DECISION;
3) COHTI LUATION OF THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF AUGMENTING THEIR CAPASIL-
ITIES FOR THE GRADUAL TRANSITION TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE; C) REVERSION
TO A LESSER SCALE OF INSURGENCY; OR D) A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
1 1 . ALTHOUGH THE FIRST COURSE OFFERS PROSPECTS FaR__QUICK
SUCCESS, IT CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF TRIGGERING A MASSIVE U.S.
RESPONSE. WHILE NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES POSSESS CONSIDERABLE
STRENGTH, DISRUPTION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE NORTH BY
US./GVN AIRSTRIKES HAS SERIOUSLY RESTRICTED THE SIZE OF FORCES WHICH
COULD lE SUPPORTED IN A CONVENTIONAL INVASION OF THE SOUTH, AND IT IS
DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE ENEMY COULD SE CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO
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>ECRET
IN ~,^ \ PAGE fI
CT; 761/; VIET CONG SAIGON LAST YEAR REBUFF VIET COIN SUiL1ER U.S.
ALLIED SCI T CO IG 1(Y i1G['J-CGT"'1U;J:IST VIET CONG URBAN VIET CONG S'rI^i{E:J 11-1 CL.; I !'w `u? INE SAG: NTS. LIDERATION FRONT A SIGNIFICA NT PSYCHOLOGICAL SET
^CK POPULACE FRONT'S A GENERAL HOUR SILENCE 15 OCTOBER A VIET CONE
Try O IST I?UCH- HERALDED MO ,JTH-LONG "HATE AMERICA" A SERIOUS VIET CON ;
t';ESTI" E VIET CONG SETBACKS IMPACT U.S.-GVN CUIFU HCI RALLIERS
TON JO SIGNIFICANT VIET CONG VIET CONG VIETNAM VIET CONG DISRUPT
""'GO GV NJ-CONTROLLED VIET CONG-DOMINATED TAX NOT SUFFICIENT TAX
RATES FAR'i'1ERS VIET CO'NG ADOPT SOUTH VIETNAM A) ESCALATION 3)
C) 1 LESSER D) A NEGOTIATED A MASSIVE U. S. NORTH VIETNAMESE NORTH
US/G.VINJ (,IRETRIKES A CONVENTIONAL SOUTA SOU . E- NJORTL_ _~j TNA11 E:SE AIR
E'1K CHINESE U. S. CHINESE MA-INLAND BOMBAST, PEKING NO INCLINATION
L r
S. NORTH VIETNAM U. S. NORTH U.S. SOUTH VIETNAM PEKING IMAGE U.S.
"PC.PE; T IGER" U. S.
77
SECTION THP EE OF FOUR
FOR 1-{(S INTERNAL USE ONLY
THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE--CONTINUING THE BUILD-UP FOR TRANSITION
TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE--MAY EBE VIEWED BY THE COMMUNISTS AS CARRYING
LESS RISK OF PROVOKING ANY.NEW MAJOR ESCALATION BY THE U.S. THIS
COURSE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHINESE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE DOCTRINAL
CONCEPTS OF "LIBERATION WARS"y AND ANY DEVIATION FROM IT WOULD BE DIFF-
ICULT FOR THEM TO RATIONALIZE TO THEIR ADHERENTS. BOTH HANOI AND THE
LIBERATION FRONT HAD STATED THAT THEIR MAJOR AIM FOR THIS YEAR WAS
THE 'BUILD-UP OFVIET CONG CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC BALANCE.
OF FORCES AS A PRELUDE TO THE GENERAL COUNTEROFFENSIVE. THERE IS EVI-
DENCE THAT B~~s~q(F2/181Ef-lA'-F?-~86~d~7~~?005b~00'97L6 AT TAIN -
FrFT i
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ABLE, DESPITE THE BUILD'-UP OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES, AND THAT THEY
HAVE UNDERTAKEN NEW MEASURES TO RESTORE THE BALANCE. LINES OF COMNUN-
IC AT IOC' FROM THE - NORTH APE ADEQUATE TO SUSTA IN THE INF IL TRATION AN D
OPERATIONS OF A LIMITED NUMBER IF ADDITIONAL WORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
UNITS. ALTHOUGH THE VIET CONG HAVE SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES IN
LA
I?G'._-SCALE OPERATIONS, THEIR REPLATEIENT SYSTEM APPEARS EFFECTIVE
AND THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT SEEM THUS FAR TO HAVE BEEN DETERRED FROM
COi:TINUING SUCH ACTION. THE COMMUNISTS MAY CALCULATE THAT THIS
ALTERNATIVE--WHICH PROVED SUCCESSFUL AGAINST THE FRENCH--OFFERS THE
BEET PROSPECTS FOR WEARING DOWN THE WILL AND DETERMINATION OF THE U.S.
TO CONTINUE THE WAR. IF THE]:R BUILD-UP PERMITS THEM TO REGAIN THE
INITIATIVE AND MOMENTUM THEY ENJOYED EARLIER
THIS YEAR, THEY MAY FEEL THAT ON THE-IMPACT ON ARVN AND CIVIL IAN MORALE
WILL CAUSE A RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY WHICH COULD PROVE
DECISIVE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR.
13, THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE- -REVERSION TO A LESSER LEVEL OF
INSURGENCY--WOULD TEND TO FRUSTRATE U.S. CAPABILITIES FOR CONVENTIONAL
WARFARE, BUT WOULD ENTAIL SERIOUS RISKS TO VIET CON G MORALE. THE
COMMUNISTS MIGHT FEEL THAT BY FOREGOING LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AND
DIVERTING THEIR MAIN FORCES UNITS TO SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL; FORCES IN
SMALL-SCALE GUERRILLA ACTIONS THEY COULD REDUCE THEIR VULNERABILITY
TO AIR ATTACKS AND LARGE-SCALE SWEEPS BY US-GVN FORCES. IT MIGHT
ALSO CAUSE THE U.S. TO CONCLUDE THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY NEED FOR THE
PRESENCE OF LARGE COMBAT UNITS TO SUPPORT THE VIETNAMESE FORCES.
DESPITE THESE TEMPTING PROSPECTS, HOWEVER, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD ENCOUN-
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TER SUESTANTIAL PROBLEMS IN RATIONALIZING THIS DOCTRINALLY. MZEOV' 7,
THE LOTS OF MiMEN.TUM WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE .A MAJOR DROP IN THE
ORALE OF VIET CONE, `TROOPS AND POLITICAL CADRES, AND RESULT IN A.
SUESTANTIAL INCREASE IN DEFECTIONS WHICH COULD REACH DISASTROUS PRO-
PORTIONS FOR THE VIET CONE. IT WOULD SIMILARLY ENHANCE THE CONFIDENCE
OF THE CIVILIAN POPULACE IN TEE ULTIMATE DEFEAT OF THE VIET COND.
ALTHOUGH GUERRILLA ACTIVITY WOULD CONTINUE TO DISRUPT LINES OF
COMMUNICATION AND HARASS PACIFIED AREAS, THE ABSENCE OF THE THREAT OF
LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS. WOULD FREE U.S.-GVN FORCES FOR FULL-TIME SUPPORT
OF RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS AND PERMIT THE 'GRADUAL EXTENSION OF
GVN CONTROL INTO AREAS NOW HELD BY THE VIET COND. THUS THE COMMUNISTS
WOULD RISK SUBSTANTIAL--AND POSSIBLY IRRETRIEVABLE--LOSSES TO THEIR.
POSITION BY ADOPTING THIS ALTERNATIVE.
14. THE FOURTH ALTERNATIVE--SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
ALSO OFFERS MIXED BLESSINGS TO THE COMMUN ISTS. WHILE THEY MIGHT BE
TEMPTED AT SOME POINT TO CONSERVE THEIR POSITION BY NEGOTIATING A HALT
OF US-GVN OPERATIONS, THEY COULD NOT BE SURE THAT THEY WOULD OBTAIN. A
SETTLEMENT TO THEIR. ADVANTAGE. PAST EXPERIENCE HAS LED THEN TO BE
SUSPICIOUS OF U.S.' INTENTIONS IN NEGOTIATIO"-.'S THE`: ".?-E'- f N.L:IKELY TO
ACCEPT ANY TERNS ..W_AICH DQ.N OT PROV "DE. FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF
US. FARCES AND PERMIT THE: NATIONAL FRONT TO EXIST AS A LEGAL POLITICAL
ENTITY, AND MAY NOT l"r:GOTIATZ AT ALL IF THEY FEEL THESE TERMS ARE
UNATTAINABLE. DOCTRINALLY, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A FEASIBLE ALTERNAT
IVE IF THEIR OUTCOME ASSURED ATTAINMENT OF THEIR ULTIMATE GOALS. IF
THEIR POSITION BECAME PROGRESSIVELY WEAKER THROUGH THE FAILURE OF
OTHER ALTERNATIVES, SO THAT A FAVORABLE SETTLEMENT WERE NOT FEASIBLE,
THEY MIGHT PREFER A WITHERING AWAY OF THE VIET CONG Tr%.t5JJ?CENCY TO
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TO LEEK NEc'OTIATIO:'