SITUATION IN THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190032-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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24 February 1966
OCI No. 1108/66a
MEMORANDUM FOR. The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
SUBJECT : Situation in the Congo
Although the Congo has not been in the head-
lines recently, the situation there remains un-
sound, and the threat of further deterioration is
ever present. My analysts have prepared a memor-
andum on the subject which I am forwarding for
your use.
Vol Ric'iar1 'Tolms
Attachment
Richard Helms
Deputy Director
Attachment is OCI No. 11138/66 dated
24 February 1966 "Situation in the
Congo"
DDI/OCI/Pre 1(23 Feb 66) 25x1
original - Addressees (w/att.0
vT - ER (w/o/att.)
2 - DCI files (w/onecopy of att.) aEI,; :- ..F Pages s 2
2 - O/DDI files (w/o/att.) 1?1
1 - D/OCI (w/o/att.)
1 - OCI/MCO (w/o/att.)
Identical Memos sent w/att. to:
Mr.
Robert Komer
The
Honorable
Cyrus
R.
Vance
Mr.
U. Alexis Johnson T
he
Honorable
Robert
S.
McNamara
The
Honorable Dean Rusk T
he
Honorable
George
W.
Ball
The Honorable W. Averell Harriman
The Honorable G. Mennen Williams
Mr. J. Wayne Frederic~.s r-^r,r,
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24 February 1966
OCI No. 1108/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 1108/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
24 February 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in the Congo
SUMMARY
Foreign Minister Spaak's comment last November
on Mobutu's coup is still applicable: the coup was
the "best thing that could possibly have happened;
it remains to be seen whether it is also a good
thing." President Mobutu and Premier Mulamba are
making a far more energetic attack on the Congo's
multitudinous problems than any of their predeces-
sors did. They are trying to cut down corruption,
to improve the country's foreign exchange position,
to reduce unemployment and increase agricultural
production, to make the central government's influ-
ence more effective in the provinces, and also to
keep up the momentum of the fight against the rebels.
This would be a tall order even for a government with
far greater resources at its disposal than Leopold-
ville has. Thus, notwithstanding the good intentions
and the energy of Mobutu and Mulamba, the outlook
for the Congo is about as bleak as ever.
1: Mobutu and Mulamba have put together a
cabinet that compares favorably in ability with
previous Congolese governments. To the extent that
its members' ideology can be determined, it is one
of the most solidly Western-oriented since inde-
pendence.
2. Mobutu is also trying to increase his
leverage with the governments in the 21 provinces,
which have always compounded the corruption and.in-
efficiency of the central government. To this end
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one provincial governor has already been convicted
of misuse of public funds, and others may be ar-
rested soon. Mobutu and Mulamba have also begun to
visit the provincial capitals on tours designed to
strengthen Leopoldville's standing with both the
politicians and the populace at large.
3. The government is also making a more ener-
getic effort than any of its predecessors to cope
with some of the country's economic problems. It is
encouraging the unemployed Congolese who have swelled
the cities' populations since independence to return
to their home areas. It is urging everyone to grow
more food and is trying to improve the transport net-
work for both cash and subsistence crops. It is
working to bring smuggling under control and is other-
wise trying to ameliorate the chronic foreign exchange
shortage.
4. Leopoldville's presence is gradually being
re-established in the regions troubled by rebellion
since 1964. The rebellion in Kwilu Province led by
Peking-trained Pierre Mulele is confined to a few
pockets of resistance in the deep forest. French-
and Spanish-speaking mercenaries, helped by troops
from Moise Tshombe's old Katanga gendarmerie and
occasionally by Congolese Army (ANC) units and by
local tribal militia, are slowly regaining control
of the major towns and the roads and railroads of
the northeast. Near Lake Tanganyika, a South African
mercenary - ANC force is having much heavier going.
Even here, however, the rebellion seems very gradually
to be losing ground.
5. The insurgents' outside supporters, includ-
ing Communist China and Cuba, have grown disillu-
sioned with the erratic fighting qualities of the
rebels and the perennial squibbing among rebel
leaders. They have drastically reduced their aid,
and Cuba at least has withdrawn most of its ad-
visers. After rebel defeats last October, the Tan-
zanian Government halted the transport of supplies
already made difficult by the increasing effective-
ness of the Congolese patrol boats on Lake Tanganyika.
6. The rebellion will continue to be a drain
on the country's meager human and financial resources
for a long time, however, and the wounds it has caused
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will be slow to heal. The Kwilu revolt, small though
it may be, is still tying down 1,500 ANC troops who
must be paid and provided with logistical support.
Economic activity in this area, which used to pro-
duce considerable palm oil, remains at a standstill.
7. In the northeast the rebels can still move
with relative freedom over wide stretches of country;
not much of the area has re-entered the money economy;
and much of what little is produced is smuggled out
(usually with the connivance of local civil and mili-
tary officials). Of the government forces in this
region, ANC troops are only sporadically helpful,
and then only when stiffened by mercenaries or by
Belgian regular officers assigned to the ANC. The
Katangan troops, which have been in the area for a
year and a half, want to go home, and the French-
speaking mercenaries get along with neither ANC nor
civilian officials. The Spanish-speaking unit of
about 40 men has been quite impressive in the two
months it has been in the Congo. It has cleared out
a fairly large area, working with locally recruited
tribal warriors, and it is one of the few govern-
ment units to give much attention to civic-action
programs.
8. In a large area of the eastern Congo ex-
tending north and east from Albertville, the rebels
can still present an effective challenge to the avail-
able government forces. In part the loss of govern-
ment momentum in this region is due to rapid turn-
over in the South African mercenary unit, whose new
members reportedly will not finish their training
until mid-March. In part the government has been
slowed by very difficult terrain. In part the rebel
skill at mining roads, with deleterious effects both
on the ANC's transport and on its always shaky morale,
is responsible. At any rate, clearing operations
are more than two months behind schedule, with no
sign of early improvement.
9. In both the northeast and the east, rebels
in the past have often been supported by local popu-
lations, many of which have long histories either of
opposition to central authority, of feuds between
tribes, or of friction within tribes. In some cases
rebel excesses have alienated these people, but dis-
affection from the rebel cause rarely brings the
-3-
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people over firmly to the government's side. The
traditional frictions, which existed long before the
rebels arrived to build on them, will remain long
after the rebellion per se is snuffed out.
10. The rebels apparently still get a little
aid from outside--ANC sources, for instance, state
that some Ugandan border garrisons are willing to
pass arms. Even if no help at all came in, however,
the ANC would be hard pressed to cope with the rebel-
lion, much less to maintain order in nominally paci-
fied areas. Non-Congolese units thus will continue
to bear the brunt of the fighting.
11. In civil affairs, Mobutu's programs are
still little more than a mixture of decrees and
wishful thinking. The tug of war between the prov-
inces and the central government has hardly begun;
tours by Leopoldville leaders and arrests of pro-
vincial figures are a hopeful sign, but it is still
an open question whether Mobutu can make his de-
cisions stick. To do this requires an administra-
tive system to keep up the pressure, and this is
almost nonexistent. Since independence, relations
between Leopoldville and the provinces have operated
through a network of tribal and personal alliances;
to replace this with an institutionalized administra-
tive structure would be almost revolutionary. Until
such a structure can be set up, however, Mobutu will
have to play Congolese politics according to its
traditional rules. This means that the central gov-
ernment's authority will be limited essentially to
what he and his trusted associates can personally
exercise.
12. Given the paucity of civilian talent, Mobutu's
chief instrument presumably will be the ANC, which
has rarely been tactful in its dealings with the
Congolese populace or dedicated in its compliance
with orders from Leopoldville. With very rare ex-
ceptions, the ANC has shown no ability to fulfil an
administrative function effectively: its participa-
tion in Mobutu's program of economic mobilization,
for instance, has so far been minimal. It seems
reasonable to expect that one result--perhaps the
main one--of the army;'s further immersion in the coun-
try's internal affairs will be the further politic-
ization of its officers, and that in the future,
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rivalries within the army and between military and
civilian officials will be added to the endemic
civilian political maneuvering.
13. The politicians themselves have only tem-
porarily and incompletely suspended their activity.
Despite Mobutu's efforts, some in his own circle are
busily feathering their own nests: Finance Minister
Litho, for instance, is said to be shocking even the
Congolese with the blatancy of his corruption. Litho
is Mobutu's cousin and his intermediary on private
financial transactions, a fact which does not add to
the regime's image of idealism and selflessness.
Those politicos on the outs-.-by far the majority--
are beginning to feel around cautiously for alliances
which can present a viable challenge to Mobutu. They
are incensed at his proclamation of a five-year presi-
dential term for himself and at his reduction of the
legislature to a rubber stamp for his decrees; they
are also said to be restive at "drawing no more than
their legal pay." Parliament is scheduled to recon-
vene in March, and Mobutu is likely to have trouble
controlling the disgruntled politicians when they
get together.
14. The principal opposition figure is still
former Premier Tshomb6, who is now in Europe. He ap-
pears to believe that the Mobutu regime will soon be
weighted down by the problems confronting it, pos-
sibly in the next few months, and that he will be
called on to save the situation as he was when the
rebellion broke out in 1964. He therefore does not
seem to be actively plotting Mobutu's overthrow,
Mobutu's fears to the contrary notwithstanding. He
is, however, keeping up his contacts with Belgian
interests and with his own political associates, and
he probably is also seeing to the military defenses
of his stronghold in southern Katanga. He has said
he will be on hand when Parliament reconvenes.
15. Mobutu is an old hand at Congolese politics,
and there seems to be a good chance that, backed by
his trusted ANC units in Leopoldville, he can con-
tinue to keep the politicians off balance. Making
significant progress toward unifying and integrating
the Congo is another matter, however. Given the
shortage of administrative skills, the lack of money,
and the endemic local rivalries, his or any other
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government will have trouble imposing its will through-
out the country. Unless a stronger authority begins
to emanate from Leopoldville, the Congo's economic,
political, and social malaise is certain to continue.
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