LETTER TO THE HONORABLE MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM RAY S. CLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400190027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: January 6, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

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Atts: OCI No. 0482/65, 4 Jan 66 "Evolution of Communist Positions
Cpncerning Negotiations"
No. 0483/66, 5 Jan 66 "The Five-Point Program of the National
RSC:du Liberation Front, the 4-Point Proposal etc
Distribution
Orig - Addressee Watts
1 - DCI w/atts (RDK put in a DCI briefing book)
1 - DDCI w/atts,/
1 - Ed Applewhite (via WI)
1 - Policy Dissem w/o atts
1 - 0/CR Liaison w/o attivjanuttr_y 1966
1 - DDI Chrono w/o atts
1 - RSC Chrono w/o atts
Dear Mac:
I am responding to your query of a few days
ago by sending two studies, somewhat overlapping,
of the Communist position on political settlement
of the Vietnam conflict. One is a close textual
study of the key provisions of the Geneva Accords
of 1954, the NFLVN "five points" and the Hanoi
"four points;" and the other is a current analysis
of the "Evolution of Communist Positions Concerning
Negotiations" in Vietnam. I suggest you read the
first one first if you have time to study it care-
fully; the second one stresses the more recent
manipulation of the tricky terminology employed
by the Communists.
Both studies make clear that the basic aim of
the Hanoi regime, supported vehemently by Peking,
is a political settlement creating a unified,
Communist controlled Vietnscm (North and South).
Naturally, the American commitment to an independent,
non-Communist South Vietnam is incompatible with
this aim, Which theCommunists argue, erroneously,
was guaranteed by the 1954 agreements. Hanoi may
settle for postponement of its aim in this respect,
but it is hard to see any compromise possible between
the Colnlvmist concept and the American commitment.
.$incerely.
y 5. Cline
Deputy Di tor for Intelligence
Attachments: a/s
?d/ .,-
The Honorable McGeorge aunay---
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
25X1
v10 1/CDF Pac:
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RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
5 January 1966
No. 0483/66
Copy No.
THE FrVE-POINT PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT,
THE FOUR-POINT PROPOSAL OF PHAM VAN DONG AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
lExcluded from automatic]
downgrading or
declassification
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WARNING
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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THE FIVE-POINT PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT,
THE FOUR-POINT PROPOSAL OF PHAM VAN DONG AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS
I. INTRODUCTION
Vietnamese Communists-- including spokesmen for both
the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the DRV -- gen-
erally tend to shy away from any positive discussion of
"negotiations" and prefer instead to talk about their
terms or conditions for "settlement" of the war in Viet-
nam which, of course, they blame entirely on "US aggres-
sion". Over the past nine months, Communist remarks
about such a settlement have generally been based on
or at least made reference to the so-called Five-Point
"Program" of the NLF, the Four-Point proposal of Pham
Van Dong and, particularly, to the "Geneva Accords".
Both Hanoi and the NLF claim that, in essence, they
are asking for nothing but a strict observance of the
agreements made at Geneva in 1954, and, further, that
the Front's program and Dong's four points are really
nothing but a condensation or "explanation" of the es-
sential elements of these Accords. (On 4 January 1966,
for example, the DRV Foreign Ministry stated that
Dong's four-point proposal is "a concentrated expres-
sion of the essential military and political provi-
sions of these agreements".)
Hanoi and NLF comments on Communist conditions
for a Vietnam settlement have generally been confusing,
full of calculated and frequently disingenuous ambiguity,
involved a considerable measure of distorted historical
half-truths, and sometimes, contained outright perver-
sions of historical fact. To sort out the Communists'
real aims and discern the objectives their proposals are
intended to achieve, it is necessary to examine not only
the actual texts of these proposals but also to take a
careful look at what the Geneva Accords really were,
what they actually said, and what the real relationship
is between their provisions and the programs enunciated
by the Front and Hanoi.
eiNY-BWHAsEl
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II. THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS
The term "Geneva Accords is a loose description
for a series of four interrelated documents produced
produced by a conference on Indochina convened in Geneva
on 8 May 1954 (the day after the fall of Dien Bien Phu)
and attended by representatives of the USSR, the United
Kingdom, the Chinese Peoples Republic, the United
States, the DRAT, and the three "Associated States" of
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These documents include
three "Agreement(s) on the Cessation of Hostilities",
dated 20 July 1954 (one each for Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia) and a "Final Declaration of the Geneva confer-
ence" dated 21 July 1954. An appreciation of the rele-
vance of these documents to the present situation in
Vietnam requires a clear understanding of the precise
ends they were written to serve, the climate in which
they were drafted, and the position taken on their sub-
stance by the United States and the legal predecessor of
the present GVN at the time they were issued.
Each of the three cease fire agreements bears two
signatures. In all three cases Ta Quang Buu (then
DRV Vice Minister for National Defense) signed on be-
half of the Commander-in-Chief of the Peoples Army of
Vietnam. The agreement on Cambodia was countersigned
by General Nhiek Tioulong on behalf of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Khmer National Armed Forces. The
cease fire agreements for Vietnam and for Laos were
both countersigned by a French general (Brigadier Gen-
eral Delteii) on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of
the French Union Forces in Indo-China. The representa-
tive of the legal predecessor of the present GVN (Tran
Van Do, now the GVN's Foreign Minister) did not sign
the cease fire agreement and, on 17 July 1954, filed a
formal protest with the French Delegation on the
grounds that his government was not being kept fully
abreast of all the developments in the negotiations
and, further, took specific exception to several provi-
sions subsequently embodied in the final document. On
22 July 1954 Ngo Dinh Diem, then Prime Minister of the
Associated State of Vietnam, formally denounced the
cease fire agreement as an "iniquity"against which his
government had raised "a most solemn protest".
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The United States did not sign any of the Four 1954
Geneva documents. On 21 July President Eisenhower is-
sued a statement which said, in part, that the United
States had not been a belligerent in the war and
"Accordingly, the United States has not
itself been party to or bound by the de-
cisions taken by the conference, but it
is our hope that it will lead to the es-
tablishment of peace consistent with the
rights and needs of the countries con-
cerned. The agreement contains features
which we do not like, but a great deal
depends on how they work in practice ...
as loyal members of the United Nations ...
the United States will not use force to
disturb the settlement. We also say
that any renewal of Communist aggres-
sion would be viewed by us as a matter
of grave concern".
On the same day (21 July) the US Delegate to the Con-
cluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference (Un-
der Secretary Smith) reiterated in a formal statement
that the US was not "prepared to join in a declaration
by the conference such as is submitted". They went on
to make a unilateral declaration of US position which,
echoing President Eisenhower, contained the stipulation
that the US would "view any renewal of the aggression
in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave
concern and as seriously threatening international peace
and security."
The two Geneva documents most directly relevant
to the present situation in Vietnam are the "agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam" and the
1954 Conference's "Final Declaration". Both are sloppily
drafted and decidedly ambiguous in certain key sections.
Both were produced under great pressure, in great haste,
and were primarily designed to make possible an early
cessation of hostilities which would permit France to
disengage militarily from Indo-China. The terms each
contained were dictated as much by domestic French po-
litical considerations as by the realities and require-
ments of the situation in Vietnam. The several partici-
pants in the Geneva conference each had their own ob-
jectives and motives, but all were disposed to believe
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that an early acquisition of DRV control over all of Viet-
nam was virtually inevitable. The Accords were an in-
terim settlement of an immediate situation. Longer-term
problems were ignored or discounted. In particular,
the two documents in question were far from explicit on
three key issues: the future political shape of Vietnam,
the mechanics of reunification, and the conceptual defini-
tion of what the term "Vietnam" was supposed to mean.
On Vietnam's political shape and future, the cease
fire agreement simply. states (in Article 14) that:
"Pending the elections which will bring
about the unification of Viet-Nam, the con-
duct of civil administrations in each re-
grouping zone shall be in the hands of the
party whose forces are to be regrouped and
by virtue of present agreement".
No time frame for these elections is stipulated here,
but the "Final Declaration developed this point in more
explicit detail:
"In order to insure that sufficient prog-
ress in the restoration of peace has been
made, and that here the necessary condi-
tions obtain for free expression of the
national will, general elections shall be
held in July 1956, under the supervision
of an international commission composed of
representatives of the Member States of
the International Supervisory Commission,
referred to in the agreement on the ces-
sation of hostilities".
Thede-retnarks9n elections,coupled with the statement
in the Final Declaration that "the military demarcation
line is provisional and should not in any way be inter-
preted as constituting a political or territorial boundary",
make it clear that the participants in the conference
were looking to early reunification, almost certainly un-
der Hanoi's domination, and never really addressed them-
selves to the problems of possible political future of
the Associated State of Viet-Nam. At that time, this
"State of Vietnam" was very much under French political
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control and throughout the course of the 1946-54
war the French had adamantly refused to give genuine
political authority to any non-communist Vietnamese
government. Technically, the Associated State's
writ extended over all of Vietnam, though in fact
its authority was obviously reduced to that portion
of the country which lay below the 17th Parallel.
The State of Viet-Nam appears On the roster of par-
ticipants, but its name does not appear in any of
the Four key documents. Instead, the cease fire
agreement and the Final Declaration refer simply
to the "regrouping zones of the two parties" --
thel parties being the French Union and the DRV.
At that time, of course, few if any participants
in the conference foresaw Diem's political survival,
South Vietnamese acquisition of genuine political
independence from France, or creation of the begin-
nings of a non-communist Vietnamese nation.
On this key issue, the representatives of the
US and the nascent GVN were diplomatically and po-
litically very much out of step with the rest of
the conference participants. President Eisenhower's
previously cited 21 July statement, for example,
notes that "we already have a Chief of Mission at
Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam and this Embassy
will, of course, be maintained." Behind that
statement lies an attitude and the germ of a
policy which the US has pursued consistently since
1954 in supporting the development of non-Communist
Vietnamese independence; but it is an attitude
which was repugnant to France at the time of Geneva
and, of course, was anathema to the DRV. It is
essentially on this matter of the proper role and
the legitimate rights of what became the4wesent
GVN that current interpretations of the true im-
port or intent of the 1954 Accords differ sok radieally.
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III, THE FIVE-POINT "PROGRAM" OF THE NLF
We will not attempt to review here the growth
of the GVN, the outbreak and rise of Hanoi directed-
insurgency in South Vietnam, the creation of the
National Liberation Front and the escalation of the
war which led to the situation which existed in the
early spring of 1965. On 22 March 1965 the chair-
man of the NLF, Nguyen Huu Tho, allegedly held a
press conference in "a liberated area" during the
course of which he made a five-point statement broad-
cast by the NLF radio on 23 March and subsequently
replayed widely by Hanoi. This statement--the so-
called "NLF Five-Point Program"--is actually not a
program at all but an analysis of the then current
situation and an exhortation to the South Vietnamese
people and their potential supporters around the
world.
Tho began with a review of what he described
ten years of steadily increasing involvement in
SoL:th Vietnam by the "US imperialists" who (by 1965)
had completely revealed their "war mongers' face"
and status as the "deadly enemy" of the Vietnamese
people. He then went on to make his five points.
(a) The first develops the theme that the US
has disregarded the Geneva Agreements, intensified
the war in the south and is the enemy of the Viet-
namese and all Indochinese people. This sounds a
theme which Communist propagandists have played ever
since with increasing intensity: that the US sab-
otaged the 1954 Geneva Accords and is solely respons-
ible for the current war.
(b) Thos second point stresses that the
Vietnamese people are determined to drive away the
"TS imperialists" and although eager for peace, pre-
fer death to bondage, and with the "support of the
people of the world" will certainly defeat the
enemy (i.e., the US) . It also includes the remark
that "at present" all negotiations would be useless
"as US troops and material have not been withdrawn
from South Vietnam"--strongly suggesting, but without
actually saying so, that total US withdrawal is a
precondition for negotiations. The most politically
significant element of this second point, however,
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lies in Tho's comment that the recently commenced
air strikes against North Vietnam were "being made
in the hope of forcing the NLF to sell out its
fatherland". Here we have a slippery and never
explicitly delineated theme that runs throughout
all Vietnamese Communist pronouncements about the
future political shape of Vietnam: that the country
is one nation whose capital is now Hanoi.
(c) The third point takes up this theme,
stressing "that Vietnam is one, that the South
Vietnamese are delighted with the achievements of
the North Vietnamese in struggling against the
internal 'aggressors"'. The political implications
of this remark are obvious, but Tho carefully
avoids spelling out the present or projected future
political relationship between the NLF and the DRV;
or the Front's relative degree of political sub-
ordination to Hanoi.
(d) The "fourth point" is actually three
rather convoluted paragraphs stressing the NLF's
primary reliance on "its own force and ability"
but simultaneously calling for moral and material
assistance from "the socialist countries and
nationalist countries, from all world organizations
and all peace-loving peoples throughout the world".
(e) The final point, while mentioning the
"brilliant victories of the South Vietnamese people,
is in essence an exhortation to "rural compatriots,
urban compatriots and compatriots throughout the
country to continue to struggle against 'TS agres-
sor?!'.
As is obvious to anyone who reads the text
of Tho's statement, this is hardly a program and
it bears little logical relationship to any of the
provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords. NLF and DRV
propagandists have confidentally and accurately
assumed, however, that few people would take the
trouble to analyze the text of this statement (or,
for that matter, the Geneva Accords) and hence have
billed it as the definitive NLF position on a future
settlement. The object of this by no means un-
successful propaganda campaign has been to purvey
widely the notion that the NLF has a simple, reason-
able five-point program for settlement closely
attuned to "the spirit of Geneva".
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IV. PHAM VAN DONG'S SPEECH
On 8 April 1965 DRV Premier Pham Van Dong made
a very long speech (over 30 close, small type, single
spaced pages), presented as a "report of the DRV Gov-
ernment" to the second session of the DRV National .
Assembly. Dong's celebrated "four points" were ap-
pended at the end of the speech, but the speech sets
the stage for them and is itself worthy of careful
scrutiny. Rambling, contradictory, didactic and in-
transigent, this oration is not so much a "report"
as an analysis of the then current political situa-
tion as seen through North Vietnamese eyes, a defense
of the "correctness" of DRV policy, a recitation of
achievement, an exhortation to better performance on
the part of the North Vietnamese people, and an ap-
peal to, particularly, the Socialist (i.e. Communist)
countries for assistance in the North Vietnam's strug-
gle. The text makes crystal clear the DRV's convic-
tion of the doctrinal rightness of its cause, the
historical inevitability of victory on Hanoi's terms
and the firm Vietnamese Communist belief that this
victory, (as was the case in their victory over the
French), will be materially assisted by rising po-
litical pressures on and, above all, within the United
States--pressures which will make it impossible for
the US to persevere in South Vietnam.
For Our analytic purposes, the most significant
element of the speech is the way it describes North
Vietnam's relation to the South and the war being
fought there. The underlying theme is sounded in Pham
Van Dong's opening sentence "the US imperialists are
intensifying the aggressive war in the southern part
of our country." Throughout his-speech there are fFe-
quent refe-re-hces to "the southern part of our coun-
try," "the northern part of our country," or to "our
fatherland," a term obviously intended to denote the
entire territory of both North and South Vietnam. The
import of these expressions is unmistakable but Pham
Van Dong quite carefully avoids the spelling out their
detailed political implications.
The NLF's 22 March statement (Nguyen Huu Tho's
five-point program analyzed above) is mentioned sev-
eral times, always in laudatory terms. Dong's speech
is obviously designed, at least in part, to picL up
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and amplify the themes there sounded. The NLF is
referred to as "the mobilizer and organizer of the
patriotic forces in South Vietnam." Dong claims
that it has "ever higher international prestige and
position, and is being more and more recognized by
foreign countries and world public opinion as the
sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese
people." However, he carefully avoids claiming that
the NLF is or should be recognized (in the technical,
legal sense of the term) as an independent govern-
ment, and he is equally careful to avoid any clear
explanation of Hanoi's view of the political re-
lationship between the DRV and the NLF.
It is quite obvious how Dong envisages the fu-
ture course of Vietnamese history, though (again) he
is murky on explicit details. "The DRV," he pro-
claims, "a member of the Socialist camp, is steadily
advancing to Socialism. This is the common achieve-
ment of the Vietnamese revolution, the fruit of the
common endeavor of the people of the whole country.
It is a strong basis for the patriotic struggle in
the south and the peaceful reunification of the coun-
try."
This same theme is implied throughout this
speech and specifically sounded again when Dong later
says "the northern part of our country, the DRV, will
bring into play its great impact as the base for the
liberation of South Vietnam and the peaceful reunifi-
cation of the fatherland."
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V. THE FOUR POINTS
The last few pages of Dong's 8 April 1965
speech have the air of being tacked on and are ex-
plicitly designed to counter President Johnson's
7 April speech at Johns Hopkins. It is in this
concluding portion that Dong spells out what have
come to be known as the DRV's "four points", which
are prefaced with the comment that "the unswerving
policy of the DRV government is to respect strictly
the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and to imple-
ment correctly the basic provisions as embodied in the
following points:"
(1) Recognition of the basic national
rights of the Vietnamese people--peace,
independence, sovereignty, unity, and
territorial integrity. According to
the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Govern-
ment must withdraw from South Vietnam
U.S. troops, military personnel, and
weapons of all kinds, dismantle all
U.S. military bases there, and cancel
its military alliance with South Viet-
nam. It must end it policy of inter-
vention and aggression in south Viet-
nam. According to the Geneva agree-
ments, the U.S. Government must stop
its acts of war against North Vietnam
and completely cease all encroachments
on the territory and sovereignty of
the DRV.
The first sentence of this point states an aspira-
tion with which no one can take issue, though ob-
viously the Communists on the one hand and the US
and GVN on the other would attach fundamentally
different definitions to the key words involved.
The second sentence harks back to Chapter III ("Ban
on Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel,
Arms and Munitions, Military Bases") of the 20 July
1954 "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities on
Viet-Nam." The third sentence makes a standard DRV
propaganda charge. The last sentence is the most
interesting. It involves an obvious reference to
Article 19 of the same Chapter III ("the two parties
shall ensure that the zones assigned to them . . .
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are not used for the resumption of hostilities
or to further arvaggrestive policy") with the im-
plied inference that the US has taken over the
colonialist role of the French Union Forces. It
also involves a central element of the whole DRY
thesis on the Geneva Accords: that Article 19
prohibits the kind of military support the US
is giving the GVN, but not the kind of support
the DRY is giving the NIP-and the Viet Cong.
The rationale for this contention is developed
by oblique implication in Dong's succeeding three
points.
(2) Pending the peaceful reunification
of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still
temporarily divided into two zones
the military provisions of the 1954
Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be
strictly respected. The two zones
must refrain from entering into any
military alliance with foreign coun-
tries and there must be no foreign
military bases, troops, or military
personnel in their respective terri-
tory.
Again, Dong is harking back to the concept em-
bodied in the cease-fire Agreement and spelled
out in the 1954 Conference's "Final Declaration"
that the present division of South Vietnam is
only a temporary military expedient, not a per-
manent political settlement. The second sentence
goes directly back to Articles 18 and 19 of the
Vietnam cease-fire Agreements Ch. III, but,
again, implicitly claims that the provisions of
these Articles apply only to what the US is doing,
not to what the DRV is doing.
(3) The internal affairs of South
Vietnam must be settled by the South
Vietnamese people themselves in accord-
ance with the program of the NFLSV
without any foreign interference
As Dong and the DRV propagandists are aware, no
reasonable man can take issue with the contention
that the internal affairs of South Vietnam ought
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to be settled by the South Vietnamese people them-
selves. To say that they must be so settled "in
accordance with the program of the NLF," however,
is to say that the South Vietnamese people have
no right to a non-Communist, non-Hanoi-controlled
government. The really key word in this third
point, however, is the word "foreign" in the con-
cluding phrase. Dong is playing on the Geneva
Accords' ambiguities and the 1954 Conference's
refusal to face the question of who is and who is
not a "foreigner" where South Vietnam is con-
cerned. By Vietnamese Communist definition, "Viet-
nam is one." Involvement by compatriots in the
"northern part of the country" in the affairs of
their fellow compatriots in the "southern part of
the country"--also by definition--can not be
classed as "foreign interference." On this semantic
sleight of hand, rests the core of Hanoi's whole
position on the Geneva Accords and its reasOn for
claiming that while these Accords prohibit US
support for southern independence, they do not
prohibit DRV support and direction of southern
insurgency.
(4) The peaceful reunification of
Vietnam is to be settled by the Viet-
namese people in both zones, without
any foreign interference.
This is essentially a restatement of point three
with a slightly different twist. Again, the key
issue involves what is and what is not "foreign
interference."
Dong declared that it was the view of the
DRV that the four points stand he had expounded
was "the basis for the soundest political settle-
ment of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is
recognized, favorable conditions will be created
with the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people,
and it will be possible to consider the reconvening
of an international conference along the pattern
of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam." He
also made it quite explicit, however, that in the
opinion of the DRV, "any approach contrary to the
aforementioned stand is inappropriate; any approach
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tending to secure UN intervention in the Viet-
nam situation is also inappropriate. Such
approaches are basically at variance with the
1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam."
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VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FOUR POINTS AND THE GENEVA ACCORDS
Pham Van Dong's four point proposal purports to
be based on the Geneva Accords andthephraseology of
these points is obviously intended to echo language
appearing in some of the Geneva agreements' key ar-
ticles. The paragrapiti.Dong's speech immediately
preceding!, his statement of the four points. --,para-
graphs which take up and criticize President John-
son's Johns Hopkins address of 7 April 1965 -- under-
line this alleged connection between the DRV's pres-
ent stand and the conclusions of the 1954 conference
and develop the complementary argument that the
US is the,s01e violator of the agreements reached
at Geneva. ("The US imperialists have never respected
the 1954 Geneva agreements on Cambodia and the 1954
and 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.") These para-
graph. introducing the four points also claim that
the US has been forced to refer to the 1954 Accords,
but does so only with the aim of "distorting" their
basic principles, "in order to perpetuate our coun-
try's division, and to consider the north and the
south as two entirely different nations."
The Geneva theme has been stressed repeatedly
by DRV spokesmen and propagandists since publica-
tion of Pham Van Dong's speech. The DRV's ob-
vious intent to play on the emotional con-
notations which mention of these agreements arouse
throughout the world (and in the United States it-
self,) and to portray the DRV's present conditions
for a political settlement as but the logical ex-
tension of the interim arrangements devised to stop
the fighting in 1954. Hanoi also wishes to direct
world attention from its own violations of the 1954
agreements by making the US the villain of the piece
and claiming that it is the US alone who has sabo-
taged them. The DRV's case is based on selective
references to certain provisions of a complicated se-
ries of agreements, which Hanoi's propagandists can
confidently assume that most of their target audi-
ences have never studied in detail. Hanoi apparently
hopes that by constant, repetition it-can have its
interpretation of the 1954 Accords generally ac-
cepted, more or less uncritically, as constituting
the agreed parameters for any current discussion of
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the present situation in Vietnam. The DRV's settle-
ment conditions -- and even more so the so-called
Five-Point Program of the NLF -- really have very
little to do with the details of the '54 Agreements
when studied carefully as a total package. Hanoi's
references to the 1962 Laos settlement involve an
even more blatant violation of historical accuracy,
again perpetrated to play on the emotional overtones
of "Geneva" in the confident belief that few will
examine the historical record with sufficient care
to recognize the deception involved.
Actually the 1962 Laos settlement is a very
dangerous precedent for Hanoi to cite. The situa-
tion that existed in Laos in 1962 was demonstrably
caused by persistent and willful NVN/Pathet Lao re-
fusal to abide by the provisions of the 1954 cease
fire Agreement for Laos. What the Communists in-
sisted upon for Laos then is precisely what they
would adamantly deny the US and the GVN the right
to request for Vietnam, now: .a new set of 'agree-
ments based on the realities of the existing situa-
tion and not tied or bound by the technical provi-
sions of language drafted in 1954 to handle a quite
different set of problems.
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VII. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
The DRV's Four-point "settlement" proposal
and the NLF's "five points" to which it is ciosu.
related were initially propounded and have been
insistently repeated for a variety of reasons.
One, as we have seen, has been to appropriate the
mantle of "Geneva" and establish a climate of in-
ternational political and diplomatic opinion in
which the import of crucial passages of the 1954
Accords are interpreted in a manner useful to
Hanoi's ends. A more basic objective, however, has
been that of employing the proven propaganda tech-
nique of prolonged and insistent repetition to es-
tablish an advantageous political position from
which Hanoi can bargain if it should ever decide
that its interests would be better served by some
form of discussions or negotiations rather than--
or in addition to--physical combat.
The DRV's Four-Point proposal, if its key
terms are defined according to the Communist lexicon,
is tantamount to total North Vietnamese victory and
the eradication of everything US policy has been
framed to support and achieve in South Vietnam.
On the face of it, Hanoi's position is unrealistic
and palpably unacceptable. By sticking to this
position for almost a year, however, by repeating
it time without number, by directing attention away
from its intrinsic faults and arrogant assumptions
to peripheral issues (e.g., whether it is a "pre-
condition for negotiations" or "basis for settle-
ment"), Hanoi is endeavoring to have its adherence
to this position become so familiar to the rest of
the world that any movement from this stance will
be universally hailed as a great "concession"
which, in turn, will generate severe domestic and
international political pressure on the US and the
GVN to be equally "forthcoming". In short, Hanoi
seems to be acting on the assumption that a noisy
insistence on an outrageous position, over a suf-
ficient period of time, will stand a good chance
of making a subsequent preposterous position toler-
ably palatable to its enemies. This is an ancient
technique of Asiatic bazaar bargaining and as well
as a commonplace tactic in Communist diplomatic
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procedure. It was effectively used by the Chinese
Communists in Korea in the early 1950's. It is
almost certainly the technique Hanoi plans to use
should the present Vietnamese war ever come to the
conference table.
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
EVOLUTION OF COMMUNIST POSITIONS
CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS
4 January 1966
OCT No. 0482/65
Copy No.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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WARNING
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 0482/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 January 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Evolution of Communist Positions
Concerning Negotiations
Summary
The DRV position on settling the war has remained firmly
based on its four-point proposal set forth last April. Sev-
eral of these points are an accurate gist of the 1954
Geneva agreements; others, however, depart from both the
spirit and the letter of the accords. Hanoi has not made
explicit whether it regards the carrying out of the four
points as preconditions for negotiations on the war; its
most recent statements, however, implicitly suggest that
it does.
The peace terms of the National Liberation Front have
never been precisely delineated by the Communists; both
Hanoi and the Front, however, regard a manifesto of Front
intent in the war published last March as containing their
peace proposals. In general, the Front has taken a tougher
position than Hanoi on the question of US withdrawal from
Vietnam prior to the start of negotiations.
Peking has maintained the most adamant
of the Asian Communists against negotiations
both,condemned Soviet encouragement of talks
warned Hanoi against starting negotiations.
Soviet Union apparently is encouraging Hanoi to seek
political alternatives to the war, the indications are
that Moscow is prepared for the time being to continue
military aid to the DRV.
stand of any
It has
and obliquely
Although the
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North Vietnam
1. The North Vietnamese attitude toward a "set-
tlement" of the war has remained basically unchanged
since DRV Premier Pham Van Dong put forward a four-
point proposal on the conflict in a speech on 8 April
1965 before the DRV National Assembly. This proposal
was issued as a reply to President Johnson's speech
of 7 April at Johns Hopkins University. Dong's four
points were as follows:
a. Recognition of the basic national
rights of the Vietnamese people--
peace, independence, sovereignty,
unity, and territorial integrity.
According to the Geneva agreements,
the US Government must withdraw
from South Vietnam US troops, mil-
itary personnel, and weapons of all
kinds, dismantle all US military
bases there, and cancel its mili-
tary alliance with South Vietnam.
It must end its policy of interven-
tion and aggression in South Viet-
nam. According to the Geneva agree-
ments, the US Government must stop
its acts of war against North Viet-
nam and completely cease all en-
croachments on the territory and
sovereignty of the DIIV
b. Pending the peaceful reunification
of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still
temporarily divided into two zones
the military provisions of the 1954
Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be
strictly respected. The two zones
must refrain from entering into any
minilary alliance with foreign coun-
tries and there must be no foreign
military bases, troops, or military
personnel in their respective ter-
ritory.
c. The internal affairs of South Vietnam
must be settled by the South Vietnam-
ese people themselves in accordance
with the program of the NFLSV without
any foreign interference.
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d. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam
is to be settled by the Vietnamese
people in both zones, without any for-
eign interference.
2.'After listing these points, Dong asserted that the
DRV Government considered the "stand" expounded in them
"the basis for the soundest political settlement of the
Vietnam problem." If this "basis is recognized," Dong
stated, "favorable conditions" will be created for a
"peaceful settlement." The North Vietnamese apparently
attached this vague formulation to their proposals in
order to leave themselves some maneuvering room should
they at some point decide to modify or expand their
terms. Subsequently the North Vietnamese have never
made it completely clear whether they regard the four
points as preconditions for negotiations or only as
proposals to be discussed after negotiations have been
started.
3. Last May, the chief DRV representative in
Paris told the French that the four points were to be
considered "working principles" which were subject to
negotiation once the US formally "recognized" them.
On the issue of a US troop withdrawal, the DRV offi-
cial stated that this was only a "principle" and that
the timing could be worked out in the course of talks.
This was the softest presentation of Hanoi's terms
ever made by a DRV representative. Other DRV offi-
cials abroad, however, also suggested in private last
'summer that the timing of US troop withdrawal would
not be a problem in starting negotiations.
4. The DRV's position on this question, however,
was again obscured by the remarks of Ho Chi Minh in an
interView with 4 prominent French newsman which was
broadcast on 15 August by Hanoi radio. Although he
did not explicitly make US troop withdrawal a precon-
dition for talks, he did call for "tangible proof"
that the US accepted all of the DRV's four points.
Since Ho's interview, other DRV statements have also
occasionally called for tangible or "concrete" proof
that the ps accepts the four points. They imply,
but do not state explicitly that such proof must be
given before any talks are started.
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5. The strongest formulation along this line
was contained in the DRV commentary of 30 December
on the latest US efforts to get negotiations going.
It was asserted in this commentary that "to solve
the Vietnam problem," the "only way" is for the
US to "solemnly declare and prove by actual deeds"
its acceptance of the DRV's four points. The com-
mentary seemed, by its wording, to thrust the is-
sue of US troop withdrawal into the forefront as a
DRV demand, and suggested there could be no movement
toward any talks until the US makes a firm commitment
on pulling out its forces.
6. In his speech, of 8 April, Dong claimed that
the DRV's four-point proposal represented the "basic
provisions" of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam,
and that the DRV was therefore only calling for a
"correct implementation" of the 1954 accords in order
to solve the Vietnam problem. Since April, Hanoi has
often reiterated this point, calling the four points
the "essence" of the Geneva agreements. A comparison
of the four points with the 1954 accords reveals that
the DRV claim is only partially justified. The first
two of the DRV terms express the spirit, if not the
letter, of the agreements--particularly the "Final
Declaration of the Geneva Conference" which was ap-
pended to the accords--but the others contain ele-
ments introduced by Hanoi to suit its own purposes.
7. The Geneva agreements, asndoes Pham Vann"
Dongls-first.poipt,..stated that a final settle-
ment of the Vietnam question should respect the in-
dependence, unity, and territorial integrity of the
Vietnamese people. The 1954 accords, however, did
not call specifically for a withdrawal of US weap-
ons or equipment or a cessation of US "aggression."
Instead the Geneva agreements stipulated the with-
drawal of all forces and equipment to the respec-
tive zones of Vietnam controlled by the, combatants
and prohibited the fresh introduction of any troops
or war materiel. Thus, the US is justified in con-
demning the clandestine introduction of North Viet-
namese forces and equipment into South Vietnam since
1954.
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8. The second point in Pham Van Dong's pro-
posals is an accurate gist of the intent of the
1954 accords. The accords stated that the demili-
tarized zone should not be interpreted as a polit-
ical or territorial boundary, but only as a military
demarcation line. The accords also referred to the
goal of eventual reunification of Vietnam, and
banned military alliances, foreign military bases,
and so forth, pending reunification.
9. In the last two points of Dong's pro-
posals, however, the DRV has departed almost
entirely from the spirit as well as the letter of
the Geneva Agreements. The thrust of points 3
and 4 is that the settlement of Vietnamese polit-
ical affairs is to be left entirely to the Viet-
namese people without any foreign supervision.
The Geneva agreements, however, definitely pro-
vided for an international supervisory presence,
at least while the initial arrangements for a
further political settlement were being worked
out in Vietnam. The International Control Com-
mission (ICC), set up under the accords, had as
one of its missions the :supervision, of elections
in 1956 in both North and South Vietnam for the
expression of the "national will" on the question
of reunification.
10. Although left unstated, it appeared
to be the intent of the Geneva agreements that
an international presence would also be necessary
to guarantee the establishment of democratic
government after elections on the issue of reuni-
fication.
11. Despite Hanoi's constant harping in
its propaganda on the necessity of adherence to
the Geneva Accords, DRV spokesmen in private have
indicated that the agreements could be ignored in
whole or in part if circumstances warranted. The
head of the North Vietnamese liaison mission to
the ICC, for example, told an ICC member last
August that the "question of the Geneva agreements
at the end of the war depends on the circumstances
of the war and its termination. New accords might
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be written, or the Geneva agreements might still
be viable." The DRV official criticized the
present functioning of the ICC, but implied that
Hanoi might be willing to accept some modified
version of the commission in a future settlement.
The National Liberation Front
12. The so-called "peace terms" of the Com-
munist-controlled Front group in South Vietnam were
set forth on 22 March interspersed within a rambling
five-point statement. Essentially, the Front's
five points were as follows:
a. The condemnation of US policy in
Vietnam along with a catalogue of
US war "crimes" there since 1954.
b. An expression of the determination
of the Vietnamese "people" to
"kick out" the US "imperialists"
from Vietnam and to "liberate"South
Vietnam. According to the state-
ment, the Vietnamese will never
stop fighting until their ultimate
objectives of "independence, democ-
racy, peace, and neutrality" have
been obtained. The "only way out"
for the US is to "withdraw" from
South Vietnam. The statement de-
clared that "at present, all ne-
gotiations are useless" on the war
as long as "the US imperialists
do not withdraw all troops, weap-
ons, and means of war from Vietnam,
and as long as the Liberation Front
does not have the "decisive voice."
By this the Front apparently meant
that it should have a dominant
voice in any political settlement
of the conflict.
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c. A pledge of determination to "ad-
vance toward" the reunification of
Vietnam.
d. A declaration that the Front has
the "full right" to receive inter-
national assistance. While rely-
ing primarily on its own force, the
Front "will buy war materiel from
any country," and will call "if
necessary" for foreign volun-
teers.
e. A call on all South Vietnamese peo-
ple to join in the fight to "lib-
erate" the South.
13. At its publication, the Front statement
was primarily touted by the Viet Cong as a manifesto
of their intent in the war. It was not until af-
ter Pham Van Dong's speech setting forth the DRV's
four-point peace proposal that both Hanoi and the
Viet Cong began to point to the Front statement
of 22 March as containing the Viet Cong peace terms.
Subsequent Front statements have largely echoed
the 22 March manifesto, differing only in that
several of them hardened the Front's position on
the withdrawal of US forces. A statement of 14
June, for example, claimed that "all negotia-
tions are useless" if the US imperialists "have
not yet withdrawn" from South Vietnam, A Front
cent-ill-committee statement Of 25 November, how-
ever, did not attach any condition of timing to
a withdrawal as.a preliminary to a settlement.
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14. Although there is no explicit evidence
to support the contention, we believe the appar-
ently harder Front position on US withdrawal during
the last few months, in contrast with Hanoi's, is
maintained primarily for tactical reasons by the
Viet Cong. Hanoi's final position on this point,
whatever it turns out to be, would probably be
the deciding word if the Vietnamese Communists
decided to move toward a political settlement.
Communist China
15. Peking has maintained an adamant stand
against negotiations on the Vietnam situation, and
has repeatedly lashed out at the Soviet Union for
trying to promote talks on the problem. The most
recent major attack on Moscow came on 30 December
1965 in a People's Daily editorial charging that
the Soviets are helping theUS in "its plot of
peaceful negotiations." The Chinese asserted that
such "appeasement and capitulationism" merely
serve to "inflate the aggressive arrogance of the
US."
16. The Chinese have continued to stress
their support for the Hanoi four-point formula
and the Liberation Front five-part statement on
negotiations. On 14 December People's Daily
reiterated the Chinese position that these form
the "only correct basis" for the solution of the
Vietnam question. The closest Peking has come to
stating that the withdrawal of US troops was a
prerequisite for negotiations came in a People's
Daily editorial on 20 July, which asserted thaf-
the withdrawal of US troops is "the basic point
and most important prerequisite for the settle-
ment of the Vietnam question" and added that so
long as US forces remain in South Vietnam "there
is no point" in talking about other aspects of a
Vietnam settlement.
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17. Peking publicly disparaged the current US
peace initiatives on 1 January, charging that the
p use in air attacks was nothing but the prelude to
a new US escalation of the war, nd asserting that
the US objective in advocating "unconditional dis-
cussions" w s to force the Vietnamese people to sur-
render nd to accept the "permanent stay" of US troops
is Vietnam. The People's Daily editorial on New
Ye r's D y applauded North-VITinamese determination
in the struggle with US "imperialism" and asserted
that H noi had "pointedly scuttled" the US "peace
intrigue."
The Soviet Union
18. Immediately after the first US bombing at-
tacks against the DRV, the Soviet Union appeared
willing to try to arrange negotiations of some sort
on Southeast Asian problems. However, as the war
intensified and Chinese attacks on Soviet "collusion"
with the US mounted, the USSR retreated from this
position. By the end of February Moscow was already
maintaining that the US must ce se its bombings be-
fore there could be negotiations. While the Russians
were quick to endorse the Hanoi government's four
points in general terms and have firmly adhered to
the position that peace in Vietnam can be found only
by using the four points as a "basis," they have con-
tinued to pl ce major emphasis on the impossibility
of ny negotiations while the US is attacking the
territory of a "fraternal state." They have advanced
no other explicit preconditions to negotiations.
19. With the escalation of the Vietnam war,
Soviet officials have continued to stress privately
Moscow's lack of maneuver room and have clearly in-
dicated their frustration over their inability to
do very much to influence US policy in Southeast
Asia. Although Moscow has stayed in step with Hanoi
on the question of negotiations, there is enough
evidence to indicate that the Russians are almost
certainly using their influence to urge DRV leaders
to keep flexible position in order to take full
advantage of unforeseen developments and opportunities.
O. The Soviet leaders apparently see no pros-
pect for any immediate break in the war. They can
be expected to persist in their line that a cessation
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of US air strikes is a necess ry first step toward
talks. In this context, the forthcoming visit of
one of the USSR's top leaders--party secretary
Shelepin--to North Vietnam is particularly interest-
ing. His visit represents a direct challenge to
China's influence in Hanoi, and will mark the first
trip to the DRV by a high-level Soviet leader since
the Kosygin mission last February. The Soviets
probably feel that the current pause in US bombing
raids against the DRV provides a good opportunity
to encourage Hanoi to seek political alternatives
to the war.
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DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP 5 Jan 66
TO:
DDC I
ROOM NO.
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REMARKS:
FROM:
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EXTENSION
FORM NO .0,1 1 REPLACES FORM 36 8
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